John Nolan Clouse, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] John Nolan Clouse appeals his conviction for Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he drove (1) while intoxicated and (2) in a manner that endangered a person. We find the evidence sufficient to prove the first but not the second. We therefore reverse Clouse's conviction and remand with instructions for the trial court to enter judgment for the included offense of Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Shortly before 3:00 a.m. on January 28, 2025, Jasper County Sheriff's Department Deputy Juan Trejo was dispatched to a Family Express gas station to conduct a wellness check on a person who had been in a car for “about an hour.” Tr. p. 27. When Deputy Trejo arrived, he observed Clouse's car parked in front of the gas station with the engine “running,” the radio “extremely loud,” and Clouse (the only person in the car) “passed out” in the driver's seat. Id. at 13. There was an open bottle of vodka on the passenger seat as well as Clouse's seizure medicine, Depakote. Concerned for Clouse's safety, Deputy Trejo opened the door and shook him. Clouse briefly woke up but then “passed out again.” Id. at 14. Deputy Trejo woke Clouse up again and asked him to turn off the radio. After “an extended period of time and with great difficulty,” Clouse turned off the radio. Id.

[3] Deputy Trejo asked Clouse to exit his car, and Clouse was “unsteady” as he did so. Id. at 15. Once Clouse was outside the car, Deputy Trejo smelled “a strong odor of ․ alcoholic beverage emanating from [Clouse's] breath and person.” Id. In addition, Clouse's speech was slurred, and his eyes were glassy. Clouse was “incoherent” and told a “confusing” story about Deputy Trejo calling him to that location for maintenance. Id. at 15, 20. Deputy Trejo asked Clouse if he had been drinking, and he gave an “incoherent answer,” “something to the effect of ․ since I've been called here.” Id. at 43. But Clouse also said that he had “just” come from the “Oasis” and “stopped [at the gas station] to do the safe thing.” Id. at 21; see also id. at 15. According to Deputy Trejo, the Oasis is a bar and has two locations (Malden and San Pierre), both of which are about 25 minutes away from the gas station. See id. at 21. Deputy Trejo asked Clouse if he had been to the one in Malden, and Clouse said it was not that one. Id. at 39. During the stop, Deputy Trejo learned from dispatch that Clouse has a traumatic brain injury, which is why he takes Depakote. Deputy Trejo had Clouse perform field-sobriety tests, and Clouse failed them all. Deputy Trejo offered Clouse a portable breath test, but he refused.

[4] The State charged Clouse with Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person and the included offense of Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated. At the bench trial, Clouse testified in his own defense that he had been taking Depakote for about a month at the time of this incident and that the medicine's side effects include drowsiness, tiredness, and confusion. He explained that he was driving home from a friend's house when he became “suddenly tired,” so he stopped at the gas station to “try to be safe” “[i]nstead of driving.” Id. at 46. He denied drinking alcohol.

[5] The judge found Clouse guilty of both offenses but only entered judgment of conviction on the Class A misdemeanor.

[6] Clouse now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Clouse contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person. Contrary to Clouse's contention, the standard of review is not de novo. See Appellant's Br. p. 8. Rather, sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims “trigger a deferential standard of review in which we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the” fact-finder. Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quotation omitted). “A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation omitted). In conducting that review, we consider only the evidence that supports the fact-finder's determination, “not evidence that might undermine it.” Id.

[8] Clouse doesn't dispute that the evidence is sufficient to prove that he drove his car to the gas station and that he was intoxicated when Deputy Trejo encountered him. However, he argues that the State failed to prove that he was intoxicated while driving. He says that “[t]he only evidence of drinking the State presented was the statement of [him] indicating that he had done so while he was parked at the gas station.” Appellant's Reply Br. p. 5. The evidence shows that Deputy Trejo arrived at the gas station around 3:00 a.m. for a wellness check; Clouse's car had been there about an hour when he arrived. Clouse was passed out in the driver's seat, and an open bottle of vodka was on the passenger seat. Deputy Trejo had difficulty waking Clouse up, who smelled of alcohol. Clouse told Deputy Trejo that he had “just” come from the Oasis, which is a bar, and that he “stopped [at the gas station] to do the safe thing.” Based on this evidence, the judge could reasonably conclude that Clouse was intoxicated while he drove his car to the gas station and that he didn't start drinking once he arrived there.

[9] Clouse argues that this case is like Flanagan v. State, 832 N.E.2d 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), and Gatewood v. State, 921 N.E.2d 45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied, where we found the evidence insufficient to prove that the defendant drove while intoxicated. But here, unlike in those cases, Clouse admitted that he had left a bar and stopped at the gas station because it was the “safe” thing to do. A reasonable inference from this statement is that Clouse was intoxicated—and knew that he was intoxicated—while he was driving.

[10] Clouse also argues that even if he drove while intoxicated, the evidence is insufficient to prove that he operated his car in a manner that endangered a person, which elevates the offense from a Class C misdemeanor to a Class A misdemeanor. See Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2(b). We agree with Clouse. To prove this element, the State must submit proof of endangerment that goes beyond “mere intoxication.” Dorsett v. State, 921 N.E.2d 529, 533 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Here, Deputy Trejo found Clouse passed out inside his car, and the State didn't present any evidence other than his intoxication to prove that he operated his car in a manner that endangered a person. See id.¹ We therefore reverse Clouse's conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated as a Class A misdemeanor and remand with instructions for the trial court to enter judgment as a Class C misdemeanor and resentence Clouse accordingly.

[11] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Citing the dissent in Dorsett, the State claims that “a high level of intoxication alone” can establish endangerment. 921 N.E.2d at 534 (Bradford, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The State, however, doesn't cite any cases where this is the majority holding.

Vaidik, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Scheele, J., concur.