GARRISON v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Keith Allen Garrison appeals his conviction for Level 5 felony failure to register as a sex offender while having a prior unrelated conviction for failure to register.¹ He argues the State presented insufficient evidence he knowingly or intentionally failed to register. Because the State provided sufficient evidence to the contrary, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Garrison pleaded guilty to Level 4 felony misconduct with a minor in 2015. He was sentenced to twelve years in the Department of Correction (“DOC”), with two years suspended to probation. Additionally, Garrison had to register as a sex offender. In March 2024, he pleaded guilty in Hendricks County to Level 6 felony failure to register as a sex offender. Garrison settled in Indianapolis shortly thereafter.

[3] In May, Garrison left Indianapolis for Lafayette to seek “mental health and rehabilitation” treatment at Meridian Health. Tr. Vol. 2 at 111. He scheduled an appointment with Kasey Dulin—the sex offender registry coordinator—to register as a sex offender in Tippecanoe County. The two met on May 22. During their meeting, Garrison informed Dulin he was unhoused. Dulin explained to Garrison the applicable registration requirements, particularly Garrison's obligation to report in person every seven days because he lacked permanent housing. Before concluding the meeting, Garrison dated and initialed various registration documents, including one containing the following language:

If you live at a temporary residence such as a homeless shelter, a group home, or a halfway house, or if you are homeless you must register IN-PERSON to the Sheriff's Office at least once every 7 days until you find a permanent residence.

Ex. Vol. 1 at 12. Garrison similarly signed a waiver form acknowledging he was trained on how to use the registration kiosk, especially the process for “checking in for the homeless registry.” Id. at 17.

[4] Garrison did not return to the registry office until June 14, when he used the kiosk to leave his phone number and inform Dulin of his desire “to go to another county[.]” Id. at 19. On July 28, Garrison booked an appointment with Dulin for the purpose of an “address change.” Id. at 21.² Law enforcement arrested Garrison on July 31, 2024, the day of the scheduled appointment for his failure to report.

[5] The State charged Garrison with two counts of Level 6 felony failure to register and filed enhancements for these charges to Level 5 felonies because of his prior failure to register in Hendricks County.³ And the State alleged Garrison was a habitual offender.⁴

[6] Garrison waived his right to a trial by jury, and both he and Dulin testified at the bench trial. Dulin asserted she had explained to Garrison the need to report in person every seven days because he was unhoused. In addition to Dulin's testimony, the State presented and the trial court admitted documentary evidence of all the forms Garrison had signed and initialed. For his part, Garrison disclaimed any knowledge of his obligation to report weekly.

[7] The trial court found Garrison guilty of all counts of failure to register as a sex or violent offender and related enhancements. But because of double jeopardy concerns, the court entered judgment of conviction only on the Level 5 felony failure to register with a prior conviction. The court found Garrison not guilty of Class A misdemeanor failure to possess identification and the applicable Level 6 felony enhancement. The trial court then determined Garrison was a habitual offender. He received a total sentence of six years, with three years executed in the DOC.

Sufficient evidence exists to prove Garrison knowingly or intentionally failed to register as an offender.

[8] Garrison argues “the State presented insufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to show that he knowingly or intentionally failed to register every seven days as a homeless person.” Appellant's Br. at 11.

[9] A sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim warrants a “deferential standard of review in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility[.]’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied). Instead, we respect the factfinder's exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence, Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018), and consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact, Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). It is “not necessary that the evidence ‘overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ ” Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind. 1995)).

[10] In general, a “sex or violent offender who resides in Indiana shall register with the local law enforcement authority in the county where the sex or violent offender resides.” I.C. § 11-8-8-7(b) (2013). A person commits a Level 5 felony when they knowingly or intentionally fail to register as a sex offender while having a prior unrelated conviction for failure to register. I.C. § 11-8-8-17(a)(1), (b)(1). A person acts knowingly if, “when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b) (1977). A person acts intentionally if, “when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(a). In the event an offender lacks a principal or temporary residence, he

shall report in person to the local law enforcement authority in the county where the sex or violent offender resides at least once every seven (7) days to report an address for the location where the sex or violent offender will stay during the time in which the sex or violent offender lacks a principal address or temporary residence.

