Raymond Edwards, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Raymond Edwards appeals the trial court's imposition of the advisory sentence of three years, fully executed, after he pleaded guilty to Level 5 felony robbery without the benefit of a plea agreement.¹ He argues the trial court abused its discretion in identifying and balancing aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and contends the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 2

[2] In the early morning hours of February 18, 2025, twenty-year-old Edwards texted B.D.C. (age seventeen) and M.E.A. (age fourteen) and asked them to give him a ride to buy marijuana. The teens picked Edwards up, and as they drove around, B.D.C. and M.E.A. began discussing robbing a gas station for gas money. The group then drove to a gas station in Clinton, where Edwards and B.D.C. donned ski masks with the intent to rob the store of “blunt wraps” and vapes. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 51. Once in the store, B.D.C. attempted to distract the attendant. B.D.C. then grabbed the vapes, and Edwards took the wraps. The attendant told them to stop, and they ran outside to the car, where M.E.A. was in the driver's seat. M.E.A. sped away but lost control of the car and crashed into a tree. Edwards started to walk away from the scene but stopped when M.E.A. asked for help and fell to the ground. Edwards and B.D.C. started to head back to help M.E.A. but fled on foot when they saw another individual arrive on the scene. The two contacted Edwards’ girlfriend, who picked them up and took them to her house. Later that day, at his girlfriend's urging, Edwards turned himself in and gave a statement to police providing the facts above.

[3] For these actions, the State charged Edwards with Level 5 felony robbery and Class A misdemeanor theft. Edwards pleaded guilty to both charges without the benefit of a plea agreement, and the trial court entered judgment of conviction on robbery only. Sentencing was left to the trial court's discretion.

[4] At the sentencing hearing, Edwards testified he decided to rob a gas station to get high on marijuana. He indicated a willingness to undergo a substance use evaluation. He said he had been diagnosed with “[b]ipolar, schizophrenic and ․ anxiety” and used marijuana to manage the latter. Tr. Vol. 2 at 7. He apologized and expressed regret for his actions. See id. at 8 (Edwards stating, “I apologize for robbing their store, and if I [could] go back I wouldn't have done it.”). In arguing for a sentence of probation, Edwards’ attorney noted Edwards was a first time offender, has a mental illness, and used marijuana “as self medication.” Id. at 9.

[5] In sentencing Edwards, the trial court found the following mitigating circumstances: (1) Edwards’ lack of criminal history; (2) Edwards pleaded guilty without the benefit of a plea agreement; and (3) Edwards’ self-reported mental illness diagnosis, although the trial court did “not place much weight on it” due to a lack of evidence beyond Edwards’ self-report. Id. at 12. The trial court continued:

As far as the aggravators in this case, Mr. Edwards, even though this is your first criminal act this was an act that involved a victim in which you took items from. Okay? The danger associated with that, and the statute says that the Court can take into consideration aggravating and mitigating circumstances that are not specifically numerically listed, but are in accordance with the law under the circumstances. The -- this crime was also committed in the presence of a couple juveniles -- okay -- under this that were involved as well in this matter in this criminal act. You are an adult. Okay? Under those circumstances that is a situation which the Court believes could be deemed an aggravator.

Id. The trial court noted a community corrections placement was not available and so the court's sentencing options were an executed sentence or probation. The trial court sentenced Edwards to the advisory sentence of three years, all executed in the Indiana Department of Correction, and recommended him for the Recovery While Incarcerated program due to his admitted drug use. The trial court advised Edwards he could seek a modification of his sentence after completing the program. The trial court's written order did not identify the aggravating and mitigating circumstances the trial court considered.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing.

[6] Edwards first argues the trial court abused its discretion in its identification and balancing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. We review a trial court's sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 269 (Ind. 2023). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)). A trial court may abuse its sentencing discretion in a number of ways, including if it (1) fails to enter a sentencing statement; (2) relies on aggravating or mitigating factors unsupported by the record; (3) fails to find aggravating or mitigating factors that are supported by the record and advanced for consideration; or (4) relies on reasons that are improper as a matter of law. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1223 (Ind. 2008). In reviewing a sentencing decision, we may consider both the trial court's written sentencing order and oral statements made at the sentencing hearing. Corbett v. State, 764 N.E.2d 622, 631 (Ind. 2002).

