Laura R. Warner, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Laura Warner appeals the Franklin Circuit Court's revocation of her probation and sentence. Warner presents two issues for our review:

1. Whether she knowingly waived her right to an attorney at the probation revocation hearing.

2. Whether the trial court erred when it sentenced her.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] For several months in 2016, Warner repeatedly drove Roy Peters round trip from Indiana to Georgia to purchase methamphetamine for Peters to sell in Indiana. Warner was paid for her services in cash and methamphetamine. In 2018, the State charged Warner with Level 2 felony conspiracy to deal in methamphetamine. And, on March 6, 2019, Warner pleaded guilty to Level 4 felony conspiracy to deal in methamphetamine. The trial court sentenced her to six years in the Department of Correction, with four years suspended to probation.

[4] While Warner was on probation in October 2020, the State charged her with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe, Level 6 felony legend drug deception, Level 6 felony possession of a narcotic drug, and Class A misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance in Case No. 21D01-2010-F6-600 (“F6-600”). In April 2021, Warner pleaded guilty to Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine.

[5] In July 2022, Warner tested positive for methamphetamine. And, in August 2022, the State charged Warner with Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine, Level 6 felony possession of a narcotic drug, Level 6 felony obstruction of justice, Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia in Case No. 21C01-2208-F5-557 (“F5-557”).

[6] Accordingly, in September 2022, the State filed a petition alleging that Warner had violated the terms of her probation. And, in December 2025, the State filed an amended petition stating that Warner had pleaded guilty to Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine in F5-557 and that she had tested positive for methamphetamine, marijuana, and buprenorphine in November 2025.¹

[7] During a hearing on the amended petition, Warner appeared without counsel. The trial court engaged her in the following colloquy:

[THE COURT:] There was a probation—there [were] two probation violation petitions filed against you, one on September 29th, 2022, and the other one on December 11th of 2025. You have the right to take these to a hearing at which time the burden will be upon the State to prove that you violated your terms and conditions of probation.

[WARNER]: Okay.

THE COURT: And that burden will be by a preponderance of the evidence. You do have the right to face all witnesses against you and to see, hear, question, and cross-examine those witnesses. You also have the right to call witnesses to testify on your own behalf.

[WARNER]: Okay.

THE COURT: The Court can assist you in that right by issuing subpoenas. If there's any allegation in either one of the petitions that relates to an unresolved criminal case, you would have the right to remain silent with respect to those issues.

[WARNER]: Okay.

THE COURT: You do have the right to be heard in your own defense and to be represented by an attorney. If you cannot afford an attorney, if you meet certain criteria, the Court can appoint one for you․

* * *

THE COURT: Are you under the influence of any alcohol or drugs today?

[WARNER]: No, I'm not.

THE COURT: Did you understand the rights that I read to you?

[WARNER]: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: The petitions that were filed on September 29th, 2022, and December 11th, 2025, are that -- is that what you have in front of you there?

[WARNER]: Yes. Yes, I do.

THE COURT: Have you had a chance to read each one of those over?

[WARNER]: I have.

THE COURT: Do you have any questions about either one?

[WARNER]: Well, the question I have is if I've been failing for drug tests․

THE COURT: Well, let me --

[WARNER]: -- wouldn't it be better to send me to․

THE COURT: Well, let me go over the petition with you․

[WARNER]: Okay.

THE COURT: -- and we'll talk about that here in a minute, okay?

[WARNER]: Okay.

THE COURT: So if you look at paragraph two of the petition, that contains the information of why you were placed on probation and how much time was suspended to probation.

[WARNER]: Okay.

THE COURT: If you're found to have violated, that time could be revoked and you would have to serve that time, or your terms and conditions of probation could be extended or modified. Do you understand that?

[WARNER]: Oh, okay. Okay.

THE COURT: Then if you look at paragraph four of each petition, that contains the specific allegations of how you violated probation. Do you have any questions about that?

[WARNER]: No, I do not.

THE COURT: And do you wish to admit or deny today?

[WARNER]: I am going to plead guilty today, admit.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you -- okay. It looks like the criminal cases that were the subject of these petitions have been resolved. Is that correct?

[STATE]: That's what it -- yeah. Per the petition, Judge. That's why I'm ready.

THE COURT: Okay. Ma'am, do you understand that by admitting today you're giving up your right to take this matter to a hearing or a fact-finding where the State would have to prove that you violated your terms and conditions of probation?

[WARNER]: Yes.

THE COURT: And do you understand that at that hearing you'd have the right to be represented by an attorney to assist you? Do you understand that?

[WARNER]: Yes, I understand.

THE COURT: Do you want to proceed today without an attorney?

[WARNER]: Yes, I do. Yes.

THE COURT: Has anybody forced you or threatened you to get you to admit?

[WARNER]: No. I just -- I believe that I need to be put in a rehab.

THE COURT: Well, we'll․

[WARNER]: Jails and institutions aren't doing me any good.

THE COURT: We'll get to that here -- we'll get to that here in a minute.

[WARNER]: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay. I just want to be satisfied that you understand that by admitting today you're not going to have a fact-finding or a trial where the State has to prove it. You understand that?

[WARNER]: Okay. Yes, I do. I understand

THE COURT: Okay. [The prosecutor] is here. He understands the rules of evidence and rules of procedure. He understands criminal law. You have the right to be represented by an attorney, but you've indicated that you don't want to have an attorney. Is that correct?

[WARNER]: Right. I -- correct. Correct.

THE COURT: Okay. And has anybody forced you or threatened you to get you to admit today?

[WARNER]: No.

