IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: T.M. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] T.M., Ai.W., Az.W., S.W., and N.W. (collectively, “Children”) are the biological children of M.W. (“Mother”). Mother failed to provide Children with a safe and appropriate living environment, so Children were each adjudicated as a child in need of services (“CHINS”). Mother then failed to meaningfully engage in court-ordered services, so petitions to terminate her parental rights were filed and granted. Mother appeals,¹ raising three issues for our review, which we revise and restate as: Whether the trial court's decision to terminate Mother's parental rights was clearly erroneous.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In October 2021, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report from an Indianapolis hospital alleging that T.M., Ai.W., and Az.W. (collectively, “Older Children”) were victims of child abuse or neglect.² On October 18, DCS filed a petition alleging Older Children were CHINS because T.M. had sustained a broken femur for which Mother delayed seeking medical care even though the femur was “broken completely in half,” which would have been “excruciating.” Ex. Vol. I at 86. DCS further alleged that after Mother and T.M.’s father gave conflicting accounts on how the injury occurred, DCS transported Ai.W. and Az.W. to the same hospital for full-body examinations, which revealed Ai.W. “also ha[d] a broken femur that [was] at least two weeks old.” Id. DCS also asserted that Ai.W. was “underweight and aspirating on his food due to not being fed through [a] G-tube,” which Mother had removed. Id. In connection with those injuries, Mother was charged with and pled guilty to two counts of neglect of a dependent (the “Criminal Case”).

[4] In January 2022, based on Mother's “Deny and Submit agreement,” Ex. Vol. I at 96, the trial court adjudicated Older Children as CHINS. The trial court ordered Mother to participate in and complete all recommendations stemming from home-based therapy, a parenting assessment, and a psychological evaluation. Ex. Vol. I at 103. Less than two weeks after the Older Children were adjudicated as CHINS, S.W. was born.

[5] In September 2022, DCS filed a petition alleging S.W. was a CHINS because Mother was incarcerated pending trial in the Criminal Case and her release date was unknown. Based on Mother's admission, the trial court adjudicated S.W. as a CHINS.

[6] In April 2023, Mother was sentenced in the Criminal Case to 6 years of incarceration with 1,890 days suspended to probation. Approximately six months after Mother's sentencing, the State filed a notice of a probation violation, which Mother admitted, so on November 2, the trial court in the Criminal Case revoked Mother's probation and executed two years of her sentence.

[7] N.W. was born approximately three months later. In February 2024, DCS filed a petition alleging N.W. was a CHINS because Mother was incarcerated with an earliest possible release date of October 2024, and N.W. was in an Indianapolis hospital for renal failure and would need continuing medical treatment upon discharge. In June, based on Mother's “Deny and Submit Agreement,” the trial court adjudicated N.W. as a CHINS. Ex. Vol. I at 187. The trial court ordered Mother to participate in and complete all recommendations stemming from home-based therapy, home-based case management, parenting education, and the still-pending psychological evaluation. The trial court also ordered Mother to “complete all recommended training to learn how to care for a child with [N.W.’s] specific medical needs and demonstrate the ability to properly care for him.” Ex. Vol. I at 193.

[8] By June 2024, Mother had been incarcerated “for most of the time” Older Children had been removed. Appellant's App. Vol. IV at 174. After Mother's release in June 2024, Mother began participating in some services. However, Mother did not progress beyond supervised visits with Children, and Older Children and S.W.’s (collectively, “Older Four Children”) therapist wrote multiple letters requesting Mother not have visitation with them because of the “damage” it does to them, Tr. Vol. II at 127. During Mother's visits with N.W., she was “inconsisten[t] across the board with attendance at visits, medication, feedings, cleaning of the G-tube, attendance at appointments, management of appointments, and even ․ in bonding.” Appellant's App. Vol. IV at 94.

[9] On June 19, 2024, DCS filed petitions to terminate Mother's parental rights over Older Four Children. On February 18, 2025, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights over N.W. After a bifurcated factfinding hearing, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights to Children. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court Did Not Clearly Err by Terminating Mother's Parental Rights to Children

[10] Mother challenges the trial court's termination of her parental rights over Children. “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute. When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45–46 (Ind. 2019) (internal citations omitted) (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013)), cert. denied.

[11] We will affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)). In reviewing for clear error, “we determine whether the evidence supports the court's findings and whether those findings support the court's judgment.” Norris v. Norris, 275 N.E.3d 505, 509 (Ind. 2026) (citing Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016)). A decision is clearly erroneous “only if the findings lack factual support in the record or if the judgment applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” Id. (citing Wysocki v. Johnson, 18 N.E.3d 600, 603–04 (Ind. 2014)). We will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, id. (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123), and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015)). Furthermore, we accept as true any findings which Mother does not challenge on appeal. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)).

