FEEBACK v. Shanna Marie Powell, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In 2020, Jason Feeback (Father) initiated this paternity action against Shanna Marie Powell (Mother) (collectively, Parents). The trial court established paternity of Parents’ two children and awarded Mother sole legal custody and primary physical custody. In 2023, Father's brother, James Feeback, and his long-term partner, Cari McKinney (collectively, Intervenors), intervened in the case and moved for custody of both children. The trial court denied their petition, and Intervenors now appeal. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Parents are the biological parents of K.F., born in 2016, and W.F., born in 2017. W.F. was born with spina bifida, which requires him to have “constant [medical] care[.]” App. Vol. II p. 117. Parents and the children resided together in Indianapolis until Parents separated in January 2020. Father then initiated the paternity action and moved in with Intervenors. Soon after, he was arrested and ultimately was incarcerated off and on for the next few years. This left Mother to solely handle W.F.’s medical care. In addition to this responsibility, she “had difficulty providing financially for the children and lacked stable housing, lacked a dependable vehicle, and lacked sufficient income.” Id. As a result, four-year-old K.F. began spending large amounts of time at Intervenors’ home. By March 2021, K.F. was living full-time with Intervenors, although all parties believed this to be a “temporary” situation. Id. at 118. In December 2021, the court issued an order granting Mother sole legal and primary physical custody of the children, with Father exercising supervised parenting time when not incarcerated. Notwithstanding this order, K.F. continued to live with Intervenors while W.F. lived with Mother, although W.F. visited Intervenors frequently.

[3] In the summer of 2023, Mother expressed to Intervenors that she planned for K.F. to return to her care later that year. In September, Father, who had been released from incarceration, moved for full legal and primary physical custody of the children. The next month, Intervenors filed a petition alleging they were de facto custodians and requesting custody of both children. In December, Mother took K.F. to her home for a weekend visit and never returned her to Intervenors’ care. For the next two years, while both motions to modify remained pending, the children continued to reside primarily with Mother, with Father exercising parenting time and Intervenors exercising visitation pursuant to a preliminary order by the court.

[4] A final hearing was held over two days in August and September 2025. In November, the court issued an order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court found Intervenors were de facto custodians of K.F.—but not of W.F.—and that Mother had acquiesced to Intervenors’ care of K.F. The court then made findings relating to the children's best interests under Indiana Code sections 31-14-13-2 and 31-14-13-2.5 and concluded that it was not in the children's best interests for custody to be modified. The court ultimately ordered that “Mother shall retain sole legal and primary physical custody of the children” and “Father shall have parenting time” pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines. Id. at 128. Intervenors now appeal.

Discussion and Decision

I. Adequacy of Findings

[5] We first address Intervenors’ contention that the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law “do not permit meaningful review by this Court.” Appellants’ Br. p. 25. Prior to the final hearing, Intervenors made a written request for special findings and conclusions in accordance with Indiana Trial Rule 52(A), which provides, “Upon its own motion, or the written request of any party filed with the court prior to the admission of evidence, the court in all actions tried upon the facts without a jury ․ shall find the facts specially and state its conclusions thereon.” “Such findings should contain all of the facts necessary for a judgment for the party in whose favor conclusions of law are found.” Erb v. Erb, 815 N.E.2d 1027, 1030 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). “The purpose of Trial Rule 52(A) is to provide the parties and the reviewing court with the theory upon which the trial court decided the case in order that the right of review for error may be effectively preserved.” Hurst v. Smith, 192 N.E.3d 233, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

[6] Here, the trial court issued a fifteen-page order with almost a hundred findings of fact and conclusions of law. The order specifically laid out the legal authorities the court was citing, the relevant analyses, and a variety of facts relating to each party. Importantly, the court issued findings as related to the modification of custody from a parent to a third party. Specifically, the court issued findings and conclusions on the natural-parent presumption and the relevant statutory best interests factors enumerated in Indiana Code sections 31-14-13-2 and 31-14-13-2.5, including findings on the wishes of the children (Finding 68), the interrelationship of the children with each other and the parties (Findings 18, 46), the children's adjustments to home, school, and community (Findings 36-38, 42, 45, 63), any evidence of a pattern of domestic violence (Finding 92), and evidence as to de facto custodians (Findings 25-26, 67). See App. Vol. II pp. 114-28.

[7] Yet Intervenors point to various topics they feel were omitted from the trial court's findings, such as allegations that Mother was abusing alcohol. However, the trial court is not required to make findings on every conceivable topic, but rather to make sufficient findings to support its judgment and provide us with the ability to conduct meaningful review. See Erb, 815 N.E.2d at 1030. The court's findings of fact and conclusions of law here adequately do this. Thus, we find no error.

II. Custody Modification

[8] Intervenors next argue the trial court incorrectly applied the relevant legal analysis when determining whether custody should be modified. In general, we review custody modifications for an abuse of discretion with a preference for granting latitude and deference to the trial court in family law matters. Wilson v. Myers, 997 N.E.2d 338, 340 (Ind. 2013). As noted above, here the trial court issued findings and conclusions under Trial Rule 52.

The conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. But pursuant to Trial Rule 52(A), we shall not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Factual findings are only clearly erroneous where there is no support for them in the record, either directly or by inference; a judgment is only clearly erroneous when it applies an improper legal standard to proper facts. In either case, we must be left with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made.

Johnson v. Johnson, 999 N.E.2d 56, 59 (Ind. 2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

[9] Indiana Code section 31-14-13-6 provides in pertinent part that a court may not modify a child custody order unless the modification is in the child's best interests and there is a substantial change in one or more of the factors listed in Indiana Code section 31-14-13-2 and, if applicable, section 31-14-13-2.5. Indiana Code section 31-14-13-2 provides in pertinent part,

The court shall consider all relevant factors, including the following:

(1) The age and sex of the child.

