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Lynn Ellen Mullins, Appellant v. David Wayne Mullins, Appellee
MEMORANDUM DECISION
[1] Lynn Ellen Mullins (“Wife”) appeals from the trial court's order dividing the marital property in this dissolution action. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Wife and David Wayne Mullin (“Husband”) were married in August 2011. At that time, Wife was employed by Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois, where she had worked since 1981, and Husband owned and operated Dave's Automotive, Inc. Wife left her employment in October 2013. On August 2, 2022, Wife filed a petition for legal separation.
[3] On February 10, 2023, Husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. In November 2023, the court entered a provisional order requiring Husband to continue to pay certain expenses including the mortgage, property taxes, utilities, and insurance on the marital residence. The court held a final hearing over four days, concluding on March 11, 2025. The parties presented evidence regarding the marital estate which included real property, retirement accounts, automobiles, personal property, and Husband's business. The parties’ real property included the marital residence in Westville (the “Farm”), a property in LaPorte (the “Lake House”), and property on Horse Prairie Avenue in Valparaiso (the “Horse Prairie Property”). Dave's Automotive is located on the Horse Prairie Property. The parties filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions.
[4] On August 12, 2025, the trial court issued a decree of dissolution of marriage dividing the marital property. The court found that “[t]he parties stipulated to the admission of the valuation assigning an increase in the value of [Dave's Automotive] from $526,000.00 on the date of marriage to $847,000.00 on the date of filing, for a coverture value of $321,000.00.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 21. The court found “the Horse Prairie Property should be valued for marital estate purposes in a similar manner as Dave's Automotive was valued above – attempting to give a coverture value,” and it “value[d] the coverture portion of the Horse Prairie Property at $520,000.00 with a mortgage balance of $432,807.00, leaving equity of $87,193.00.” Id. at 23-24. The court found:
Wife has requested a deviation from an equal division of assets and is asking the Court to apply a 60/40 split to the property division. There are various statutory factors the Court must take into consideration to justify deviation from an equal division of assets. One of the primary considerations is the earning ability of the parties. When the final hearing started in this matter, it could be argued Husband had a significantly higher earning ability than Wife. Due to events occurring during the pendency of this matter indicated above, that can no longer be said to be true. Prior to the conclusion of the final hearing, Husband suffered his second stroke and appeared at the final hearing having to use a walker for mobility. Husband testified he had not been back to work as the owner of Dave's Automotive since the stroke and did not know when or if he was going to be able to return to work. The evidence also reveals Husband was responsible for the acquisition of the vast majority of the marital assets. Taking into consideration all of the requisite factors, including Husband's health and his ability to go forward with employment, and, given the substantial assets that Wife is receiving pursuant to the judgement entered below, the Court finds that there is no reason to deviate from an equal division of assets in this cause and the marital estate should accordingly be divided 50/50.
Id. at 28-29.
[5] The court concluded “[t]he marital estate of the parties shall be divided equally as follows”:
Assets Husband Wife [ ] Horse Prairie (coverture value) $520,000.00 Dave's Automotive (coverture value) 321,000.00 Marital Residence/Farm $794,000.00 [ ] LaPorte, IN/Lake House 335,000.00 Personal Property 566,605.00 144,781.00 Nationwide IRA 536,339.19 Thrivent Annuity 11,251.40 MetLife IRA 17,600.75 Jackson National IRA 258,653.38 Sea Ray sale proceeds 15,606.86 Total Assets $2,034,465.99 $1,486,371.59 Debts Husband Wife Horizon mortgage on Farm $327,239.00 Horizon loan on Lake House $338,825.00 Horizon loan on [ ] Horse Prairie 432,807.00 Total Debts $771,632.00 $327,239.00 Net Marital Estate $1,262,833.99 $1,159,132.59 Total Marital Estate $2,421,966.58 1/212 of Marital Estate $1,210,983.29 Equalization Payment ($51,850.70) $51,850.70 Total Equal Division $1,210,983.29 $1,210,983.29
Id. at 34-35. The court found that Husband made payments pursuant to the provisional order which totaled $111,028.46 for August 2022 through March 2025, that because of the large disparity of incomes of the parties through the time of trial Husband should receive a credit of only $51,850.70, and that neither party owed the other party any further payment. Wife filed a motion to correct error alleging the court made certain mathematical errors, erred in dividing the entirety of her $547,590.59 in retirement funds rather than only the coverture share, and failed to assign ownership of a timeshare asset. The court issued an order assigning the timeshare asset and debt to Wife and in all other respects denying her motion to correct error.
