EASTERWOOD v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Raheem Easterwood was found guilty of Count I, theft, a Level 6 felony, and Count II, aiding, inducing, or causing theft, a Level 6 felony. The trial court entered judgment of conviction only on Count II out of double jeopardy concerns. Easterwood appeals and argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. The State argues that the trial court erroneously used the term “merged” rather than “vacated” in the sentencing order. We disagree with both Easterwood and the State. Accordingly, we affirm.

Issues

[2] Easterwood raises one issue, which we restate as: whether the evidence was sufficient to support Easterwood's conviction. The State raises a separate issue on cross-appeal, which we restate as: whether the trial court erred by stating in its sentencing order that Count I “merged” into Count II rather than vacate Count I.

Facts

[3] Boots Y'all is a small, family-owned retail store in South Bend that sells western-style work boots and clothing. The company operates a sister location, Horse Saddle Shop, in Bremen, which sells only horse products. Josh Hueni is the president of the company.

[4] On November 29, 2024, Shaelyn McCray was working the register at Boots Y'all. At approximately 4:40 p.m., a woman wearing a mask entered the store and asked McCray questions about the store's layout. Shortly thereafter, a man entered the store wearing all-black clothing, a hood, and a blue medical mask. McCray described the man as a tall African American male. The man walked toward the women's work boot wall at the back of the store, picked up a stack of four boot boxes, approached the register as though he intended to purchase them, and then turned and walked out of the store without paying.

[5] The boots the man took were “women's Double-H” brand boots. Tr. Vol. II p. 46. Immediately behind the man, the woman left the store carrying boots that had been displayed on the shelves out of their boxes. The two individuals got into a silver SUV with no license plate and drove away. McCray photographed the vehicle as it left, called her supervisor, and contacted the non-emergency police line to report the theft. The store's security cameras captured these events on video.¹

[6] Hueni estimated the value of the stolen boots at approximately $1,400 to $1,500. The Double-H boots were an uncommon brand that did not sell frequently at Boots Y'all; in the six months prior to the theft, the store had sold only two pairs of Double-H boots, both shipped to customers on the East Coast. Because Hueni was familiar with the brand and the distinctive appearance of its packaging, he searched Facebook Marketplace to determine whether anyone was attempting to resell the stolen boots. On December 4, 2024, Hueni “found the boots that went missing for sale” on Facebook Marketplace on a profile bearing the name “Easterwood Raheem.” Tr. Vol. II p.70; State's Ex. 4A-D. Hueni took screenshots of the listing and provided them, along with the surveillance video and other information, to the South Bend Police Department.

[7] The following day, Hueni was present at the Bremen location when his brother, Charles Hueni (“Charlie”), received a phone call. The caller identification displayed the name “Easterwood Raheem” or “Raheem Easterwood.” Tr. Vol. II p. 77. Charlie recorded the call. During the call, the caller stated that he had purchased several pairs of Double-H boots from the Horse Saddle Shop in Bremen, that he did not have a receipt, and that the boots were brand new and still in the box. The caller asked if he could “trade them out for the right sizes.” State's Ex. 5 at 00:53-00:57. When Charlie informed the caller that the Bremen location did not sell boots, the caller said he had called the wrong shop and ended the call.

[8] South Bend Police Officer Joel Paschen investigated the theft. Officer Paschen reviewed the surveillance video, examined the Facebook Marketplace screenshot, and confirmed that the profile selling the boots belonged to Easterwood. Officer Paschen also confirmed through the telephone number obtained from the caller identification that the caller was Easterwood and that the address associated with the number corresponded to Easterwood. Officer Paschen further confirmed that the silver SUV seen in the surveillance footage and in McCray's photographs was registered to “a person who was associated with [ ] Easterwood.” Tr. Vol. II p. 101.

[9] Officer Paschen obtained a warrant for cell phone records from T-Mobile for the telephone number associated with Easterwood. T-Mobile produced call detail records, timing advance records, and location data for the number. South Bend Police Detective Brandon Martin plotted a map from the cell phone records, which showed Easterwood's cell phone in the area of the Boots Y'all store at the time of the theft.

[10] On January 28, 2025, the State charged Easterwood with Count I, theft, a Level 6 felony. On March 14, 2025, the State amended the charge to add Count II, aiding, inducing, or causing theft, a Level 6 felony. In June 2025, the matter proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury returned verdicts of guilty on both counts.

