Jomal M. Tyler, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In the early morning hours of January 6, 2024, Jomal Tyler shot Britney Long in the head, killing her. The State charged Tyler with murder and alleged that Tyler was eligible for a sentencing enhancement due to his use of a firearm in the commission of the murder. A jury found Tyler not guilty of murder but guilty of the lesser-included offense of Level 5 felony reckless homicide. The jury also found that the State had proven that Tyler was eligible for the sentencing enhancement. The trial court sentenced Tyler to five-and-one-half years for reckless homicide, enhanced by twelve years by virtue of the sentencing enhancement, for a total aggregate seventeen-and-one-half-year sentence. On appeal, Tyler challenges his reckless-homicide conviction, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] As of January of 2024, Tyler and Britney were involved in a romantic relationship and had children together. The couple had argued on January 5, 2024, but had “got[ten] past it” and had celebrated Britney's oldest daughter's birthday at “Chuck E. Cheese.” Tr. Vol. V p. 9. After arriving home and putting their children to bed, Tyler left to purchase alcohol and cocaine. Upon returning home, Tyler consumed alcohol and ingested cocaine. Once Britney fell asleep, Tyler went to a friend's house where he consumed more alcohol and ingested more cocaine. Tyler unsuccessfully attempted to purchase more cocaine before returning home around 1:00 a.m. on January 6.

[3] Upon returning home, Tyler grabbed his firearm from the side of his bed, placed it under his pillow, and climbed into bed. Several minutes later, Tyler heard a “knock at the” front door. Tr. Vol. V p. 25. He “immediately jumped up” and grabbed his firearm with his non-dominant hand. Tr. Vol. V p. 25. According to Tyler, as he was walking out of the bedroom, the firearm discharged, shooting Britney in the head. Tyler was frightened by the discharge but, believing that the firearm had “discharged and hit the ground[,]” continued to the front door. Tr. Vol. V p. 27. Tyler did not see anyone standing at or near the front door. Tyler returned to the bedroom to find Britney covered in blood. Tyler called 911, telling the 911 operator that his firearm had gone off, he was “going to f[***]ing prison,” and that he needed to get some cocaine. Tr. Vol. V p. 33.

[4] Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officers Madison Burger and Joseph Hockstra were dispatched to Britney and Tyler's residence at 1:24 a.m. Upon arriving at the residence, Officers Burger and Hockstra observed a dark-colored Chevy Suburban parked halfway in the driveway and halfway on the road with the engine still running and the front driver's side door “wide open.” Tr. Vol. II p. 131. The vehicle was registered to Britney. Britney's blood was on the inside of the driver's side door. Tyler subsequently claimed that he had left the vehicle running when he had arrived home because he had been planning to leave again.

[5] As Officer Burger approached the residence, she observed that the side door was “standing wide open” and heard Tyler “screaming from inside.” Tr. Vol. II p. 132. Officers Burger and Hockstra announced themselves as police and Tyler “directed [them] to the back bedroom.” Tr. Vol. II p. 133. In the back bedroom, Officers Burger and Hockstra found Britney “lying in the bed with a gunshot wound to her head.” Tr. Vol. II p. 133. Britney “was still breathing” but unable to speak and “the only movement that she was able to do was her body jerking from the residual brain activity.” Tr. Vol. II p. 133. Officers Burger and Hockstra observed that “there was blood everywhere. Blood above the bed, blood on the door, blood right in the entryway.” Tr. Vol. II p. 134. Officers Burger and Hockstra requested that paramedics come to the scene despite Officer Burger knowing that Britney “was not likely to survive [her] injury” and that the case “was going to be a homicide.” Tr. Vol. II p. 134. Britney was transported to Methodist Hospital, where she remained on life support for several days before succumbing to her injuries.

