Leroy T. Evans, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] In January 2023, law enforcement officers encountered Leroy Evans passed out behind the wheel of a vehicle. While retrieving Evans's driver's license from inside the vehicle, an officer discovered a firearm. A further search of the vehicle revealed cocaine, a large sum of cash, and items associated with dealing cocaine. Evans was found guilty of dealing cocaine and unlawful possession of a firearm. Evans now appeals and presents one issue for our review: Whether the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence at trial.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On January 7, 2023, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officers John Gomez and Joshua Stayton were dispatched to East 20th Street and North Fulton Road for a welfare check of a person who had been “passed out behind the wheel” of a vehicle “for twenty minutes.” Tr. Vol. II at 162. Upon arriving at the scene, Officer Gomez approached the vehicle and observed an unconscious man—who later identified himself as Leroy Evans—in the driver's seat with the engine running, the vehicle in reverse, and his foot on the brake. Officer Gomez also noticed a crossbody bag across Evans's chest. Upon seeing the bag, Officer Gomez was concerned that, based upon his training and experience, there might be a firearm inside it. Tr. Vol. II at 168–69.

[4] Officers Gomez and Stayton repeatedly knocked on the vehicle's window for a “minute” to wake up Evans. Tr. Vol. II at 216. Once Evans woke up, Officer Gomez asked him to put the vehicle in park. After multiple requests from the officers, Evans complied but not until after the vehicle “actually move[d] backwards a few feet”. Id. Officer Gomez noticed that Evans demonstrated signs of intoxication such as “red, glossy eyes.” Id. at 15, 167. Officer Gomez asked Evans to step out of the vehicle. Before doing so, Evans stated, “I got a gun.” State's Ex. 1 at 03:56–03:58. Evans removed the crossbody bag from across his chest and placed it in the passenger seat. Once Evans was outside the vehicle, Evans stated, “I'm alright. I got my ID, [I] got [my] driver's license.” State's Ex. 1 at 04:44–04:47. Officer Gomez asked Evans where his ID was located. Evans responded that his ID was in the crossbody bag.

[5] Officer Gomez then approached the driver's side of the vehicle, where the door was still open, and he reached inside to grab the crossbody bag. Once Officer Gomez opened the crossbody bag to look for the ID, he observed a firearm. After discovering the firearm, Officer Gomez took the crossbody bag to his patrol vehicle and placed Evans in handcuffs. Officer Gomez asked Evans for his name and date of birth, and Evans provided the information. After conducting searches through the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles (“BMV”) system and the prosecutor portal, Officer Gomez discovered that Evans had several felony convictions and was thus prohibited from possessing a firearm. The officers then searched Evans's vehicle. Officers found a small bag of cocaine weighing more than 6 grams; a large bag of cocaine weighing approximately 24 grams; a digital scale; clear sandwich baggies; baking soda; “fourteen thousand and a couple hundred” dollars cash, Tr. Vol. II at 182; and three cell phones.

[6] The State charged Evans with dealing in cocaine as a Level 2 felony ¹ and unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon as a Level 4 felony ² ; the State also alleged that Evans was a habitual offender ³ .⁴ Before trial, Evans filed a motion to suppress evidence discovered during the search of his vehicle, arguing his federal and state constitutional rights were violated when law enforcement officers searched Evans's vehicle without obtaining a warrant. The trial court denied Evans's motion to suppress evidence. At trial, Evans renewed his suppression arguments and objected to the admission of evidence seized from his vehicle as well as Officer Gomez's testimony; the trial court overruled Evans's objections. A jury found Evans guilty as charged, and Evans admitted to being a habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Evans to 39 years of incarceration with 5 years suspended. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Admitting Certain Evidence at Trial

[7] Evans claims that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence at trial. “Although an abuse-of-discretion standard typically applies to a trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence, we engage in de novo review when an alleged ‘constitutional violation has resulted from the admission of evidence.’ ” Carr v. State, 274 N.E.3d 444, 452 (Ind. 2026) (quoting Speers v. State, 999 N.E.2d 850, 852 (Ind. 2013)).

[8] Evans specifically challenges the search of his crossbody bag. We first address Evans's challenge under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. We then address Evans's challenge under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.

a. United States Constitution

[9] The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,” U.S. Const. amend. IV, and “[t]he ‘basic purpose of this Amendment ․ is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials,’ ” Dunem v. State, 254 N.E.3d 559, 565–66 (Ind. Ct. App.) (alteration in original) (quoting Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 303 (2018)), trans. denied, 262 N.E.3d 816 (Ind. 2025). A “warrantless search or seizure is per se unreasonable” unless the State shows that one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement applies. M.O. v. State, 63 N.E.3d 329, 331 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 935 (Ind. 2006)).