[11] On July 16, 2025, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. When first questioned about what corrections it sought, the State stated that “Counts I and II I think are gonna merge.” Tr. Vol. II p. 215. The trial court responded, however, that “there's really no such thing as merger.” Id. In its sentencing order, the trial court “enter[ed] judgment of conviction on Count II only,” reasoning that “Count I is merged with Count II due to double jeopardy.” App. Vol. II p. 114. The trial court sentenced Easterwood to two years, all suspended to probation, and ordered restitution. Easterwood now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Sufficiency of Evidence

[12] Easterwood argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to convict him for aiding, inducing, or causing theft. Sufficiency of the evidence claims warrant a deferential standard of review in which we “neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024). A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if “there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. In conducting this review, we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it. Id. We affirm the conviction “ ‘unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.’ ” Sutton v. State, 167 N.E.3d 800, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007)).

[13] Here, Easterwood argues that the State's evidence failed to establish his identity as the perpetrator beyond a reasonable doubt because social media accounts and cell phone accounts can be used by other individuals, no witness identified him as the person in the store, and the stolen boots were never recovered in his possession. He contends that the evidence demonstrated, at most, his opportunity to commit the offense, which falls far short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.

[14] Indiana courts have long recognized that “[c]ircumstantial evidence will be deemed sufficient if inferences may reasonably be drawn that enable the trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pierce v. State, 761 N.E.2d 821, 826 (Ind. 2002) (citing Franklin v. State, 715 N.E.2d 1237, 1241 (Ind. 1999)). Here, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. Easterwood does not dispute that the Facebook Marketplace account listing the stolen Double-H boots or the cell phone number from which the call to the Bremen store was placed belonged to him. Hueni, as the store owner, moreover, testified that Double-H boots are uncommon in the area and that the store had sold only two pairs in the six months prior to the theft, both of which were shipped out of state. Cell phone location data placed Easterwood's phone in the shopping plaza where Boots Y'all was located at the time of the theft. Store surveillance video captured the theft as it occurred, and the store clerk photographed the silver SUV, a vehicle later linked to a known associate of Easterwood, as it departed.

[15] Easterwood's own post-theft conduct further corroborated his identity as the perpetrator. He called the Bremen store attempting to exchange the stolen boots without a receipt or order number. The jury could, thus, reasonably infer from this circumstantial evidence that Easterwood was the person who committed the offense. Easterwood's argument merely asks us to reweigh the evidence in his favor and disregard the jury's verdict, which we cannot do. Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to support Easterwood's conviction for aiding, inducing, or causing theft, a Level 6 felony.

II. Sentencing Error

[16] The State raises a separate issue in its appellee's brief, which we restate as whether the trial court erred by stating in its sentencing order that it “merged” the counts instead of “vacating” Count I, theft, a Level 6 felony. Appellee's Br. p. 4 n.1. At the sentencing hearing, the State first introduced the terminology now at issue, stating that “Counts I and II I think are gonna merge.” Tr. Vol. II p. 215. The trial court responded that “there's really no such thing as merger.” Id. The trial court's subsequent written sentencing order and abstract of judgment used the term “merged.” App. Vol. II p. 114. The trial court, however, expressly declined to enter judgment of conviction on Count I on double jeopardy grounds, entering judgment of conviction only on Count II, aiding, inducing, or causing theft, a Level 6 felony. Because the trial court did not enter a judgment of conviction on Count I, there is no conviction to vacate.

[17] The State's reliance on Perry v. State, 258 N.E.3d 1028, 1034 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), is misplaced. In Perry, the trial court entered judgments of conviction on both counts and thereafter used “merged” language, necessitating a remand to correct the judgment to reflect vacatur rather than merger. Here, the trial court never entered a judgment of conviction on Count I. Because no judgment of conviction on Count I exists, there is nothing to vacate and no sentencing order to correct. Accordingly, we find no error.

Conclusion

[18] The evidence is sufficient to support Easterwood's conviction for aiding, inducing, or causing theft, a Level 6 felony. The trial court, moreover, did not err in its sentencing order. Accordingly, we affirm.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Boots Y'all’s policy when a theft occurred was to let the thief go, document a description of the person and the items taken, call the police, and notify a supervisor.

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.