Discussion
[6] Wife contends the trial court abused its discretion in several respects in dividing the marital estate. We review a trial court's division of marital property for an abuse of discretion. Roetter v. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d 221, 225 (Ind. 2022). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision stands clearly against the logic and effect of the facts or reasonable inferences, if it misinterprets the law, or if it overlooks evidence of applicable statutory factors. Id. When the trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court may set aside the judgment only when clearly erroneous. Id.
[7] The division of marital property involves a two-step process. Id. at 226. First, the trial court must identify the property to include in the marital estate. Id. at 226-227. This consists of both assets and liabilities and encompasses “all marital property,” whether acquired by a spouse before the marriage or during the marriage or procured by the parties jointly. Id. at 227. Once the court identifies the marital estate, it must then distribute the property in a “just and reasonable” manner. Id. (quoting Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5). The court shall presume that an equal division of the marital property between the parties is just and reasonable. Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5. A party, however, may rebut this presumption with relevant evidence showing “that an equal division would not be just and reasonable.” Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 227 (quoting Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5). This evidence may include:
• each spouse's contribution to the property's acquisition, regardless of whether the contribution produced any income;
• the extent to which a spouse acquired property, either before the marriage or through inheritance or gift;
• each spouse's economic circumstances at the time of divorce;
• the parties’ conduct during the marriage, as it related to the disposal or dissipation of assets; and
• the parties’ respective earnings or earning ability.
Id. (citing Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5). This statutory list is nonexclusive, and no single factor controls the division of property. Id. We review a trial court's valuation of an asset in a marriage dissolution for an abuse of discretion. Bingley v. Bingley, 935 N.E.2d 152, 154 (Ind. 2010).
A. Loan
[8] Wife argues that “the court mistook the portion of the [Horse Prarie] loan proceeds used to purchase the Lake house for a second, independent debt” and erred “by double-counting the same debt under two different names and crediting Husband's distributive share with both.” Appellant's Brief at 15-16. She argues, “[t]his error is easily corrected by eliminating the duplicated debt from the calculations of the distributive shares.” Id. at 15. Husband asserts that he “testified that there was a loan owed to Dave's Automotive for the purchase price of the Lake House.”1 Appellee's Brief at 10.
[9] The trial court included both a “Horizon loan on [ ] Horse Prairie” in the amount of $432,807 and “Horizon loan on Lake House” in the amount of $338,825 as debts of the parties. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 35. The record reveals that, on May 3, 2022, Husband as the borrower obtained a loan from Horizon Bank in the amount of $471,000, and the loan was secured by the Horse Prairie Property.2 A portion of the proceeds, namely $132,174.06, was used to pay off a prior loan from Horizon Bank, and the remaining proceeds of $338,825.94 were deposited into a checking account. The next day, an amount of $332,802.18 was wired from the account to Meridian Title in connection with the purchase of the Lake House.3
[10] While Husband had a portion of the proceeds of the $471,000 loan from Horizon Bank deposited into a checking account (specifically, $338,825.94) and later used a portion of those funds to purchase the Lake House (specifically, $332,802.18), he was not obligated to repay two separate loans to Horizon Bank. He was obligated to repay a single loan—the loan from Horizon Bank in the original principal amount of $471,000—and was not obligated to repay an additional, separate loan to Dave's Automotive.4 We find that the trial court erred in including an amount of “$338,825” for a “Horizon loan on Lake House” as a marital debt. Id. We reverse and remand for an amended decree which does not include the “$338,825” debt in the marital estate and for recalculation of the division of the marital property as discussed below.
B. Retained Earnings
[11] Wife further asserts the trial court erred in failing “to address and divide Husband's retained earnings.” Appellant's Brief at 22. Husband argues that Wife waived her argument by failing to cite to the record and that the value of the retained earnings is reflected in the valuation of Dave's Automotive. Wife does not cite to the record in the argument section of her appellant's brief and has waived her argument. See City of Indianapolis v. Buschman, 988 N.E.2d 791, 795 (Ind. 2013) (argument not supported by citation to authority or parts of record on appeal relied on is waived). Waiver notwithstanding, we do not find Wife's argument to be persuasive.