[6] Officers Burger and Hockstra secured and conducted a protective sweep of the residence, during which they located Britney's four children—who ranged in age from a few months to seven years old—in other bedrooms. While securing the scene, Officers Burger and Hockstra located a firearm on the ground next to the bed where Britney's body had been found. The firearm had malfunctioned and was jammed as it had both a fired cartridge case and an unfired cartridge lodged in the chamber. Tyler told police that the gun had accidentally discharged when he was climbing into bed.

[7] A paramedic was assigned to examine Tyler. As the paramedic attempted to examine him, Tyler “began kind of thrashing around” and “started banging his head on the wall.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 217. Tyler demonstrated signs of emotional distress and had to be sedated. The Department of Child Services eventually arrived and took custody of the children.

[8] Britney's cause of death was determined to be a “[g]unshot wound [to] the head.” Tr. Vol. III p. 7. It was determined that the bullet had entered the left side of Britney's forehead and had exited on “the right side of the head, above and slightly behind the right ear[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 239. The trajectory “of the wound path basically [had been] from ․ the front of [Britney's] head, from her front to back, left to right, and very slightly upwards. So, it basically came in above her left eye and then exited somewhat above and at the back margin of her right ear.” Tr Vol. II p. 250.

[9] The firearm recovered from the scene, which was determined to have been used to shoot Britney, was examined by two firearms examiners, Rafael Perez and Douglas Boxler. Perez did not observe any mechanical malfunctions to the firearm or recall it having a light trigger, which he would have investigated. Perez did not observe “anything abnormal” about the trigger pull. Tr. Vol. III p. 201. Boxler found that the firearm had “a trigger safety[,]” which was intended “to reduce the risk of that trigger being pulled without the intent of that trigger being pulled, an accidental discharge.” Tr. Vol. III p. 213. The firearm also had a “cocked indicator[,]” which “shows that the firearm is indeed cocked and ready to fire[.]” Tr. Vol. III p. 214. Boxler conducted impact testing, which “simulates a drop[.]” Tr. Vol. III p. 215. The firearm did not discharge during impact testing and there were no mechanical malfunctions during test fires. Boxler “[t]ested the trigger pull with a digital force gauge, and it resulted in an average of 4.17 pounds of force necessary to discharge or pull the trigger entirely[,]” which was within the typical range for the type of firearm.¹ Tr. Vol. III p. 218.

[10] On January 18, 2024, the State charged Tyler with murder. On September 15, 2025, the State alleged that Tyler was eligible for a sentencing enhancement due to his use of a firearm in the commission of the offense. A four-day jury trial commenced on September 22, 2025.

[11] In addition to evidence relating to the shooting, the State introduced testimony from several of Britney's family members as evidence of the contentious nature of Britney's and Tyler's relationship. Tyler objected to some of this testimony and, upon overruling each objection, the trial court instructed the jury that the challenged evidence could only be considered to explain the nature of Britney's and Tyler's relationship.

[12] Tyler testified at trial and acknowledged that the firearm had been in his possession but claimed that the discharge had been accidental. Tyler further testified that he had had no formal firearm-safety training and that he had kept his firearm loaded with a round in the chamber. Tyler disputed Britney's family's description of his and Britney's relationship, stating that he believed that their testimony was exaggerated and “[m]ade up[.]” Tr. Vol. V p. 12.

[13] During closing argument, the State stated that “[y]ou heard testimony from [Britney's] family. Every time they spoke, the Judge told you, that evidence is for a limited, specific purpose. I want to be clear. That limited, specific purpose is the relationship between [Tyler] and [Britney]. That evidence shows [Tyler's] motive to kill Britney.” Tr. Vol. V p. 68. The State reiterated that “[t]hat testimony was given to you for a specific and limited purpose. Again, I'll reiterate it. To demonstrate the nature of the relationship and his motive for fatal hostility in this relationship.” Tr. Vol. V pp. 72–73.

