BROOKS BROWN v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Brooks-Brown was tried and convicted for aiding, inducing, or causing felony murder after she and her boyfriend Tyrone Leftridge lured Willie Smith Jr. to an alley, where they robbed him using a baseball bat. Brooks-Brown appeals and raises one issue: Whether the State presented sufficient information to support her conviction.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In June 2021, Brooks-Brown was living with Leftridge in Flora, Indiana, in a house owned by Jennifer Dean. On or around June 11, Brooks-Brown, Leftridge, or both began conversing with Smith through Brooks-Brown's profile on a social app called MeetMe. Smith agreed to meet Brooks-Brown and pay her for sex.

[4] In the early morning hours of June 16, Smith withdrew $120.00 from an ATM and headed toward Brooks-Brown for the planned encounter. As Smith was driving, Leftridge and Brooks-Brown were in Dean's house discussing a plan “to rob somebody.” Tr. Vol. V at 106. Leftridge expressly used the word “rob.” Id. at 126. Dean recommended Leftridge and Brooks-Brown meet Smith at a location near Dean's house. Dean also agreed to watch Brooks-Brown's child for $20.00 while she and Leftridge were gone. Brooks-Brown asked Dean for a “weapon,” and Dean directed her to an aluminum baseball bat she kept in her kitchen. Id. at 106.

[5] As Smith neared the agreed location, Brooks-Brown and Leftridge left Dean's house together with the bat. Leftridge wore black clothing and a bandana he had obtained from Dean. Brooks-Brown then waited on the road for Smith while Leftridge hid behind a nearby detached garage. Smith pulled into an alley, and as he stepped out of the vehicle to speak with Brooks-Brown, he was hit in the head with the bat. Leftridge took the cash and other items from Smith's collapsed body. Once back at Dean's house, Brooks-Brown or Dean washed off the bat.

[6] Smith was discovered with fatal injuries later that morning. During their investigation—which included (1) speaking with Dean after Smith was found; (2) discovering Brooks-Brown and Leftridge hurriedly moving their belongings out of Dean's house; (3) matching Leftridge to a person seen running to and from Dean's house several times soon after the robbery; (4) locating $100.00 in cash that looked “brand-new minted” like it “just got [ ] out of an ATM” near Leftridge in a vehicle during a traffic stop, Tr. Vol. IV at 153; and (5) holding various interviews with Brooks-Brown, Leftridge, and Dean, during which their stories shifted several times—law enforcement officers identified the three as suspects in the robbery.

[7] The State charged Brooks-Brown with (1) aiding, inducing, or causing felony murder;¹ and (2) aiding, inducing, or causing robbery resulting in serious bodily injury as a Level 2 felony.² ,³ At the ensuing jury trial, Brooks-Brown, Leftridge, and Dean, all testified. The jury found Brooks-Brown guilty as charged. Due to double jeopardy concerns, the trial court entered a conviction for only aiding, inducing, or causing felony murder. Brooks-Brown was sentenced to fifty years of incarceration. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Brooks-Brown's Conviction

[8] Brooks-Brown argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support her conviction for aiding, inducing, or causing felony murder. Our standard of review for such a claim is as follows:

“A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Teising [v. State], 226 N.E.3d [780,] 783 [(Ind. 2024)].

Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025). We do not reweigh the evidence or reassess witness credibility. Id. at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783).

[9] A person commits felony murder when the person “kills another human being while committing or attempting to commit” an enumerated felony. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(2). The State “does not have to prove intent to kill but does have to prove intent to commit the underlying felony.” Shields v. State, 248 N.E.3d 1246, 1272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (citing Luna v. State, 758 N.E.2d 515, 517 (Ind. 2001)), trans. denied, 255 N.E.3d 443 (Ind. 2025). The underlying felony here is robbery, which a person commits when she “knowingly or intentionally takes property from another person or from the presence of another person ․ by using or threatening the use of force on any person,” I.C. § 35-42-5-1(a)(1).

[10] Brooks-Brown was convicted of aiding, inducing, or causing felony murder by aiding, inducing, or causing the robbery. “A person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense ․” I.C. § 35-41-2-4. The person is considered to be an “accomplice” to the offense and is treated the same as the principal offender. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021).

