Joshua P. Martinez, Appellant/Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee/Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Early in the morning of November 3, 2024, Carlos Martinez (“Carlos”), Romulo Reyes, Joshua Martinez, and Lucas Montano were all attending a party in Elkhart when a fight broke out. Montano and Martinez were ejected from the party and told to leave. As Montano and Martinez walked to their car, Martinez began to run, followed by Reyes, Carlos, and then Montano. Martinez reached the car first, and Reyes attempted to pin him with the car door.

[2] Martinez began shooting, hitting Carlos before shooting Reyes in the back as he attempted to flee, killing him. Martinez and Montano drove off, running Carlos over as they maneuvered the car out of its parking spot. The State charged Martinez with murder and Level 1 felony attempted murder. Prior to trial, Martinez filed notice of his intent to pursue a claim of self-defense, and the State moved in limine to exclude evidence regarding Carlos's immigration status and that he had possessed a firearm at some point prior to the shooting. The trial court allowed Martinez to question Carlos regarding his immigration status to explore the possibility that the State had forgone pursing criminal charges related to it in exchange for his testimony but denied his request to question Carlos regarding his prior possession of a firearm. After the jury found Martinez guilty of murder and attempted murder, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate sentence of ninety-eight years of incarceration. Martinez contends that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to rebut his claim of self-defense and that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow him to question Carlos about his prior possession of a firearm. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In November of 2024, Carlos was a manager at Madrid Tokio, a restaurant and club in downtown Elkhart, which was co-owned by Carlos's friend Reyes. Early in the morning of November 3, 2024, Carlos, Reyes, and two others left Madrid Tokio and went to a Halloween after-party that was being hosted by a friend of theirs at a pole barn in Elkhart. The foursome arrived at the after-party between 3:00 and 3:30 a.m., and there were two security guards patting down each attendee for weapons. After entering, Carlos stayed by the door near the security guards to help receive guests. Martinez and his friend Montano arrived at the after-party shortly after 3:00 a.m. and, like most attendees, were drinking and dancing.

[4] Around 4:30 a.m., a fight broke out in the barn, prompting security to escort some of those involved out of the party. Carlos followed because he knew that one of those involved was a customer of Madrid Tokio and believed that he could help to deescalate the situation. Reyes also left the party, and, shortly thereafter, security escorted Martinez and Montano outside as well.

[5] The group involved in the argument congregated in front of the barn. Carlos had gone with them and was telling them to “keep calm, get in their cars, and leave.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 113. Meanwhile, the host of the after-party and Reyes were telling Martinez and Montano to calm down and that they needed to leave. Martinez and Montano began walking through the cars in the parking lot away from the barn and towards the street, and, as they did so, Reyes followed a few feet behind them and one row of cars over.

[6] As Martinez and Montano passed the initial group of cars and began walking down the long driveway towards the street, Martinez began running. Reyes called out to Carlos that he needed help because Martinez “was gonna go after a gun, and he was gonna shoot everybody.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 116. Reyes and Carlos ran down the driveway after Martinez. When Martinez reached his car, he opened the front door and got in the front seat. Reyes arrived at the car first and pushed the car door on Martinez, attempting to “pin [him] with the door[.]” Tr. Vol. IV p. 141. As Reyes and Carlos stood outside the car, Martinez began shooting, exiting the car as he did. Martinez shot Carlos first, who fell to the ground and was unable to move. Martinez fired several more shots, hitting Reyes as Reyes ran away. Reyes stumbled away from Martinez and in between two cars for a few seconds, then came out from between the cars and attempted again to flee. Martinez shot Reyes again in the back, and he fell to the ground with wounds that ultimately proved fatal.

[7] Martinez returned to the driver's seat with Montano in the passenger's seat. As Martinez maneuvered his car out of the parking space, he struck Carlos several times. The last maneuver pushed Carlos's body forward several feet. Carlos suffered bullet wounds to his neck and arm, fractured vertebrae, road rash, and bruising, which left him fully paralyzed in his legs with only partial use of his arms.

[8] On November 8, 2024, the State charged Martinez with murder and the Level 1 felony attempted murder. On January 26, 2025, Martinez filed his notice of intent to assert self-defense. On May 1, 2025, the State filed a motion in limine requesting the exclusion of, inter alia, evidence of Carlos's immigration status and evidence that either Carlos or Reyes had possessed a firearm on occasions other than the day of the shooting. The evidence regarding Carlos's possession of a firearm apparently consists of a single photograph of Carlos holding one, which was taken at an unknown time and place.

[9] On May 5, 2025, prior to the beginning of trial, the trial court ruled that Martinez would be permitted to impeach Carlos by asking him about his immigration status but that any evidence that he had possessed a firearm at a previous, unrelated time was too prejudicial and raised the danger that jurors would make the inference that either Carlos or Reyes were “bad actor[s.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 18. The trial court further explained that the evidence it had heard was not sufficient to show that Carlos could be charged with a crime, and there was no evidence that the State had given special treatment to him in exchange for his testimony.

