Joseph Bortka, derivatively on behalf of an alleged voluntary association commonly known as The Indiana Republican Party, Appellant-Plaintiff v. 2022 2024 (2026)

[1] Joseph Bortka, derivatively on behalf of an entity he has identified as a “voluntary association” commonly known as “The Indiana Republican Party,” filed an amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Indiana Republican State Committee, Inc. and two former Chairmen of the Indiana Republican Convention. In his amended complaint, Bortka sought to have the trial court determine and declare that the Republican State Committee and future Convention Chairmen were obliged to follow certain procedural rules during Indiana Republican Conventions and were also obliged to release certain party records to party members. The trial court dismissed Bortka's complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] According to his amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, Bortka self-identifies as a member of the Republican Party. Bortka served as an elected delegate to the 2024 Indiana Republican Convention, representing Marion County Delegate District 8. He also was the 2024 Republican candidate for State Representative in District 100. Meanwhile, Edwin Simcox served as the Chairman of the 2022 Indiana Republican Convention, and Randall Corbly Head served as the Chairman of the 2024 Indiana Republican Convention. Head is also a member of the Republican State Committee.

[4] The Republican State Committee is an Indiana nonprofit corporation operating under articles of incorporation and adopted rules. The Republican State Committee is the legal entity commonly known as the “Indiana Republican Party.” Appellees’ App. Vol. 2, p. 7. Under the Republican State Committee's current rules, and consistent with Indiana law, the Republican State Committee is the highest party authority for the Republican political party in Indiana. Appellees’ App. Vol. 2, p. 15; see Ind. Code § 3-6-1-12 (2021).

[5] In July 2025, Bortka filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Republican State Committee and against Simcox and Head in their official capacities. Bortka filed an amended complaint in October. According to his amended complaint, Bortka represented not himself or a putative class but instead a voluntary association commonly known as the “Indiana Republican Party.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 10.¹ Thus, Bortka's complaint alleged that his standing to seek the requested declaratory and injunctive relief was derivative of the purported voluntary association of Indiana Republicans.

[6] The gravamen of Bortka's amended complaint is that the voluntary association of Indiana Republicans present at the party's Convention, not the Republican State Committee, is the lawful “higher ․ authority” over the Indiana Republican political party. Id. at 18. The amended complaint further states that the Republican State Committee's role as the highest power for the political party applies only “when the convention is not in session.” Id. at 17. From that premise, the amended complaint alleges that, at the 2022 and 2024 Indiana Republican Conventions, the Republican State Committee, through its officers, “usurped” the “rightful power [of party] membership” through various alleged procedural irregularities, ultra vires actions, fraud, and breaches of fiduciary duty and contract. Id. at 13.

[7] Thus, Bortka's amended complaint generally sought the following relief:

• Declaratory relief on the hierarchy of authority between delegates at the Convention and the Republican State Committee;

• Declaratory relief regarding the rights of party members to party records;

• Declaratory relief regarding the proper procedures to be followed by party officers in the operation and administration of the party's Conventions;

• Injunctive relief requiring the Republican State Committee to operate and administer future Conventions under the latest edition of Robert's Rules of Order unless there is a proper vote to do otherwise; and

• Injunctive relief requiring the Republican State Committee to permit Bortka and others to access certain party records.

Id. at 41-44.

[8] After Bortka filed his amended complaint, the Republican State Committee, Simcox, and Head (hereafter collectively referred to as the “Republican State Committee”) moved to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Republican State Committee included an affidavit and its adopted rules as exhibits to the motion to dismiss. The trial court then dismissed Bortka's complaint on the ground that Indiana's judiciary lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over his claims.

[9] This expedited appeal ensued.²

Standard of Review

[10] Bortka appeals the trial court's dismissal of his complaint. As our Supreme Court has made clear, under Indiana Trial Rule 12,

if matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion [to dismiss] shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56. T.R. 12(B), 12(C). A trial court converts a Rule 12 motion to a motion for summary judgment by its consideration of extraneous matters regardless of whether the court converts the motion to one for summary judgment expressly.

Davidson v. State, 211 N.E.3d 914, 925 (Ind. 2023) (citation modified).

[11] Here, the trial court's dismissal of Bortka's complaint followed the court's consideration of exhibits attached to the motion to dismiss. Thus, the trial court's judgment is, as a matter of law, the entry of summary judgment for the Republican State Committee. See id.

