PRENTICE v. BALL (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Tyler Prentice (Father) appeals the trial court's order granting Morgan Ball's (Mother) petition to modify custody of their son, K.P. (Child), which switched custody from equal parenting time to Mother having primary physical custody and Father having parenting time pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines. Father contends that the trial court failed to apply the correct legal standard and, in the alternative, that the evidence was insufficient to establish a substantial change in circumstances. Finding that the order does not permit meaningful appellate review, we remand for the trial court to enter particularized findings based on its consideration of the statutory factors, any substantial change in circumstances, and the best interests of Child.

[2] We reverse and remand.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] Child was born to Mother and Father in May 2019. When their relationship ended in 2021, Mother and Father agreed to equal parenting time on a two-week rotating schedule where Father had three overnights during the first week and four overnights during the second week. That schedule was memorialized by an order on paternity issued April 19, 2022 (the 2022 Agreed Order).

[4] Since their separation, Mother and Father have generally coparented well. They have maintained the shared custody arrangement, and they both enjoy active support from their respective parents.

[5] About three years after the 2022 Agreed Order, Mother filed a pro se letter with the trial court raising concerns regarding the shared custody arrangement and asking for primary custody of Child. The main concerns noted by Mother related to Father's use of alcohol and Child's anxiety. The trial court set the matter for hearing, and then Mother, after retaining counsel, filed a verified motion to modify custody, parenting time, and child support on May 19, 2025.

[6] At the evidentiary hearing on October 30, 2025, three witnesses testified: Mother, Father, and the paternal grandfather (Grandfather). Two primary concerns were addressed at the hearing: whether Father's use of alcohol presents a safety concern when Child is in his care and whether Child's anxiety issues are aggravated or caused by the fifty-fifty custody arrangement requiring Child to go between homes during the school week.

[7] Regarding alcohol use, Father acknowledged that he drinks most evenings and that his bank records from January through August 2025 showed that on average he visits a particular liquor store fifteen times per month and spends $318 per month.¹ Mother testified to two separate instances in February 2025, in which she believed she observed Father under the influence of alcohol while with Child. Father challenged Mother's testimony through cross-examination, and he testified that he had not had any alcohol on those two occasions. Grandfather, who was with Father during one of those occasions, a wrestling meet, testified that he did not observe any signs of alcohol use that morning. Grandfather testified that Father “casually drinks in the evenings” and that Grandfather had never observed concerning behavior with respect to Father's drinking. Id. at 95. Further, Father testified that he did not have “an alcohol issue” and that his drinking habits had not changed since his relationship with Mother. Id at 57. He noted that despite these known drinking habits, Mother previously agreed to the shared custody arrangement.

[8] As to anxiety, Mother and Father agreed that Child's anxiety had increased over the last year, particularly during the school year, and that he was experiencing temper tantrums in the mornings about going to school.² They were seeking medical and therapeutic treatment to assist with Child's behaviors. Mother described Child as “constantly worried about where he's going, what day he[‘s] going to who's house, uh, when he's going, who's picking him up.” Id. at 17. And she attributed much of his increased anxiety and behaviors to “insecurity on which home he's going to during the week.” Id. at 18. Father disagreed that the parenting schedule was a cause of Child's increased anxiety, and he testified that no expert had expressed that the schedule should be changed. Further, he was actively working with Mother and providers to address Child's anxiety.

[9] At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court took the matter under advisement and then issued its decision on November 10, 2025. The court's order contains limited findings of fact, some of which are contained in a section entitled Statements of Law. The court found that Child was nearly three years old when the 2022 Agreed Order was issued and that Child is “now school age, which is causing schedule complications[.]” Appendix at 24. The court did not elaborate on what it meant by schedule complications, and it did not make any findings related to Child's anxiety, which was a key issue below.

[10] Further, the trial court recognized Mother's concern for Child's safety because of Father's “alleged problem with excessive drinking, if not alcoholism.”³ Id. But the court found that Mother had not presented sufficient evidence in this regard, explaining:

[That Father] is spending way too much time at the liquor store cannot be in serious dispute. However, the exact nature and severity of its impact on the child (question before the court) is, based on the testimony, murky at best, and not instructive to the court.

Id. at 25.

[11] The trial court then made the following legal observation:

[I]n family law matters, the court does not consider agreements binding when they fail to be so. When circumstances change, the court sets aside the agreement and starts from the beginning. The rebuttable presumption is for parenting time pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines, and the standard is that which is in the best interest of the child.

Id.

[12] Ultimately concluding that custody should be modified, the trial court observed:

In spite of the court's reluctance to inject conflict where, in the grand scheme of things, there appears to be little, the court cannot neglect its primary responsibility: ordering that which is in the best interests of the child. Evenly split arrangements may work with children who are older and more independent. The most important thing a court can order for a child this age is stability. A child this young who lives everywhere lives nowhere. Further, the scheduling involved is requiring third parties who may be willing as of now, but cannot be ordered by the court to participate. The simple fact has to be that [the] agreed sharing arrangement is not working and will not as the child advances through school, at least for many years, until such as the child becomes more independent, as previously stated. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the court to [do] what is best for the child, not what is easiest for the parents, and assign primary physical custody to [Mother], subject to [Father's] parenting time under the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines.

