MILES v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] After a bench trial, Ira D.R. Miles (“Miles”) was convicted and sentenced for several offenses, among them, Level 3 felony rape ¹ and Level 6 felony criminal confinement.² Miles claims, and the State concedes, that these convictions resulted in multiple punishments in violation of substantive double jeopardy. Miles also claims the sentencing order is unclear. Concluding that both convictions cannot stand, we reverse and remand to the trial court with instructions to vacate the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed as to Count VII for Level 6 felony criminal confinement. On remand, the court is directed to enter a new sentencing order and abstract of judgment that reflects this change and clearly communicates the intended sentence for each count.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Miles married Shelly Miles (“Shelly”) in October 2016. C.W. is Shelly's daughter from a prior relationship. The family lived in hotels in Indianapolis, moving frequently. In 2020, when C.W. was eleven years old, she attended school online and spent time alone with Miles when her mother went to the store or donated plasma. That year, Miles forced her to perform oral sex on him and threatened to hurt her and her mother if she told anyone. He also touched C.W.’s genitals with his hands. From that point forward, Miles regularly touched C.W. in ways that made her feel uncomfortable. In 2024, when C.W. had just turned fifteen, Miles pushed her onto a bed, removed her clothing, held her down by her arms and legs, and sexually penetrated her. During the rape, he repeatedly threatened her not to tell anyone. Later that year, C.W. confided in a neighbor, who contacted the Indiana Department of Child Services. C.W. disclosed the abuse to her mother the following day.

[3] On January 15, 2025, the State charged Miles with two counts of child molesting as Level 1 felonies (Counts I and II), rape as a Level 3 felony (Count III), sexual misconduct with a minor as a Level 4 felony (Count IV), two counts of criminal confinement as Level 5 felonies (Counts V and VI), criminal confinement as a Level 6 felony (Count VII), and intimidation as a Level 6 felony (Count VIII). The State later added a habitual offender allegation.

[4] A bench trial was held on June 27, 2025. During its closing argument, the State made the following remarks: “As for the confinement for Count [VII], that is also a part of the rape from when the defendant is holding [C.W.] down.” Tr. Vol. II p. 74. The trial court found Miles not guilty of Counts II and VI and guilty of Counts I, III, IV, V, VII, and VIII. Miles then admitted to the habitual offender enhancement. The trial court later entered judgments of conviction.

[5] At the sentencing hearing on July 25, 2025, the trial court vacated the conviction on Count IV—sexual misconduct with a minor—on double jeopardy grounds. On Count I, the court sentenced Miles to thirty-five years for the child molesting offense enhanced by six years for the habitual offender finding, for a total of forty-one years, with thirty-seven years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction, two years in community corrections on home detention, and two years suspended to sex offender probation. The court imposed ten years executed on Count III (Level 3 felony rape), four years executed on Count V (Level 5 felony criminal confinement), two years executed on Count VII (Level 6 felony criminal confinement), and two years executed on Count VIII (Level 6 felony intimidation). Counts I, V, and VIII were ordered concurrent with one another, for a concurrent term of forty-one years. Counts III and VII were ordered concurrent with one another, but consecutive to the other counts, for a consecutive term of ten years. These terms, taken together, yielded an aggregate sentence of fifty-one years. The abstract of judgment, however, contains a stray comment stating that Miles received “41 years total,” consisting of “39 years executed, [i.e.,] 37 years DOC followed by 2 years” in community corrections. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 126. Miles now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Miles argues, and the State concedes, that the convictions for Counts III (Level 3 felony rape) and VII (Level 6 felony criminal confinement) violate principles of substantive double jeopardy. Double jeopardy issues present pure questions of law, which we review de novo. See Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227, 237 (Ind. 2020). In Wadle, our Supreme Court established the analytical framework for scenarios where “a single criminal act or transaction violates multiple statutes with common elements․” Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 263 (Ind. 2020) (citing Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 247–48). Our analysis proceeds in three steps. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 247.

[7] At the first step, we determine whether “the language of either statute clearly permits multiple punishment, either expressly or by unmistakable implication ․” Id. at 248. Here, the State concedes that the statutes do not clearly permit multiple punishment. See Appellee's Br. p. 12 (citing Zamilpa v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1079, 1084 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (“Neither statute clearly permits multiple punishment.”)). We, therefore, proceed to the second step.

[8] At the second step, we “apply our included-offense statutes” and determine whether one offense is included in the other, either inherently or as charged. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248 (applying Indiana Code section 35-31.5-2-168). “[W]here ambiguities exist in a charging instrument about whether one offense is factually included in another,” courts “must construe those ambiguities in the defendant's favor, and thus find a presumptive double jeopardy violation at [s]tep 2.” A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1069 (Ind. 2024). Here, the State concedes that “[t]he charging information is ambiguous,” so the offense of criminal confinement “may be factually included” in the offense of rape. Appellee's Br. p. 14. We, therefore, proceed to the third step of our analysis.

[9] The third step requires looking at “the facts underlying th[e] offenses, as presented in the charging instrument and as adduced at trial.” A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1071 (emphasis removed) (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249). “[I]f the ‘facts show only a single continuous crime, and one statutory offense is included in the other, then the prosecutor may charge these offenses only as alternative (rather than as cumulative) sanctions.’ ” Id. at 1071 (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249). As to the third step, this court has previously noted that, under Wadle, convictions for both rape and criminal confinement cannot stand if “[t]he facts presented at trial—and as summarized by the State in closing—do not demonstrate a distinction between the rape and criminal confinement charges” and, instead, “show a single continuous crime.” Smith v. State, No. 25A-CR-1764, slip op. at 9, 2026 WL 479181, at *4 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2026). Here, the State concedes the double jeopardy violation, acknowledging that “it appears from the facts adduced at trial, the State's closing arguments, and the trial court's reasoning that the same act of force was used to support both the rape and criminal confinement convictions․” Appellee's Br. p. 17.

[10] Consistent with Wadle, and in light of the parties’ agreement on this issue, we reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the judgment of conviction on Count VII due to a double jeopardy violation. We direct the court to enter a new sentencing order and abstract of judgment reflecting this change, ensuring these documents clearly communicate the intended sentence imposed across all of the counts.³

[11] Reversed and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(a)(1).

2.   I.C. § 35-42-3-3(a).

3.   In light of these remand instructions, we need not further address Miles's claim that his sentence is unclear.

Foley, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.