[12] To terminate Mother's parental rights, DCS had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that, among other things, (a) there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Older Four Children's removal or the reasons for their placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied,³ and (b) termination of the parent-child relationship is in Children's best interests. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c) (effective Mar. 11, 2024, to June 30, 2025). We address each element in turn.

a. Remediation of Reasons for Removal

[13] Mother first argues the trial court erred by concluding that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Older Four Children's removal or the reasons for their placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied.⁴ On this issue, the trial court made the following relevant findings and conclusions:

148. Mother is unemployed and has a fixed monthly income of nine hundred and seventy-four dollars ($974.00) in Social Security benefits ․ She was unable to explain [her] budget, and other monthly expenses for herself and her five (5) minor children should they be returned to her care․

149․ Mother only seemed to make progress when child family team members would do things for her and relied upon the team's prompts․

Appellant's App. Vol. IV at 101–02.

168․

A. Mother has a history of engaging in relationships that expose both her and her children to domestic violence:

(1) [T.M.] and [Ai.W.] were alleged to be present during one or more incidents of domestic violence between Mother and [one of the alleged fathers].

* * *

(5) Mother had another child, K.W., during the pendency of these CHINS cases, and the alleged father of K.W.. . . is currently facing pending charges for domestic battery with bodily injury to a pregnant woman (Mother) ․ following an incident on or about May 1, 2025, during which he forcibly entered Mother's apartment and elbowed her in the stomach․

(6) Mother demonstrated inconsistencies in reporting to the Court, DCS, and during the TPR trial, giving the Court great concern whether she would be willing, or able, to report timely, truthfully and accurately to service providers, medical providers and/or law enforcement should she or one of the Children need assistance. Mother testified that she had not seen or had contact with [K.W.’s alleged father] since the date of that incident. However, [K.W.’s alleged father] was present at a Child and Family Team Meeting held on or about June 3, 2025, because Mother requested transportation to the meeting by him.

* * *

B. Mother's ability to make reasonable decisions regarding her own well-being, and the well-being and best interests of her children, is impaired, and is likely not to be remedied within a reasonable period.

Id. at 106–07.

207․

o. The conditions that led to the Children's removal or placement and retention outside the home of Mother are not only Mother's continued failure to demonstrate that she can provide a safe, stable, and appropriate home for the Children, but also Mother has not demonstrated she can adequately address her mental health needs ․ Although Mother has engaged in and completed some goals of the services ordered by the Court and referred to by DCS, she has not fully engaged, not completed all the services, and has not demonstrated she can sustain progress, as evidenced by losing the housing she once had and by being discharged unsuccessfully from services. There are still concerns regarding her mental health, her ability to provide for the needs of the Children ․

* * *

t. It is highly probable that these conditions will not be remedied, even if [Mother] were given additional time to remedy the conditions. [Older Children's] CHINS cases have been open for nearly four (4) years as of the last date of trial. [S.W.’s] CHINS case has been open for just over three (3) years as of the last date of trial․

u. [Mother has] demonstrated a lack of commitment to remedy the conditions and to consistently engage in an appropriate manner with the Children.

v. There is a substantial probability that future neglect or deprivation will occur because of [Mother's] failure to remedy the conditions.

Id. at 120–22.

[14] In reviewing a trial court's findings regarding a parent's failure to remediate the reasons for removal, we first “identify the conditions that led to removal” and then “determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” In re J.S., 133 N.E.3d 707, 715 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643).

In the second step, the trial court must judge parental fitness as of the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration the evidence of changed conditions. The trial court is entrusted with balancing a parent's recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct. The trial court has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting and citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643). Furthermore, we do “not simply focus on the initial basis for a child's removal for purposes of determining whether a parent's rights should be terminated, ‘but also those bases resulting in the continued placement outside the home.’ ” In re T.S., 267 N.E.3d 6, 15 (Ind. Ct. App.) (quoting In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)), trans. denied, 272 N.E.3d 957 (Ind. 2025).