[12] The record reveals a valuation of Dave's Automotive concluding that the fair market value of the business was $847,000 as of August 2, 2022, and $526,000 as of August 26, 2011. The report's appendices contain supporting information which includes the business's retained earnings as of specified dates, and the business's retained earnings as of August 2, 2022, was $329,298. Jon Gold, Husband's accountant, testified that retained earnings are “assets left in the company after your income and your stock purchases and your paid in capital and your distributions.” Transcript Volume III at 148. Gold later stated, “[Husband] is a hundred percent shareholder” and “[s]o if he would have taken money out of here and the business is less, okay, then you'd be valuing his personal assets more and it would be a wash.” Id. at 155. He testified, “if [Husband] would have taken $200,000 out of the retained earnings, you could say this business is worth $200,000 less, but now [he] is worth $200,000 more.”5 Id. We conclude that the trial court did not err in not identifying the retained earnings as a marital asset separate from the asset of Husband's business.
C. Property Division
[13] Finally, Wife maintains that the trial court found there was no reason to deviate from an equal division of the marital property and yet “went on to apply coverture formulas anyhow which resulted in an unequal distribution.” Appellant's Brief at 19. She argues that the court “made no findings as to what distinguished Husband's premarital assets that deserved to be adjusted for their coverture value from [her] similarly situated premarital assets” and that she “also had a substantial premarital asset in her retirement account.” Id. at 20. Husband asserts that, “[w]hile Wife is technically correct that the trial court should have found that the presumption of an equal division had been rebutted,” reversal is not warranted because the court's findings support a deviation in his favor, Wife invited the error, and the court treated the parties’ retirement accounts in the same manner. Appellee's Brief at 13.
[14] Ind. Code § 31-15-7-4 requires the court to “divide the property of the parties, whether: (1) owned by either spouse before the marriage; (2) acquired by either spouse in his or her own right: (A) after the marriage; and (B) before final separation of the parties; or (3) acquired by their joint efforts.” (Emphasis added). The “one pot” theory prohibits the exclusion of any asset from the scope of the court's power to divide and award. Roberts v. Roberts, 219 N.E.3d 767, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). While the court may ultimately determine a particular asset should be awarded to one spouse, it must first include the asset in its consideration as to how the marital estate should be divided. Id. The court shall presume that an equal division of the marital property is just and reasonable, and a party may rebut the presumption based on the factors in Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5. Also, when dividing marital property, the trial court “must come close to the attempted apportionment[,] otherwise the findings will not support the judgment and we must remand.” Maxwell v. Maxwell, 163 N.E.3d 337, 340 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citation omitted), trans. denied.
[15] Here, with respect to identifying the marital property subject to division, the trial court did not include the entire value of Husband's business or the Horse Prairie Property. Instead, it considered only “the increase in value of” Husband's business during the marriage and the “coverture portion of the Horse Prairie Property”6 to be included in the marital estate to be divided. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 21, 24. While the court may ultimately determine that the value of Husband's business and the Horse Prairie Property at the time of the marriage should be awarded to Husband before dividing the remaining assets, it must first include the entire value of the assets in its consideration as to how the marital estate should be divided. Further, we note that the trial court did not find that either party rebutted the presumption of an equal division. The court stated, “[t]aking into consideration all of the requisite factors, ․ the Court finds that there is no reason to deviate from an equal division of assets in this cause and the marital estate should accordingly be divided 50/50.” Id. at 28-29. However, the court made this determination after excluding significant assets from the marital pot for division, and we cannot say with confidence that the court would have made the same determination had it included the entire values of the assets in the marital estate for division. Also, as the parties discuss, the court did not award the premarital value of the parties’ respective retirement accounts to them before dividing the remaining assets, and the premarital values of those accounts were significant.
