YOUNG v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In September 2024, Frederick Young was dating Tara Mollett. When Mollett invited A.S., a childhood acquaintance, to spend the night at her house, she invited Young to join them. Before the night was over, Young and Mollett had tortured and terrorized A.S. for hours. Following a jury trial, Young was found guilty of attempted rape,¹ criminal confinement,² and aggravated battery,³ all Level 3 felonies. The trial court ordered him to serve an aggregate thirty-six-year sentence. Young appeals, raising two issues: (1) Was the evidence sufficient to support his convictions? and (2) Is his sentence inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mollett and A.S. attended sixth grade together in the mid-2000s. When Mollett bullied A.S.’s younger sister, A.S. hit Mollett in the face and gave her a bloody nose. After that single altercation, A.S. apologized to Mollett and the two became friends. Mollett moved away the next summer but she and A.S. kept in touch periodically through social media.

[3] On September 22, 2024, Mollett and A.S. began a conversation after not having communicated for some time, first on Facebook and then on the phone. Mollett lived in a duplex in Elkhart and A.S. lived in Michigan. A.S. had two children aged two and four at the time; the four-year-old has autism. A.S. and her kids were planning to go to South Bend to visit her brother in the coming days. She and Mollett decided that Mollett would drive to Michigan that day and bring A.S. and her children back to Elkhart to spend the night at Mollett's house before they went to South Bend.

[4] In the meantime, Mollett and Young were conversing by text. Mollett told Young she was on the phone with A.S., a girl she went to school with, and asked if Young wanted to go to Michigan with her to pick up A.S. and her kids. Young declined, and Mollett asked if he would come drink with them when they got back to Elkhart. Young agreed.

[5] When Mollett and A.S. got back to Mollett's house around 9:00 p.m., A.S. fed her kids and put them to bed in an upstairs bedroom. Mollett and A.S. started drinking and continued drinking throughout the night. Mollett texted Young to tell him they were home and said, “[W]e're getting in the shower now[.] I'll send pics.” Ex. Vol. 9 at 175–76. Mollett and A.S. then took a series of “goofy pictures,” including some in which they were both naked. Tr. Vol. 6 at 102. Mollett texted the pictures to Young unbeknownst to A.S.

[6] During this time, Mollett also texted Young: “I'm gonna have to be twisted and if I'm feeling it I'll tell you but this is the first b*tch I've had a 3 way with so I'll let you know if I'm down[.]” Ex. Vol. 9 at 184. Young and Mollett then had the following text exchange:

[Young:] Should get a pic of her p*ssy just for my records ․ lmao

[Mollett:] Okay baby bet lmao

[Young:] *ssh*le and all. Make a video

[Mollett:] I got you but no

[Mollett:] If you're going to be with me and have a 3 way your not gonna get a vid that's a no go with me

[Young:] Lmao okay

Id. at 193–94 (spelling in original).

[7] At 10:35 p.m., Young texted Mollett to tell her he was picking up a friend and headed her way. When they arrived at Mollett's house, Mollett's demeanor toward A.S. changed. She made a comment about A.S.’s kids and started “bringing up the altercation that had happened in sixth grade.” Tr. Vol. 6 at 104. Young asked his friend to take A.S. on a walk while he had a conversation with Mollett to “calm [her] down.” Id. at 171.

[8] When they got back, Young was trying to leave, and Mollett was “pulling on his shirt trying to get him to stay[.]” Id. at 108. Young told Mollett she “was crazy and being really disrespectful” and left the house. Id. Young's friend followed. Mollett told A.S. they left because “of how [A.S.] was making her act out.” Id. at 178. Mollett told her to “go out there and ․ say that this was all [her] fault and just a bunch of stuff to try and get them to stay.” Id. at 108. A.S. did as Mollett asked, apologizing to the men for how the night was going and telling them there was nothing to worry about. Mollett was also texting Young and pleading with him to return. The men returned to the house.