[15] Mother challenges the trial court's conclusion that she will not remediate the reasons for Older Four Children's removal because she is “improving, little by little” and “cannot be faulted for failing to improve on a faster timetable than she is able.” Appellant's Br. at 49. Mother's arguments are merely an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. See Norris, 275 N.E.3d at 509 (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123). For example, Mother claims that the trial court erred by considering her failure to progress beyond supervised parenting time because she had moved from therapeutic visits to traditional supervised visits and “will likely move to unsupervised visits.” Appellant's Br. at 47. Here, Older Children had been removed from Mother's care for almost four years, yet Mother's visits were limited to “typically” once a week for two hours, and Mother declined the opportunity to increase her visitation time when it was offered, Appellant's App. Vol. IV at 88. Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that Mother likely will not remedy the reasons for Children's removal or placement outside of Mother's care.⁵

b. Best Interests of Children

[16] Mother also challenges the trial court's conclusion that termination of her parental rights over Children is in Children's best interests. To determine the best interests of a child, a trial court looks at the totality of the evidence and subordinates the interests of the parents to those of the child. In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing In re A.B., 887 N.E.2d 158, 167–68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)), reh'g denied (Jan. 25, 2023), trans. denied sub nom. A.B. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 209 N.E.3d 1168 (Ind. 2023). A central consideration in this determination is the child's need for permanency. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). The trial court also considers whether a child's emotional and physical development is threatened by the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). Permanent impairment of physical, mental, or social development is not necessary before a trial court may terminate the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). “[T]he recommendation by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” P.B., 199 N.E.3d at 799 (citing L.S. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied).

[17] Here, the family case manager and guardian ad litem recommended terminating Mother's parental rights to Children. Even though such testimony is sufficient evidence that termination is in Children's best interest, see P.B., 199 N.E.3d at 799, Mother nevertheless argues that her completion of domestic violence classes and patience during visits with Older Four Children supports the opposite conclusion. These arguments are requests to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which, again, we will not do. See Norris, 275 N.E.3d at 509 (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123). The unchallenged portions of the trial court's findings and conclusions include the following:

81․ Prior to visits with Mother starting back up after her release from incarceration, [Older Children] had routines and were behaving better. Once visits started again, [Older Children] were acting out and being defiant․

Appellant's App. Vol. IV at 87.

138․ [Mother's] failure to plan will likely jeopardize [N.W.’s] health, if he is placed in Mother's care. Id. at 99.

205․ Mother has not demonstrated the ability ․ to adequately or consistently address her ․ own needs, including mental health, housing and financial stability, or manage the Children's needs, including [N.W.]’s intensive medical needs. Despite the services ordered and made available to her, she has not consistently demonstrated the ability to provide a safe, stable, and appropriate living environment while appropriately addressing her needs while caring for five (5) children under the age of seven (7).

Id. at 116. Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that termination is in Children's best interests.

[18] Based on the foregoing, the trial court's decision to terminate Mother's parental rights to Children was not clearly erroneous. We therefore affirm that decision.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Children's fathers do not participate in this appeal.

2.   T.M. was born on August 7, 2018. Ai.W. was born on March 12, 2019. Az.W. was born on July 8, 2020. S.W. was born on January 31, 2022. N.W. was born on January 31, 2024.

3.   DCS alleged and the trial court concluded that Mother's parental rights to N.W. should be terminated because, among other things, (1) there was a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in N.W.’s removal or the reasons for placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d)(3), and (2) there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of N.W. pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d)(4). DCS only needed to prove either that there was not a reasonable probability Mother would remedy the reasons for removal or that Mother's relationship with Child posed a threat to Child's well-being. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(1), (d). Because Mother does not challenge the trial court's conclusion under Subsection (d)(4), we need not address her argument regarding Subsection (d)(3). However, we note that Mother's arguments thereon are requests for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. See In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)).

4.   Mother asserts eight of the trial court's findings are “unsupported” by the evidence. Appellant's Br. at 23; see id. at 24–27. DCS concedes that three of those eight findings are unsupported by the record. Appellee's Br. at 24. Similarly, Mother asks us to disregard in whole or in part 45 of the trial court's findings because they “recount witnesses’ views but fail to indicate the court's findings.” Appellant's Br. at 39. We do not base our decision on any portion of the findings Mother challenges, so we do not address the parties’ arguments on this issue.

5.   Additionally, DCS alleged and the trial court concluded that Mother's parental rights to Older Four Children should be terminated because (1) despite DCS's reasonable efforts, Mother was unable to remedy the circumstances that led to Older Four Children's removal and (2) continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Older Four Children. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(2), (4) (effective date March 11, 2024 to June 30, 2025). Mother challenges these conclusions as well, but because we conclude the trial court did not clearly err by concluding there was not a reasonable probability Mother would remedy the reasons for removal, we need not address her arguments regarding these other bases for termination. See supra ¶ 12 n. 3.

Felix, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.