Dillon Smith, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Dillon Smith pleaded guilty to residential entry, a Level 6 felony, and was sentenced to a total of 910 days, with 696 days suspended to probation. The trial court later revoked Smith's probation due to a new charge of possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor. Smith pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana, and the trial court sentenced him to serve 180 days. Based on the guilty plea, the trial court revoked Smith's probation and ordered him to serve 180 days of his previously suspended sentence.

[2] In this consolidated appeal, Smith appeals and argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing 180 days of his previously suspended sentence. Smith further argues that his sentence for possession of marijuana is inappropriate. We affirm.

Issues

[3] Smith raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sanctioned Smith for his probation violation.

II. Whether Smith's sentence for possession of marijuana is inappropriate.

Facts

[4] On August 31, 2025, Smith was intoxicated and entered Donna Pevlor's home without permission. On September 2, 2025, the State charged Smith with residential entry, a Level 6 felony, in Cause No. 69D01-2509-F6-127 (“F6-127”). On December 15, Smith pleaded guilty and the trial court sentenced him to 910 days, with 696 days suspended to probation. The remaining portion of the sentence, 214 days, was resolved by time served. The terms of Smith's probation included refraining from the use alcohol and controlled substances and refraining from committing another crime. Prior to this incident, Smith did not have a known criminal history.¹

[5] While he was serving his probation term, on January 14, 2026, Smith tested positive for alcohol and THC on a urine drug screen. The following day, Ripley County Court Services conducted a home visit at Smith's residence. The odor of marijuana was present in Smith's room, and Smith gave a probation officer a cigarette pack with some hand-rolled marijuana cigarettes inside. Marijuana, a metal grinder, and two glass smoking pipes were located in the house. Smith admitted to smoking marijuana that morning.

[6] On January 20, 2026, the State charged Smith with: Count I, possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor; and Count II, possession of paraphernalia introducing a controlled substance into the body, a Class C misdemeanor, in Cause No. 69D01-2601-CM-015 (“CM-15”). On January 21, 2026, Ripley County Court Services filed a petition in Cause No. F6-127 alleging a probation violation based on Smith's new charges and Smith's positive drug screen.

[7] In Cause No. CM-15, Smith pleaded guilty to Count I, possession of marijuana, and was sentenced to 180 days to be served consecutively to his sentence in Cause No. F6-127. On January 22, 2026, the trial court dismissed Count II, possession of paraphernalia, at the State's recommendation.

[8] Smith also admitted to violating the terms of his probation in Cause No. F6-127. The trial court granted the petition to revoke probation and ordered Smith to serve 180 days of Smith's previously suspended sentence. Smith now appeals both the revocation of his probation and his sentence for possession of marijuana.

Discussion and Decision

I. Smith's sanction for violating the terms of his probation was not an abuse of discretion.

[9] Smith argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve 180 days of his previously suspended sentence in Cause No. F6-127. We acknowledge that “ ‘[p]robation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.’ ” Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007)). “It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine probation conditions and to revoke probation if the conditions are violated.” Id. “In appeals from trial court probation violation determinations and sanctions, we review for abuse of discretion.” Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances․ or when the trial court misinterprets the law.” Id. “We will consider all the evidence most favorable to supporting the judgment of the trial court without reweighing that evidence or judging the credibility of the witnesses.” Holmes v. State, 923 N.E.2d 479, 483 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Monroe v. State, 899 N.E.2d 688, 691 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)).

[10] “Probation revocation is a two-step process. First, the trial court must make a factual determination that a violation of a condition of probation actually occurred.” Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 616 (citing Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008)). “Second, if a violation is found, then the trial court must determine the appropriate sanctions for the violation.” Id.

[If the trial court] finds that the person has violated a condition at any time before termination of the period, and the petition to revoke is filed within the probationary period, the court may ․ [o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h)(3).

