Justin R. Bault, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] A jury convicted Justin R. Bault (“Bault”) of Class A felony child molesting,¹ Level 1 felony child molesting,² and Level 5 felony child exploitation.³ The trial court imposed an aggregate ninety-eight (98) year sentence, with forty-five (45) years for each of Bault's two child molesting convictions and eight (8) years for his child exploitation conviction. Bault argues that: (1) the trial court committed fundamental error when instructing the jury; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support his Level 5 felony child exploitation conviction; (3) the trial court erred by sentencing him for his Level 1 child molesting conviction under Indiana Code § 35-50-2-4(c) instead of Indiana Code § 35-50-2-4(b); and (4) the trial court abused its discretion by ordering consecutive sentences.

[2] In response, the State argues that the trial court did not commit fundamental error when instructing the jury, there was sufficient evidence to support Bault's Level 5 felony child exploitation conviction, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering consecutive sentences. However, the State concedes that the trial court erred by sentencing Bault for his Level 1 child molesting conviction under Indiana Code § 35-50-2-4(c). Additionally, although not raised by Bault, the State points out the trial court erred by sentencing Bault on his Level 5 felony child exploitation conviction because the eight-year sentence imposed was outside the statutory range for a Level 5 felony, which is between one and six years.

[3] We conclude that: (1) the trial court did not commit fundamental error when instructing the jury; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support Bault's Level 5 felony child exploitation conviction; (3) the trial court erred when imposing the sentence on Bault's Level 1 felony child molesting conviction and his Level 5 felony child exploitation conviction; and (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering consecutive sentences. Accordingly, we affirm Bault's convictions and affirm in part and reverse in part the sentences imposed by the trial court. We remand this case to the trial court with instructions to resentence Bault within the applicable statutory range for his Level 1 child molesting conviction and his Level 5 felony child exploitation conviction.

[4] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Issues

1. Whether the trial court committed fundamental error when instructing the jury.

2. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support Bault's Level 5 felony child exploitation conviction.

3. Whether the trial court erred when imposing Bault's sentence for his Level 1 felony child molesting conviction.

4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences.

Facts

[5] A.C. (“A.C.”) was born in June 2006. Bault was a childhood friend of A.C.’s mother (“A.C.’s mother”), and they grew up together and went to the same church. Bault and A.C.’s mother continued to be “really good friends” into adulthood and watched out for one another. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 214). If A.C.’s mother needed a ride, she would call Bault. For example, when A.C.’s mother was pregnant with A.C., Bault drove her to the hospital when she had been sick.

[6] Bault had a daughter (“Bault's daughter”) who was the same age as A.C., and Bault's daughter and A.C. were also good friends. The two families frequently spent time together for game nights and sometimes went on family trips. Bault had A.C. “get on his shoulders” and gave her “piggyback rides[.]” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 242). Bault was a “father figure” to A.C. and her younger sister (“A.C.’s sister”), and they called him “Uncle Justin.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 217, 243). A.C. and A.C.’s sister frequently spent the night or the weekend with Bault's daughter when she was at Bault's house.⁴ A.C.’s mother also allowed A.C. and A.C.’s sister to spend the night at Bault's house when Bault's daughter was not there. Additionally, A.C.’s mother allowed Bault to take A.C. on trips when A.C.’s mother was not there.

[7] Sometime in 2012 or 2013, when A.C. was six or seven years old, she spent the night with Bault's daughter at Bault's house. A.C. had fallen asleep in the living room, and Bault was next to her when she awoke. Bault, who was at that time thirty or thirty-one years old, told A.C. that she had “touched him” while she had been sleeping and that “it grew, referring to his penis[.]” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 241) (internal quotation marks omitted). A.C. “started crying[,]” and Bault told her that she was “act[ing] like [she had] never been touched before[.]” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 241).

[8] Bault subsequently started engaging A.C. in conversations about sex. He “start[ed] off just talking” and asking her if she “knew what sex was.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 244). Bault then started to “teach” A.C. about sex and “quiz” her about it. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 244). Thereafter, Bault asked A.C. if she “wanted to touch [him] or if [she] could touch him or [do] oral ․ stuff[.]” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 244).

