Robert Lee Mills, Jr., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Robert Lee Mills, Jr., appeals his conviction for Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct, arguing that his conduct was protected speech under Article 1, Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In April 2024, Mills was pulled over by Brownsburg police and received a traffic citation for operating a motor vehicle without financial responsibility and improper headlights. See Cause No. 32I02-2404-IF-704. A bench trial on the citation was set for June 26, 2024. Before trial, Mills sent a “public record request” to the Brownsburg Town Court, alleging that the traffic stop was unlawful and seeking “[B]rady information and background on all the officers and the court, the administrators, the prosecutors, everybody involved.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 205. Mills also purportedly “submitted a $4 million lawsuit to the Town Manager” regarding the traffic stop. Ex. 3 at 12:18.

[3] On the day of the bench trial, Mills arrived in the lobby of the Brownsburg Police Department, which also houses the Town Court and Court Clerk's Office, about 30 minutes before court started. Several other people were in the lobby waiting for court to begin. Mills went up to the window of the clerk's office to “discuss the traffic stop” and “question [them] about why they refuse[d] to respond to [his] public record request.” Tr. Vol. 2 pp. 205, 219. Mills yelled at the clerk's office employee and began causing a disturbance, so the employee activated the panic alarm to alert police. Officers Matthew Dixon and Sarena Clay responded to the alarm. As they approached the lobby, Officer Dixon could hear Mills's voice “coming from across the entire lobby.” Id. at 204. Officer Dixon tried to deescalate the situation by asking Mills to step away from the window and sit down, but Mills “became upset” and refused. Id. at 174. One of the officers informed their supervisor, Corporal Daniel Brinson, that they needed a supervisor in the lobby “due to an unruly subject.” Tr. Vol. 3 p. 4.

[4] For the next 27 minutes, Mills yelled at the officers about the alleged illegality of the April traffic stop and the lack of a response to his public-records request. Both the clerk's office and the police department closed their windows and pulled the shades down due to Mills's yelling. Throughout his tirade, Mills was holding up his cell phone and recording. Corporal Brinson told Mills he'd have to put his phone away before court because courtroom policy prohibits cell phones. Mills asked to see the “law” prohibiting phones in the courtroom, stating, “I don't follow policies. I follow law.” Ex. 3 at 0:56. Officer Clay obtained a copy of the courtroom policy and began reading it, but Mills interrupted her. He later told Officer Clay, “Shut your mouth you dumb b***h.” Id. at 8:31. Corporal Brinson “raise[d] [his] voice” and told Mills not to cut Officer Clay off and to “just chill.” Tr. Vol. 3 p. 7. Mills “lean[ed] in towards” Corporal Brinson, id. at 84, and shouted, “Get loud, you c***sucker, get loud. And I'll get f***ing loud! Is that what you want? Shut the f*** up,” Ex. 3 at 2:09. Officer Taylor Adamson, who was inside the police department office, saw this interaction through the window and “felt that [his] presence was needed in the lobby in case of an attack.” Tr. Vol. 3 p. 84.

[5] Mills continued on about the legality of the April traffic stop. He told the officers, “You f***ed with the wrong person. I've been watching you pigs for over a f***ing year, videoing you motherf***ers and your unlawful actions.” Ex. 3 at 8:19. Mills has a YouTube channel on which he frequently posts videos of his interactions with law enforcement and other government employees, and he asked the officers if they'd watched his videos. Officer Adamson responded that he wasn't going to answer questions, and Mills said, “[Y]ou don't have the mental capacity to answer anything ‘cause you don't understand anything ‘cause you're a moron.” Id. at 13:44-13:58. Mills also said to Officer Adamson, who'd been present for the traffic stop, “You even conspired and joined in yourself searching my vehicle. What did you find? Tools? Huh? Your mom's douche nozzle?” Ex. 4 at 10:07.

[6] In addition to his comments to the officers, Mills made crude statements to another person waiting in the lobby. An elderly man told Mills to “grow up,” and Mills responded, “Why don't you grow a pair and quit letting these criminals take advantage of the people? ․ You're a moron. If you think you're free in America, you're wrong.” Ex. 3 at 3:50-4:02. Later, the man mentioned to Mills that he was homeless. Mills told him, “You need to get your mind right,” and “Maybe you should get back on drugs.” Id. at 20:21, 22:30. Eventually, Mills relented and put his cell phone away before court, but his unrest delayed the start of court by a couple of minutes.¹

[7] The State charged Mills with Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. Mills represented himself at trial. The jury found him guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to 120 days in the county jail.

[8] Mills, now represented by counsel, appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Mills contends that the State failed to prove that he committed disorderly conduct. To convict Mills of Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct, the State had to prove that he recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally engaged in fighting or in tumultuous conduct, made unreasonable noise and continued to do so after being asked to stop, or disrupted a lawful assembly of persons. See Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3(a); Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 108. Mills doesn't dispute that he made unreasonable noise and continued to do so after being asked to stop or that he disrupted a lawful assembly of persons. Rather, he argues that his conduct constituted protected speech under Article 1, Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution and thus cannot serve as the basis for a disorderly-conduct conviction.²

[10] At the outset, we note that Mills did not raise this argument in the trial court, either through a motion to dismiss or during the jury trial. Generally, arguments raised for the first time on appeal are waived. Stewart v. State, 945 N.E.2d 1277, 1288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. But the State does not argue waiver, so we will consider the merits of Mills's claim.

