IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of K.C. and N.C. (Minor Children); (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[2] A.C. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to her minor children, K.C. and N.C. (collectively, “Children”). We affirm.

Issues

[3] Mother raises three issues, which we consolidate and restate as:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Mother's motion to continue the fact-finding hearing, thereby violating Mother's due process rights.

II. Whether the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) presented sufficient evidence to show adoption as a satisfactory post-termination plan for the Children.1

Facts

[4] K.C. was born in 2009, and N.C. was born in 2012 to Mother and C.C. (“Father”).² DCS removed the Children from Mother's care on June 26, 2024, after it received a report that Mother and maternal grandmother were using illegal substances in the home and that the Children lacked adequate bedding.

[5] On the same day, DCS filed petitions alleging that the Children were children in need of services (“CHINS”). On August 9, 2024, Mother, DCS's attorney, and the court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) executed the Mediated Agreed Entry. The trial court held an initial hearing on August 13, 2024, accepted the Mediated Agreed Entry, adjudicated the Children to be CHINS, and entered dispositional orders. Mother's obligations under the dispositional orders included: initiating weekly contact with DCS; notifying the family case manager (“FCM”) of changes in address, household composition, employment, or telephone number within five days; keeping all appointments with the FCM, CASA, and service providers; maintaining suitable housing; securing and maintaining a stable source of income; completing a home-based casework program; completing a substance abuse assessment and following all treatment recommendations; submitting to random drug screens; and consistently engaging in visits with the Children.

[6] At a periodic case review hearing on December 18, 2024, at which Mother failed to appear, the trial court found that, although Mother was participating in visitation and home-based casework, she was “not progressing.” Ex. Vol. I p. 46. On May 8, 2025, the trial court ordered Mother's visits with the Children to be converted to supervised therapeutic visits.

[7] On July 27, 2025, the trial court changed the permanency plan to a concurrent plan of reunification and adoption for both of the Children. The trial court found that Mother was “not participating in her substance abuse services or screens” and had “not been consistent in her participation in home based casework and visitation.” Id. at 51. Four days later, on July 31, 2025, DCS filed its petition to terminate Mother's parental rights (“TPR petition”).

[8] On August 14, 2025, Mother appeared in person at the initial hearing on the TPR petition, at which the trial court entered a denial on her behalf and appointed counsel. The trial court also scheduled the fact-finding hearing for September 23, 2025, and October 21, 2025, and notified Mother of those dates. Mother replied, “Okay” to both dates. Tr. Vol. II p. 11. The trial court also informed Mother that the hearing would be held at “the Madison County Youth Center.” Id. at 12. Mother confirmed that she had been there “[o]ne (1) time.” Id.

[9] On September 23, 2025, Mother failed to appear for the scheduled fact-finding hearing. Mother's counsel informed the trial court that Mother's car had broken down, Mother was in contact with him by text message, and Mother was waiting for a ride. Mother also informed the trial court through counsel that “she would be here in five (5) minutes.” Id. at 21. The trial court agreed to wait fifteen minutes past the scheduled start time. When Mother had still not appeared, the trial court convened the hearing. Mother's counsel orally moved for a continuance and argued that Mother's absence prevented him from adequately representing Mother. DCS and the CASA objected and requested that the trial court proceed in Mother's absence. The trial court denied Mother's oral motion for a continuance and proceeded with the hearing.

[10] DCS Division Manager, Laura Hueston, testified that Mother had not completed a substance use disorder assessment; had submitted to only “a couple” of random drug screens, despite screens being available throughout the entirety of the CHINS case; had not successfully completed home-based casework; and had not consistently engaged in parenting time with the Children.  ³ Tr. Vol. II pp. 54-55. Additionally, Mother had not initiated weekly contact with DCS, had not provided evidence of “safe, stable, and appropriate housing,” and had not provided documentation of “a legal and stable source of income” sufficient to support herself and the Children. Id. at 55-57.

[11] Hueston further testified that, in her opinion, termination of Mother's parental rights was in the Children's best interests because of Mother's inconsistency, “substance use,” “instability,” and inability to provide a safe home for the Children. Id. at 57.