[14] The jury found Tyler guilty of reckless homicide, a lesser-included offense of murder, and found that the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Tyler had used a firearm during the commission of the offense. The trial court sentenced Tyler to five-and-one-half years for reckless homicide, enhanced by twelve years by virtue of the sentencing enhancement, for a total aggregate seventeen-and-one-half-year sentence.

Discussion and Decision

[15] Tyler contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his reckless-homicide conviction.

I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Admitting Evidence Regarding Tyler and Britney's Relationship

[16] The admission of evidence is a matter that we generally “leave to the discretion of the trial court.” Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259–60 (Ind. 2013). “We review these determinations for abuse of that discretion and reverse only when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.” Id. at 260. “We will not reweigh the evidence and will resolve all conflicts in favor of the trial court's ruling.” Schnitzmeyer v. State, 168 N.E.3d 1041, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Furthermore, “we will not reverse the decision to admit or exclude evidence if that decision is sustainable on any ground.” Carpenter v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1075, 1078 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[17] Relevant evidence is generally admissible. Ind. Evid. Rule 402. “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Ind. Evid. Rule 403. As for evidence relating to the defendant's other acts, Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.

(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case. This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.

(Emphases in original).

As such, evidence may be admissible for a permitted purpose under Rule 404(b) contingent upon the following requirements: first, the court must determine that the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act; and second, the court must balance whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by prejudicial effect.

Schnitzmeyer, 168 N.E.3d at 1046.

[18] “Evidence of motive is always relevant in the proof of a crime ․ [a]nd, hostility is a paradigmatic motive for committing a crime.” Davis v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1203, 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (internal quotations and brackets omitted), trans. denied. “Numerous cases have held that where a relationship between parties is characterized by frequent conflict, evidence of the defendant's prior assaults and confrontations with the victim may be admitted to show the relationship between the parties and motive for committing the crime.” Iqbal v. State, 805 N.E.2d 401, 408 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 222 (Ind. 1997)). In Hicks, the Indiana Supreme Court held that

Under the first part of the 404(b) test, if the evidence of prior acts of domestic violence was offered only to show that Hicks was of bad character and acted in conformity therewith by murdering Koontz, then the evidence would be inadmissible. The State cites Guenthensperger v. State, 566 N.E.2d 61, 62 (Ind. 1991) for the proposition that “evidence of a defendant's prior assaults, batteries, or threats against a homicide victim is admissible to prove motive.” Guenthensperger, though directly on point, was decided prior to the adoption of Rule 404(b) and does not control the admissibility of evidence under this Rule. The substance of the holding in Guenthensperger has, however, been repeated in Rule 404(b) cases. As we recently held in Ross v. State, 676 N.E.2d 339, 346 (Ind. 1996), “[a] defendant's prior bad acts are ․ usually admissible to show the relationship between the defendant and the victim.” See also Elliott v. State, 630 N.E.2d 202, 204 (Ind. 1994) (prior threats of violence to ex-wife and victim admissible to show the relationship between the parties and defendant's motive); Price v. State, 619 N.E.2d 582, 584 (Ind. 1993) (prior bad acts against the victim are admissible “to show the relationship between the parties and appellant's motive”). Federal courts agree. More precisely, as the Fourth Circuit put it in United States v. Russell, [971 F.2d 1098, 1106–07 (4th Cir. 1992)], “[h]ostility is a paradigmatic motive for committing a crime.” In Hicks’ case, the hostility between him and Nicole existed from the relationship's inception, as shown by the incident of abuse of the victim in 1991, and continued up to the time of the murder. See generally United States v. Hinton, 31 F.3d 817, 822–23 (9th Cir. 1994) (testimony about accused's four previous assaults on his wife was admissible to show motive in a prosecution for assault with intent to murder); Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 F.2d 1185, 1197–98 (10th Cir. 1989) (evidence of intense disputes between defendant and victim admissible to show motive for murder) (applying Wyoming law).