[9] Over the following years, Bault engaged in repeated acts of molestation against A.C., including having her perform oral sex on him or inserting his finger in her vagina. After Bault had “initiated ․ the sexual contact[,]” he gave A.C. material things in exchange for her engagement in sexual acts. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 246). Bault told A.C., “if you do this, you'll earn this much money for this stuff, or I'll take you to the store and we can go get stuff.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 246). In exchange for sexual acts, Bault bought A.C. a bingo game, an Easter dress, a mini trampoline, and a knife.

[10] Typically, Bault would engage in these sexual acts with A.C. at his house on Sundays when everyone had left for church. Bault and A.C. would then arrive late for church. Sometimes, however, Bault would take A.C. to a hotel. On one occasion, when A.C. was ten or eleven years old, Bault bought alcohol before going to the hotel and gave some alcohol to A.C. when they arrived at the hotel. “[I]t started off with ․ the usual touching, ․ [A.C.] touching [Bault] with [her] hand or him touching [her] with his hand and then [A.C.] giving him oral.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 248). Bault also performed oral sex on A.C. Bault then had A.C. do “69” with her putting her mouth on his penis while he simultaneously put his mouth on her vagina. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 248). The following day, Bault took A.C. to a Build-A-Bear and bought her a stuffed bear.

[11] Bault also took photographs and videos of A.C. Specifically, Bault took photographs of A.C. when she was naked. After Bault had A.C. spread her legs apart, he used his fingers to spread her “privates” apart and took “a couple of pictures.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 2). Additionally, Bault recorded a video of A.C. giving him “a blow job” and then “made [her] watch the video back with him.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 2).

[12] The last time that Bault attempted to engage in sexual activity with A.C. was in the Summer of 2020 when A.C. was thirteen years old and spending the night with Bault's daughter. When others in the house were getting ready to leave for church, Bault asked A.C. “if [she wanted to stay behind and do anything[,]” and A.C. refused. (Tr. Vol. 4 at 2). Bault “tried to convince [her] to stay” but did not force her to stay. (Tr. Vol. 4 at 2).

[13] Two years later, in late July and early August 2022, A.C. told her mother about what Bault had done to her, and A.C.’s mother contacted the State Police (“the police”). When the police interviewed A.C., she told the police what Bault had done and indicated that Bault had taken digital images and videos of her. In September 2022, the police obtained and executed a search warrant for Bault's electronic devices. The police did a subsequent examination of Bault's electronic devices and did not discover any photographs or videos of A.C. at that time.

[14] In September 2022, the State charged Bault with Class A felony child molesting, Level 1 felony child molesting, and Level 4 felony child exploitation for acts alleged to have been committed against A.C. between June 2012 and June 2020.⁵ During that time period, A.C. would have been between six and fourteen years old.

[15] The trial court held a two-day jury trial in March 2025. Bault's theory of defense was that A.C.’s testimony was not credible. Specifically, he argued that A.C. was not credible because she had delayed reporting Bault's offenses and because there was no corroborating evidence.

[16] At the time of the trial, A.C. was eighteen years old. A.C. testified about how Bault had molested her when she was between the ages of six or seven and thirteen or fourteen. Specifically, A.C. testified about how Bault had repeatedly had her perform oral sex on him and how he had inserted his finger in her vagina. When addressing the child exploitation offense, A.C. testified that Bault had taken “a couple of pictures” of her when she had been “fully naked[ ] and that [Bault] had had [her] ․ legs spread apart and then he was ․ spreading [her] privates apart with his fingers[.]” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 2). She also explained why she had delayed reporting and that Bault had told her “not to tell anybody.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 13). Additionally, she testified that Bault had had multiple cell phones.

[17] After the State had rested its case, Bault moved for a directed verdict, including on the child exploitation charge. Specifically, Bault argued that there had been no testimony and no evidence of any performance or incident that included A.C.’s uncovered genitals and that the search of his electronic devices had not revealed anything. The trial court denied Bault's motion, specifically noting that A.C. had testified that Bault had taken a photograph of her where he had digitally opened her vagina with his fingers.

[18] Thereafter, the trial court discussed the final jury instructions with the parties. Bault neither objected to the instructions nor tendered an instruction for the trial court to give.