[9] Mollett was fine “for a minute[.]” Id. at 109. She gave A.S. a shot of alcohol and then told her to open her mouth. Mollett put a pill on A.S.’s tongue and gave her another shot. A.S. was “just trying to have fun” and “avoid anything that could start an argument” with Mollett. Id. at 109, 110. But then Mollett's demeanor changed again and she started saying A.S. was “a shady person” because of the sixth-grade altercation. Id. at 110. A.S. decided to take another walk by herself.

[10] A.S. returned to the house to find Young's friend gone and Mollett performing oral sex on Young on the living room couch. Mollett was naked and Young's pants were pulled down to his ankles. A.S. decided to leave and began packing her suitcase that was on the living room floor. She planned to call her brother to come get her and her children. As A.S. packed, Mollett said something indiscernible to Young, and Young replied, “[D]o it[.]” Id. at 116. Mollett asked Young, “Do you have my back?” and Young said, “I've got your back.” Id. And then Mollett said, “[H]old her down.” Id. Young pinned A.S.’s arms back so she could not move them, and Mollett said “[s]omething along the lines of [A.S.] being a shady person” before swinging her arm back and striking A.S. in the cheek area with a closed fist. Id. at 120. When Young wrapped his arms around her, A.S. said, “Fred, please don't.” Id. at 121.

[11] Her plea had no effect. Young continued to hold A.S.’s arms so she could not fight back as Mollett struck her in the face several more times. A.S. began to fade in and out of consciousness as Mollett hit, kicked, and stomped her all over her body. She heard Mollett and Young discussing killing her and her kids and “whether to dump our bodies in the woods or in the water.” Id. at 123. Young “was getting mad at [Mollett] because he kept telling her to kill [A.S.] and [Mollett] ․ was saying the b*tch won't die.” Id. at 123–24.

[12] A.S. tried to escape several times. Each time, Young was “right there,” grabbing her arms, her shirt, anything he could to block her or pull her away from the door and “back into the attack.” Id. at 134. A.S. attributed a handprint-shaped bruise that developed on her shoulder to Young “grabbing on to [her] and holding on to [her] a lot during the attack.” Id. at 150. A.S. did not recall Young striking her.

[13] A.S. also tried to play dead a few times, hoping they would leave her alone. Mollett told Young to check A.S.’s pulse and then A.S. could feel someone touching her left foot. They checked multiple times and then Mollett continued beating her.

[14] On one occasion when A.S. had briefly lost consciousness, she was roused by the feeling of her “body shaking from [her] clothes being removed[.]” Id. at 125. She was “flat on [her] stomach,” and when she looked over her shoulder, saw Young standing behind her, “not necessarily crouching but reaching down and pulling off [her] pants[.]” Id. at 126. She did not want her pants to be removed. As far as she could remember, however, Young did not penetrate her vagina. After A.S.’s shorts were removed, Mollett immediately sat on A.S.’s back, pulled her head back by the hair, and began hitting her again. A.S. started screaming as loud as she could.

[15] Young recorded two videos of the attack with his phone, recorded at 2:31 a.m. and 2:32 a.m. He said he started recording because he was “[t]errified really. Situation like this, we [are] usually the ones that get blamed.” Tr. Vol. 7 at 14. In the first video, A.S. is wearing shorts while she lays on the floor and Mollett—naked—lays on top of her face and chest. Mollett puts her hands on A.S.’s throat as she lays on top of her. Mollett makes several threatening comments and punches A.S. as A.S. tries to break free. At one point, Young says, “Why you kickin’?” and grabs A.S.’s ankle. Ex. 1120 (IMG_1747.mov) at 1:07. In the second video, A.S. is naked from the waist down and face down on the floor as Mollett sits on her back and punches her repeatedly. Young zooms in on A.S.’s genitalia and then walks closer to the pair and puts his phone down. The image becomes indistinct, but the sounds of crying, screaming, and hitting continue. Young says, “Alright that's enough” and when Mollett says, “She's faking it,” he replies, “No, I just choked her to sleep.” Ex. 1120 (IMG_1748.mov) at 1:02. When a clear image resumes, A.S. is still on the floor and Mollett is standing over her. Young zooms in on A.S.’s battered and bloodied face and says, “Relax, look at her face,” id. at 3:05, and “[Y]ou gonna f*ckin’ kill her, G*d damn it,” id. at 3:29, but does not otherwise intervene. Mollett continues hitting her and yells that she needed “sixty-eight f*cking stitches, you b*tch” because of the sixth-grade altercation. Id. at 3:56. A forensic digital analyst viewed the videos and testified that when Young's lower half appeared in the videos, he was wearing only underwear and appeared to have an erection. These videos were eventually posted on Facebook, although it is unclear who posted them.