690 N.E.2d at 222–23.

[19] Tyler argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting “generalized testimony from multiple family members” detailing the nature of his and Britney's relationship. Appellant's Br. p. 10. The challenged evidence included testimony from Britney's mother, brother, aunt, and sisters. The State argues that the challenged evidence was admissible because it detailed the nature of Tyler's and Britney's relationship and was relevant below to establishing Tyler's motive for shooting Britney.

[20] Britney's mother testified that “[i]n [her] opinion, [she] felt that the relationship was very toxic and very abusive[,]” that she had observed frequent verbal and physical fights, and that she had observed Tyler threaten to kill himself. Tr. Vol. II p. 122. Britney's brother testified that while living with Britney and Tyler in the Spring of 2023, he had heard Tyler call Britney a “b[***]h” and belittle her. Tr. Vol. III p. 152. Britney's aunt testified that Britney, Tyler, and Britney's children had “stayed with [her] temporarily” in late 2022, during which time she had observed physical altercations between Britney and Tyler. Tr. Vol. IV p. 80. One of Britney's sisters testified that she had overheard verbal altercations and threats between Britney and Tyler, including a statement from Tyler that he would “f[***] her up.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 102. Another of Britney's sisters testified that she had observed an altercation between Britney and Tyler, during which Tyler had become agitated and threatened to “kill him and her[.]” Tr. Vol. IV p. 165. Yet another of Britney's sisters testified that she had observed an incident of violence between Britney and Tyler.

[21] After Tyler objected to the challenged evidence, the trial court instructed the jury each time that the challenged evidence could only be considered to explain the nature of Britney's and Tyler's relationship. “On appeal, we must presume that the jury obeyed the court's instructions in reaching its verdict.” Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 481 (Ind. 2015) (internal quotation omitted). The State also indicated during its closing argument that “[y]ou heard testimony from [Britney's] family. Every time they spoke, the Judge told you, that evidence is for a limited, specific purpose. I want to be clear. That limited, specific purpose is the relationship between [Tyler] and [Britney]. That evidence shows [Tyler's] motive to kill Britney.” Tr. Vol. V p. 68. The State reiterated that “[t]hat testimony was given to you for a specific and limited purpose. Again, I'll reiterate it. To demonstrate the nature of the relationship and his motive for fatal hostility in this relationship.” Tr. Vol. V pp. 72–73.

[22] Upon review, we conclude that the evidence is similar to that discussed in Hicks, Davis, and Iqbal and like in those cases, the challenged evidence was relevant to establish motive. The limited purpose of the evidence was made clear to the jury by both the trial court and the State. Again, we presume that the jury followed the trial court's instruction and only considered the challenged evidence for the limited purpose for which it was admitted. See Isom, 31 N.E.3d at 481. We also disagree with Tyler's assertion that the “temporal distance” of the acts described in the challenged testimony diminished any probative value of the evidence as the challenged evidence demonstrated the continuing contentious nature of Tyler's and Britney's relationship. Appellant's Br. p. 10. As such, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence.²

II. The Evidence is Sufficient to Sustain Tyler's Conviction

[23] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they must consider it most favorably to the trial court's ruling. Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146–47 (Ind. 2007) (internal brackets, citations, emphasis, and quotations omitted). Stated differently, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the convictions, neither reweighing evidence nor reassessing witness credibility” and “affirm the judgment unless no reasonable factfinder could find the defendant guilty.” Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016).

[24] “Reckless homicide is an inherently included lesser offense of murder.” Carter v. State, 273 N.E.3d 825, 830 (Ind. 2026). “A person who recklessly kills another human being commits reckless homicide, a Level 5 felony.” Ind. Code § 35-42-1-5. “A person engages in conduct ‘recklessly’ if he engages in the conduct in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(c). In order to prove that Tyler committed reckless homicide, the State was required to prove that he acted recklessly when he shot and killed Brittney.