[19] During the State's closing argument, it referred to the child exploitation charge as a Level 5 felony and told the jury that A.C.’s testimony supported the elements of the offense. Specifically, the State pointed out that A.C. had testified that Bault had taken “photos of [A.C.’s] uncovered vagina” while it was further exposed by opening it with his fingers. (Tr. Vol. 4 at 48). The State addressed the fact that the police had not recovered the specific photos from Bault's phone recovered during the execution of the search warrant. The State pointed to A.C.’s testimony that Bault had had multiple phones and argued that it was not uncommon for someone to have a “crime phone where they do their dirt [and] is usually hidden somewhere.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 48). The State then argued that A.C.’s testimony proved the elements of the child exploitation offense and that if the jurors found her to be credible, then they should find him guilty of child exploitation.

[20] When Bault made his closing argument, he argued that the jury should doubt the credibility of A.C.’s testimony because she had not disclosed her allegations against Bault until 2022. He also argued that the jury should find him not guilty because the State had not presented any photographs, physical evidence, or DNA evidence to corroborate A.C.’s testimony. Additionally, Bault reminded the jurors that they had “all agreed that [they] must follow the rule that it has to be unanimous.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 51).

[21] When the trial court read the final jury instructions, the trial court instructed the jury that “[t]o return a verdict, each [juror] must agree to it” and that the jury could “not sign any Verdict Form for which there [wa]s not [a] unanimous agreement.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 63, 64). The trial court also instructed the jury as to A.C.’s date of birth. In one of the trial court's final instructions, it initially stated that Bault had been charged with Level 4 felony child exploitation, but the instruction on the elements of the child exploitation charge listed it as a Level 5 felony offense. However, the verdict form listed the child exploitation charge as a Level 4 felony.

[22] The jury found Bault guilty of Class A felony child molesting, Level 1 felony child molesting, and Level 4 felony child exploitation. The trial court later entered judgment of conviction for Bault's child exploitation conviction as a Level 5 felony.

[23] During Bault's sentencing hearing, the State asked the trial court to determine that Bault was a credit restricted felon under Indiana Code § 35-31.5-2-72 for his two child molesting convictions so that his credit time would be one day for every six days served. The State also pointed out that Bault's two child molesting convictions were both considered to be a crime of violence under Indiana Code § 35-50-1-2 and, therefore, would not be subject to any cap or restriction on the imposition of consecutive terms for sentencing. The State argued that the trial court should impose the maximum sentence for each of Bault's convictions. Specifically, the State requested the trial court to impose a fifty-year sentence for Bault's Class A felony child molesting and Level 1 felony child molesting convictions and to impose a six-year sentence for his Class 5 felony child exploitation conviction. In regard to Bault's Level 1 felony child molesting conviction, the State asserted that the sentencing range was twenty to fifty years because Bault was a credit restricted felon.

[24] Bault asked the trial court to impose presumptive sentences for his three convictions, resulting in an aggregate thirty-year sentence. Bault asserted that the trial court should impose concurrent sentences because “[t]his was one continuous situation[.]” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 94). Additionally, Bault argued that “this [wa]s not a[n] out of the ordinary child molest case by any means” and that it was “milder than a lot of stuff that we've had in this court with other victims.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 95).

[25] Before sentencing Bault, the trial court reflected on Bault's offenses against A.C. The trial court noted that A.C. had grown up with Bault “as a family member” and stated that the trial evidence “indicated a targeted, lengthy, planned series of events to gain the mother's trust, gain the child's trust, and then use it and use their love of him against them in order to create an opportunity for him to get what he wanted.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 98). Additionally, the trial court stated that Bault had used “lots of manipulation techniques[,]” such as “games that he would play with this child in the middle of the night when no one else was watching so that she could win prizes if she ․ did whatever perverted act he [had] asked her to do.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 97). The trial court noted that “that [wa]s a tremendously harmful, destructive thing to do to a child.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 97).

[26] The trial court found the following aggravating circumstances: (1) the nature and duration of the offenses; (2) Bault's care of A.C. and violation of that position of trust; and (3) the harm caused to A.C. was greater than needed for proof of the elements.⁶ The trial court found that Bault's lack of criminal history was a mitigating circumstance. However, the trial court stated that it gave minimal weight to this mitigator given the prolonged period that Bault had “systematically and regularly violat[ed] a child [A.C.]” and the “psychological manipulation and control” that he had exerted over A.C. (Tr. Vol. 4 at 97).