When we review a summary judgment decision, we apply the same standard as the trial court. Summary judgment is proper only when the designated evidence shows no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor.

Red Lobster Rests. LLC v. Fricke, 234 N.E.3d 159, 165 (Ind. 2024) (citations omitted).

Discussion and Decision

[12] Our resolution of this appeal turns on whether Bortka's amended complaint seeks relief on purely political issues. If so, Indiana's judiciary lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the amended complaint. We agree with the Republican State Committee and the trial court that Bortka's amended complaint seeks relief on purely political issues.

[13] “Subject-matter jurisdiction is the constitutional or statutory power of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which any particular proceeding belongs.” State v. Reinhart, 112 N.E.3d 705, 711 (Ind. 2018) (quotation marks omitted). To determine whether the judiciary has subject-matter jurisdiction, “the only relevant inquiry is whether the ․ claim falls within the general scope of the authority conferred ․ by the constitution or by statute.” Id. at 711-12 (quotation marks omitted).

[14] In State ex rel. Coffin v. Superior Court of Marion County, our Supreme Court held as follows:

We conclude ․ that the superior court had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of granting an injunction to determine in advance and regulate and control in advance ․ the acts which should or should not be done by the presiding officer and members of a convention of the representatives of a political party met for a distinctively political purpose ․

196 Ind. 614, 149 N.E. 174, 178 (1925) (per curiam). Stated another way, Indiana's judiciary has “no jurisdiction to try disputed questions concerning the organization and functioning of political parties ․ Such questions are properly referable to the statutory party organization.” State ex rel. Blaize v. Hoover, 210 Ind. 215, 2 N.E.2d 391, 392 (1936) (per curiam); see also State ex rel. Marion Cnty. Democratic Comm. v. Superior Ct. of Marion Cnty., 214 Ind. 322, 15 N.E.2d 379, 379 (1938) (per curiam).

[15] We agree with the Republican State Committee and the trial court that the best understanding of Bortka's amended complaint is that it seeks to have Indiana's judiciary direct, either through declaratory or injunctive relief, “the acts which should or should not be done by the presiding officer and members of a convention of the representatives of a political party met for a distinctively political purpose ․” Coffin, 149 N.E. at 178. Bortka's amended complaint seeks to have Indiana's judiciary determine and direct the procedures under which Indiana Republican Conventions are to be operated and administered. It likewise seeks to have us declare the relationship between the Republican State Committee and Hoosiers who affiliate with the Indiana Republican Party. Resolving such concerns is not within the power of Indiana's judiciary. See id. Likewise, Bortka's request to compel the Republican State Committee to permit certain persons to access party records is a dispute that we conclude is best left to the political party and not the judiciary. See Blaize, 2 N.E.2d at 392.

[16] Still, Bortka argues that Indiana's judiciary has jurisdiction over his amended complaint because the above-cited Indiana Supreme Court cases do not reflect “the modern framework distinguishing subject-matter jurisdiction from justiciability ․” Appellant's Br. at 13. We reject Bortka's assertion. Our Supreme Court's precedents are clear and plainly refer to the judiciary's subject-matter jurisdiction. We likewise reject Bortka's reliance on Indiana's Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act as a basis for side-stepping our Supreme Court's precedents. See id. at 25-26. As the remainder of Bortka's arguments on appeal require us to agree with his attempt to distinguish our Supreme Court's binding precedents, we decline to consider his additional arguments.³

[17] For all of the above-stated reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment for the Republican State Committee.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Elsewhere in his complaint, Bortka acknowledged that the Republican State Committee is an Indiana nonprofit corporation also commonly known as the “Indiana Republican Party.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 12.

2.   Our motions panel granted Bortka's motion for expedited consideration of his appeal.

3.   Insofar as Bortka also argues that Indiana Code section 3-6-1-13 authorizes his amended complaint, he has confused his proffered voluntary association of Indiana Republicans with the Republican State Committee. Compare I.C. § 3-6-1-13 (permitting “the state committee of each political party” to bring a civil action, in its own name, to enforce its rules and resolutions) with Appellant's Br. at 24 (alleging that Bortka's derivative action “on behalf of the party itself” enables him to bring a civil action under section 3-6-1-13).

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Felix, J., concur.