27 v. Fifth Third Bank National Association, Appellee (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judges Bailey and Weissmann concur.

[1] Moorish Science Temple of America #27 Sol Temple by its Trustee Bro. J. Page Bey, Brooke Rachel Page, and Tamara Sue Green (collectively, “Appellants”)¹ appeal the trial court's order dismissing their Petition to Quiet Title. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Page and Green (together, “Borrowers”) executed a promissory note dated April 11, 2023, in favor of Fifth Third Bank National Association (“Fifth Third”) in the original amount of $142,274 and a mortgage (“Mortgage”) granting Fifth Third a security interest in real property in Allen County commonly referred to as 1148 Division Street in Fort Wayne (the “Property”). Bey v. Fifth Third Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. 24A-MF-1741, 2025 WL 289356, at *1 (Ind. Ct. App. January 24, 2025), trans. denied. A quitclaim deed was recorded in May 2023 stating that Borrowers conveyed the Property to “Moorish Science Temple of America #27 Sol Temple, Jordan Page Bey, Trustee ․” Id.

[3] On November 16, 2023, Fifth Third filed a Complaint on Note and for Foreclosure of Mortgage against Appellants under cause number 02D03-2311-MF-365 (“Cause No. 365”) alleging payments due had not been paid. Id. In May 2024, Fifth Third filed a motion for summary judgment. Id. at *2. On July 2, 2024, the trial court issued an Entry of Summary Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure which granted judgment against Borrowers in favor of Fifth Third in the amount of $155,915.32 plus $185 for court costs and ordered that the mortgage lien of Fifth Third be foreclosed and the Property sold by the Allen County Sheriff. Id. at *3. Appellants appealed, and in a memorandum decision on January 24, 2025, this Court affirmed the trial court's entry of summary judgment and decree of foreclosure. See id. at *3-5. Appellants filed a petition for rehearing, which this Court denied. Appellants filed a petition for transfer, which the Indiana Supreme Court denied.

[4] On February 11, 2025, Appellants filed a “Motion to Vacate Order” in Cause No. 365 requesting the court to vacate the entry of summary judgment and alleging, “[Fifth Third] has sent remittance bills addressed to our estate(s) for reinstatement of the alleged mortgage loan which would satisfy the note” and “[t]he reinstatement amount was paid by approximately seven times the reinstatement amount.” February 11, 2025 Motion, Cause No. 365. As an exhibit, Appellants attached the coupon portion of two billing statements (“Payment Coupons”) which stated, “Please return this portion with your check payable to Fifth Third.” Id. On one of the Payment Coupons, in the space for “Total amount enclosed,” the amount of $142,274 was handwritten, and the words “For deposit” and “Accep” were also handwritten on the document. Id. The other Payment Coupon, in the space for “Total amount enclosed,” included the handwritten amount of $22,314.15, and the words “Pay to bearer” and “Pay on Demand” were handwritten below the total. Id. Also, the words “Accepted,” “Memo: (Money order),” “U.C.C. 3-104 ․ 3-603 ․ 1-308 ․ 3-419,” and “For Deposit” were handwritten on the document. Id. On August 21, 2025, the court denied Appellants’ Motion to Vacate Order. On September 17, 2025, Fifth Third filed a Praecipe for Sheriff's Sale in Cause No. 365.

[5] On September 19, 2025, Appellants filed a “Motion to Strike Praecipe for Sheriff's Sale and to Enforce Reinstatement and Dismissal” (“Motion to Strike”) arguing that they tendered funds to Fifth Third of $142,274 on June 28, 2024, and of $42,159.36 on April 30, 2025. The Payment Coupons were attached to the Motion to Strike. Also attached to the Motion to Strike was an affidavit by Page, titled “Affidavit of Reinstatement Payments, Intent to Retain Property, Notice of Intent to File Injunction and Exhibit Submission,” stating that payments were tendered to Fifth Third on behalf of Borrowers in the amounts of $142,274 on June 28, 2024, and $42,159.36 on April 30, 2025 (the “Page Affidavit”). Motion to Strike Dated September 19, 2025, Cause No. 365. On September 29, 2025, the court denied the Motion to Strike.

