Jenarius Thurman, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Jenarius Thurman appeals from his conviction of Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. He claims that: (1) there is insufficient evidence to sustain the verdict; and (2) he should not have been convicted because he was exercising his right to free speech at the time of his arrest. Concluding that Thurman has failed to demonstrate error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On the afternoon of February 28, 2025, Officer Spencer Clark of the Lawrence Police Department was on patrol in an unmarked police vehicle. He was accompanied by his training officer, Sergeant Sean White. The officers saw a pickup truck that appeared to be speeding. Their car's radar unit confirmed that the truck was going fifty miles per hour in an area with a forty-mile-per-hour speed limit. In addition, the officers searched the truck's license plate number in their records and determined that the truck's registration had expired.

[3] Officer Clark activated his vehicle's red and blue emergency lights to signal the truck's driver to stop. The driver, later identified as Thurman, slowed down but did not immediately pull over, choosing instead to continue down the road for several blocks and turn into a parking lot before stopping.

[4] Before the truck stopped, the officers noted that Thurman was “reaching towards the center console and also the floorboard.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 80. They were concerned that Thurman may have been attempting to hide contraband or a weapon. Officer Clark asked for an additional officer to be dispatched to the scene.

[5] Next, the officers got out of their vehicle and approached Thurman's truck. Normally, both officers would have approached the passenger-side window. Due to concerns that Thurman may have concealed a weapon, Officer Clark walked up to the passenger window, and Sergeant White walked up to the driver's side. Officer Clark placed his hand on his holstered gun.

[6] Officer Clark told Thurman his name and explained why he had stopped him. Thurman called the officer a “liar” and a “racist” and asked him why he had his hand on his gun. Id. at 81. Next, Thurman demanded to speak with a supervisor and rolled up the passenger side window.

[7] Sergeant White, now at the driver's side window, again told Thurman why they had pulled him over. Thurman retrieved documents from the glove box while arguing loudly with the sergeant. He denied speeding or having an expired registration. Sergeant White asked Thurman to continue speaking with Officer Clark, and Thurman refused, claiming that Officer Clark was racist and complaining that the officer had his hand on a gun.

[8] The sergeant was resting his hand on his holstered taser. Thurman noticed and asked him why he had his hand on his “gun,” and also asked him if he was “trying to kill [Thurman].” Id. at 101. Sergeant White denied that his hand was on his gun and told Thurman to get out of the truck. Thurman refused, claiming that he was “scared for his life.” Id. at 83. The sergeant repeated his order “twelve or fifteen times.” Id. at 102. Thurman refused each time.

[9] Officer Andrew Thorup arrived and moved to stand next to Sergeant White. Officer Thorup drew his taser and told Thurman he would be tased if he did not step out of the vehicle. Thurman refused, saying he was not scared of a taser, and continued to argue.

[10] Sergeant White opened the driver's door, unbuckled Thurman's seat belt, and put a handcuff on Thurman's left wrist. Officer Clark walked around the truck as Sergeant White pulled Thurman out of the truck. Thurman tensed up and tried to pull away, refusing an order to put his hands behind his back, but the three officers finished handcuffing him.

[11] The officers moved Thurman to the back of the truck for further questioning. Thurman continued to yell and curse at the officers. He confronted Sergeant White, telling the officer to shoot him in the head and calling him a “bitch.” State's Ex. 1 at 2:17. Thurman loudly refused the officers’ directions to sit down, saying that he did not need to do that. In contrast to his earlier statement, he also told the officers he was not afraid, and he claimed that their behavior was illegal. He repeatedly demanded that they contact a supervisor.

[12] Next, Officer Clark and Sergeant White returned to Officer Clark's vehicle to confer. Officer Thorup moved Thurman to the front of that vehicle, where Thurman continued to deny that he was speeding or that his registration had expired. At one point, Thurman moved toward Officer Thorup, telling the officer to tase him. Officer Thorup directed Thurman to stay put and gently pushed Thurman back. Thurman fell back onto the hood of Officer Clark's vehicle and then slid onto the ground, landing on his rear end. He screamed “very loudly” that the officer had pushed him and shouted, “help they are trying to kill me.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 84.

[13] Thurman repeatedly shouted for help at the top of his lungs, and he again claimed that the officers were trying to kill him. He also loudly asked anyone nearby to record what was happening. Next, Thurman told Officer Thorup to kick him while he was down, repeating that he was not afraid and calling the officers “bitches.” State's Ex. 3 at 5:48. Sergeant White told Thurman to lower his voice, advising that he was at risk of being arrested for disorderly conduct, but Thurman continued to yell for help and insult the officers for several minutes.

[14] During this encounter, several individuals at a nearby gas station stopped to watch, and some of them recorded the officers and Thurman. In addition, a vehicle passing by on the road slowed down, and someone in the car took a video of the scene with their phone.

[15] The State charged Thurman with Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement and Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. The case proceeded to a jury trial. All three officers testified, and their body camera recordings were introduced into evidence. The jury determined that Thurman was not guilty of resisting law enforcement but was guilty of disorderly conduct. The trial court imposed a suspended sentence of 176 days, and this appeal followed.

Issues

[16] Thurman presents two issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Thurman's conviction of disorderly conduct.

II. Whether Thurman could not be convicted because he was engaging in free speech that was protected by the Indiana Constitution.