[27] Additionally, the trial court determined, based on Bault's age and A.C.’s age, that Bault was a credit restricted felon for his two child molesting convictions. The trial court stated that it was not imposing a maximum sentence on Bault's convictions given his lack of criminal history. The trial court imposed a forty-five (45) year sentence for Bault's Class A felony child molesting conviction and for his Level 1 felony child molesting conviction, and an eight (8) year sentence for his Level 5 felony child exploitation conviction. The trial court ordered these sentences to be served consecutively, resulting in an aggregate sentence of ninety-eight (98) years.

[28] Bault now appeals.

Decision

[29] Bault argues that: (1) the trial court committed fundamental error when instructing the jury; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support his Level 5 felony child exploitation conviction; (3) the trial court erred by sentencing him for his Level 1 child molesting conviction; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion by ordering consecutive sentences. We will review each argument in turn.

1. Fundamental Error in Jury Instructions

[30] We first review Bault's challenge to the trial court's jury instructions. Bault initially argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to give a separate unanimity jury instruction. However, he correctly recognizes that he has waived that argument because he failed to object to the trial court's final instructions and failed to tender an instruction to the trial court. See Baker v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1169, 1178 (Ind. 2011) (explaining that a defendant who fails to object to an instruction at trial waives any challenge to that instruction on appeal), reh'g denied. Thus, Bault argues that the trial court committed fundamental error “by failing to issue a readily available patterned jury instruction regarding unanimity.” (Bault's Br. 10).

[31] Our Indiana Supreme Court explained our review of a waived jury instruction issue under the fundamental error doctrine.

The fundamental error doctrine provides a vehicle for the review of error not properly preserved for appeal. In order to be fundamental, the error must represent a blatant violation of basic principles rendering the trial unfair to the defendant and thereby depriving the defendant of fundamental due process. The error must be so prejudicial to the defendant's rights as to make a fair trial impossible. In considering whether a claimed error denied the defendant a fair trial, we determine whether the resulting harm or potential for harm is substantial. Harm is not shown by the fact that the defendant was ultimately convicted. Rather, harm is determined by whether the defendant's right to a fair trial was detrimentally affected by the denial of procedural opportunities for the ascertainment of truth to which he would have been entitled.

Baker, 948 N.E.2d 1178-79.

[32] Our Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Baker is relevant to our review of Bault's fundamental error claim. In Baker, the State charged the defendant with three counts of child molesting, which represented one count for each of the three child molesting victims, and introduced evidence of multiple acts of molestation for each victim. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court had erred by failing to give a unanimity instruction. The Baker Court held that the defendant had waived this appellate challenge by failing to object to the trial court's instructions. Id. at 1178. Thus, the Court reviewed the defendant's instruction challenge for fundamental error.

[33] The Baker Court explained that if the State presents evidence of more criminal acts than are charged, “the jurors should be instructed that in order to convict the defendant they must either unanimously agree that the defendant committed the same act or acts or that the defendant committed all of the acts described by the victim and included within the time period charged.” Id. at 1177. Although the trial court had not provided the jury with this specific unanimity instruction, the Baker Court held that the trial court had not committed fundamental error. Id. at 1179.

[34] The Baker Court explained that “the only issue was the credibility of the alleged victims” and that the defendant's only defense was to undermine the victims’ credibility. Id. The Court observed that the jury had “[u]ltimately ․ resolved the basic credibility dispute against [the defendant] and would have convicted the defendant of any of the various offenses shown by the evidence to have been committed.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis in original). The Baker Court thus concluded that the defendant had “not demonstrated that the instruction error ․ so prejudiced him that he [had been] denied a fair trial.” Id.

[35] Here, just as in Baker, the only issue in this case was the credibility of A.C., and Bault's only defense was to undermine her credibility. The jury resolved this basic credibility dispute against Bault, and it could have convicted him of any of the various offenses shown by the evidence to have been committed. Accordingly, Bault has failed to show that the instructional error had so prejudiced him that he was denied a fair trial. See, e.g., id.  ⁷

2. Sufficiency of Evidence

[36] Bault next argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his Level 5 felony child exploitation conviction. We disagree.

[37] “Sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims trigger a deferential standard of review in which we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (cleaned up). “A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (cleaned up). “In conducting that review, we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it.” Id.

[38] To convict Bault of Level 5 felony child exploitation, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Bault, with the intent to satisfy or arouse the sexual desires of any person, knowingly or intentionally created a digitized image of any performance or incident that includes the uncovered genitals of A.C., who was less than eighteen (18) years of age. See I.C. § 35-42-4-4(b)(4) (2015).

