IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of B.B. (Mother) and J.C. (Father) and J.T.B. (Minor Child) B.B. (Mother) and J.C. (Father) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] B.B. (“Mother”) and J.C. (“Father”) appeal the termination of their parental rights to their child, J.T.B. (“Child”). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and Father (collectively “Parents”) have “extensive histories of substance abuse, particularly with opioids including heroin and fentanyl.” Mother's App. Vol. 2 p. 90. Father started using opiates and methamphetamine when he was 13, and Mother started using heroin in 2016 when she was 26. See Tr. Vol. 2 p. 218. Parents met at a methadone clinic in 2017, at which point they started using heroin together. Id. at 177.¹ They were still using heroin in June 2018 when Child was born.²

[3] In October 2023, Parents and one of Father's relatives were involved in a physical altercation over heroin. Police were called, and Child was removed from Parents and placed in foster care. The Department of Child Services (DCS) in Marion County filed a petition alleging that Child was in need of services (CHINS). At the time, Child, who was five, was not toilet trained and had significant speech issues and developmental delays, which were later diagnosed as autism spectrum disorder. Mother admitted that Child was a CHINS because she “need[ed] the assistance of DCS to demonstrate and provide a safe and stable home free from substance use.” Ex. Vol. 1 p. 39. The trial court adjudicated Child a CHINS in January 2024. Its dispositional order continued Child's removal and ordered Parents to, among other things, complete a substance-abuse assessment and follow all recommendations and submit to random drug screens. In addition, Mother was ordered to participate in home-based casework and follow all recommendations, and Father was ordered to participate in Fatherhood Engagement and follow all recommendations.

[4] Following disposition, Mother regularly tested positive for drugs (primarily fentanyl). See id. at 93-203. Mother attended two inpatient drug-treatment programs (November 2024 at VOA and February 2025 at Centerstone) but didn't complete either one because she thought she could do better on her own. Although ordered to drug test, Father rarely did so (he had 145 missed calls and 28 unforgiven missed tests, see id. at 236). And when he did drug test, the results were positive for fentanyl.

[5] Parents also inconsistently participated in services. They were referred to a parent educator, Breinne Compton. Mother participated for a year, and Father never participated. Mother's participation was “inconsistent” with several no-shows. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 34. Compton ended some sessions early due to concerns that Mother was under the influence. Compton twice called law enforcement for a wellness check on Mother after she threatened to commit suicide and to purchase a gun to bring to court. Tr. Vol. 3 p. 17. The service was closed unsuccessfully for Parents. Father's participation in Fatherhood Engagement was likewise “inconsistent” and he was eventually discharged. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 70.

[6] Mother was referred to home-based therapy with Nikki Rogers. The primary focus was Mother's substance abuse and working through her “extensive” history of trauma, including aging out of the foster system. Id. at 86. Rogers found Mother's use of fentanyl “very scary” and feared she would overdose. Id. at 93. After about a year, Rogers stopped working with Mother because the therapeutic relationship became “more damaging than ․ helpful.” Id. at 113. It was “really hard” for Rogers to articulate any progress Mother had made during that year, ultimately stating that Mother had increased her self-esteem and self-worth. Id. at 112.

[7] Parents had supervised visits with Child. Mother had a “pretty consistent pattern” of showing up “sick” to the visits, either from drug use or not getting methadone. Id. at 77. Mother was supposed to have one visit per week, but she often canceled or no-showed, rarely completing four visits in one month. Father was supposed to have two visits per week but was eventually discharged due to too many no-shows.

[8] In December 2024, DCS petitioned to terminate Parents’ parental rights to Child, and the fact-finding hearing was set for September 2025. Shortly before the hearing, Parents started making progress in services. In May, Mother started a methadone program at Sandra Eskenazi Mental Health Center, “fired all her providers,” and requested new ones. Id. at 132.

[9] In July, the case was transferred to DCS in Whitley County because Child was moved to a pre-adoptive placement in nearby Allen County, where he has since remained. In late July, Father completed a 28-day residential inpatient program at Centerstone. After completing this program, Father went to a transitional living facility but left after just three days (a normal stay is six months). Around this time, Mother started seeing her new providers and was showing progress. In August, Parents had their supervised visits transferred to a new provider, and the new provider said the visits (four for Mother and two for Father) were going well. Father restarted Fatherhood Engagement and had attended one session.

[10] The termination hearing was held on September 5 and 8, 2025. By that time, Child was seven and hadn't been in Parents’ care for nearly two years. Evidence was presented that Mother tested positive for fentanyl on August 18 and Father tested positive for fentanyl on August 27. However, according to the scientific director of the laboratory that tested Parents’ samples, the single-digit levels detected (2.03 ng/mL for Mother and 4.47 ng/mL for Father) were consistent with the fact that in heavy users, fentanyl can be detected up to 30 days after last use. See Tr. Vol. 3 pp. 105-06, 110. Mother's drug screen from August 22 was negative.