[25] Tyler argues that the evidence establishes that he, at most, acted negligently and that “[m]ere negligence is not sufficient to show a reckless disregard for the safety of others in a prosecution for reckless homicide.” Appellant's Br. p. 13 (citing State v. Kelsey, 325 N.E.2d 218, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975)). Tyler asserts that the State did not present any evidence that he “was aware the firearm would discharge when he stood up” and that his behavior was “consistent with shock following an unexpected and accidental event, not with indifference or conscious disregard for human life.” Appellant's Br. pp. 13, 14. Contrary to Tyler's argument, however, we conclude that the evidence most favorable to the jury's verdict demonstrates that Tyler engaged in reckless behavior, not mere negligence.

[26] Tyler had consumed alcohol and ingested cocaine before grabbing a loaded firearm with his non-dominant hand. Tyler knew his firearm was loaded. The firearm contained multiple safety features aimed at making an accidental discharge unlikely. Subsequent testing indicated that the normal amount of pressure was necessary for discharge, suggesting that Tyler had handled the firearm with the requisite level of force. The jury could reasonably interpret these facts as evidence that Tyler had acted recklessly, not merely negligently. See Springer v. State, 798 N.E.2d 431, 435 (Ind. 2003) (finding that evidence of an uninvited person seeking a confrontation at an occupied residence of another person while wielding a loaded, cocked weapon without the safety mechanism engaged supported a determination that the uninvited person had acted recklessly rather than merely negligently); Joseph v. State, 126 N.E.3d 810, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (affirming the factfinder's determination that Joseph had acted recklessly when he cleaned his firearm without engaging available safety mechanisms), trans. denied.

[27] Tyler claimed at trial that the firearm had discharged as he was walking out of the bedroom to investigate the sound of a knock at the front door. However, he had told police just after the shooting that the firearm had discharged as he was getting into bed. The jury was not required to credit Tyler's conflicting account of the events leading to Britney's death. See Tharp v. State, 942 N.E.2d 814, 816 (Ind. 2011) (“[T]he fact finder is best positioned to judge the credibility of these witnesses, is free to credit or discredit testimony, and weigh conflicting evidence.”); see also Young v. State, 198 N.E.3d 1172, 1181 (Ind. 2022) (providing that having addressed a witness's credibility, the jury does not have to believe every word the witness says).

[28] Tyler also claimed that he had left Britney's vehicle running, with the door open, because he had planned to leave the residence before he decided to climb into bed with Britney. Tyler's claim, however, does not explain why Britney's blood was found in the vehicle. The jury could have reasonably inferred from the presence of Britney's blood that Tyler had entered the vehicle after shooting Britney. The jury could have further reasonably inferred that Tyler had at least contemplated fleeing, which is consistent with a consciousness of guilt. See Myers v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1069, 1077 (Ind. 2015) (providing that evidence of flight and an attempt to avoid arrest can be considered as circumstantial evidence of a consciousness of guilt).

[29] The evidence most favorable to the jury's verdict is sufficient to prove that Tyler had acted recklessly. Tyler's claim to the contrary amounts to nothing more than a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Griffith, 59 N.E.3d at 958. The evidence demonstrates that Tyler recklessly shot and killed Britney. The evidence is therefore sufficient to sustain Tyler's conviction for Level 5 felony reckless homicide.

[30] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Four to four-and-one-half pounds of force per pull is standard for firearms similar to Tyler's firearm.

2.   While Tyler argues that the challenged evidence “encouraged jurors to reason that Tyler's alleged prior conduct made it more likely that he committed the charged offense[,]” Appellant's Br. p. 11, we agree with the State that the jury's acquittal of Tyler on the murder charge supports the inference that “the jury followed the instructions and that it did not make a forbidden inference from the challenged testimony.” Appellee's Br. p. 19. Thus, even if the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence, such error was, at most, harmless. See Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1238 (Ind. 2012).

Bradford, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., concurs. Felix, J., concurs in result without opinion.