[10] Although both parties argue whether the medical assistance exception or search-incident-to-arrest exception applies, we need not apply those exceptions because we agree with the State that the inevitable discovery exception applies to Officer Gomez's search of Evans's crossbody bag. “[T]he inevitable discovery doctrine allows for the admission of evidence that would have been discovered even without the unconstitutional source,” Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 238 (2016) (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443–44 (1984)), “[i]f the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means,” Nix, 467 U.S. at 444.

[11] Here, the evidence shows that prior to exiting the vehicle, Evans voluntarily told the officers he had a gun. Evans provided his name and date of birth when requested by Officer Gomez, so Officer Gomez would have run Evans's information through the BMV and prosecutor portal and discovered that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm. That is, even if Officer Gomez had not searched Evans's crossbody bag prior to learning he was a convicted felon, Officer Gomez would have had probable cause to search Evans's vehicle for the firearm Evans claimed to have. See State v. Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d 1281, 1285 (Ind. 2010) (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 164 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153–54 (1925)) (explaining law enforcement may “search a vehicle without obtaining a warrant if they have probable cause to believe evidence of a crime will be found in the vehicle”). In other words, the officers would have inevitably discovered the firearm, cocaine, large sum of cash, and paraphernalia, based upon the probable cause to search for the gun. So, all the evidence was admissible under the inevitable discovery exception. We therefore cannot say Evans's rights under the Fourth Amendment were violated such that the evidence found during the search of his vehicle was inadmissible.

b. Indiana Constitution

[12] Like the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution prohibits “unreasonable search or seizure.” Ind. Const. art. 1, § 11. When reviewing an unreasonable search or seizure claim under the Indiana Constitution, we “ask whether the State has shown that a particular search or seizure was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances.” Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 191 (Ind. 2021) (citing Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932, 942 (Ind. 2020)). In conducting this analysis, we employ the framework set forth by our Supreme Court in Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356 (Ind. 2005), which requires us to balance three factors: (1) “the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred,” (2) “the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities,” and (3) “the extent of law enforcement needs.” Ramirez, 174 N.E.3d at 191 (quoting Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 361). We address each Litchfield factor in turn.

[13] Degree of Suspicion. Evans argues that the degree of suspicion was low based on Officer Gomez's testimony that he was not aware of a violation of the law to justify entering Evans's vehicle and searching the crossbody bag. When evaluating the degree of suspicion “we consider all the information available to the officer at the time of the search or seizure.” Ramirez, 174 N.E.3d at 191 (citing Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932, 942 (Ind. 2020)). Officer Gomez believed Evans was intoxicated and suspected Evans was operating his vehicle while intoxicated. Evans also admitted to having a firearm. The degree of suspicion that Evans violated the law was high.

[14] Degree of Intrusion. Evans argues the degree of intrusion was high because Officer Gomez entered Evans's vehicle and opened the crossbody bag “under the guise of looking for [Evans's] driver's license.” Appellant's Br. at 18. When determining the degree of intrusion, we consider the intrusion into the person's physical movements and privacy with a focus on how the officer conducted the search. Ramirez, 174 N.E.3d at 192 (citing Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 944–45). At the time of the search, the officers were still concerned about Evans's medical condition and whether it was safe to permit him to continue driving. While the officers’ immediate concerns about whether Evans was unconscious had ended, they remained concerned about what caused him to pass out and whether it was safe to let him leave. Knowing who Evans was and learning whether he had any restrictions on his driver's license remained paramount to the officers’ investigation. Because that investigation was ongoing and Evans would have been required to remain on scene, the degree of intrusion into Evans's movement was low. However, the search led Officer Gomez to seize a closed bag, open it, and search its contents. The degree of intrusion into Evans's privacy was moderate.

[15] Law Enforcement Needs. Evans contends that the law enforcement need was low because by the time Officer Gomez searched the crossbody bag, the concern that Evans needed medical attention no longer existed. To determine the extent of law enforcement needs, we consider the needs of the officer to act in a general way and in a particular way at the time of the search. Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 947. Officer Gomez believed it was necessary to obtain Evans's driver's license in order to identify Evans. After being unconscious for more than 20 minutes, and showing several signs of intoxication, the officers had an important need to determine whether it was safe to let Evans drive his vehicle away. Law enforcement needs were high

[16] Balancing the high degree of suspicion, low-to-moderate degree of intrusion, and high law enforcement needs, the State has shown that the search of Evans's crossbody bag was not unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances. We therefore cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by admitting at trial any evidence obtained pursuant to the search of Evans's crossbody bag or vehicle.

Conclusion

[17] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting certain evidence at trial because the evidence was admissible under the inevitable discovery exception and the search was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. We therefore affirm Evans's convictions.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a)(2), (e)(1) (effective July 1, 2017, to June 30, 2023).

2.   I.C. § 35-47-4-5(c) (effective July 1, 2020, to June 30, 2023).

3.   I.C. § 35-50-2-8.

4.   The State also charged Evans with unlawful carrying of a handgun as a Level 5 felony, but this charge was dismissed prior to trial.

Felix, Judge.

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.