[16] Michael Wise, who lived with his family on the other side of the duplex, heard the commotion and went next door to see what was going on. Young answered when Wise knocked, “kind of shut[ting] the door behind him” as he explained the women were fighting “about some stuff that happened a long time ago” and he was trying to break it up. Tr. Vol. 3 at 154; Tr. Vol. 7 at 17. A.S. “came flying to the door screaming for help.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 154. But A.S. was unable to leave the house because, according to Wise, Young “put his arm up to where she couldn't get out.” Id. at 158. She told Wise “they were trying to kill [her] kids and [her] and ․ trying to rape [her]” and she needed help. Tr. Vol. 6 at 131. Wise asked Young, “[W]hy don't you just let her go, she wants to go, you know, and [Young] said he couldn't because she was too belligerent or drunk[.]” Tr. Vol. 3 at 154. In the background, Mollett was asking Wise to call the police because A.S. had broken into her house. Wise thought the scene was “kind of frightening” and could tell A.S. “was in serious trouble.” Id. at 155. He returned home and his wife called 9-1-1 at 2:48 a.m.

[17] A.S. used the opportunity of Young and Mollett being distracted by the interruption to run to the bathroom to try to escape or find something to protect herself. But there was only a small window and nothing she could use as a weapon. Young got the bathroom door open, pulled her out of the bathroom by her arm, and “brought [her] back into the attack.” Tr. Vol. 6 at 133.

[18] Police arrived about five minutes after the 9-1-1 call. When an officer knocked on the door, Young said they needed to be quiet. Mollett got in A.S.’s face one more time, pulled her head back by the hair, told her to “shut [her] f*cking mouth,” and hit her in the chin. Id. at 135. Then Mollett answered the door and immediately said to the officer standing there, “This chick laid her hands on me,” as A.S. ran past her screaming, “Help me! Help me! ․ My kids are inside!” State's Ex. 5 (video) at 1:05.

[19] When Officer Nicholas Ragsdale arrived shortly after,

Patrolman Carder was standing on the porch speaking with [Mollett] and [Young]. Patrolman Fitzgerald was standing next to [A.S.], who was laying on the sidewalk.

* * *

[A.S.] was in like a panic state and pleading with us to help her and help her children. [Young] seemed really uninvolved and [Mollett] was just talking about how it was self-defense and she can defend herself.

Tr. Vol. 4 at 3. Officer Ragsdale spoke with Young. Young said A.S. took her own pants off because “we [were] about to have a three-way.” Ex. 8 at 0:08. Officer Ragsdale asked, “After she was all bloody?” Id. at 0:17. Young replied, “Nah, she wasn't at first ․ it's complicated.” Id. at 0:20. At some point, Young pulled a wrapped condom out of his pocket and said, “I'm just here for this.” Tr. Vol. 4 at 8.

[20] A.S. was transported to the hospital.⁴ Both of her eyes were swollen shut and she said the pain was the “worst ․ I've ever felt in my entire life and it was even worse because I couldn't see anything.” Tr. Vol. 6 at 143. A forensic nurse noted bruises and abrasions on multiple parts of A.S.’s body, including her shoulders, arms, chest, legs, and back. She had swelling, bruising, and tenderness to both eyes, her chin and jaw area, and her cheeks. There was a laceration to her left eyelid that required stitches, an abrasion to her upper lip, and her nose was broken on both sides. And she had redness to the top of her head consistent with hair being pulled out. The day after A.S. was discharged, a second forensic nurse called to check on her. A.S. reported experiencing more pain and having trouble holding her head up. A.S. returned to the emergency room and the nurse noted abrasions on A.S.’s neck, petechia ⁵ on various areas of her body, and a subconjunctival hemorrhage in her eye consistent with strangulation.

