ARNOLD v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Johnese Arnold appeals her convictions for four counts of Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent and two counts of Level 5 felony neglect of a dependent. Arnold also appeals her aggregate sentence of eighteen years, of which fourteen years are to be served in the Department of Correction, two are to be served on home detention, and two are suspended to probation. Arnold raises the following two issues for our review:

1. Whether her convictions are contrary to Indiana's protections against double jeopardy.

2. Whether her aggregate sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and her character.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In 2019, T.R.J. and T.D.J., brothers who were around six-years old at the time, were placed in the legal custody of Carmen Queen in Ohio. In the summer of 2022, when both children were nine-years old, Queen brought them into Indiana to live with Arnold, Queen's sibling, and Arnold's partner, Quoshawn Stewart. The children lived with Arnold and Stewart in Indianapolis until the fall of 2022.

[4] While living with Arnold and Stewart, the children were effectively tortured. Both children were forced to sleep “[c]ramped” together in a “cat cage” in the living room. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 139, 225-26. Arnold and Stewart did “not really” feed the children, and when Arnold and Stewart were away or asleep the children would break out of the cage to eat cat food. Id. at 140, 243.

[5] If Arnold or Stewart caught the children “steal[ing]” the cat food, the children would “get hurt.” Id. On some occasions, that meant Arnold or Stewart would “tie [the children] up with a cord.” Id. at 140. On at least one occasion, Stewart used a lighter and an aerosol can to set T.R.J.’s back and shoulder on fire. T.R.J. “scream[ed]” and “cried” in pain. Id. at 143. Arnold did not stop Stewart and did not seek medical care for T.R.J.

[6] On other occasions, Stewart struck T.R.J. with a baseball bat. One time, Stewart struck T.R.J. in the face and knocked out at least one tooth. Another time, Stewart struck T.R.J. in the hand with the bat, and T.R.J. thought his hand was broken. On yet another occasion, Stewart used a heater with a grate to burn T.R.J. And on yet another occasion, Stewart struck T.R.J. across the hands with a knife. Sometimes Arnold would stop Stewart, but sometimes Arnold “would be sitting there and watch it and not do anything.” Id. at 150. And at no point did Arnold involve medical or law enforcement professionals.

[7] T.D.J. similarly suffered while living with Arnold and Stewart. On an occasion in which T.D.J. had been tied up with a cord, Stewart used a lighter and aerosol can to set T.D.J. on fire. Arnold was present but did “[n]othing” to stop Stewart or to ensure appropriate medical care for T.D.J. Id. at 227. Stewart likewise struck T.D.J. with a bat and with a knife and used a grated heater to burn T.D.J. “Sometimes” Arnold “would be there” for the abuse. Id. at 229. Sometimes Arnold participated, including striking both children with the metal end of a belt, putting cigarettes out on the children, and “drown[ing]” the children in the bathtub. Id. at 232.

[8] In September or October, Queen returned to pick the children up, and, the day after Christmas, she took them to their biological mother's home. There, the children's biological mother observed numerous scars all over the children's bodies. She drove the children to a nearby emergency room, where social workers and law enforcement became involved.

[9] The State ultimately charged Arnold with the following relevant counts:

• Count 2: Level 5 felony neglect of a dependent for having “either inflicted injury on T.R.J. or failed to protect T.R.J. from injury, and that said act resulted in bodily injury to said dependent, to-wit, bruises and/or scars and/or pain”;

• Count 4: Level 5 felony neglect of a dependent for having “either inflicted injury on T.D.J. or failed to protect T.D.J. from injury, and that said act resulted in bodily injury to said dependent, to-wit, bruises and/or scars and/or pain”;

• Count 6: Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent for having “either inflicted injury on T.R.J. or failed to protect T.R.J. from injury and that said act resulted in serious bodily injury to said dependent, to-wit: extreme pain”;

• Count 7: Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent for having “either inflicted injury on T.R.J. or failed to protect T.R.J. from injury and that said act resulted in serious bodily injury to said dependent, to-wit: serious permanent disfigurement and/or permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ”;

• Count 9: Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent for having “either inflicted injury on T.D.J. or failed to protect T.D.J. from injury and that said act resulted in serious bodily injury to said dependent, to-wit: extreme pain”; and

• Count 10: Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent for having “either inflicted injury on T.D.J. or failed to protect T.D.J. from injury and that said act resulted in serious bodily injury to said dependent, to-wit: serious permanent disfigurement and/or permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ ․”

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 80-83.