THE COURT: Has anybody promised you anything of value to get you to admit?

[WARNER]: No.

THE COURT: By admitting that you violated your terms and conditions of probation, is that how -- is that how you want to resolve the case?

[WARNER]: Yeah.

THE COURT: Okay.

Tr. pp. 41-45 (emphasis added). The trial court revoked Warner's probation and sentenced her as follows:

The Court now revokes Four (4) years of the previously suspended sentence to be served in the Indiana Department of Correction[ ]. Probation in this matter is terminated. [Warner] is eligible to participate in the Recovery While Incarcerated (RWI) program while serving her sentence at the Indiana Department of Correction[ ]. If [Warner] successfully completes the RWI program, she is entitled to petition the Court for modification of sentence, but the Court is not bound to Grant it.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 84. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Right to Counsel

[8] Warner first contends that her waiver of counsel was not made knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily. Warner maintains that the trial court's advisement of her right to counsel was inadequate because, among other things, it did not warn her about the dangers of self-representation. As the State points out, however, Warner cannot raise this issue on direct appeal because she admitted to the probation violations.

[9] As this Court explained in Dobrowolski v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1168, 1171 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022):

a defendant forfeits the right to challenge a conviction on direct appeal after pleading guilty. See Alvey v. State, 911 N.E.2d 1248, 1250 (Ind. 2009) (holding defendant could not challenge trial court's ruling on motion to suppress after pleading guilty to the underlying charge). Likewise, a probationer may not challenge on direct appeal a finding the probationer violated the conditions of his probation after admitting a violation. See Kirkland v. State, 176 N.E.3d 986, 989 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (declining to address improperly brought direct appeal challenge to the validity of probationer's waiver of his right to counsel and probation violation admission).

Thus, here, to challenge the validity of her waiver of counsel, Warner must do so through a petition for post-conviction relief under Post-Conviction Rule 1. Id.

[10] We reject Warner's argument in her reply brief that we should consider this issue on direct appeal because “[t]he failure of the trial court to warn her of the risks of self-representation ․ is readily apparent from the record.” Reply Br. at 5. In support, Warner cites Snyder v. State, 176 N.E.3d 995, 999 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), where we addressed a double jeopardy issue despite the defendant's guilty plea where “the double jeopardy violation was conceded by the parties and determined by the trial court below.” Unlike Snyder, where the trial court's error was “glaringly erroneous,” here, the record shows that the trial court advised Warner of her right to an attorney. Id. at 1000. Warner merely argues that the advisement should have been more thorough. We decline Warner's invitation to apply the reasoning in Snyder here, and we conclude that her remedy, if any, lies in the post-conviction process.

Issue Two: Sentence

[11] Warner also argues that the trial court erroneously applied Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3 when it sentenced her. She maintains that, in advising her of the possible sanctions she faced by admitting to the probation violations, rather than stating that she was facing either a modification of probation or an executed sentence for all or part of the four-year suspended sentence, the court stated that she “would have to serve that time” unless the court modified her probation. Tr. p. 43. In short, Warner contends that this statement shows that the trial court erroneously believed that it had to sentence Warner either to all four years executed or no time executed. We do not agree.

[12] In appeals from trial court probation violation determinations and sanctions, we review for abuse of discretion. Hammann v. State, 210 N.E.3d 823, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citation omitted). An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or when the trial court misinterprets the law. Id. (citations omitted).

[13] Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(h) provides that, upon the revocation of a defendant's probation, the court has discretion to impose one or more of the following sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

[14] Here, during the probation revocation hearing, the trial court asked Warner preliminary questions about her understanding of the allegations against her and stated in relevant part:

THE COURT: Well, let me go over the petition with you․

[WARNER]: Okay.

THE COURT: -- and we'll talk about that here in a minute, okay?

[WARNER]: Okay.

THE COURT: So if you look at paragraph two of the petition, that contains the information of why you were placed on probation and how much time was suspended to probation.

[WARNER]: Okay.

THE COURT: If you're found to have violated, that time could be revoked and you would have to serve that time, or your terms and conditions of probation could be extended or modified. Do you understand that?

[WARNER]: Oh, okay. Okay.

THE COURT: Then if you look at paragraph four of each petition, that contains the specific allegations of how you violated probation. Do you have any questions about that?

[WARNER]: No, I do not.

Tr. p. 43 (emphasis added).

[15] After Warner admitted to the violations, the State recommended that the court sentence her to four years executed and make her eligible for the Recovery While Incarcerated (“RWI”) program. The trial court noted that Warner had accrued multiple felony convictions to date and had not taken advantage of prior opportunities to treat her drug addiction outside of prison. Accordingly, the court sentenced Warner to four years executed and invited her to petition the court for a sentence reduction if she completed the RWI program. In imposing sentence, the trial court made no remarks suggesting that it misunderstood the sanction options under Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(h).

[16] We agree with the State that “[t]here is no explicit contrary statement in this record sufficient to overcome the presumption that the trial court was aware of its sanction options.” Appellee's Br. at 19. As the State points out, the sanction options under Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(h) have been the law for decades, and there is a presumption that the trial court knows and follows the applicable law. See Tharpe v. State, 955 N.E.2d 836, 842 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. Had the trial court stated explicitly that it was required to impose an executed four-year sentence or none, we would obviously agree with Warner. But because the trial court only vaguely referred to Warner having to serve “that time” in the context of advising her of her rights, we cannot say that the court erred. Tr. p 43.

[17] For all these reasons, we affirm Warner's probation revocation and sentence. [18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record does not reveal why no action was taken on the 2022 petition.

Mathias, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.