[21] The State charged both Young and Mollett with multiple counts arising from this incident. Specifically, the State charged Young with Count 1, Level 3 felony attempted rape; Count 2, Level 3 felony criminal confinement; and Count 3, Level 3 felony aggravated battery. With respect to Counts 2 and 3, the State alleged “Young and ․ Mollett, and they and each of them” committed the crimes. Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 27. They were tried together by a jury. In addition to presenting testimony from A.S., Mollett's neighbors, police officers who responded, and nurses who treated A.S., the State admitted into evidence text messages between Mollett and Young on the day of the attack and the next day, as well as the videos Young took with his phone. The State also introduced photographs documenting blood on the floor, walls, and door frames, and clumps of long, dark hair consistent with A.S.’s hair scattered on the floor of Mollett's duplex.

[22] Young testified that A.S. started the fight. He said after A.S. returned from her solo walk, “she just went crazy really. It's like nobody said anything out [of] the way to her or mean. She just started snapping on [Mollett] and got [in] her face and ․ grabbed her hair and slapped her. That's how it started.” Tr. Vol. 7 at 28–29. He called it a “mutual wrestling match” and a “highly drunken fight[.]” Id. at 30, 33. He said when he was talking to the neighbor, Mollett was at the door, too, and “then [A.S.] ran up, she says she was trying to get out but she really attacked [Mollett] again. That's why she didn't get out the door.” Id. at 17. And he said A.S.’s shorts “had to” have come off “from the scuffling, them pulling and scratching.” Id. at 16–17. He acknowledged lying to Officer Ragsdale but said he “[c]ouldn't describe” what had happened and “didn't want to be in a situation ․ [he's] in now for being accused of raping or attempting to rape somebody.” Id. at 18. He denied removing A.S.’s shorts or attempting to rape her, and said he never grabbed or restrained her. In short, he claimed he was trying to break up the fight and he did not assist Mollett in battering A.S. or keeping her from leaving.

[23] The jury found Young guilty as charged.⁶

[24] At sentencing, A.S. testified about how these events affected her:

Emotionally and mentally everything that I used to do prior to this incident I did with hope, free will, joy, happiness, and everything that I do in my life now I have to question it several times, I have to create backup plans for my safety, as well as my children's safety, and it's impacted my life in every way, emotionally, mentally, and physically.

Tr. Vol. 7 at 180. She has permanent scars on her face and persistent back pain. She noted because of her children's ages and speech capabilities, they were unable to share what they saw or heard in Mollett's house that night but said they act “completely differently now.” Id. at 182. When they first saw her after the assault with all her injuries, “they were so scared of [her]” they would not come near. Id. They struggle with sleep and have nightmares. A.S. has cut off family and friends because she doesn't trust anyone. And referencing the videos posted to social media, she said, “This wasn't just an incident that happened inside of a duplex with me, [Young], [Mollett]. This was something that went completely public, as well as my name. I was publicly humiliated.” Id. at 183.

[25] The trial court began its sentencing remarks with the following observation:

I have seen many things over my more than 20 years of being involved in the criminal justice system and particularly as my role as a judicial officer for nearly 10 years. I have the occasions to preside over cases involving just horrific acts of violence. That being said, this case stands out amongst one of the worst cases that this Court has ever seen and the Court was particularly impacted by this and I certainly don't mean to indicate that I'm callus [sic] to other things but for lack of a better term, you do kind of build some type of tolerance to the depravity that human beings are willing to impose upon other human beings but this is just beyond the pale. The one thing I keep coming back to is just how senseless this was, how this makes no sense that this happened and I just – I can't reconcile in my mind why.

Id. at 215.

[26] The court then identified the following aggravators:

• Young's history of criminal or delinquent behavior, which “spans over a fairly long enough period of time that [it] gives the Court some concern about whether or not you are going to conform your behavior to being a law abiding citizen.” Id. at 216.