[10] After a bench trial at which both of the children testified, the court concluded that the State had proved the above allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. The court then held off on entering its judgment of conviction so that both sides could argue any possible double jeopardy concerns at sentencing. Arnold did not object to the court's procedure, and at the sentencing hearing the State articulated the following factual bases for the charges based on the evidence presented at the trial:

• Counts 2 and 4: for the children having been “tied up” and “stuck in the cage”;

• Counts 6 and 9: for the children having suffered extreme pain “from the cigarette burns”;

• Counts 7 and 10: for T.R.J.’s “burn scar[s] ․ from the heater” and for T.D.J.’s “burn scars from the lighter and the aerosol can ․” The State also argued that these counts could be supported by the children's knife scars.

Tr. Vol. 3, p. 71.

[11] Thereafter, the court entered its judgment of conviction on the above six counts and sentenced Arnold to an aggregate term of eighteen years, with fourteen years to be served in the Department of Correction, two to be served on home detention, and two suspended to probation.

[12] This appeal ensued.

1. Arnold's convictions are not contrary to Indiana's double jeopardy protections.

[13] On appeal, we first address Arnold's argument that her convictions are contrary to Indiana's protections against double jeopardy. We review such questions de novo. A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1064 (Ind. 2024).

[14] Indiana's protections against substantive double jeopardy prohibit “multiple convictions for the same offense in a single proceeding.” Id. at 1066. To determine if a substantive double jeopardy violation has occurred, we apply a “three-part test based on statutory sources.” Id. First, we look to the statutory language of the offenses at issue; if that language “clearly permits multiple punishment,” then “there is no violation of substantive double jeopardy,” and we end our analysis. Id. (quotation marks omitted). The parties here agree that the first step of our substantive double jeopardy analysis is not dispositive, and so we proceed to step two.

[15] Under step two, we assess whether the alleged offenses are inherently included by statute or factually included as charged. Id. at 1068. Our Supreme Court has clarified that, “when assessing whether an offense is factually included, a court may examine only the facts as presented on the face of the charging instrument.” Id. at 1067 (bold font removed). However, “where ambiguities exist in a charging instrument about whether one offense is factually included in another, courts must construe those ambiguities in the defendant's favor[ ] and thus find a presumptive double jeopardy violation” at step two. Id. at 1069 (citation omitted). The State does not dispute Arnold's contention that the offenses alleged here created a presumptive double jeopardy violation, and we therefore proceed to step three.

[16] Step three of our substantive double jeopardy analysis gives the State the opportunity to rebut the presumptive double jeopardy violation established in step two. To do so, “the State must demonstrate that it made clear to the fact-finder at trial that the apparently included charge was supported by independent evidence such that the State made a ‘distinction between what would otherwise be two of the same offenses.’ ” Ratliff v. State, 242 N.E.3d 1070, 1078-79 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1071), trans. denied. However, if the State's evidence at trial “shows only a single continuous crime, and one statutory offense is included in the other,” the State may not obtain cumulative convictions. Id. at 1079 (quotation marks and brackets omitted).

