Nathan Jacobs, Appellant-Plaintiff v. II (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Charles Philip Tufts II (Tufts), an attorney at Hensley Legal Group, P.C. (Hensley), represented Nathan Jacobs in a civil tort action. Jacobs subsequently sued Tufts and Hensley (Defendants) for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent case management, and negligent supervision. Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. After a hearing, the court summarily granted Defendants’ motion for judgment on pleadings, denied a motion to strike Jacobs had filed, and dismissed his complaint with prejudice. On appeal, Jacobs argues the trial court erred by: (1) failing to convert Defendants’ motion to one for summary judgment; (2) granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings; (3) denying his motion to strike; and (4) dismissing his complaint with prejudice. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In May 2025, Jacobs filed suit related to a car accident he had been involved in.¹ Tufts, an attorney at Hensley, briefly represented Jacobs in that case. On June 9, pursuant to Marion County Local Rule 207(B),² Tufts and defense counsel filed a joint proposed case management plan setting discovery deadlines. On the evening of Sunday, June 15, Jacobs emailed Tufts and terminated his representation. The following morning, Tufts responded and acknowledged the termination, indicating he would file a motion to withdraw by the end of the day. With his response, Tufts attached Jacobs’ case file, informed him about upcoming deadlines and the status of the case, and advised him to retain new legal counsel.

[3] In the meantime, the court had signed an order adopting the parties’ proposed case management plan on June 13. On June 16, Tufts filed his motion to withdraw as Jacobs’ legal counsel, which roughly coincided with when the trial court uploaded its order approving the case management plan to the case docket. Tufts emailed Jacobs about this development, explaining that the court uploaded the order just after he filed his motion to withdraw. He sent Jacobs the order and noted the new deadlines, including pertinent details about the next status conference, the final pretrial conference, and trial. Again, he advised Jacobs to hire replacement legal counsel.

[4] Four days after Tufts’ withdrawal, Jacobs filed what he characterized as a legal malpractice action against Defendants under Cause No. 29D05-2506-CT-6889.³ However, Jacobs’ “pleading” did not comply with the Trial Rules. Instead, the operative “pleading” was a $2,000,000 demand letter addressed to “Mr. John Hensley” that accused Tufts of committing nebulous “ethical violations” and acts of “potential[ ] criminal misconduct under state and federal law.”⁴ Though the exact nature of Tufts’ alleged violations and misconduct was unclear, it appears Jacobs thought Tufts filed the proposed joint case management plan after Jacobs instructed him to withdraw from the personal injury suit, an act Jacobs claimed amounted to “[p]otential forgery or misrepresentation ․”⁵ On Defendants’ motion, on September 23 the trial court dismissed Jacobs’ legal malpractice action without prejudice after finding as follows:

Although [Jacobs] has filed dozens of documents in this matter, the Court cannot identify any of them as a complaint as described in the Trial Rules. The Court has advised [Jacobs] to follow the Trial Rules on multiple occasions, without apparent success. Therefore, dismissal at this time is appropriate.[6]

Jacobs attempted to appeal that dismissal, but this Court dismissed the appeal after finding no final judgment or appealable interlocutory order had been entered.⁷

[5] Meanwhile, Jacobs elected to represent himself through the remainder of his original personal injury proceedings, and the case was dismissed on November 18 after the defendant's insurer agreed to settle Jacobs’ claim at policy limits.⁸ Four days later, on November 21, Jacobs filed an entirely new complaint against Defendants. He alleged that Tufts: (1) engaged in legal malpractice; (2) breached his fiduciary duty; (3) and engaged in “negligent case-management and transition.”⁹ Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 12. According to Jacobs, Tufts had committed these alleged acts “[b]y sponsoring or allowing a joint case-management plan by counsel that later populated on the docket as [he] withdrew after acknowledging termination[.]” Id. He claimed this “breach caused harm [in his personal injury action] including corrective work, delay, and prejudice ․” Id. For the same reason, he claimed Hensley had negligently supervised Tufts. In his complaint, Jacobs also sought declaratory and injunctive relief to “prohibit[ ] Defendants from acting in [his] name without express written consent ․” Id. at 13. He attached numerous exhibits to his complaint, including emails with Tufts, the case management order, a screenshot of the docket for the underlying case, and an affidavit establishing a “timeline [and] prejudice” of Tufts’ representation. Id. at 66.