[11] “[E]ven a probationer who admits the allegations against him must still be given an opportunity to offer mitigating evidence suggesting that the violation does not warrant revocation.” Woods, 892 N.E.2d at 640. “While it is correct that probation may be revoked on evidence of violation of a single condition, the selection of an appropriate sanction will depend upon the severity of the defendant's probation violation, which will require a determination of whether the defendant committed a new criminal offense.” Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 618. The requirement that a probationer obey federal, state, and local laws is automatically a condition of probation by operation of law.” Luke v. State, 51 N.E.3d 401, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied; Ind. Code § 35-38-2-1(b).

[12] Smith admitted that he violated the terms of his probation by testing positive for THC and alcohol and by committing a new offense, possession of marijuana. Smith, however, argues that the imposition of a portion of his suspended sentence was an abuse of discretion because the probation violation and the new offense were relatively minor. The trial court, however, exercised restraint in imposing only 180 days of Smith's 696-day suspended sentence. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Smith to serve 180 days of his previously suspended sentence.

II. Smith's sentence for possession of marijuana is not inappropriate.

[13] Next, Smith argues that his sentence is inappropriate. The Indiana Constitution authorizes independent appellate review and revision of sentences imposed by a trial court. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6). This authority, as implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), enables this Court to “revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Deference to the trial court's sentence should prevail unless “overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense and the defendant's character.” Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023) (internal quotations omitted).

[14] “Our role is primarily to leaven the outliers and identify guiding principles for sentencers, rather than to achieve the perceived correct result in each case.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 122 (internal quotations omitted). “Ultimately, we rely on our collective judgment as to the balance of all the relevant considerations involved, which include the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

[15] While we recognize the advisory sentence as the starting point the Legislature selected as appropriate for felony convictions, Kelly v. State, 257 N.E.3d 782, 805 (Ind. 2025), Smith was convicted of a Class B misdemeanor, and the Indiana Code does not provide advisory sentences for misdemeanors. Indiana Code Section 35-50-3-3 provides: “A person who commits a Class B misdemeanor shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of not more than one hundred eighty (180) days․” The trial court sentenced Smith to 180 days, the maximum term for his misdemeanor conviction.

Nature of the Offense

[16] Our analysis of the “nature of the offense” requires us to look at the extent, brutality, and heinousness of the offense. Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 5 (Ind. 2014)). “And given that sentencing ‘is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference[,]’ a trial court's sentencing decision will generally prevail ‘unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as [being] accompanied by restraint, regard and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).’ ” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1093 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)).

[17] Here, while on probation, Smith possessed marijuana in his residence. Smith argues that his offense did not cause harm to another person and that he cooperated with law enforcement. While this may be true, it does not amount to compelling evidence portraying the nature of the offense in a positive light.

Character of the Offender

[18] Our analysis of the character of the offender involves a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities, including the defendant's age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse. See Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 100 (Ind. 2021); McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020). The significance of a criminal history in assessing a defendant's character and an appropriate sentence vary based on the “gravity, nature and number of prior offenses as they relate to the current offense.” McElfresh v. State, 51 N.E.3d 103, 112 (Ind. 2016).

[19] Smith was thirty-eight years old at the time of sentencing and had one prior conviction, for which he was on probation at the time of his new offense. While Smith's criminal history is short, “[e]ven a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character.” Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). Committing this new offense while on probation also reflects negatively on Smith's character.

[20] Further, Smith has a history of committing criminal offenses while intoxicated or using illicit substances. We find it admirable that Smith hopes to recover from his substance abuse issue, but it is within the trial court's sentencing discretion to determine that Smith's rehabilitative needs will be better served in incarceration. We do not find compelling evidence that Smith's character should cause us to overcome our deference to the trial court.

[21] We cannot find a basis to conclude that the trial court's imposition of its sentence was inappropriate. Accordingly, we find that Smith's sentence is not inappropriate.

Conclusion

[22] We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning Smith for his probation violation in Cause No. F6-127, and his sentence for possession of marijuana in Cause No. CM-15 is not inappropriate. Accordingly, we affirm.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record indicates that Smith had another charge in the State of Louisiana in 2012, but the record does not indicate the nature of this charge or whether Smith was convicted.

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Bradford, J., and Felix, J., concur.