• The harm, injury, loss, or damage was significant and greater than the elements needed to prove each crime, particularly noting A.S.’s “repeated statements that you and ․ Mollett were going to kill her and kill her children and based upon the injuries that were inflicted upon her and the way that the offense stopped, not because you choose [sic] to stop it but because the police arrived when the neighbors called.” Id. at 217.

• The crime was a crime of violence knowingly committed in the presence of a child less than eighteen years of age: “the fact that we had neighbors on the other side of the wall who couldn't sleep because the screams of [A.S.] and the beating was so loud that they could hear it, the Court presumes that the children could hear it too.” Id. at 218.

• Less-severe sanctions have been unsuccessful in keeping Young from engaging in criminal activity and he has not taken advantage of programming offered to him in the past.

• There is uncharged conduct, in that whether Young uploaded the videos or provided them to someone else who did so, he facilitated disseminating the video.

[27] As for mitigators, the court found that Young had been gainfully employed and “imprisonment will make it unlikely [his dependent children] are going to receive any further financial support[,]” which will be a hardship on them. Id. at 220. The court also acknowledged that Young expressed condolences to A.S. in allocution, but he did so in the passive voice “suggest[ing] that this just happened to her without you being involved [and] takes away from any acceptance of responsibility[.]” Id. at 219–20.

[28] The court found the aggravators “far outweigh” the mitigator and imposed a sentence of thirty-six years in the Indiana Department of Correction.⁷ Id. at 221.

There is sufficient evidence to support Young's convictions.

[29] A sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim warrants a “deferential standard of review in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility[.]’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied). Instead, we respect the factfinder's exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence, Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018), and consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact, Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). It is “not necessary that the evidence ‘overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ ” Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind. 1995)).

[30] Young challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting all three of his convictions. He correctly asserts the State has the burden of proving all essential elements of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt, but he does not specify which element or elements he claims were not proven as to each charge. See Appellant's Br. at 12–13. Apparently, he challenges the aggravated battery conviction because A.S. testified he did not strike or choke her and the attempted rape conviction because A.S. said she did not see his penis and he did not penetrate her. See id. at 13. He does not make a specific claim about the criminal confinement conviction.

[31] Starting with the aggravated battery conviction, Indiana Code Section 35-42-2-1.5 defines Level 3 battery as “knowingly ․ inflict[ing] injury on a person that creates a substantial risk of death[.]”⁸ During the portion of one of the videos when only audio is available, Young says, “I just choked her to sleep.” Ex. 1120 (IMG_1748.mov) at 1:02. Although A.S. did not remember Young choking her, she testified she was going in and out of consciousness during the attack. A forensic nurse noted A.S. had injuries consistent with strangulation. Strangulation “can be fatal in minutes[,]” Tr. Vol. 5 at 17, and “can be fatal even after the fact[,]” Tr. Vol. 4 at 217. This is sufficient evidence that Young knowingly inflicted injury on A.S. creating a substantial risk of death.

[32] Moreover, the State advanced a theory of accomplice liability for this count. Under Indiana Code section 35-41-2-4, a defendant can be found guilty as an accomplice when the defendant “knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense[.]” It is not necessary for the evidence to establish the accomplice personally participated in the commission of each element of the offense. Jackson v. State, 222 N.E.3d 321, 336–37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. A person who aids another in committing a crime is just as guilty as the actual perpetrator. Madden v. State, 162 N.E.3d 549, 557 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).

[33] There is no bright-line rule for determining accomplice liability. Carter v. State, 235 N.E.3d 875, 885 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. The particular facts and circumstances of each case determine whether a person was an accomplice. Id. We consider the following four factors: “(1) presence at the scene of the crime; (2) companionship with another engaged in criminal activity; (3) failure to oppose the crime; and (4) a defendant's conduct before, during, and after the occurrence of the crime.” Garland v. State, 788 N.E.2d 425, 431 (Ind. 2003). The State need not show a preconceived plan; it must merely demonstrate concerted action or participation in an illegal act. Mitchell v. State, 742 N.E.2d 953, 955 (Ind. 2001).