[10] Carlos testified about the shooting and admitted on cross-examination that he was in the country illegally. Martinez was allowed to question Carlos about the possibility that he had agreed with the State to testify in exchange for a special visa, which Carlos denied, stating that he “did not know” that the State would help him stay in the United States in exchange for his testimony. Tr. Vol. IV p. 150. Several witnesses who had been at the entrance to the barn when Martinez and Montano had been expelled, including the host and one of the security guards, testified that no one had made any threats outside the barn, either to Martinez or anyone else. At the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief, Martinez moved for a judgment of acquittal on the grounds that the State had not disproven self-defense, which motion the trial court denied.

[11] Martinez testified that the initial group that had been escorted outside had repeatedly told him that they were going to kill him. Martinez also testified that the security guards and Reyes had both been trying to get him to fight the other group and that, after Reyes had chased him to the car, he had been “smashing me against my car with the door [․] as hard as he could.” Tr. Vol. VI p. 178. On May 12, 2025, the jury found Martinez guilty of murder and attempted murder, and, on June 19, 2025, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate sentence of ninety-eight years of incarceration.

Discussion and Decision

I. The State Produced Sufficient Evidence to Rebut Martinez's Self-Defense Claim

[12] Martinez contends that the State produced insufficient evidence to rebut his claim that he had shot Carlos and Reyes in self-defense. “[S]elf-defense is legal justification for an otherwise criminal act.” Gammons v. State, 148 N.E.3d 301, 304 (Ind. 2020). A valid self-defense claim requires the defendant to show that he had “acted without fault.” Carroll v. State, 744 N.E.2d 432, 433 (Ind. 2001). Additionally, the force used by the defendant must be proportional to the threat. Turner v. State, 253 N.E.3d 526, 535 (Ind. 2025). “The self-defense statute provides that an individual has the right to use ‘reasonable force against any other person to protect the person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.’ ” Stewart v. State, 167 N.E.3d 367, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c)), trans. denied.

[13] To prevail on a claim of self-defense involving the use of deadly force, the defendant must show that: (1) he was in a place where he had a right to be; (2) he did not provoke, instigate, or participate willingly in the violence; and (3) he had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm. Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 800 (Ind. 2002). The Indiana Supreme Court has determined that the above language establishes both a subjective and an objective standard to evaluate the reasonableness of a defendant's belief that force was necessary to protect against the imminent use of unlawful force. Littler v. State, 871 N.E.2d 276, 279 (Ind. 2007). The defendant must actually believe that force is necessary, and that belief must be objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Id.

[14] When a defendant raises a self-defense claim which finds support in the evidence, the State carries the “burden of negating at least one of the necessary elements.” Hughes v. State, 153 N.E.3d 354, 361 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. “The State may meet this burden by rebutting the defense directly, by affirmatively showing the defendant did not act in self-defense, or by simply relying upon the sufficiency of its evidence in chief.” Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ind. 1999). Whether a defendant acted in self-defense is a question of fact for the jury. Taylor v. State, 710 N.E.2d 921, 924 (Ind. 1999). The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence rebutting a claim of self-defense is the same as any sufficiency review. Weedman v. State, 21 N.E.3d 873, 892 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. We will neither reweigh evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses, and we will reverse a conviction only if no reasonable person could say that self-defense was disproven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We conclude that this is not one of those cases.

[15] Regarding a subjective belief, Martinez argues that there is “no question” that he had believed that his life was in danger, Appellant's Br. p. 15, pointing to his testimony to that effect and what he contends was corroborating evidence that he was, in fact, afraid for his life at the time. The jury, however, was under no obligation to credit Martinez's claim of being “scared” or any of the other evidence of fear and likely did not. Tr. Vol. VI. p. 215; see, e.g., McCullough v. State, 985 N.E.2d 1135, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (providing that the jury, acting as the trier of fact, was under no obligation to credit defendant's statement to police that he had acted without fault or that his actions had been reasonable), trans. denied.

[16] As for whether Martinez has established an objectively reasonable fear of death, we conclude that, in light of the evidence most favorable to the judgment, he has not. Martinez points to evidence that he and Montano were threatened outside the party, but other evidence, which the jury was entitled to credit, contradicts this. Martinez also points to Carlos's testimony that Reyes was “pushing the car door” on Martinez, “trying to pin” him, and his own testimony that Reyes was attempting to open the door and “smashing him against the car” in the process. Tr. Vol. IV p. 141; Vol. VI p. 178. Relevant surveillance video, however, does not necessarily lead to a conclusion that Reyes's actions amounted to an attack.