[6] Defendants filed their answer and asserted among other affirmative defenses that Jacobs’ “[c]omplaint fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief [could] be granted.” Id. at 76. They subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings arguing the same. In their memorandum, Defendants explained the apparent misunderstanding underlying Jacobs’ complaint. Namely, contrary to Jacobs’ belief, Tufts had not “performed any actions on [Jacobs’] behalf” after Jacobs terminated him. Id. at 86-87. As a result, Defendants asserted Jacobs could not prove they breached any duties, that he suffered any damages, or that he was entitled to declaratory or injunctive relief. In support of their argument that Jacobs didn't suffer any damages, Defendants cited two filings from the underlying personal injury case: Jacobs’ Supplemental Motion to Expedite Ruling on Motion to Reset Deadlines (in which Jacobs asked the court to reset the case management deadlines) and the court's July 23 order (which granted Jacobs’ request). They noted that the trial court could take judicial notice of the underlying case and those filings pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 201. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 83.

[7] Jacobs filed a response in opposition and attached the same set of exhibits he attached to his complaint. He argued the court should deny Defendants’ motion because it “depend[ed] on disputed inferences, relie[d] on facts outside the pleadings, and misapplie[d] Indiana law governing pleadings-stage review[.]” Id. at 92. Defendants filed their reply and attached a copy of the July 23 order (“Reply Exhibit 1”) it referenced in its original memorandum. Jacobs then filed a motion to strike Reply Exhibit 1 as “outside-the-pleadings material ․” Id. at 99-100.

[8] The trial court held a hearing on Defendants’ motion in February 2026. Defendants reiterated the arguments made in their motion. Jacobs asserted that “everything ․ [Defendants] brought up [was] outside the four ․ corners of [Trial Rule] 12(C)” and “rest[ed] on [his] brief.” Transcript at 14. The court took the matter under advisement and entered an order six days later. Upon “consider[ing] all the papers submitted in support of and in opposition to the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,” the court summarily denied Jacobs’ motion to strike, granted Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, and dismissed Jacobs’ complaint with prejudice. Appellant's App. at 110. Jacobs now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Jacobs makes several arguments on appeal. He argues the trial court erred by: (1) failing to convert Defendant's motion to a motion for summary judgment; (2) granting Defendants’ motion; (3) denying his motion to strike; and (4) dismissing his complaint with prejudice without providing him with the opportunity to amend his complaint. Jacobs represents himself in this appeal, and we note that “pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys.” Shawa v. Gillette, 209 N.E.3d 1196, 1199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh'g denied).

1. Standard of Review

[10] “An Ind[iana] Trial Rule 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings is to be granted ‘only where it is clear from the face of the complaint that under no circumstances could relief be granted.’ ” Osadchuk v. Rice, 203 N.E.3d 493, 502 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Consol. Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Water Servs., LLC, 994 N.E.2d 1192, 1196 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied). Our review of a trial court's decision on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is de novo. Id. However, Jacobs claims the court's consideration of Defendants’ Reply Exhibit 1, which he purports was “outside-the-pleadings evidence[,]” obligated the court to convert Defendants’ Rule 12(C) motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. Appellant's Brief at 36. While we agree with Jacobs that the court should have converted the motion, we conclude that he, rather than Defendants, triggered that obligation.

[11] “ ‘Pleadings’ consist of a complaint and an answer, a reply to any counterclaim, an answer to a cross-claim, a third-party complaint, and an answer to a third-party complaint[,]” Osadchuk, 203 N.E.3d at 502, as well as “any written instruments attached to a pleading, pursuant to Ind[iana] Trial Rule 9.2.”¹⁰ Consol. Ins. Co., 994 N.E.2d at1196. Furthermore, “[i]n the context of Rule 12 motions, ‘materials of which a trial court may take judicial notice ․ are not considered matters outside the pleading[s].’ ” Davidson v. State, 211 N.E.3d 914, 925 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Moss v. Horizon Bank, N.A., 120 N.E.3d 560, 563 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)), reh'g denied.

[12] Defendants’ Reply Exhibit 1 is a court order from the underlying personal injury case, meaning it was judicially noticeable material and was not outside of the pleadings for purposes of ruling on the motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Ind. Evidence Rule 201(b)(5) (authorizing the court to take judicial notice of “records of a court of this state”). Jacobs offers no argument on appeal that the court could not take judicial notice of that court record and thus waives any such challenge. See Davidson, 211 N.E.3d at 925 (concluding that appellant “waived any argument that the court should not have judicially noticed the[ ] materials by failing to raise the argument in her opening appellate brief”). As such, that document was not “outside-the-pleadings evidence” as Jacobs purports and did not require the court to convert Defendants’ motion to one for summary judgment.¹¹

[13] Of the materials considered by the trial court that would trigger conversion to summary judgment, it was Jacobs’ exhibits that created such necessity. However, the court's “failure to [convert the motion] does not constitute reversible error, and we may treat the [motion for judgment on the pleadings] as a motion for summary judgment” on appeal.¹² Osadchuk, 203 N.E.3d at 503. The standard of review for summary judgment is well established:

Summary judgment is appropriate only where the evidence shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. All facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are construed in favor of the nonmoving party. To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a party must demonstrate that the undisputed material facts negate at least one element of the other party's claim. Once the moving party has met this burden with a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish that a genuine issue does in fact exist. The party appealing the summary judgment bears the burden of persuading us that the trial court erred.