[11] Article 1, Section 9 prohibits the legislature from passing any law “restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject whatever.” This clause is not absolute and also provides, “but for the abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible.” Ind. Const. art. 1, § 9. “Because one's conduct or expression may be free speech protected under the Indiana Constitution, an application of the disorderly conduct statute must pass constitutional scrutiny.” Barnes v. State, 946 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Ind. 2011), adhered to on reh'g, 953 N.E.2d 473. “We employ a two-step inquiry in reviewing the constitutionality of an application of the disorderly conduct statute: we (1) determine whether state action has restricted a claimant's expressive activity and (2) decide whether the restricted activity constituted an ‘abuse’ of the right to speak.” Id. (quotations omitted).

[12] The State concedes that Mills's conviction for disorderly conduct amounts to a restriction of his expressive activity, so we turn to step two. This step hinges on whether the restricted expression constituted political speech. Id. If the claimant demonstrates under an objective standard that “the expressive activity that precipitated the disorderly conduct conviction was political in nature, ․ the burden shifts to the State to show that it did not materially burden the claimant's opportunity to engage in political expression.” Blackman v. State, 868 N.E.2d 579, 585 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. But if the expression was not political, we review the State's restriction of the expression under standard rationality review. Id. We judge the nature of expression under an objective standard, and the burden is on the claimant to demonstrate that his or her expression would have been understood as political. Wells v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1133, 1148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). “If the expression, viewed in context, is ambiguous, a reviewing court should find that the claimant has not established that it was political ․” Id.

[13] Expressive activity is political if its point is to comment on government action, including criticizing the conduct of an official acting under color of law. Id. But expression that is directed toward or refers to the conduct of a private party, even if in part, is not protected political expression. Stone v. State, 128 N.E.3d 475, 483 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. “Likewise, speech in which the speaker refers to him- or herself, even when prompted by a state actor's conduct or statements, and even when coupled with political statements, permits a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that the focus of the entirety of the speech is ambiguous and, therefore, not political.” Id. (quotation omitted). “In other words, where speech is at least in part not germane to a public issue, a trier of fact may find the speech as a whole not protected by Article 1, Section 9.” Id.

[14] We acknowledge that much of Mills's tirade included commentary on government action, specifically the legality of the April 2024 traffic stop, the lack of response to his public-records request, and the policy prohibiting cell phones in the courtroom. But other parts of Mills's speech were not germane to any public issue. He made statements to the Brownsburg police officers that had nothing to do with their official conduct, including telling Officer Clay, “Shut your mouth you dumb b***h,” calling Corporal Brinson a “c***sucker” and telling him to “[s]hut the f*** up,” and making a comment to Officer Adamson about “[his] mom's douche nozzle” and calling him a “moron.” Mills also directed some of his comments to a private party—he called an elderly man a “moron,” told him to “grow a pair” and “get his mind right,” and, after learning that the man was homeless, suggested that he “get back on drugs.” Because these remarks were not comments on government action or otherwise germane to a public issue, we conclude that the focus of Mills's speech as a whole is ambiguous and therefore not political. See Blackman, 868 N.E.2d at 586 (concluding based on the “dual nature of Blackman's outbursts” that “although Blackman's expressive activity began as political speech, it did not end as such”); Stone, 128 N.E.3d at 483 (“Even if those comments are coupled with political statements, a reasonable fact-finder could conclude from them that the focus of the entirety of the speech ․ is ambiguous and, therefore, not political.” (quotation omitted)).

[15] Accordingly, we evaluate Mills's speech under standard rationality review. In doing so, we determine whether the State rationally could have concluded that Mills's expressive activity, because of its volume, was an abuse of his right to speak. Williams v. State, 59 N.E.3d 287, 295 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). In other words, we consider whether Mills's speech was “a threat to peace, safety, and well-being.” Id.

[16] Four police officers had to respond to Mills's disturbance. When Officers Dixon and Clay first went to the lobby after the panic alarm was activated, Officer Dixon could hear Mills's voice “coming from across the entire lobby.” The officers then had to call their supervisor, Corporal Brinson, because Mills was being “unruly.” And after Mills leaned toward Corporal Brinson and shouted, “[G]et loud. And I'll get f***ing loud!” Officer Adamson went into the lobby because he “felt that [his] presence was needed in the lobby in case of an attack.” Additionally, both the clerk's office and the police department closed their windows and pulled the shades down, and court started a couple of minutes late due to Mills's conduct. Under these circumstances, in charging Mills with disorderly conduct, the State rationally could have concluded that his expressive activity was an abuse of his right to speak. See Blackman, 868 N.E.2d at 587 (“Here, in filing the charges, the State could have reasonably concluded that Blackman's expressive activity because of its volume, the attention that it attracted, the potential threat to officer safety, and the ensuing interference with the officers’ investigation, was a threat to peace, safety, and well-being, and therefore, was an abuse of Blackman's right to speak.” (quotation omitted)). Mills's conviction for disorderly conduct does not violate Article 1, Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mills initially went into court, but he left the courtroom during the bench trial on his traffic citation. He was tried in absentia and found guilty. See Cause No. 32I02-2404-IF-704 (June 26, 2024 CCS entry).

2.   Mills argues that there is insufficient evidence that he engaged in fighting or tumultuous conduct, but the State had to prove only one of the elements in Indiana Code section 35-45-1-3(a). Because Mills doesn't challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that he made unreasonable noise and continued to do so after being asked to stop or that he disrupted a lawful assembly of persons, we need not address his sufficiency argument.

Vaidik, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Scheele, J., concur.