[17] Exhibit 2B shows Martinez running to his car with Reyes, Carlos, and Montano not far behind. At the 0:16 mark, Martinez arrives at his car, Reyes arrives at 0:20, and Martinez fires the first shot at 0:25. In the five seconds between Reyes's arrival and first shot, there is no clear indication that Reyes was “smashing” Martinez with the car door; the jury was free to conclude that Reyes was merely attempting to prevent Martinez from accessing a firearm as opposed to attacking him. Again, the jury was under no obligation to credit Martinez's testimony and apparently did not. See McCullough, 985 N.E.2d at 1139. The jury was entitled to interpret Exhibit 2B in context with the other evidence presented at trial, an interpretation that we will not second-guess. See, e.g., Taylor, 710 N.E.2d at 924.

[18] In any event, even if we were to assume that Martinez's use of deadly force was subjectively and objectively reasonable initially, the jury was entitled to find that his use of force had ultimately been disproportionate to the level of the threat. Exhibit 2B does not clearly indicate how many shots Martinez fired, but he appears to have shot both victims multiple times, and one thing that is very clear is that he shot Reyes in the back as he attempted to flee. This was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that, even if Martinez's response had initially been reasonable, it had ultimately been disproportionate to the threat. Martinez's argument in this regard is nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Weedman, 21 N.E.3d at 892.

II. The Trial Court did not Abuse Its Discretion when It Limited Martinez's Cross-Examination of Carlos

[19] Martinez contends that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting his cross-examination of Carlos regarding the potential that he had made a deal with the State to secure leniency in exchange for his testimony. Martinez's specific argument is that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to allow him to cross-examine Carlos about his alleged possession of a firearm, which Martinez alleges could have led to charges the State declined to pursue in exchange for his testimony.¹

[20] The right to cross-examine witnesses is a fundamental right of the criminal justice system guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13, of the Indiana Constitution. See Collins v. State, 835 N.E.2d 1010, 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. The Sixth Amendment, however, does not prevent a trial judge from imposing limits on a defendant's questioning as to the potential bias of a prosecution witness. Id. The right of confrontation is “not absolute,” and is “subject to reasonable limitations” placed at the discretion of the trial judge. Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1268 (Ind. 2015). A trial court retains “wide latitude” to impose reasonable limits on the right of cross-examination based on “concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Wilson v. State, 39 N.E.3d 705, 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. A trial court's ruling will be reversed on appeal only for a clear abuse of discretion. Collins, 835 N.E.2d at 1015.

[21] Martinez argues that it was “failure to prosecute Carlos Martinez or refer him to federal authorities to do so” that “conferred a benefit” to Carlos. Appellant's Br. 22.

Our supreme court has acknowledged the importance of fully disclosing to the jury any beneficial agreement between an accomplice and the State, even when those agreements are not reduced to writing. [․] Nevertheless, our supreme court has also held that the duty to disclose arises when there is a confirmed promise of leniency in exchange for testimony and that preliminary discussions are not matters which are subject to mandatory disclosure. An express agreement requiring disclosure does not exist if a witness testifies favorably in the hope of leniency, and the State neither confirms nor denies leniency to the witness.

Seketa v. State, 817 N.E.2d 690, 693–94 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citations omitted).

[22] We have little hesitation in concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting Martinez's cross-examination of Carlos, because there was no evidence that he had entered into, or even discussed entering into, any agreement to testify with the State. In the absence of any such evidence, the trial court was entitled to accept the prosecutor's statement that “the only reason [Carlos] is cooperating in this is because he thinks it's the right thing to do.” Tr. Vol. II p. 10. While “ ‘pending charges that are the basis of an arrangement with the witness are a proper subject of cross-examination,’ ” there were no pending charges in this case and no evidence of an arrangement. Tolliver v. State, 922 N.E.2d 1272, 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Smith v. State, 721 N.E.2d 213, 219 (Ind. 1999)), trans. denied. A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying inquiry that is merely a fishing expedition into speculative deals that have no basis in fact. Id. at 1286; see also Collins, 835 N.E.2d at 1015 (concluding that defendant was not entitled to cross-examine the State's witness regarding his criminal history to attempt to show bias where witness denied the existence of any deal when questioned during defendant's offer of proof).² We conclude that Martinez's challenge to the trial court's limitation of his cross-examination of Carlos is without merit.

[23] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   As mentioned, the trial court did allow Martinez to cross-examine Carlos regarding his immigration status, with Martinez questioning him about the possibility that he had agreed with the State to testify in exchange for a special visa, which Carlos denied. (Tr. Vol. IV p. 150).

2.   The prosecutor also indicated that the only evidence that Carlos had ever possessed a firearm was a photograph of him holding a gun, the date and location of which could not be verified, making it much less likely that a possession charge could have even been brought. (Tr. Vol. IV 163–64).

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.