(2) The wishes of the child's parents.

(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.

(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:

(A) the child's parents;

(B) the child's siblings; and

(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest.

(5) The child's adjustment to home, school, and community.

(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent.

(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto custodian, and if the evidence is sufficient, the court shall consider the factors described in section 2.5(b) of this chapter.

Our Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he party seeking to modify custody bears the burden of demonstrating the existing custody should be altered.” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016).

[10] Here however, the custody dispute is between the natural parents and third parties. As we recently explained:

Where a third party seeks to modify custody in favor of the third party rather than the natural parent, our courts engage in a three-step analysis. First, Indiana recognizes the presumption that “ ‘natural parents are entitled to the custody of their minor children, except when they are unsuitable persons to be entrusted with their care, control, and education.’ ” In re Guardianship of B.H., 770 N.E.2d 283, 285 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Gilmore v. Kitson, 165 Ind. 402, 74 N.E. 1083, 1084 (1905)). The parent “comes to the table with a ‘strong presumption that a child's interests are best served by placement with the natural parent.’ ” [K.I. ex rel. J.I. v. J.H., 903 N.E.2d 453, 460 (Ind. 2009)(quoting B.H., 770 N.E.2d at 287)]. Accordingly, when custody is at issue between a third party and a natural parent, we begin with the presumption in favor of the natural parent. Id.

In the second step, the third party must rebut the natural-parent presumption with clear and convincing evidence. Id.; B.H., 770 N.E.2d at 287. “ ‘The presumption will not be overcome merely because a third party could provide the better things in life for the child.’ ” B.H., 770 N.E.2d at 287. Instead, in determining whether the presumption is overcome, the trial court may seek “guidance” from the three Hendrickson factors: “(i) unfitness on the part of the parent, (ii) long acquiescence in the third party's custody of the child, or (iii) voluntary relinquishment of the child such that the affections of the child and third party have become so interwoven that to sever them would seriously mar and endanger the future happiness of the child.” K.I., 903 N.E.2d at 459. The trial court is also free to rely on relevant factors other than the Hendrickson factors. Id.

***

If the third party overcomes the natural-parent presumption, the trial court proceeds to the third step. In the third step, the third party must demonstrate that, based on the relevant custody statutes, a “substantial change” occurred and that “ ‘the child's best interests are substantially and significantly served by placement’ ” with the third party. K.I., 903 N.E.2d at 460-61 (quoting B.H., 770 N.E.2d at 287) ․ The third-party's burden of proof in this step remains proof by clear and convincing evidence. K.I., 903 N.E.2d at 460-61.

Matter of A.M.J., 228 N.E.3d 1132, 1140-41 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

[11] Intervenors allege the trial court incorrectly applied the legal analysis, specifically that it found they had overcome the natural-parent presumption but nonetheless “applied the presumption it had already found was rebutted.” Appellants’ Br. p. 11. We disagree. As Intervenors acknowledge, the trial court properly articulated that it must first address whether the natural-parent presumption had been rebutted, and if so, then go on to the best interests analysis. See App. Vol. II p. 123. In applying this standard, the trial court first found “Mother acquiesced to [Intervenors’] care of” K.F., thereby rebutting the presumption that she should have custody. Id. at 125.¹ Thus, the court properly went on to engage in the best interests analysis as to K.F. After the court made a variety of findings relating to the statutory best interests factors, the court found:

95. The [Indiana Supreme] Court stated in [B.H., 770 N.E.2d at 287]

“before placing a child in the custody of a person other than the natural parent, a trial Court must be satisfied by clear and convincing evidence that the best interests of the child require such a placement. The trial court must be convinced that placement with a person other than the natural parent represents a substantial and significant advantage to the child. The presumption will not be overcome merely because [ ] a third-party could provide the better things in life for the child.” [ ]

96. The evidence presented at the trial did not show by clear and convincing evidence that the best interests of the children require the placement of the children with the Intervenors. Based on the evidence that the children are thriving in Mother's care, there would be no substantial and significant advantage to the children to be placed in the care of the Intervenors.

Id. at 127.

[12] In sum, the trial court first determined that Intervenors had rebutted the presumption in favor of Mother, then found Intervenors had failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that it was in K.F.’s best interests to be placed with Intervenors. This is the correct legal analysis when determining whether custody modification is warranted between a natural parent and a third party. See supra ¶10. The trial court did not err in its custody determination.²

[13] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Notably, the trial court did not find Intervenors overcame the natural-parent presumption for W.F. As such, the analysis for W.F. should have ended here. See Armstrong v. Armstrong, 274 N.E.3d 465, 470 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (“[O]nly if the [natural parent] presumption is rebutted does the trial court continue to the [best interests analysis].”). Instead, the court went on to engage in the best interests analysis as to both children. This was an error, albeit harmless, as the court ultimately determined that it was in both children's best interests to remain with Mother.

2.   Intervenors also request we remand and order the trial court to “enter specific findings addressing K.F.’s contact with the Intervenors”—namely, visitation. Appellants’ Br. p. 20. But even assuming Intervenors may request visitation, they did not do so in the trial court. See K.I. ex rel. J.I. v. J.H., 903 N.E.2d 453, 461-62 (Ind. 2009) (noting the de facto custodian statute grants “standing in certain custody proceedings” but “is silent on the question of visitation.”). As such, we will not address this argument. See Matter of R.A.M.O., 190 N.E.3d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (“Generally, an argument cannot be presented for the first time on appeal.”).

Scheele, Judge.

May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.