Id. at 503-04 (quoting Holmes v. Celadon Trucking Servs. of Ind., Inc., 936 N.E.2d 1254, 1256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)). We review the court's ruling de novo. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). Bearing in mind Jacobs’ burden on appeal, we turn to the allegations in his complaint.

2. Jacobs’ Claims

[14] In Count I of his complaint, Jacobs alleged Tufts had engaged in legal malpractice during his representation in the underlying case. A legal malpractice claim is proven by showing four elements: “(1) employment of the attorney (the duty); (2) failure of the attorney to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge (the breach); (3) proximate cause (causation); and (4) loss to the plaintiff (damages).” Osadchuk, 203 N.E.3d at 504. If the undisputed material facts negate even one of these elements, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. Clary v. Lite Machs. Corp., 850 N.E.2d 423, 430 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Here, Jacobs specifically alleged:

Defendants owed duties of competence, diligence, loyalty, and communication, including to cease acting upon discharge while promptly seeking withdrawal.

By sponsoring or allowing a joint case-management plan by counsel that later populated on the docket as they withdrew after acknowledging termination, Defendants breached those duties.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 12. In support, he offered the following facts:

7. On Sunday, June 15, 2025 at 7:51 PM, I terminated Hensley's representation and revoked all authority in writing.

․

9. At 11:51 AM, Mr. Tufts acknowledged termination in writing, promised to file a Motion to Withdraw that day, stated there were no court-ordered deadlines, and wrote: We will not seek repayment of advanced expenses nor for legal services performed.

10. At 12:42 PM, Hensley's case manager transmitted my client file via OneDrive link.

11. At 4:00 PM, Mr. Tufts emailed [insurance defense counsel] that he had filed the Motion to Withdraw and that Hensley would no longer be serving as my counsel as of that day.

12. At 4:46 PM, Mr. Tufts emailed that although the Case Management Order states it was ordered June 13, 2025, it was not uploaded to the Court's docket until after he filed the withdrawal that afternoon; he listed newly populated trial and pretrial settings.

13. The Joint Proposed Case Management Order (by counsel) commits the parties to long deadlines and late-2026 trial readiness.

14. The sequence above shows that after termination was acknowledged and as Hensley filed to withdraw, a long-horizon schedule populated on the docket based on a joint plan by counsel, depriving me as a newly pro se litigant of a meaningful opportunity to be heard on that schedule.

Id. at 10-11 (citations to exhibits omitted).

[15] On appeal, Jacobs claims

at the precise moment Tufts made the joint case-management filing, he had already been terminated ․ and had not yet formally withdrawn as counsel of record. He therefore made an affirmative filing in a court proceeding on behalf of a client whose authority he no longer held, before taking the procedural step that would have made his involvement in the case visible to the court.

Appellant's Br. at 13. Jacobs’ ultimate contention is incorrect. Neither the facts alleged in his complaint nor his evidence offered in response to Defendants’ motion show that Tufts “made an affirmative filing in a court proceeding on behalf of a client whose authority he no longer held[.]” Id.

[16] Rather, an exhibit Jacobs himself filed establishes that Tufts filed the joint proposed case management plan on June 9, six days before Jacobs terminated his representation. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 42 (referencing the “Proposed Case Management Order (filed June 9, 2025)”) (emphasis added). Then, on June 16, the trial court docketed its June 13 order approving the proposed case management plan. There is nothing to suggest Tufts had any role or say in the court's decision to upload its order on June 16. Tufts still represented Jacobs when he filed the proposed case management plan on June 9 and therefore was authorized to act on Jacobs’ behalf. And other than emailing Jacobs about important updates to his case and filing a motion to withdraw, there is no evidence Tufts took any action after Jacobs terminated his representation. In light of this evidence, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Tufts breached his purported duties “to cease acting upon discharge while promptly seeking withdrawal” or maintain “competence, diligence, loyalty, and communication[.]” Id. at 12.