[16] We reverse that portion of the decree valuing Husband's business and the Horse Prairie Property and remand with instructions for the court to include the entire values of Husband's business and the Horse Prairie Property in the marital estate,7 to enter findings that either an equal division of the property is just and reasonable under the circumstances or, alternatively, that the presumption of an equal division has been rebutted by evidence, which could include the significant value of Husband's business and the Horse Prairie Property, as well as the parties’ retirement accounts, at the time of the parties’ marriage, and thus that an equal division would not be just and reasonable. The court should recalculate the division of the marital property accordingly and, if necessary, recalculate Husband's equalization payment, without the necessity of another hearing. See Kendrick v. Kendrick, 44 N.E.3d 721, 729 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (“The trial court included only the coverture fraction of [h]usband's pension in the marital estate for property division and failed to include the portion of his pension earned before the marriage․ We reverse that portion of the decree valuing [h]usband's pension and the marital estate and remand with instructions for the court to include the entire value of [h]usband's pension in the marital estate, to enter findings that either an equal division of the pension is just and reasonable under the circumstances or, alternatively, that the presumption of equal division has been rebutted by evidence which could include that a portion of the pension was earned by [h]usband prior to the parties’ marriage, and thus that an equal division would not be just and reasonable. The court is to recalculate the division of marital assets accordingly and, if necessary, recalculate [h]usband's equalization payment, without the necessity of another hearing.”).8
[17] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for entry of an amended decree and recalculation of the division of the marital property, and if necessary Husband's equalization payment, consistent with this opinion.
[18] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
FOOTNOTES
1. Husband cites to his testimony on pages 101-102 of Transcript Volume IV, which shows that, when asked, “[e]ven though there is not a mortgage per se on the lake house, do you believe there's an obligation related to it,” he replied “[y]es,” and when asked “that was through Dave's Automotive,” he again replied “[y]es.” Transcript Volume IV at 101-102. When asked, “if the Court orders that lake house sold, what should happen with the proceeds from the sale,” he stated, “[p]ersonally, I think they should go back to the company to put the equity back in the company.” Id. at 102.
2. The loan documents name Dave's Automotive as a guarantor.
3. The court found that there is no mortgage on the Lake House.
4. The valuation of Dave's Automotive does not refer to a debt for $471,000 or a loan to Husband or the parties for $338,825.94 or $332,802.18.
5. Gold also stated that, “taking it out has nothing to do with taxing it” and “[h]e's already paid tax on it.” Transcript Volume III at 156. Dave's Automotive's tax returns show that it was treated as an S corporation.
6. This Court has stated:The “coverture fraction” formula is one method a trial court may use to distribute pension or retirement plan benefits to the earning and non-earning spouses. Under this methodology, the value of the retirement plan is multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which is the period of time during which the marriage existed (while pension rights were accruing) and the denominator is the total period of time during which pension rights accrued.In re Marriage of Fisher, 24 N.E.3d 429, 433 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Hardin v. Hardin, 964 N.E.2d 247, 250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citation omitted)).
7. The marital estate should not include a marital debt of “$338,825” for a “Horizon loan on Lake House” as discussed in Part A above.
8. To the extent Husband points to Wife's proposed findings and cites the doctrine of invited error, the doctrine of invited error is grounded in estoppel and precludes a party from taking advantage of an error that he or she commits, invites, or which is the natural consequence of his or her own neglect or misconduct. Balicki v. Balicki, 837 N.E.2d 532, 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Witte v. Mundy ex rel. Mundy, 820 N.E.2d 128, 133 (Ind. 2005)), trans. denied. While the proposed findings submitted by Wife stated, “this Court finds that the business valuation report credibly established the value of the business for purposes of division in this dissolution as $321,000.00 and accepts that valuation,” Appellee's Appendix Volume II at 52, her proposed findings also stated, “the Court ․ finds it appropriate to exclude from division the entire balance of Wife's retirement accounts as a premarital asset,” id. at 53, the “Court finds that Husband should be awarded [the Horse Prairie Property] and assigns the value of $1,040,000.00,” id. at 54, and “this Court finds that the evidence shows it is necessary in this case to deviate from an equal division of the marital assets in order to equitably divide the marital estate, and therefore awards [Wife] a 60% share of the marital estate.” Id. at 56. Wife did not request the court to exclude the values of Husband's business and the Horse Prairie Property at the time of the marriage from the assets to be divided while including the full value of her retirement account in the assets to be divided. The doctrine of invited error does not apply here.
Brown, Judge.
Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.
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Docket No: Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-DN-2866
Decided: June 22, 2026
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana.
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