[34] Young was at least an accomplice even if he did not hit, kick, and strangle A.S. himself. All four factors demonstrate Young actively participated in the crime. Young does not dispute he was at the scene when A.S. was attacked, and there is ample evidence of his companionship with Mollett. Rather than opposing the crime, he both contributed to it and documented it. And his behavior during and after the crime indicates his involvement. He encouraged Mollett, tried to downplay what happened when speaking to the neighbor and police, and gave inconsistent statements about what occurred. There is sufficient evidence that Young aided, induced, or caused Mollett to commit the crime of aggravated battery.

[35] Turning to criminal confinement, a person commits Level 3 felony criminal confinement when that person knowingly confines another person without the person's consent and causes serious bodily injury. See I.C. § 35-42-3-3. To “confine” means to “substantially interfere with the liberty of a person.” I.C. § 35-42-3-1 (1977). “Serious bodily injury” includes bodily injury that causes extreme pain. I.C. § 35-31.5-2-292(3) (2012). A.S. testified Young held her arms so she could not move or defend herself when Mollett first began striking her. And he kept her from escaping several times by being “right there” grabbing her, and by pulling her out of the bathroom by the arm. Tr. Vol. 6 at 134. She had a handprint-shaped bruise on her shoulder from Young grabbing her and told nurses at the hospital her pain was a ten out of ten. The evidence is sufficient to prove Young substantially interfered with A.S.’s liberty and caused her serious bodily injury.

[36] Finally, a person is guilty of attempted rape when they take a substantial step toward committing rape, which is defined as knowingly having sexual intercourse with another person when that person is compelled by force or imminent threat of force. Whether a substantial step has occurred is a question of fact for the jury. B.T.E. v. State, 108 N.E.3d 322, 327 (Ind. 2018). The substantial-step requirement is “a minimal one,” and the focus is on what the defendant has done, not what he has left undone. Id. (citation omitted). Even before Young arrived at Mollett's house, he asked Mollett for specific sexually explicit pictures and video of A.S. A.S. testified Young removed her shorts against her will. Video from before and then after Young removed A.S.’s shorts shows him with an erection. A.S. told the neighbor they were trying to rape her. As Young points out, A.S. testified that Young did “not successfully penetrate [her] vagina.” Tr. Vol. 6 at 128; see Appellant's Br. at 13. But penetration is not required to prove attempted rape. There was sufficient evidence to support the jury's determination that Young committed a substantial step toward committing rape.

[37] In sum, a reasonable jury could have found the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Young committed each of the crimes with which he was charged.

Young's sentence is not inappropriate.

[38] Young asks us to revise his sentence. The Indiana Constitution authorizes this Court to review and revise a trial court's sentencing decision as provided by rule. Ind. Const. art. 7, § 6. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The principal role of appellate review is to leaven the outliers, not to achieve a perceived correct sentence in each case. Conley v. State, 183 N.E.3d 276, 288 (Ind. 2022). Therefore, “we reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 160 (Ind. 2019) (per curiam).

[39] “[S]entencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). The two prongs of 7(B) review are “separate inquiries to ultimately be balanced in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Conner v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). “[T]o the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. at 127.

[40] The question “is not whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” Helsley v. State, 43 N.E.3d 225, 228 (Ind. 2015) (quoting King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)) (emphasis omitted). Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. The defendant bears the burden of persuading us a revised sentence is warranted. Cramer v. State, 240 N.E.3d 693, 698 (Ind. 2024).

[41] The nature of the offense is “found in the details and circumstances of the commission of the offenses and the defendant's participation.” Croy v. State, 953 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We look at the “nature, extent, heinousness, and brutality of the offense.” Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). Young notes he had never met A.S. before this incident and had no grudge against her. Yet he did not step in and stop Mollett's relentless attack on A.S. Instead, he kept A.S. in the house so Mollett could continue to attack her, encouraged Mollett to kill her, documented the disturbing sights and sounds of the violence, and participated in terrorizing A.S. by removing her shorts and leading her to believe he was going to rape her—all while her children were upstairs.⁹ And he furthered A.S.’s humiliation by telling police she was a willing participant and then making the explicit videos he took available to be posted on social media. He showed no restraint, regard, or lack of brutality when participating in these offenses. See Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122. Rather than demonstrating the nature of his offenses warrants revision, the fact he did not know A.S. and had no reason to treat her as he did makes the nature of Young's offense even more disturbing.