[17] Because Jacobs’ malpractice claim fails on the element of breach, Tufts was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that claim and we need not address the remaining elements. And critically, all of Jacobs’ remaining claims and prayers for relief are based on his mistaken belief that Tufts was responsible for the appearance of the case management plan on the docket on June 16. As discussed, the factual allegations in Jacobs’ complaint and his supporting evidence do not create a genuine issue as to that fact. Thus, we conclude the trial court did not err in granting Defendants’ motion and dismissing Jacobs’ complaint.

[18] Furthermore, we reject Jacobs’ argument that under these circumstances, the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint with prejudice. Jacobs is correct that “where a motion for judgment on the pleadings raises a defense of failure to state claim upon which relief can be granted, the motion ․ should be treated in the same manner as a Trial Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Mourning v. Allison Transmission, Inc., 72 N.E.3d 482, 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). And under Rule 12(B), “[w]hen a motion to dismiss is sustained for failure to state a claim[,]” the plaintiff may generally amend their complaint once as of right within ten days of the court's order, making dismissal with prejudice improper. However, because we reviewed Defendants’ motion as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 which does not provide a similar right to amend, we need not address this argument. And even if that weren't the case, Jacobs’ failure to indicate how he would have amended his complaint to avoid dismissal renders any error harmless. Springbrook Vill. Batesville LLC v. Southeast Ind. Title Inc., 195 N.E.3d 398, 402 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), reh'g denied, trans. denied. We further note that Jacobs’ complaint in this action was his second attempt to file a legal malpractice claim against Defendants, his first having been dismissed without prejudice after the trial court concluded he failed to file a complaint that complied with the Trial Rules. Jacobs fails to explain why he should be given a third bite at the apple after his first two attempts to sue Defendants failed.

Conclusion

[19] Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court's decision.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 201, we take judicial notice of the records filed under Cause No. 49C01-2505-CT-21330. Ind. Evidence Rule 201(b)(5) (“A court may judicially notice ․ records of a court of this state[.]”).

2.   Marion County Local Rule 207(B) provides that within ten days of the case management conference, the parties must file a “joint Case Management Order setting forth” certain information, including discovery schedules, deadlines for filings, and an estimated date they expect to be ready for trial.

3.   We take judicial notice of the records filed under Cause No. 29D05-2506-CT-6889.

4.   Final Pre-Filing Settlement Demand – Escalation Notice at 4, Jacobs v. Hensley Legal Grp. (June 20, 2025) (No. 29D05-2506-CT-6889).

5.   Final Pre-Filing Settlement Demand – Escalation Notice, supra note 4, at 5.

6.   Order of September 23, 2025, Jacobs v. Hensley Legal Grp. (Oct. 2, 2025) (No. 29D05-2506-CT-6889).

7.   Order, Jacobs v. Hensley Legal Grp. (Oct. 20, 2025) (No. 25A-CT-2494).

8.   Before the case settled, Jacobs filed hundreds of documents in the span of just a few months, many of which accused defense counsel for the insurance company of acting in concert with Tufts when they filed what he characterized as the fraudulent joint case management plan. Moreover, in July 2025, Jacobs filed an individual complaint against the insurer under Cause No. 49D02-2507-CT-34965 that made similar allegations of misconduct, which he followed with a proposed class action complaint in August under Cause No. 49D06-2508-CT-43035. The class action complaint was dismissed with prejudice in January 2026, and that order of dismissal is currently pending appeal in this Court under Case No. 26A-CT-507.

9.   Jacobs claims Defendants acted negligently in transition by “fail[ing] to take reasonably practicable steps at the moment [he] became pro se and the docket populated with long-horizon deadlines based on a ‘by counsel’ plan.” Appellant's Br. at 39.

10.   Trial Rule 9.2(A) provides in part that “[w]hen any pleading allowed by these rules is founded on a written instrument, the original, or a copy thereof, shall be included in or filed with the pleading. Such instrument ․ shall be taken as part of the record.”

11.   For these same reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jacobs’ motion to strike or otherwise exclude the July 23 court order that Defendants attached to their Reply. See Halterman v. Adams Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 991 N.E.2d 987, 989 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (“We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court's decision on a motion to strike.”).

12.   Jacobs briefly mentions that the trial court's failure to convert the motion to one for summary judgment denied him other rights under Trial Rule 56, namely, to designate competing evidence and do limited discovery in response to Defendants’ motion. See Appellant's Brief at 34. However, because it was the materials he submitted in response to Defendants’ motion that triggered the need for conversion, Jacobs was afforded the opportunity to present ample evidence in opposition to the motion. And he presents no argument as to what other evidence he would designate or discovery he would pursue. Thus, we find any error was harmless. See Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A) (“No error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the trial court ․ is ground for granting relief or reversal on appeal where its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.”).

DeBoer, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.