[11] Talia Burrage was the DCS family case manager (FCM) from the summer of 2024 until the case was transferred to Whitley County in July 2025. According to FCM Burrage, Mother “made progress but ․ there was no progression in services whatsoever. We were talking about positive drug screens all the time ․” Id. at 42. FCM Burrage said Mother admitted using Xanax, fentanyl, and alcohol. FCM Burrage testified that Mother appeared intoxicated at a child-and-family team meeting (CFTM) in June 2025. She said Mother was “staggering” and couldn't “sit still” or stay “on topic.” Id. at 44. Mother denied being under the influence, but when FCM Burrage asked her if she had drug tested that day, Mother said no. FCM Burrage also testified that during a CFTM in late 2024, Mother received a phone call from her “drug dealer” and refused to delete the phone number from her phone. Id. at 44. As to Father, FCM Burrage testified that he attended the very first CFTM but didn't attend any others. She said he was “difficult to get in touch with” and had several phone numbers during her time on the case. Id. at 45. When the case was transferred to Whitley County in July 2025, Parents had not completed any services. Id. at 46.

[12] David Millar took over as FCM once the case was transferred to Whitley County. He testified to several concerns about Parents, first noting that “there continues to be positive drug screens,” although he acknowledged that Mother had tested negative on August 22. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 131. He also noted that Parents hadn't successfully completed any services and had “multiple unsuccessful discharges” from services. Id. FCM Millar believed that Parents’ parental rights should be terminated.

[13] Leshelle Bartlett, Child's guardian ad litem (GAL), testified that Child, who was in his second or third placement since the case started, was doing “very well,” “happy,” “content,” and “bonded” with his pre-adoptive placement. Tr. Vol. 3 pp. 24, 35, 36. Child was toilet trained, his speech had “improved,” and he was doing well in school. Id. at 24. GAL Bartlett believed that Child's placement would meet his long-term needs. GAL Bartlett expressed concern about a recent incident where Child's eyeglasses were held together by tape but noted that it did not present a safety concern. (The judge asked DCS's attorney to investigate the glasses issue, and the attorney confirmed at the end of the hearing that new glasses had been ordered for Child, see id. at 119). GAL Bartlett believed that termination was in Child's best interests due to Parents’ “inconsistency in services,” “lack of proving their sobriety,” and failure to take care of Child's “basic needs” while in their care. Id. at 25. When asked about Parents’ recent progress in services, GAL Bartlett said that didn't change her mind because the case “has been open since 2023,” which was long enough. Id. at 25.

[14] Mother testified about her history of trauma and severe case of psoriasis, which was finally under control due to injections. She acknowledged that Child had special needs but that she didn't have any services in place for him when he lived with her. She stated that she hadn't used drugs in four months (since early May) and that she was taking methadone at Sandra Eskenazi Mental Health Center (although she didn't have any documentation to show her progress). Father also testified, admitting that he hadn't completed any court-ordered services but noting that he had recently reengaged in services. See Tr. Vol. 2 p. 187.

[15] In November, the trial court terminated Parents’ parental rights to Child.

[16] Parents now separately appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[17] Parents contend there is insufficient evidence to support the termination of their parental rights to Child. When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013). Rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the trial court's judgment. Id. When a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the court's findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. Id. To determine whether a judgment terminating parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings and whether the findings support the judgment. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016). DCS must prove the allegations in a termination petition by clear and convincing evidence. See Ind. Code § 31-34-12-2.

[18] Parents both argue that DCS failed to meet the statutory requirements for termination. DCS filed its termination petition under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4. A petition under that section must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c) (2024).³ As to the first requirement, DCS alleged, and the trial court found, the existence of the following circumstances in subsection (d):

(ii) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(iii) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Mother's App. Vol. 2 pp. 14, 95-96. Parents challenge the trial court's conclusions under subsection (d), that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child, and that termination is in Child's best interests.⁴ We address each challenge in turn.

I. The trial court did not err in concluding there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied

[19] In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in a child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, the trial court engages in a two-step analysis: first, the court identifies what conditions led to the child's placement and retention outside the home, and then it determines whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will not be remedied. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231. This second step requires the court to judge a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, considering evidence of changed conditions and balancing any recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). “Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.” Id.