[11] “We consider four factors to determine whether a defendant acted as an accomplice: (1) presence at the scene of the crime; (2) companionship with another at scene of crime; (3) failure to oppose commission of crime; and (4) course of conduct before, during, and after occurrence of crime.” Castillo v. State, 974 N.E.2d 458, 466 (Ind. 2012) (citing Vitek v. State, 750 N.E.2d 346, 352 (Ind. 2001)). In the context of felony murder, we must also determine whether the accomplice “reasonably should have foreseen that [her] felonious conduct would result in the ‘mediate or immediate cause’ of the victim's death.” Layman v. State, 42 N.E.3d 972, 977 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Palmer v. State, 704 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 1999)).

[12] Brooks-Brown argues the State presented insufficient evidence to prove that (1) she aided, induced, or caused the robbery; and (2) Smith's death was reasonably foreseeable. We address each argument in turn.

a. Aiding, Inducing, or Causing the Robbery

[13] Brooks-Brown argues the State failed to prove she “participated in the robbery as an accomplice” because she only intended to “provide ․ sex in exchange for money” and did not know the robbery would occur. Appellant's Br. at 11. The probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict show that Brooks-Brown was present at the scene of the robbery, was there together with Leftridge, and did not oppose commission of the crime. See Castillo, 974 N.E.2d at 466 (citing Vitek, 750 N.E.2d at 352). As for Brooks-Brown's actions before, during, and after the crime, Brooks-Brown concedes she encouraged Smith to meet with her, brought the bat to the meeting place, and “helped Leftridge clean up the evidence” after the robbery took place. Appellant's Br. at 12. Dean testified that she overheard Brooks-Brown and Leftridge expressly mention a plan to “to rob somebody” before the two left to meet Smith. Tr. Vol. V at 106.

[14] In Dean v. State, 222 N.E.3d 976, 988 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied, 230 N.E.3d 890 (Ind. 2024), we affirmed the jury's implicit finding that Dean was an accomplice to the robbery because she “helped plan the robbery, identified a location in which to commit the robbery, provided the bat and bandana, helped cover up the evidence, lied to police, and encouraged [Brooks-Brown] to lie as well.” As with Dean, Brooks-Brown's actions were sufficient for the jury to find that she aided, induced, or caused the robbery. Brooks-Brown merely requests that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783).

b. Reasonable Foreseeability

[15] Brooks-Brown also argues that Smith's death “was not reasonably foreseeable to” her. Appellant's Br. at 14. In Dean, 222 N.E.3d at 989, we rejected the argument that Smith's death was not reasonably foreseeable because Dean helped plan the robbery and provided the killing instrument—the bat—used therein. Here, the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict show Brooks-Brown acquired the bat from Dean and might have even used it on Smith.⁴ This was sufficient for the jury to find that Smith's death was reasonably foreseeable to Brooks-Brown.

[16] The State thus presented sufficient information to support Brooks-Brown's conviction. We affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code §§ 35-41-2-4 (aiding, inducing, or causing an offense), 35-42-1-1(2) (felony murder).

2.   I.C. §§ 35-41-2-4, 35-42-5-1(a)(1) (robbery by force).

3.   Leftridge pled guilty to felony murder. In a separate trial, Dean was convicted of felony murder, and her conviction was upheld on appeal. Dean v. State, 222 N.E.3d 976, 987–89 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied, 230 N.E.3d 890 (Ind. 2024).

4.   Whether Brooks-Brown, Leftridge, or both wielded the bat was left unresolved at trial. The evidence included differing accounts: In an interview with law enforcement, Brooks-Brown reported that Leftridge used the bat. At trial, Brooks-Brown testified that she did not know who used the bat but denied that it was her. As for Leftridge, in a statement before trial, he indicated, “I think I hit him, but then I think that she hit him. I'm not sure.” Tr. Vol. V at 186–87. While in prison after his arrest, Leftridge told his child's mother that Brooks-Brown used the bat. And at trial, Leftridge testified that he “blacked out” during the robbery and did not recall who used the bat. Id. at 170. Dean did not witness the robbery but claimed Brooks-Brown told her Leftridge “freaked her out because he hit somebody.” Id. at 103. In his closing argument, the prosecutor did not take a stance regarding who wielded that bat, stating, “It doesn't matter who hit [Smith] with the bat․ All that matters is that [Brooks-Brown] was involved in some portion of the robbery.” Tr. Vol. VI at 159.

Felix, Judge.

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.