[7] Mitigating Factors. We begin with evidence in mitigation. “An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493. A trial court does not abuse its discretion in failing to consider a mitigating factor if it was not raised at sentencing. Id. Moreover, if the trial court does not find the existence of a mitigating factor after it has been argued by counsel, the trial court need not explain why it has determined that factor does not exist. Id. And the trial court is “not obligated to accept the defendant's contentions as to what constitutes a mitigating circumstance.” Rascoe v. State, 736 N.E.2d 246, 249 (Ind. 2000).

[8] Here, the trial court found three mitigating circumstances: (1) Edwards’ lack of criminal history; (2) his guilty plea; and (3) his mental illness. Still, he argues the court failed to find as mitigators his “remorse, acceptance of responsibility, substance abuse issues, and desire for treatment.” Appellant's Br. at 6.

[9] First, the trial court did consider Edwards’ acceptance of responsibility, as it found his guilty plea a factor in mitigation. See Cotto v. State, 829 N.E.2d 520, 525 (Ind. 2005) (“A guilty plea demonstrates a defendant's acceptance of responsibility for the crime[.]”).

[10] As to his remorse, substance use, and desire for treatment, Edwards did not argue the trial court should consider them as factors in mitigation. Edwards testified at the sentencing hearing he used marijuana to help with anxiety, apologized for the crime, and expressed regret. But at the end of the hearing, Edwards’ counsel's sole argument related to mitigating factors was: “Your Honor, this is a first time offender. It is a felony 5, which is serious, and he understands the severity of it. He does have a mental illness, which I think the Court should take into consideration. He [was] using marijuana as self medication.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 9. In addition to factors Edwards mentioned and the trial court considered (his lack of criminal history and mental illness), the only other factor Edwards clearly identified was that he was using marijuana to cope with anxiety. We cannot conclude from this limited statement Edwards truly advanced remorse and a substance use disorder as mitigating factors for the trial court's consideration.

[11] Even if he did, Edwards failed to establish the mitigating evidence was both significant and clearly supported by the record. Edwards’ statement expressing regret was limited. And although his counsel elicited testimony that Edwards “maybe [has] a problem with marijuana considering [he was] willing to rob a gas station for money for it,” id. at 5, Edwards reported to probation he “does not believe he has experienced any significant problems as a result of his drug use.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 46. Given the minimal evidence of remorse and conflicting evidence about the extent of Edwards’ drug use, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to find them to be mitigating factors.

[12] Aggravating Factors. Edwards next argues the trial court relied on improper aggravators, specifically “that the offense involved a victim and that juveniles were present.” Appellant's Br. at 6.

[13] As Edwards correctly notes, a trial court may not use a material element of a crime as an aggravating factor to support an enhanced sentence. McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 589–90 (Ind. 2007). Here, Edwards pleaded guilty to knowingly or intentionally taking property from the gas station by putting the attendant in fear. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 25 (charging information). Accordingly, the presence of a victim was a material element of Edwards’ offense that the trial court could not use to enhance his sentence. However, we disagree that the trial court considered the victim's presence to be an aggravator. Although the trial court commented on the victim and the “danger associated with that,” the trial court's statement clearly identified only the presence of juveniles as an aggravating circumstance. Tr. Vol. 2 at 12 (“[T]his ․ crime was also committed in the presence of a couple juveniles ․ that were involved as well in this matter[.] You are an adult․ Under those circumstances that is a situation which the Court believes could be deemed an aggravator.”).