[20] Here, Child was removed because of Parents’ drug use. After Child's removal, Mother continued to test positive for fentanyl. Father rarely tested, but when he did, the results were positive for fentanyl as well. Parents don't dispute this; rather, they assert that they remedied the conditions by the time of the fact-finding hearing in September 2025. Mother claims that she last used drugs in May, started methadone treatment that same month, and tested negative for drugs in August. Father claims that he completed a 28-day inpatient stay in July. Although he tested positive for fentanyl in August, Father claims that it was not due to his use but rather the drug's extended period of release. Even accepting that Parents were not using drugs at the time of the hearing, this was a recent development. Mother had used opiates on and off for almost a decade, and Father had used opiates on and off for well over a decade. They had sought treatment before but relapsed. Moreover, at the time of the hearing, Parents hadn't successfully completed any court-ordered services. Although they were working with new providers, this was a recent development, too. While Parents’ work toward sobriety is commendable, they haven't shown an ability to stay sober long-term. The trial court was within its discretion to give more weight to Parents’ history of substance abuse and relapse than to their recent sobriety and compliance with services. See id. The evidence supports the court's conclusion there is a reasonable probability that Parents will not remedy the conditions that resulted in Child's removal and continued placement outside the home.⁵

II. The trial court did not err in concluding that there is a satisfactory plan for Child's care and treatment

[21] Here, DCS's plan for Child is adoption by his current placement. The court found that the placement is meeting Child's needs and has a bond with Child and concluded that this plan is satisfactory. Parents don't argue that adoption is not a satisfactory plan but instead assert, as part of their best-interests argument, that Child's placement is not suitable. They note, for example, that Child has had tape on his glasses, his fingernails painted, and a bruise.

[22] But the termination statute's requirement that there be a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child does not amount to a requirement that the trial court find that DCS's plan is in the child's best interests. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied; In re J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), reh'g denied. Rather, where DCS's plan is adoption, “there need not be a guarantee that a suitable adoption will take place, only that DCS will attempt to find a suitable adoptive parent.” A.S., 17 N.E.3d at 1007. “Part of the reason for this is that it is within the authority of the adoption court, not the termination court, to determine whether an adoptive placement is appropriate.” Id. The trial court did not err in determining that DCS's plan of adoption is satisfactory.⁶

III. The trial court did not err in concluding that termination is in Child's best interests

[23] Deciding whether termination is in a child's best interests requires the trial court to look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the child. In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019), reh'g denied. Central among these interests is the child's need for permanency, as “children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.” Id. We have held that recommendations by both the case manager and child advocate, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. A.S., 17 N.E.3d at 1005.

[24] Here, GAL Bartlett testified that termination is in Child's best interests due to Parents’ “inconsistency in services,” “lack of proving their sobriety,” and failure to take care of Child's “basic needs” while he was in their care. FCM Millar agreed that Parents’ parental rights should be terminated, highlighting their history of positive drug screens and the fact they hadn't successfully completed any services. Still, Parents claim that they had made progress. But as explained above, even accepting that Parents were not using drugs at the time of the fact-finding hearing, they had been consistently using fentanyl until shortly before then and therefore had not demonstrated an ability to stay sober long-term, which is particularly important considering that they had been using opiates on and off for a decade. And while they were working with new providers at the time of the hearing, that was a recent development as well.

[25] While this evidence alone is sufficient to support the trial court's best-interests determination, permanency is a central consideration. At the time of the fact-finding hearing, Child had not been in Parents’ care for almost two years. And during those two years, Child showed “significant growth”—he was toilet trained, doing well in school, and had improved his speech. Tr. Vol. 3 p. 24. In addition, Child is “happy” and “doing very well” in his current placement, to whom he is bonded and who wishes to adopt him. By all accounts Parents were bonded to Child, but they never moved past supervised visits. “[C]hildren cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49 (quotation omitted). Child should not have to wait any longer. The totality of the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that termination is in Child's best interests.

[26] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother had three other children, one of whom was born during these proceedings, but she consented to their adoptions.

2.   Father never established paternity for Child.

3.   Section 31-35-2-4 was amended effective July 1, 2025, see Pub. L. No. 179-2025, § 25, after DCS filed its termination petition but before the termination order was issued. The parties don't argue that this amendment has any bearing on the proceedings.

4.   Section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) requires the existence of only one of the circumstances in subsection (d). See In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. Because we affirm on the ground that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, we need not address the court's findings or conclusions related to whether there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child.

5.   Mother purports to challenge some of the trial court's findings related to this conclusion, arguing that they are “contradicted by other evidence,” namely her new service providers. Mother's Br. p. 24. But because there is evidence in the record from other service providers to support the findings, Mother is merely asking us to reweigh the evidence, which we don't do.Father challenges the trial court's finding that “[a]t the time of the removal [Child's] teeth had extensive decay which the parents had not adequately addressed.” Mother's App. Vol. 2 p. 90. Father contends that this finding is clearly erroneous, citing Mother's testimony that she had addressed Child's teeth problems before DCS involvement. GAL Bartlett also testified about Child's teeth problems. She “believed” they still existed when DCS got involved but “c[ould]n't remember.” Tr. Vol. 3 p. 24. Even assuming this single finding is erroneous, it is not fatal to the judgment because there are other valid findings to support the trial court's conclusions. See In re A.F., 762 N.E.2d 1244, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied.

6.   Mother challenges the trial court's finding that Child's current placement is meeting his needs. But given GAL Bartlett's testimony at trial, this is a request for us to judge the credibility of the witnesses and reweigh the evidence, which we don't do.

Vaidik, Judge.

Altice, J., and Foley, J., concur.