[42] Examining Young's character involves a broad analysis of his “qualities, including [his] age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse.” Pritcher, 208 N.E.3d at 668. Young notes he was thirty years old at the time of the offense and had no prior felony convictions and a solid work history. Although he has several misdemeanor convictions, he contends they were “from several years earlier” and “far less than the [trial court] implied.” Appellant's Br. at 14–15. Still, even a minor criminal history reflects poorly on a defendant's character. Carter v. State, 271 N.E.3d 566, 572 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. And because many people are gainfully employed, Young's work history does not weigh in favor of a lesser sentence. See Hale v. State, 128 N.E.3d 456, 465 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (stating “a defendant's employment is not necessarily a mitigating factor”) (citation omitted), trans. denied. And although the trial court acknowledged Young expressed his condolences to A.S., the court stopped short of finding he had expressed remorse or taken any responsibility for what occurred. See Tr. Vol. 7 at 186 (Young stating A.S. has his condolences for what happened to her but claiming he is “not a bad person, [he] just got caught in a bad situation, that's all”). Likewise, Young deflects responsibility on appeal, claiming Mollett “was the person who inflicted all of the injuries on” A.S. and was “far more culpable.” Appellant's Br. at 15. We conclude Young has not presented compelling evidence of “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of his good character” presenting him in a favorable light. Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[43] Finally, Young notes he received the maximum sentence possible and argues he should not bear a penalty similar to Mollett's. Although we may look to sentences imposed in other cases when deciding whether a sentence is inappropriate, we should concentrate less on comparing the facts of a case to others, whether real or hypothetical, and more on the nature, extent, and depravity of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced, and what it reveals about the defendant's character. Carter, 271 N.E.3d at 573. The nature of these offenses is exceptionally sadistic, and Young has not persuaded us his thirty-six-year sentence is an outlier warranting revision.

Conclusion

[44] Sufficient evidence supports Young's convictions, and his sentence is not inappropriate.

[45] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code §§ 35-42-4-1(a)(1) (2022) and 35-41-5-1 (2014).

2.   I.C. § 35-42-3-3(a), (b)(3)(B) (2019).

3.   I.C. § 35-42-2-1.5 (2014).

4.   A.S.’s brother picked up A.S.’s kids from Mollett's house.

5.   The nurse explained petechia are “little tiny burst[ ] blood vessels” that can be caused by the “pressure build up from ․ lack of blood flow.” Tr. Vol. 4 at 227.

6.   The jury also found Mollett guilty of Level 3 felony criminal confinement and Level 3 felony aggravated battery. The trial court ordered her to serve a sentence totaling thirty-two years. Mollett's appeal of her sentence is decided by separate opinion also handed down on this date. Mollett v. State, No. 25A-CR-1770 (Ind. Ct. App., June 22, 2026).

7.   Acknowledging these crimes arose out of an episode of criminal conduct, the court sentenced Young to four years for Count 1, sixteen years for Count 2, and sixteen years for Count 3, all consecutive. Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2(d)(7) limits the total consecutive terms of imprisonment for crimes other than “crimes of violence” to twenty years. The General Assembly has not included attempted rape or criminal confinement among the crimes defined by statute as crimes of violence, and the consecutive sentences for those two crimes could therefore total only twenty years. But Level 3 battery is defined as a crime of violence and not subject to this restriction. I.C. § 35-50-1-2(a)(6)(B).

8.   Statutes define the culpability required for each of the three crimes Young was convicted of as knowing or intentional. The State charged Young only with knowingly committing each crime. See Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 27.

9.   To the extent Young comments on the trial court's use of the presence of A.S.’s children and the likelihood they heard their mother screaming during the attack as an aggravator, that is an undeveloped abuse of sentencing discretion argument, and it is waived for lack of cogent argument. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.