Discussion and Decision

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence – Unreasonable Noise

[17] Thurman first claims that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction of Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. “When reviewing sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Denney v. State, 219 N.E.3d 784, 787 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). Instead, we consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence. Id. “If there is substantial evidence of probative value from which a reasonable factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the judgment will not be disturbed.” McCoy v. State, 157 N.E.3d 28, 31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

[18] To obtain a conviction of disorderly conduct as charged, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Thurman (2) recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally (3) made unreasonable noise and continued to do so after being asked to stop. Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3(a)(2) (2014); Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 15.

[19] Thurman claims that there is insufficient evidence that he made unreasonable noise. Regarding that element of the offense, “[t]he State must prove that a defendant produced decibels of sound that were too loud for the circumstances.” Whittington v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1363, 1367 (Ind. 1996). The Indiana Supreme Court has noted that loud noise could be found to be unreasonable in several contexts, including when it “disrupt[s] police investigations.” Id.

[20] Here, Thurman loudly argued with the officers at length during the traffic stop, denying that he had committed any infractions and accusing them of racism. He also alternatively claimed that he was scared for his life and not scared of the officers and urged them to shoot him in the head or tase him.

[21] After Thurman approached Officer Thorup, who pushed him away, causing him to back into a vehicle and fall to the ground, Thurman increased his shouting to the top of his voice, exclaiming that the officers were trying to kill him and asking anyone nearby to record the interaction. He also continued to deny that he had done anything wrong and insulted the officers. The officers advised him to calm down or stop yelling more than once, and Sergeant White specifically warned Thurman that he could be arrested for disorderly conduct, but Thurman continued to shout, disrupting and delaying the completion of the traffic stop. His loud shouting attracted the attention of persons at a nearby gas station and caused a passing vehicle to slow down on the road. This is sufficient evidence that Thurman made unreasonable noise. See Blackman v. State, 868 N.E.2d 579, 584 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (affirming conviction of disorderly conduct; defendant yelled at officers during investigation, disrupting their work and drawing a crowd), trans. denied.

II. Freedom of Speech – Indiana Constitution

[22] Thurman next argues that his conviction cannot stand because he was exercising his freedom of speech under the Indiana Constitution. Article 1, section 9 provides: “No law shall be passed, restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject whatever: but for the abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible.”

[23] When determining whether the police violated a citizen's rights under article 1, section 9 during an encounter, we must determine: “(1) whether state action has restricted a claimant's expressive activity and (2) if it has, whether the restricted activity constituted an ‘abuse’ of the right to speak.” Anderson v. State, 881 N.E.2d 86, 90 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[24] The first element of the inquiry may be satisfied when the evidence shows that an officer restricted a defendant from speaking loudly during a police investigation. McCoy, 157 N.E.3d at 32. Here, the three police officers arrested Thurman for disorderly conduct and resisting law enforcement after he repeatedly shouted at them and requested help from others, establishing the first element of the analysis.

[25] The second element of the analysis “hinges upon whether the claimant's expression constituted political speech.” Id. When the State files charges against a person, they have effectively alleged that the defendant's expressive activity was an abuse of the right to free speech. See Anderson, 881 N.E.2d at 91 (stating that State “could have reasonably concluded” that Anderson's statements were abuse of his free speech rights). “Generally, when we review the State's determination that a claimant's expression was an abuse of the right to free speech under the Indiana Constitution, we need only find that the determination was rational.” Id. at 90. But if the expressive activity that was the subject of the disorderly conduct charge is political in nature, the State must demonstrate that it did not materially burden the defendant's right to engage in political expression. Id.

[26] The Anderson Court further stated:

Expressive activity is political if its aim is to comment on government action, including criticism of an official acting under color of law. However, where the individual's expression focuses on the conduct of a private party, including the speaker himself, it is not political. We apply an objective standard when reviewing the nature of the expression. The claimant bears the burden of proving that the expressive activity was not an abuse of his right to free speech by showing that his expression was political. If the expression is ambiguous, then the expression is not political, and we review the State's restriction of the expression under standard rational review.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

[27] Thurman asserts that his speech was political in nature because he was “criticizing the officers[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 15. We conclude that the evidence is ambiguous at best. Although he stated several times that he thought the officers’ conduct was illegal, he also focused on his own private conduct, emphatically and repeatedly denying that he was speeding or had an expired registration. In addition, Thurman shouted to anyone within hearing distance that the officers were trying to kill him, but he also behaved aggressively toward the officers, telling them to shoot, tase, or kick him. He has not shown that his expressive activity was political in nature. See Williams v. State, 59 N.E.3d 287, 294-95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (defendant's speech during confrontation with police was not political; defendant referred to her own conduct in addition to challenging legality of officers’ conduct); cf. McCoy, 157 N.E.3d at 32-33 (defendant's speech during discussion with police was political; defendant intervened in eviction situation and her statements were directed entirely at legality of officers’ conduct).

[28] We must now decide whether the State rationally determined that Thurman had abused his right to free speech. An abuse of the right to speak is “a threat to peace, safety, and well-being.” Whittington, 669 N.E.2d at 1371. Here, Thurman's loud, insulting, and erratic outbursts prevented the officers from resolving the traffic stop. Further, his shouted requests for others to record the officers caused at least one car to slow down on a nearby road, potentially posing a traffic hazard, so that the car's occupant could record the encounter. This evidence provides a rational basis for the State's determination that Thurman had abused his freedom of expression. See id. (State had rational basis to arrest defendant while investigating allegation of physical assault; defendant loudly and angrily interrupted police while they questioned others and refused to sit down or be quiet). Thurman has failed to demonstrate that the State violated his right to freedom of speech under article 1, section 9.

Conclusion

[29] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[30] Affirmed.

Baker, Senior Judge.

Mathias, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.