[17] We conclude that Arnold's convictions were supported by independent evidence such that the State made a distinction between what otherwise might have been the same offenses. Before the trial court entered its judgment of conviction against Arnold following the bench trial, the State argued that Counts 2 (T.R.J.) and 4 (T.D.J.) were supported by the children's testimony that they had been “tied up” and “stuck in the cage.” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 71. The State argued that Counts 6 (T.R.J.) and 9 (T.D.J.) were supported by each child having suffered extreme pain “from the cigarette burns.” Id. And the State argued that Count 7 was supported by T.R.J.’s “burn scar[s] ․ from the heater” and Count 10 was supported by T.D.J.’s “burn scars from the lighter and the aerosol can.” Id. Accordingly, the State appropriately supported each charge with independent evidence.

[18] Still, Arnold argues that the State was unable to demonstrate a clear timeline of when each offense occurred relative to another, and, thus, the State is unable to demonstrate that the acts that occurred were not continuous. We are not persuaded. The children testified that they suffered many of their injuries repeatedly; they were in a cage nearly every day they were with Arnold and Stewart, and they were repeatedly burned with cigarettes by Arnold and Stewart. A reasonable fact-finder could have readily concluded from the children's testimony that the alleged offenses were not so compressed as to constitute a single transaction.

[19] In her Reply Brief, Arnold argues that the State may not backfill its allocation of the evidence among the charges based on the State's assertions to the court at the sentencing hearing. Reply Br. at 5-7. But, on this record, we do not agree. Following the bench trial, the court expressly informed the parties that it would hear their double jeopardy arguments at sentencing. Arnold did not object to the court's procedure, and we note that our trial courts often entertain double jeopardy arguments for the first time at sentencing. We therefore conclude that the State rebutted the presumptive double jeopardy violation and that Arnold's convictions were based on distinct offenses.

[20] Arnold's convictions are not contrary to Indiana's protections against double jeopardy.

2. Arnold's sentence is not inappropriate.

[21] Arnold also argues that her sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and her character. Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may modify a sentence that we find is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Making this determination “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).

[22] However, sentence modification under Rule 7(B) is reserved for “a rare and exceptional case.” Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 612 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam). Thus, when conducting this review, we will defer to the sentence imposed by the trial court unless the defendant demonstrates compelling evidence that portrays the nature of the offenses and her character in a positive light, such as showing a lack of brutality in the offenses or showing substantial virtuous character traits. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[23] The sentencing range for a Level 3 felony is three to sixteen years, with an advisory term of nine years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5(b) (2022). The sentencing range for a Level 5 felony is one to six years, with an advisory term of three years. I.C. § 35-50-2-6(b). Thus, for four Level 3 felony convictions and two Level 5 felony convictions, Arnold faced a maximum possible sentence of seventy-six years. Here, however, the trial court imposed the advisory term for each offense. The court further ordered the sentences for two Level 3 felony convictions to run consecutively to each other and for all other sentences to run concurrently. And the court suspended portions of her ensuing aggregate sentence of eighteen years, such that fourteen years are to be served in the Department of Correction, two are to be served on home detention, and two are suspended to probation.

[24] On appeal, Arnold argues that her sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses because, while she failed to act to stop the abuses, she “wasn't the perpetrator of the abuse” and there was evidence that at least on some occasions she attempted to stop the abuse and give the children medicine afterward. Appellant's Br. at 16. Arnold contends that her sentence is inappropriate in light of her character because she has an insignificant criminal history, good employment history, and strong family support.

[25] Arnold's position on appeal is ludicrous.¹ The facts underlying the offenses are horrific, and her role in them evinces her character for our sentence-review purposes. Further, two consecutive advisory terms—one for each child—with four years on home detention and suspended to probation, was well within the trial court's sentencing discretion. We therefore affirm her sentence.

Conclusion

[26] For all of these reasons, we affirm Arnold's convictions and sentence.

[27] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   While the argument is ludicrous under the facts and circumstances before us, appellate counsel's decision to make it is both proper and squarely within the duty to represent one's client with diligence under the Rules of Professional Conduct. Here, the trial court's decision to enter consecutive advisory sentences against Arnold was generous, to say the least, and the State chose not to seek an increase in her sentence on appeal.

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Felix, J., concur.