[12] K.C. testified that she wanted A.C., the Children's adult half-sister, to adopt her and that she did not “feel comfortable” living with Mother because of Mother's “neglect.” Id. at 27. K.C. had not seen Mother in four months. After one of the visits that K.C. described as “bad”, Mother did not respect the Children's boundaries, K.C. became upset, and N.C. cried. Id. at 28. K.C. testified that there was nothing Mother could do to repair their relationship and that termination of Mother's parental rights was in N.C.’s best interest as well.⁴ The CASA also recommended termination of Mother's parental rights as being in the Children's best interests.

[13] A.C. testified that she planned to adopt K.C. if the trial court granted the TPR petition, but that she could not adopt N.C. because she lacked sufficient financial resources, time, and accommodations to meet both of the Children's needs. K.C. was thriving in A.C.’s home and had stability and educational opportunities there. N.C. did not want to be adopted by his current placement; but he did not wish to return to Mother's care.⁵ N.C. was not in a pre-adoptive home, and DCS was continuing to seek a suitable adoptive placement for him.

[14] After DCS rested its case, Mother's counsel again moved for a continuance to October 21, 2025, so that Mother and N.C. could testify. DCS and the CASA objected, and the trial court denied the motion, noting that Mother could have appeared but failed to do so. The trial court entered an order granting DCS's petition to terminate Mother's parental rights to the Children. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mother's motion for a continuance, and Mother's due process rights were not violated.

[15] Mother challenges the denial of her motion for a continuance of the fact-finding hearing. We recognize that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional rights of parents to establish a home and raise their children. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). “[A] parent's interest in the upbringing of [his or her] child is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e] [c]ourt[s].’ ” Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000)). Parental rights, however, are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child's best interests when determining the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. Id.; see also In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (“Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute.”). “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45-46.

[16] “Generally speaking, a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to continue is subject to abuse of discretion review.” In re K.W., 12 N.E.3d 241, 243-44 (Ind. 2014) (citing Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Office of Fam. & Child., 841 N.E.2d 615, 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied). When a trial court denies a party's motion for a continuance, there is a strong presumption that the trial court properly exercised its discretion. In re N.K., 249 N.E.3d 607, 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

[17] Motions to continue are governed by Trial Rule 7(D), which leaves continuances to the discretion of the trial court, so long as the procedural requirements of the rule are met.⁶ Here, Mother's oral motion for a continuance met none of Trial Rule 7(D)’s requirements. Contrary to Mother's arguments, the trial court exercised considerable patience before proceeding. Upon learning that Mother's car had broken down, the trial court agreed to delay the start of the hearing until 9:16 a.m. to allow Mother additional time to arrive. Mother had been personally informed at the initial hearing that the fact-finding hearing would be held at the Madison County Youth Center—not at the downtown courthouse—and was provided a written order containing the address, date, and time of the hearing. Mother also confirmed that she had been to the Youth Center. Despite that notice and knowledge, Mother alleges that her ride dropped her off at the wrong courthouse.

[18] Even accepting that Mother's car trouble and her arrival at the wrong courthouse were not entirely within her control, the trial court observed that the distance between the two locations was walkable and that Mother could have walked from the wrong courthouse to the correct location within “forty-five minutes.” Tr. Vol. II p. 71. Instead, Mother chose not to appear for the hearing at all.

[19] Mother also argues that holding the fact-finding hearing in her absence violated her due process rights. Mother, however, did not raise the due process argument before the trial court and makes no fundamental error argument on appeal. Thus, the issue is waived. See In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016) (“[A] party on appeal may waive a constitutional claim, including a claimed violation of due process rights, by raising it for the first time on appeal.”).

[20] Waiver notwithstanding, Mother has failed to demonstrate a due process violation. The United States Supreme Court has stated that “ ‘the fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 917 (Ind. 2011) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). The process due in a termination of parental rights proceeding turns on the balancing of three factors: (1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure. Id. Both the State and the parent have substantial interests affected by the proceeding, so we focus on the risk of error created by the trial court's actions. Id. at 917-18.

[21] Here, Mother had a meaningful opportunity to be heard through her trial counsel, who participated in the fact-finding hearing and cross-examined DCS's witnesses. Mother had repeatedly failed to appear at court proceedings throughout both the CHINS and termination cases, and, by the time of the fact-finding hearing, she had made little meaningful progress toward completing her court-ordered services or demonstrating a willingness to remedy the conditions that led to the Children's removal. “In considering the efficacy of a continuance, the trial court could reflect on [a parent's] patterns with respect to attendance, communication, and participation when [s]he was not incarcerated.” In re J.E., 45 N.E.3d 1243, 1247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

[22] Mother chose not to appear at all for the fact-finding hearing. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate Mother's due process rights by denying her oral, last minute motion for a continuance and proceeding with the fact-finding hearing in her absence.