[6] On January 12, 2026, Appellants filed a “Verified Petition to Quiet Title and for Damages” (“Petition to Quiet Title”) under 02D03-2601-MI-19 (“Cause No. 19”), the cause from which this appeal arises, alleging that they “tendered certified payments totaling $184,433.36.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 9-10. Appellants requested that the trial court “[q]uiet title in favor of [them],” “[d]eclare [Fifth Third's] lien void and unenforceable,” “[e]njoin further enforcement actions,” and “[a]ward restitution in the amount of $184,433.36.” Id. The Page Affidavit was attached to the Petition to Quiet Title.

[7] On January 28, 2026, the trial court issued an “Order Dismissing Case” which provided:

On January 12, 2026, [Appellants], who are self-represented litigants, filed a Petition to Quiet Title regarding real estate located at 1148 Division Street, Fort Wayne, Indiana. The Court takes judicial notice of [Cause No. 365] wherein [Fifth Third] obtained a judgment in foreclosure against [Appellants] for the same real estate. The docket clearly reflects that a judgment remains outstanding. [Appellants’] efforts to avoid the pending Sheriff Sale in the MF case through the Petition to Quiet Title (which the Court notes was erroneously filed as an MI case type with an accompanying deficient Summons to [Fifth Third] that does not appear to have been served) after failing to obtain the desired relief in the MF case, is an improper attempt to repetitiously litigate this dispute. As such, [Appellants’] claims are barred by res judicata and the Petition to Quiet Title and for Damages shall be dismissed.

Id. at 7-8. On February 2, 2026, Appellants filed a notice of appeal from the January 28, 2026 order. On February 10, 2026, Appellants filed an Emergency Motion to Stay Sheriff's Sale Pending Appeal with this Court, and on February 13, 2026, this Court denied the motion. On February 16, 2026, Appellants filed a “Verified Emergency Petition for Writ of Mandate and Prohibition with Request for Immediate Stay” with the Indiana Supreme Court under cause number 26S-OR-47 requesting an order staying a sheriff's sale and enforcement of the trial court's judgment, and on February 17, 2026, the Indiana Supreme Court dismissed the request. On February 18, 2026, the Property was sold to Fifth Third at a Sheriff's sale.

Discussion

[8] Appellants assert that “[t]he July 2, 2024 foreclosure decree adjudicated rights as of that date” and “[t]he quiet title petition alleged later-occurring conduct, including post-judgment tender and subsequent enforcement activity.” Appellants’ Brief at 8. They state “the trial court collapsed identity of property into identity of claims,” “the foreclosure case adjudicated default and ordered sale,” “the quiet title action is grounded in subsequent enforcement conduct,” and “equating identity of property with identity of operative facts misapplies Indiana's claim preclusion doctrine.” Id. at 9 (capitalization omitted).

[9] Fifth Third responds that Appellants raised their claim of satisfaction of judgment in Cause No. 365, the court rejected the claim, and Appellants did not appeal the ruling. It argues that Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(7)² provides a basis for relief from a judgment which has been satisfied and Ind. Trial Rule 58(D)³ provides a procedure for a judgment debtor to obtain a satisfaction and release. Fifth Third also argues:

[Appellants’] current arguments are nothing more than a variation of the universally rejected “vapor money theory” commonly advanced by sovereign citizens. See Showers v. Spectrum Charter Commc'ns, No. 1:24-CV-00242-SEB-KMB, 2024 WL 5108157, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 12, 2024) ([“][Plaintiff]’s apparent belief that he can tear off the payment coupon portion of his billing statement, doctor it up with handwritten, meaningless jargon, and thereby transform it into a negotiable instrument that constitutes valid legal tender with which he may pay his internet service bill is total nonsense that directly contravenes all of this clear precedent.”) (compiling cases).

Appellee's Brief at 11. Fifth Third requests that this Court impose sanctions including filing restrictions.

[10] Pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys and are bound to follow the established rules of procedure. Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). To the extent Appellants have failed to develop cogent argument to support their allegations of error, they have waived review of their claims. See id. at 985 (“Appellants have failed to develop cogent argument to support any of their assertions of error. As such, they have waived review of these issues.”).

[11] Generally, claim preclusion bars subsequent litigation on the same claim between identical parties. Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 646 (Ind. 2023). Underlying claim preclusion are four requirements: (1) the former judgment must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the former judgment must have been rendered on the merits; (3) the matter now in issue was, or could have been, determined in the prior action; and (4) the controversy adjudicated in the former action must have been between the parties to the present suit or their privies. Id. Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, forecloses any “subsequent re-litigation of the same fact or issue where that fact or issue was necessarily adjudicated in a former suit and the same fact or issue is presented in the subsequent lawsuit.” Id. (citations omitted). Three conditions lay the foundation for issue preclusion: (1) a final judgment on the merits; (2) identity of the issues; and (3) the party to be estopped was a party or the privity of a party in the prior action. Id.

[12] Any issue related to the Mortgage, Borrowers’ indebtedness, or the ordered foreclosure was determined by the July 2, 2024 Entry of Summary Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure in Cause No. 365. Moreover, Appellants’ claim in their Motion to Vacate Order and their Motion to Strike that they satisfied the debt by tendering payment to Fifth Third—relying on the Payment Coupons or the Page Affidavit—were rejected by the court in Cause No. 365. Appellants may not relitigate the matter in a quiet title action in Cause No. 19. Appellants did not file a motion under Ind. Trial Rule 58(D) in Cause No. 365, and the court here noted that “[t]he docket clearly reflect[ed] that a judgment remain[ed] outstanding.” Appellants’ Appendix Volume II at 7. Based on the record and arguments, we conclude the trial court did not err in dismissing Appellants’ Petition to Quiet Title.

[13] We decline to impose sanctions or restrictions at this time but caution Appellants that any further abusive litigation practices in any judicial forum in this state may result in sanctions and restrictions. See Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 270 (Ind. 2014) (“The Court refrains from imposing sanctions or restrictions at this point, but Mr. Zavodnik can expect any further abusive litigation practices in any judicial forum in this state to be met with appropriate sanctions and restrictions.”).

[14] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The caption page of the Appellant's Brief names the appellants as: “Moorish Science Temple of America #27 Sol Temple, by its Trustee, Bro. J. Page Bey; Brooke Rachel Page; and Tamara Sue Green.” Appellants Brief at 1. The Appellants’ Brief is signed:/s/ Bro. J. Page BeyBro. J. Page Bey, TrusteeMoorish Science Temple of America #27 Sol Temple, pro se/s/ Brooke Rachel PageBrooke Rachel Page, pro se/s/ Tamara Sue GreenTamara Sue Green, pro seId. at 10. The notice of appeal contains similar signatures and indicates: “The initiating party to this matter is the Moorish Science Temple of America #27 Sol Temple (‘Temple’), care of 1148 Division Street, Fort Wayne, Indiana 46803, appearing by its duly authorized Trustee and Grand Sheik, Bro. J. Page Bey. The individual Appellants are Brooke Rachel Page and Tamara Sue Green, members of the Temple, appearing pro se.” Notice of Appeal at 1.

2.   Trial Rule 60(B) provides the court may relieve a party from a judgment for “the following reasons: ․ (7) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.”

3.   Trial Rule 58(D) provides:Based upon a review of the Clerk's payment records, the Clerk may, or at the verified request of the judgment debtor shall, issue a Notice to the judgment creditor that a judgment, including accrued interest and court costs, has been paid in full and that the judgment should be satisfied/released. The Notice shall be sent to the judgment creditor and debtor at the address shown on the Chronological Case Summary. The Clerk shall note the issuance of the Notice on the Chronological Case Summary. If the judgment creditor does not agree that the judgment should be satisfied/released, the judgment creditor shall, within 30 days of the date of the issuance of the Notice, file a verified objection. If the judgment creditor does not file an objection or a satisfaction/release of judgment, the judgment shall be deemed satisfied/released and the Clerk shall note the satisfaction/release of the judgment on the Chronological Case Summary and on the Judgment Docket.

Brown, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.