Id. at 25-26.

[13] Father filed a motion to correct error on November 26, 2025, in which he argued, in part, that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard to Mother's motion to modify custody. That is, he argued that the trial court determined only that modification was in Child's best interests but failed to determine that there had been a substantial change in one or more of the statutory factors that a court may consider in determining an award of custody. Mother filed a response in opposition, after which the trial court summarily denied Father's motion to correct error on December 9, 2025.

[14] Father now appeals. Additional information will be provided below as needed.

Standard of Review

[15] When a trial court enters findings of fact pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 52(A), we review only for clear error, employing a two-tiered standard of review. M.G. v. S.K., 162 N.E.3d 544, 547 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020); see also T.R. 52(A) (“[T]he court on appeal shall not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”). We first determine whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact and then whether those findings support the trial court's conclusions thereon. Id. at 547-48.

Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. We do not reweigh the evidence but consider the evidence most favorable to the judgment with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the judgment. A judgment is clearly erroneous if it relies on an incorrect legal standard.

Id. at 548.

[16] “Additionally, there is a well-established preference in Indiana for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016) (observing that appellate courts are “in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of the evidence”). It is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion; it must positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is a basis for reversal.” Id.

Discussion & Decision

[17] As the party seeking modification of custody, Mother bore the burden of demonstrating that the existing custody order should be altered. Id. The applicable custody modification statute, Ind. Code § 31-14-13-6, provides:

The court may not modify a child custody order unless:

(1) modification is in the best interests of the child; and

(2) there is a substantial change in one (1) or more of the factors that the court may consider under section 2 ․ of this chapter.

(Emphases added). Thus, to modify custody, the trial court was required to find both that (1) modification is in Child's best interests and (2) there is a substantial change in one or more of the factors enumerated in I.C. § 31-14-13-2. This is a “more stringent standard” than an initial custody determination, where there is no presumption for either parent, because “permanence and stability are considered best for the welfare and happiness of the child.” Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124.

[18] I.C. § 31-14-13-2 provides in relevant part:

The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interests of the child․. The court shall consider all relevant factors, including the following:

(1) The age and sex of the child.

(2) The wishes of the child's parents.

(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.

(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:

(A) the child's parents;

(B) the child's siblings; and

(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest.

(5) The child's adjustment to home, school, and community.

(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

* * *

It is from one or more of these factors that the trial court was required to find a substantial change in order to modify custody.

[19] Pursuant to Ind. Code § 31-14-13-7.7(b)(1), the trial court was required to include in its order “findings of fact and conclusions of law on which the custody order is based.”⁴ As noted above, its order contained only limited findings. While the trial court expressly determined that modification is in Child's best interests, it did not reference the relevant statutes, the statutory factors, or the requirement that the court find a substantial change in one or more of those factors.

[20] Further, the trial court provided the following regarding the legal standard that it would apply:

[I]n family law matters, the court does not consider agreements binding when they fail to be so. When circumstances change, the court sets aside the agreement and starts from the beginning. The rebuttable presumption is for parenting time pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines, and the standard is that which is in the best interest of the child.

Appendix at 25. This statement is puzzling and does not give us confidence that the court applied the correct legal standard. See Ramsey v. Ramsey, 863 N.E.2d 1232, 1239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (observing that although we presume trial courts know and follow the applicable law, “this presumption can be overcome if the trial court's findings lead us to conclude that an unjustifiable risk exists that the trial court did not follow the applicable law”). Indeed, it is unclear what, if any, substantial changes the trial court found, as it rejected Mother's primary basis that Father's use of alcohol was placing Child in danger and failed to address her other basis regarding Child's mental health. Further, we are unsure what the trial court meant when finding that Child being school age is causing “schedule complications.” Id. at 24. And the court's findings do not show how the “agreed equal sharing arrangement is not working.” Id. at 26.

[21] For the foregoing reasons, we remand for the trial court to consider the statutory factors, any substantial change in circumstances, and the best interests of Child, and to make the required special findings of fact and conclusions of law. See M.G. v. S.K., 162 N.E.3d 544, 549 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (reversing where trial court made “sparse factual findings” and “the theory upon which modification was premised [was] not evident, given the lack of reference to a substantial change in any statutory factor or an explicit conclusion that modification is in Child's best interests”).

[22] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At his peak, Father made twenty-nine purchases at the liquor store in January for a total of $584.

2.   Child is in first grade.

3.   The trial court rejected Father's invitation to question the sincerity of Mother's concern based upon her allowing Father to drive off with Child during one incident in which she suspected Father was under the influence of alcohol.

4.   This is a change in the law that went into effect on July 1, 2025, before the instant appealed order was issued.

Altice, Judge.

Brown, J. and DeBoer, J., concur.