II. DCS presented sufficient evidence to show that adoption was a satisfactory post-termination plan for the Children.

[23] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS is required to allege and prove:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c).

[24] DCS “is required to prove that termination is appropriate by a showing of clear and convincing evidence.” In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016) (citing In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. 2009)). If the trial court finds that the allegations in the termination petition are true, it “shall” terminate the parent-child relationship and enter findings supporting its conclusions. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8.

[25] Mother challenges only the trial court's finding that there is a satisfactory plan for the Children's care, especially for N.C. Indiana courts have held that for a plan to be “ ‘satisfactory’ ” for the purposes of the termination statute, it “ ‘need not be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the parent-child relationship is terminated.’ ” In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Lang v. Starke Cnty. Office of Fam. and Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied), trans. denied. “A DCS plan [of adoption] is satisfactory if the plan is to attempt to find suitable parents to adopt the children․ [T]here need not be a guarantee that a suitable adoption will take place, only that DCS will attempt to find a suitable adoptive parent.” Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 375.

[26] Here, Mother argues that DCS's post-termination plan for N.C. was not satisfactory because it was non-specific and speculative. DCS Division Manager Hueston acknowledged at the hearing that no confirmed adoptive placement existed for N.C. Hueston, however, further testified that if the current placement did not adopt N.C., DCS would find him “a great home,” and that adoption remained the overall plan for N.C. following termination. Tr. Vol. II p. 59. DCS was not required to present a concrete or finalized adoptive placement—only that adoption was the “general sense of direction” for N.C. and that DCS would attempt to find a suitable adoptive parent. Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 375. Thus, the record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that DCS had a satisfactory post-termination plan for N.C.

Conclusion

[27] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mother's motion for a continuance, and the denial did not violate Mother's due process rights. Furthermore, DCS presented sufficient evidence that adoption was a satisfactory post-termination plan for the Children. We affirm.

[28] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother also argues that the trial court erred by adopting DCS's proposed order, including the findings of fact, “verbatim.” Appellant's Br. p. 23. We acknowledge that the trial court's order was a near-verbatim adoption of DCS's proposed findings and conclusions. See Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 19-32. We “by no means encourage” this type of practice out of concern that it may cause an “inevitable erosion of the confidence of an appellate court that the findings reflect the considered judgment of the trial court.” State v. Hamilton, 197 N.E.3d 356, 362 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). This adoption, however, does not automatically establish clear error or warrant reversal. Here, Mother challenges several of the trial court's findings but does not demonstrate that any challenged finding affected the outcome of the termination order. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's near-verbatim adoption of DCS's proposed order does not, standing alone, constitute clear error.

2.   Father does not participate in this appeal.

3.   The FCM assigned to the underlying CHINS case was unavailable due to medical leave, and the FCM's supervisor had left DCS employment. See Tr. Vol. II p.33.

4.   Following K.C.’s testimony, the trial court noted that Mother's ride had dropped her off at the courthouse in downtown Anderson and that Mother was en route to the Madison County Youth Center.

5.   N.C. did not testify at the fact-finding hearing. The CASA, however, testified that N.C. had, at one point, expressed a desire to “go back” to Mother's care. Tr. Vol. II p. 47. N.C.’s expressed wishes were not, however, uniform throughout the proceedings. A.C. testified that, based on her more recent conversations with N.C., he had communicated that he did not wish to return to Mother's care and did not wish to be adopted by his current placement.

6.   We note that Trial Rule 7(D), effective January 1, 2025, governs motions to continue and contains no reference to a showing of “good cause” as former Trial Rule 53.5 did. The new rule prescribes procedural requirements, including a written motion, identification of the opposing party's position, and a good faith estimate of the time needed, that Mother's oral, day-of-hearing motion did not satisfy. We observe, however, that Trial Rule 7(D) does not expressly address the circumstance in which a party is confronted with a genuine and unforeseen emergency, such as a sudden medical crisis or comparable exigent circumstance, that prevents compliance with the rule's procedural mandates. In such a situation, we believe a trial court retains discretion to grant a continuance even when the moving party has not fully complied with the rule's requirements, and the failure to address this circumstance represents a gap in the current rule. We need not resolve that question here, as Mother's circumstances fall well short of any such threshold.

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur