Darrell Wright, Appellant-Petitioner v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Darrell Wright appeals the order of the post-conviction court (“PC Court”) denying Wright's petition for post-conviction relief. Wright claims that the PC Court clearly erred by concluding that Wright's trial counsel was not ineffective. We disagree and affirm.

Issues

[2] Wright presents two issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether the PC Court clearly erred by concluding that Wright's trial counsel was not ineffective for allegedly failing to adequately advise Wright regarding the State's plea offer.

II. Whether the PC Court clearly erred by concluding that Wright's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present evidence at the sentencing hearing.

Facts and Procedural History

A. Facts Underlying Wright's Convictions

[3] On February 23, 2018, the Indiana State Police obtained a warrant to track a cell phone owned by Curtis Carter based on information that Carter was dealing in heroin. On March 5, 2018, the Cass County Drug Task Force was tracking the location of the phone as it traveled in a vehicle from Chicago toward Cass County. A Logansport Police Department detective, John Rogers, observed the vehicle, a Dodge Journey, speeding on the highway. Detective Rogers asked Deputy Ryan Preston of the Cass County Sheriff's Department to initiate a traffic stop of the vehicle for speeding. Wright was the driver of the Dodge, and Carter was the passenger.

[4] After pulling the Dodge over, Deputy Preston approached the vehicle and detected the odor of marijuana. Deputy Preston asked Wright to exit the Dodge so that he could conduct a canine sniff of the vehicle. Instead of complying with the deputy's instructions, Wright sped off and led the police on a high-speed chase. Wright eventually drove into a flooded road, and his vehicle stalled in the water. Deputy Preston observed Wright drop a plastic bag out of the driver's side window into the floodwater. Wright exited the vehicle and was apprehended by the police.

[5] Deputy Preston checked the area where Wright had dropped the bag and located the bag under the water. Inside the bag were smaller bags that contained white and tan balls of unknown substances. These substances were later determined to consist of over seventy-two grams of a mixture of heroin and fentanyl and over five grams of cocaine. Inside the Dodge, the officers found digital scales, plastic baggies, a razor blade, and latex gloves. A search of Wright's cell phone revealed text messages that referenced heroin and drug dealing.

B. Pretrial History

[6] On the same day that Wright was apprehended, the State charged him with: Count I: dealing in a narcotic drug, a Level 2 felony; Count II: possession of a narcotic drug, a Level 3 felony; Count III: dealing in cocaine, a Level 3 felony; Count IV: possession of cocaine, a Level 5 felony; Count V: resisting law enforcement, a Level 6 felony; and Count VI: obstruction of justice, a Level 6 felony.¹

[7] The day after Wright was charged, the trial court held an initial hearing and advised Wright of the sentencing range for each crime for which he was charged, but the trial court did not specifically inform Wright about the advisory sentences or the possibility of consecutive sentencing. The trial court appointed a public defender (“Trial Counsel”) to represent Wright. Trial Counsel met with Wright during his court appearances and communicated with him by mail, but he did not visit Wright in the jail.

[8] On July 27, 2018, the State sent a plea offer to Trial Counsel; under the terms of this offer, Wright would serve a sentence of “[f]lat 19 years DOC, no suspended time, no probation,” if Wright agreed to plead guilty to Count I and Count V. Ex. Vol. III pp. 150-51. Trial Counsel sent this offer to Wright via mail, but Wright did not accept the offer.

[9] Following negotiations, the State amended the plea offer on March 12, 2019. This amended offer included a nineteen-year cap on any executed sentence instead of a fixed nineteen-year sentence. The new plea offer was conditioned on being accepted no later than March 18, 2019. Trial Counsel informed Wright of the amended plea offer via mail and explained that he had convinced the State to replace the fixed sentence with a sentencing cap. Trial Counsel also told Wright that this plea offer was more favorable than the offer received by his co-defendant, Carter. Trial Counsel further informed Wright that he believed that the evidence was “more than sufficient” to convict Wright. Ex. Vol. III p. 184. Trial Counsel warned Wright that the State had threatened to file an habitual offender allegation if Wright did not plead guilty. Still, Wright did not accept the amended plea offer.

C. Trial and Sentencing History

[10] A two-day jury trial commenced on May 15, 2019, and the jury found Wright guilty as charged. The trial court scheduled the sentencing hearing for June 18, 2019. The day before the sentencing hearing, the probation department filed its pre-sentence investigation report (“PSI”). Although the PSI noted Wright's criminal history, it recommended a sentence of only thirteen years executed, including a minimum sentence of ten years on Count I. Trial Counsel decided to rely on the sentencing recommendation contained in the PSI instead of calling witnesses or submitting letters recommending a lenient sentence. Trial Counsel believed that relying on the neutral opinion of the PSI would be more persuasive than testimony from Wright's family or friends.

[11] At the sentencing hearing, Trial Counsel argued that Wright's criminal history was not significant and that the counts of possession should be vacated or “merged” with the counts of dealing, as should the counts of resisting law enforcement and obstruction of justice. The trial court found Wright's criminal history to be a significant aggravator and sentenced Wright to an aggregate sentence of thirty-seven years in the Department of Correction.

D. Direct Appeal

[12] On direct appeal, Wright claimed that the trial court improperly overruled his Batson 2 challenge during jury selection and that the sentences on his dealing convictions should have been capped at thirty-two years pursuant to the consecutive sentencing statute. Wright v. State, No. 19A-CR-1646 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2020) (mem.), trans. denied. This Court rejected Wright's Batson argument, but we agreed that Wright's two convictions for dealing arose out of a single episode of criminal conduct and, therefore, his consecutive sentence was statutorily capped at thirty-two years. Id., slip op. at 6-7. We remanded “with instructions that the trial court cap Wright's aggregate sentence for his dealing convictions to thirty-two years, for a total aggregate sentence of thirty-four years.” Id. at 7.

E. Post-Conviction Proceedings

[13] On January 21, 2022, Wright filed a petition for post-conviction relief. On August 2, 2024, Wright filed an amended post-conviction petition in which he claimed that Trial Counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to adequately advise Wright regarding the State's plea offer, and (2) failing to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence at sentencing. The PC Court summarily denied Wright's petition and, on appeal, this Court reversed and remanded with instructions for the PC Court to hold a hearing. See Wright v. State, No. 24A-PC-2079 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2025) (mem.).

[14] On remand, Wright moved for summary disposition, which the PC Court denied. The parties then agreed to submit the matter to the PC Court based on stipulations, affidavits, and documentary exhibits. On November 20, 2025, the PC Court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon, in which it denied Wright's petition. Wright now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standards of Review

A. Post-Conviction

[15] Post-conviction proceedings are civil proceedings in which a defendant may present limited collateral challenges to a conviction and sentence. Gibson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 673, 681 (Ind. 2019); Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(b). “The scope of potential relief is limited to issues unknown at trial or unavailable on direct appeal.” Gibson, 133 N.E.3d at 681. “Issues available on direct appeal but not raised are waived, while issues litigated adversely to the defendant are res judicata.” Id. The petitioner bears the burden of establishing his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.; P.-C.R. 1(5).

[16] When, as here, the petitioner “appeals from a negative judgment denying post-conviction relief, he ‘must establish that the evidence, as a whole, unmistakably and unerringly points to a conclusion contrary to the post-conviction court's decision.’ ” Gibson, 133 N.E.3d at 681 (quoting Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ind. 2000)). When reviewing the post-conviction court's order denying relief, we will “not defer to the post-conviction court's legal conclusions,” and the “findings and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Bobadilla v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1272, 1279 (Ind. 2019). When a petitioner “fails to meet this ‘rigorous standard of review,’ we will affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief.” Gibson, 133 N.E.3d at 681 (quoting DeWitt v. State, 755 N.E.2d 167, 169-70 (Ind. 2001)).

B. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

[17] Wright's post-conviction claims alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel. To prevail on such a claim, a defendant must show that: (1) his counsel's performance fell short of prevailing professional norms; and (2) his counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Gibson, 133 N.E.3d at 682 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).

[18] A showing of deficient performance “requires proof that legal representation lacked ‘an objective standard of reasonableness,’ effectively depriving the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Id. (quoting Overstreet v. State, 877 N.E.2d 144, 152 (Ind. 2007)). We strongly presume that counsel exercised “reasonable professional judgment” and “rendered adequate legal assistance.” Id. Defense counsel enjoys “considerable discretion” in developing legal strategies for a client. Id. This “discretion demands deferential judicial review.” Id. Counsel's “[i]solated mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render representation ineffective.” Id.

[19] “To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the proceedings below would have resulted in a different outcome.” Id. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Failure to satisfy either the deficient-performance prong or the prejudice prong will cause the claim to fail. Grinstead v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (Ind. 2006). Most ineffective assistance of counsel claims can be resolved by a prejudice inquiry alone. Id.

II. Trial Counsel's advice regarding the State's plea offers.

[20] Wright claims that the PC Court clearly erred by concluding that Trial Counsel's performance regarding the plea offers was not ineffective. This Court has recognized that:

[d]efense attorneys have an obligation to advise their clients regarding the possible penal consequences of standing trial. One of the most important roles a defense attorney plays is to help clients navigate this complex decision-making process. It is incumbent upon the attorney to describe the best and worst case scenarios as to penal consequences the client would face whether the client pleads guilty, with or without a plea agreement, or stands trial.

Black v. State, 54 N.E.3d 414, 427 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied.

A. Trial Counsel's performance regarding the plea offers was not deficient.

[21] Wright claims that Trial Counsel failed to properly inform him regarding the legal implications of the evidence against him and the possible sentence he faced; Wright claims that this left him uninformed and unable to make an intelligent choice to accept or reject the State's plea offers. In support of his claims, Wright refers almost exclusively to the evidence that does not favor the PC Court's decision, specifically, his own self-serving statements regarding what Trial Counsel did or did not tell him.

[22] Trial Counsel, however, contradicted Wright's claims in his affidavits. In these affidavits, Trial Counsel averred that he: explained the range of sentencing that Wright was facing; explained the State's burden of proof and the evidence the State planned to present; and never said anything to Wright that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the State lacked sufficient evidence to convict Wright. Trial Counsel also asserted that Wright never indicated any confusion about the law or the facts of the case and that, had Wright expressed any such confusion, Trial Counsel would have addressed it with Wright.³

[23] Trial Counsel's affidavit was corroborated in large part by the letter he sent to Wright accompanying the amended plea offer. In this letter, Trial Counsel advised Wright that there was “more than sufficient” evidence to convict him. Ex. Vol. III p. 184. Trial Counsel's letter explained the evidence the State had gathered via depositions and warned Wright that the State had threatened to file an habitual offender allegation if Wright did not accept the plea offer. The letter explicitly noted the strength of the State's case and that the offer was more favorable than the offer made to Wright's co-defendant.

[24] Wright claims that Trial Counsel's letter shows that Trial Counsel failed to adequately explain constructive possession or the intent required to convict Wright. Trial Counsel, however, specifically stated in his supplementary affidavit that nothing he said would have led any reasonable person to believe that the State needed additional evidence to convict Wright, such as a video or evidence of a completed drug transaction.⁴

[25] Wright's amended post-conviction petition claimed that Trial Counsel failed to advise him that he faced a sentence of up to thirty-four and one-half years if he were convicted and failed to advise him that the nineteen-year sentencing cap called for in the State's amended plea offer was only slightly above the seventeen-and-one-half-year advisory sentence for a Level 2 felony. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5. Wright, however, admits that he was aware of the range of sentences he faced. And the trial court properly advised Wright of the applicable sentencing ranges at the initial hearing, and Wright indicated that he understood the advisement.

[26] Wright also claims that Trial Counsel failed to timely inform him of the amended plea offer and that the deadline for accepting the offer passed before he even had a chance to accept it. Wright, however, did not present such a claim in his petition for post-conviction relief. He presented it for the first time in his proposed findings and conclusions that he submitted to the PC Court. It is, therefore, waived. Allen v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1158, 1171 (Ind. 2001); see also Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(8) (“All grounds for relief available to a petitioner under this rule must be raised in his original petition.”).⁵

[27] Considering only the evidence that favors the PC Court's decision, we cannot say that it clearly erred by concluding that Wright did not meet his burden of showing that Trial Counsel's performance regarding the State's plea offers fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

B. Wright failed to demonstrate prejudice from Trial Counsel's alleged errors.

[28] Wright also claims that he was prejudiced by his Trial Counsel's alleged errors because he rejected the plea offer and ended up with a significantly higher sentence after taking his case to trial. We have explained that:

“To show prejudice from ineffective assistance of counsel where a plea offer has lapsed or been rejected because of counsel's deficient performance, defendants must demonstrate a reasonable probability they would have accepted the earlier plea offer had they been afforded effective assistance of counsel.” In addition to showing a reasonable probability that the deal would not have been cancelled by the prosecutor or rejected by the trial court, defendants must “show a reasonable probability that the end result of the criminal process would have been more favorable by reason of a plea to a lesser charge or a sentence of less prison time.”

Lindsey v. State, 71 N.E.3d 428, 434 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 147 (2012)).

[29] Wright's prejudice argument is based primarily on his own affidavit submitted to the PC Court, in which he averred that he would have accepted the amended plea offer and its nineteen-year cap if only Trial Counsel had properly explained the law and the evidence against him. It is well settled, however, that courts should not rely on “ ‘post hoc assertions from a [petitioner] about how he would have pleaded but for his attorney's deficiencies. Judges should instead look to contemporaneous evidence to substantiate a defendant's expressed preferences.’ ” State v. Hamilton, 197 N.E.3d 356, 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Bobadilla v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1272, 1284 (Ind. 2019)).⁶

[30] Here, the evidence shows that Trial Counsel conveyed both of the State's plea offers to Wright. Trial Counsel informed Wright that the State had sufficient evidence to convict him and recommended that he accept the amended plea offer. Still, Wright chose to reject the offer and proceed to trial. From this, the PC Court could readily conclude that Wright was not an uninformed or ill-advised defendant who would have accepted the plea offer if Trial Counsel had performed differently; instead, Wright simply chose to reject the plea despite Trial Counsel's advice.⁷

[31] We, therefore, conclude that the PC Court did not clearly err by concluding that Wright failed to establish a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the State's plea offers but for his trial counsel's alleged errors.

III. Trial Counsel was not ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence at sentencing.

A. Trial Counsel's strategic decision to rely on the PSI was reasonable.

[32] Wright's other claim of ineffective assistance concerns Trial Counsel's performance before and during the sentencing hearing. Wright attacks Trial Counsel's decision to rely on the PSI instead of presenting evidence from Wright's family regarding Wright's positive character.⁸ Trial Counsel explained, however, that this was a strategic decision. We cannot second-guess such strategic decisions with the benefit of hindsight.⁹ See Gibson, 133 N.E.3d at 682. Nor can we say that Trial Counsel's strategy was objectively unreasonable. The PSI was surprisingly favorable to Wright and recommended a sentence of only thirteen years. Trial Counsel reasonably believed that relying on the PSI, which was prepared by the neutral probation department, would be more persuasive than submitting letters or testimony from Wright's family, who would have been obviously biased in favor of Wright.

B. Wright was not prejudiced by Trial Counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence.

[33] Even assuming that Trial Counsel's decision to rely solely on the PSI was unreasonable, Wright failed to demonstrate any resulting prejudice. “ ‘The dispositive question in determining whether a defendant is prejudiced by counsel's failure at sentencing to present mitigating evidence is what effect the totality of the omitted mitigation evidence would have had on the sentence.’ ” Lewis v. State, 116 N.E.3d 1144, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting McCarty v. State, 802 N.E.2d 959, 967 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied). “Thus, on review, we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would have imposed a lesser sentence had it been fully informed of the mitigating evidence.” Id. (citing McCarty, 802 N.E.2d at 969).¹⁰

[34] Wright argues that the PC Court improperly characterized the mitigating evidence that he claims should have been presented as merely evidence that Wright was a “victim of society.” Appellant's App. Vol. V p. 182. But even assuming the character evidence Wright claims should have been presented would have been favorable to him, by directly professing Wright's positive character traits, we cannot say that the trial court's sentence would have been altered by such evidence. First, some evidence of Wright's background was already available to the trial court through the PSI, which provided details about Wright's upbringing, education, employment history, and family circumstances. Moreover, Wright's mother and cousin, as potential witnesses, would have been subjected to cross-examination about Wright's criminal history, which could have lessened the impact of their positive character testimony.

[35] Wright's argument also minimizes the nature of his crimes and his criminal history. Wright had possession of an especially large amount of drugs. The drugs in the bag included a mixture of heroin and fentanyl and cocaine. Wright fled from the police in a vehicle and reached speeds of 115 miles per hour. Wright also had a history of criminal and delinquent activity: he had a 2012 juvenile delinquency adjudication in Illinois for residential burglary and was sentenced to two years of probation; and in 2013, he was convicted as an adult in Illinois for residential robbery with a firearm and residential burglary and sentenced to seven years.

[36] Given these facts and circumstances, there was no reasonable probability that the trial court would have imposed a lesser sentence had Trial Counsel presented evidence from Wright's family claiming that Wright possessed positive character traits.¹¹

[37] We, therefore, conclude that the PC Court did not clearly err in concluding that Trial Counsel was not ineffective in his representation of Wright during sentencing.¹²

Conclusion

[38] The PC Court did not clearly err by concluding that Wright did not meet his burden of showing that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for allegedly failing to adequately advise Wright regarding the State's plea offers or for failing to present mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing. Accordingly, we affirm the PC Court's denial of Wright's petition for post-conviction relief.

[39] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State also charged Wright with Count VII: maintaining a common nuisance, a Level 6 felony, but the State later dismissed that count.

2.   See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

3.   Wright claims that, since his prior convictions were in Illinois, he was unfamiliar with Indiana law. Even if the PC Court credited this self-serving statement, Trial Counsel's affidavit explains that he informed Wright that the State had sufficient evidence to convict him and the range of the sentence he faced and advised Wright to accept the plea offer.

4.   Wright makes much of the fact that Trial Counsel never met with him at the jail and only met with him during court appearances and communicated with him via mail. But Wright cites no authority establishing that in-person communication is constitutionally required or that communication via mail is inadequate. Wright does refer to the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, but such guidelines are not binding on us. In fact, our Supreme Court has stated that, although it will “often consult” the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, such Guidelines are merely “advisory in nature,” and do not set forth “rigid, detailed rules.” Gibson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 673, 682 (Ind. 2019) (citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366-67 (2010) (noting that the ABA Guidelines are not “inexorable commands”)).

5.   Waiver notwithstanding, Wright's claim fails on the merits. The only evidence Wright cites in support of his claim is an envelope with various date markings and a return-to-sender stamp. This envelope and its markings were never explained by any witness. Without evidence establishing what those markings meant or when Wright actually saw the letter, we cannot say that he met his burden of showing that he was not timely informed of the plea offer. Even assuming arguendo that Trial Counsel's performance on this matter was deficient, Wright has failed to demonstrate prejudice, as explained below.

6.   Bobadilla was in turn quoting Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357, 358 (2017).

7.   Wright claims that there were no circumstances that would have prevented the trial court from accepting the plea. But this is not the relevant inquiry; the relevant inquiry is whether Wright would have accepted the plea but for his Trial Counsel's alleged errors.

8.   Wright complains that the PC Court apparently believed that Wright's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel at sentencing was that Trial Counsel made no argument “at all.” Appellant's App. Vol. V p. 182. Wright emphasizes on appeal that his claim is, instead, that Trial Counsel made an unreasonable choice to rely on the PSI alone. Because we fully understand, but disagree with, Wright's claim, the PC Court's apparent misunderstanding is of no moment.

9.   Wright notes that Trial Counsel did not receive the PSI until the afternoon of the day before the sentencing hearing and that Trial Counsel's decision not to present any mitigation evidence, therefore, could not have been a reasonable strategic decision. Regardless, as we explain below, Wright failed to demonstrate any resulting prejudice.

10.   Wright argues that the PC Court applied an erroneous legal standard by requiring him to demonstrate that, had Trial Counsel presented mitigating evidence, it would have resulted in a sentence less than the nineteen years called for in the plea offer. Wright is correct that he could have established prejudice merely by showing that, but for his counsel's alleged errors, his sentence would have been less than the actual sentence he received. See Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001) (“[A]ny amount of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment significance.”). Regardless, applying the correct standard, we reach the same conclusion as did the PC Court, i.e., Wright did not show that, but for his counsel's errors, he would have received a lesser sentence than he did.

11.   Wright cites McCarty, 802 N.E.2d 959, but that case is readily distinguishable. In McCarty, the defendant was convicted of child molesting. The defendant's trial counsel met with the defendant only once and failed to present several potentially significant mitigating factors to the trial court, including the fact that the defendant had documented mental health issues and had himself been molested as a child. In reversing the post-conviction court's denial of the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we reluctantly concluded that “there [was] a reasonable probability [that] the result of the sentencing proceeding would have been different had defense counsel presented those mitigating circumstances to the [trial] court for its consideration.” Id. at 969. Here, however, the mitigating evidence Wright claims should have been presented consisted of character evidence from his family—evidence that was clearly contradicted by Wright's criminal history and behavior in the present case.

12.   Near the end of his Appellant's Brief, Wright briefly claims that we should revise his sentence given our authority to do so under Article 7, Section 6 of the Indiana Constitution. Because this claim was not presented in Wright's post-conviction petition, it is waived. Allen, 749 N.E.2d at 1171; P.-C.R. 1(8). Moreover, that constitutional provision conditions this court's sentence revision authority on Supreme Court rules—authority the Supreme Court has implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B). And this Court has held that such revision is, absent extraordinary circumstances not present here, unavailable in post-conviction proceedings. See Hobbs v. State, 206 N.E.3d 419, 433 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.