I.C. § 11-8-8-12(c) (2007).

[11] “Intent is a mental function and, absent admission, it must be determined by courts and juries from a consideration of the defendant's conduct and the natural and usual consequences of such conduct.” Metzler v. State, 540 N.E.2d 606, 609 (Ind. 1989). Since intent is a mental state, “the trier of fact must usually resort to reasonable inferences based upon an examination of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether, from the person's conduct and the natural consequences that might be expected from that conduct, a showing or inference the intent to commit that conduct exists.” Id.

[12] Here, Garrison has a prior conviction for failure to register in Hendricks County. When he later moved from Indianapolis to Lafayette, Garrison had an obligation to register as a sex offender with the local law enforcement authority. Indeed, Garrison met with Dulin for that very purpose. In her role as coordinator, Dulin was responsible for meeting with offenders to “go over all the rules and regulations[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 76. When Garrison initially met with Dulin, he “indicated that he would be homeless.” Id. at 79. At trial, Dulin explained Garrison had both an annual registration requirement and an obligation to report in person every seven days because of his unhoused status. Dulin “provided [Garrison] the information about being homeless” and the requirement to report every seven days. Id. at 84–85.

[13] Aside from this testimony, the State presented evidence of the registration documents Garrison either initialed or signed at the registry office. One of the documents Garrison initialed had language stating all unhoused individuals had to “register IN-PERSON to the Sheriff's Office at least once every 7 days until [they] find a permanent residence.” Ex. Vol. 1 at 12. In a separate document he signed, Garrison acknowledged having been trained “on each step [of] how to use” the registration kiosk—including the process for “checking in for the homeless registry.” Id. at 17. Garrison admitted initialing and signing these documents, but he testified Dulin appeared to be in a hurry so he “was just going along with the flow.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 120. Garrison denied having knowledge of the need to report in person every seven days.

[14] Based on these circumstances, the trial court could reasonably conclude Garrison knowingly or intentionally failed to register. See Metzler, 540 N.E.2d at 609. It is up to the trier of fact to resolve conflicting evidence, see Ransom v. State, 850 N.E.2d 491, 497 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); an appellate court cannot reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility, see Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1244.

[15] Even so, Garrison relies on this Court's opinion in Dye v. State to argue the State failed to prove he had the necessary intent to support the conviction for failure to register. 943 N.E.2d 928 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). In Dye, a panel of this Court reversed the defendant's conviction for making a material misstatement or omission while registering as a sex offender. 943 N.E.2d at 931. The defendant in Dye was unable to read and did not understand the questions on the registration forms. Id. He received no help or training from staff at the registry office, and someone there altered the address he had originally provided. Id. at 929–30. Yet the defendant otherwise complied with the in-person reporting obligation every seven days. Id. at 931. The facts here are distinguishable. Garrison was able to read and write, and he received training and assistance at the registry office. After his initial face-to-face with Dulin, Garrison was otherwise noncompliant with the in-person reporting requirements. The only time he returned to the registry office before his arrest was in an attempt to inform Dulin of his return to Indianapolis. As the State contends, Garrison “was fully capable of understanding and complying” with the registration requirements but did not. Appellee's Br. at 12. Dye is therefore unavailing in Garrison's case.

Conclusion

[16] There was sufficient evidence to prove Garrison knowingly or intentionally failed to register as a sex offender.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 11-8-8-17(a)(1), (b)(1) (2020).

2.   On direct, Dulin testified Garrison used the kiosk in person to book the appointment, see Tr. Vol. 2 at 88, but on cross-examination, she clarified Garrison could have made the appointment online, see id. at 95.

3.   The State also charged Garrison with Class A misdemeanor failure to possess identification and likewise filed an enhancement of the charge to a Level 6 felony because of the prior conviction in Hendricks County.

4.   Garrison has a lengthy criminal record, which includes multiple convictions for burglary and theft.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.