[14] As to the presence of minors during the robbery, Edwards identifies no reason the trial court could not consider it a factor in aggravation. The record shows Edwards, then twenty years old, contacted two juveniles to drive him to buy drugs. He and the older teen robbed a gas station before fleeing in a car operated by a fourteen-year-old. The factors our trial courts may consider when sentencing a defendant are not limited to those listed in the sentencing statutes. See Rice v. State, 6 N.E.3d 940, 942 (Ind. 2014) (sentencing statutes provide a “non-exhaustive list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances trial courts may consider”); I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(c) (2025) (“The criteria listed in subsections (a) [aggravating circumstances] and (b) [mitigating circumstances] do not limit the matters that the court may consider in determining the sentence.”). And the nature and circumstances of the crime, as well as the manner in which the crime is committed, “has long been held a valid aggravating factor.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 492. As the record supports the trial court's identified aggravator, the court did not abuse its discretion in considering it.

[15] Balancing. Finally, Edwards takes issue with the trial court's statement that the aggravators and mitigators “negate one another,” Tr. Vol. 2 at 13, and argues “this balance was flawed.” Appellant's Br. at 6. Because a trial court has no obligation to “weigh” aggravating and mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence, a court cannot be said to have abused its discretion in failing to “properly weigh” such factors. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. This is because once a trial court has entered a sentencing statement, it may impose any sentence authorized by statute and permissible under the Indiana Constitution. Id. (citing I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(d)). And it may do so “regardless of the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances or mitigating circumstances.” I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(d). To the extent Edwards argues the trial court improperly balanced the aggravators and mitigators it found, this is not a basis to revise his sentence or to remand for resentencing.

[16] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Edwards.

Edwards’ sentence is not inappropriate.

[17] Edwards next asks us to revise his sentence. The Indiana Constitution authorizes this Court to review and revise a trial court's sentencing decision as provided by rule. Ind. Const. art. 7, § 6. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The principal role of appellate review is to leaven the outliers, not to achieve a perceived correct sentence in each case. Conley v. State, 183 N.E.3d 276, 288 (Ind. 2022). Therefore, “we reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 160 (Ind. 2019) (per curiam).

[18] “[S]entencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222. “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). The two prongs of 7(B) review are “separate inquiries to ultimately be balanced in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Conner v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). “[T]o the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. at 127.

[19] The question “is not whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” Helsley v. State, 43 N.E.3d 225, 228 (Ind. 2015) (quoting King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)) (emphasis omitted). Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. The defendant bears the burden of persuading us a revised sentence is warranted. Cramer v. State, 240 N.E.3d 693, 698 (Ind. 2024).

[20] The sentencing range for a Level 5 felony is between one and six years, with an advisory sentence of three years. I.C. § 35-50-2-6(b) (2014). Because our legislature has selected the advisory sentence as the “starting point” for “an appropriate sentence for the crime committed,” the defendant bears a “particularly heavy burden” when the trial court imposes the advisory sentence. Fernbach v. State, 954 N.E.2d 1080, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.

[21] Here, Edwards asked two minors to drive him to buy drugs. He and one of the teens then robbed a gas station for items he admitted he wanted for his drug use. True, as Edwards argues, the offense “involved no physical injury, no weapon, and no extraordinary harm beyond that required to establish the offense.” Appellant's Br. at 7. But by his own admission, Edwards committed the offense to facilitate his drug use, itself uncharged illegal conduct. There is nothing remarkable about the nature of Edwards’ offense.

[22] Nor does the record reveal anything remarkable about his character to persuade us his sentence is inappropriate. Again, Edwards committed the offense to further his admitted illicit drug use. After the robbery, Edwards and the juveniles fled in a car. When the young driver crashed, Edwards and B.D.C. left their friend at the scene, despite his requests for help. Later, Edwards turned himself in and identified his associates. While Edwards’ act of contacting the police is respectable, we cannot say it constitutes “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character” to recommend him for sentence revision, particularly considering it was done at his girlfriend's urging. Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122. A fully executed sentence for a first time offender is uncommon in our experience, but whether there is a more appropriate sentence is not the question before us. As the legislature has set the advisory sentence for a Level 5 felony at three years, and the record reveals nothing remarkable about the nature of the offense or Edwards’ character, we simply cannot conclude Edwards’ three-year sentence is inappropriate.

Conclusion

[23] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Edwards, and his sentence is not inappropriate.

[24] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1(a)(2) (2017).

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.