[39] Bault contends that “there was insufficient evidence to prove that [he had] created a digitized image of proscribed content.” (Bault's Br. 7). He acknowledges that the State presented, via A.C.’s testimony, “direct evidence of the creation of a digitalized image[,]” but he contends that her testimony was insufficient to prove “what the image actually depicted.” (Bault's Br. 12). Bault suggests that the only sufficient evidence would have been for the State to present the actual image to the jury and points out that the State did not find any such image when the police searched his phone pursuant to a search warrant.

[40] Here, the State alleged that Bault had committed the offense of child exploitation against A.C. in 2015. The fact that the police did not find the photograph during the search of Bault's electronic devices in 2022 is of no moment. A.C. specifically testified that Bault had taken “a couple of pictures” of her when she had been “fully naked[ ] and that [Bault] had had [her] ․ legs spread apart and then he was ․ spreading my privates apart with his fingers[.]” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 2). Our supreme court has explained that “[a] conviction can be sustained on only the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, even when that witness is the victim.” Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012). Bault presented this sufficiency argument and his challenge to A.C.’s credibility to the jury during his closing argument, and the jury clearly rejected it and found him guilty of child exploitation. Bault's argument that there was insufficient evidence that he created a digitized image of A.C.’s uncovered genitals is nothing more than a request to reweigh the evidence and credibility of witnesses, which we decline to do. See Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1244. Accordingly, we affirm Bault's Level 5 felony child exploitation conviction.

3. Sentencing under Incorrect Statute

[41] Next, Bault argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him on his Level 1 child molesting conviction under Indiana Code § 35-50-2-4(c), which has a sentencing range of twenty to fifty years, instead of under Indiana Code § 35-50-2-4(b), which has a sentencing range of twenty to forty years.⁸ Specifically, Bault contends that the trial court's imposition of his sentence on his Level 1 felony child molesting conviction under Indiana Code § 35-50-2-4(c) violated his Sixth Amendment rights because the jury was not asked to make a finding that the victim, A.C., was under twelve years old when Bault committed the Level 1 felony child molesting offense.

[42] In support of Bault's argument, he relies on this Court's holding in Holmgren v. State, 196 N.E.3d 281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), reh'g denied, trans. denied, in which we addressed this same argument as “a matter of first impression.” Holmgren, 196 N.E.3d at 286. In Holmgren, the State charged the defendant with Level 1 felony child molesting based on the defendant being at least twenty-one years old and the victim being under the age of fourteen. At trial, the jury instructions and closing arguments referenced that same age requirement that the victim was under the age of fourteen. The jury was not instructed to make a finding that the victim was under the age of twelve. At sentencing, the trial court found the defendant to be a credit restricted felon under Indiana Code § 35-31.5-2-72(1) and sentenced the defendant under Indiana Code § 35-50-2-4(c).

[43] On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court had violated her Sixth Amendment rights when the trial court had sentenced her under Indiana Code § 35-50-2-4(c) based upon a fact not found by the jury, i.e., that the victim was under the age of twelve. Our Court agreed with the defendant and concluded that, under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the trial court could not sentence the defendant under Indiana Code § 35-50-2-4(c) without violating her Sixth Amendment rights because the jury had not been presented with the determination of whether victim was under the age of twelve when molested. Holmgren, 196 N.E.3d at 288.⁹ Our Court reversed the defendant's sentence and remanded to the trial court for resentencing on her Level 1 felony child molesting conviction.

[44] Here, similar to Holmgren, the State charged Bault with Level 1 felony child molesting based on him being at least twenty-one years old and A.C. being under the age of fourteen. At trial, the jury instructions and closing arguments referenced that same age requirement that A.C. was under the age of fourteen, and the jury was not instructed to make a finding that A.C. was under the age of twelve. The State concedes that “this Court's decision in Holmgren is dispositive” and that, given the specific facts of this case, the trial court could not have sentenced Bault under Indiana Code § 35-50-2-4(c) without violating his constitutional rights. (State's Br. 21). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's imposition of the forty-five-year sentence under Indiana Code § 35-50-2-4(c) for Bault's Level 1 felony child molesting conviction and remand to the trial court for resentencing on this conviction.

[45] Additionally, although not raised as an issue by Bault, the State points out that the trial court erred by sentencing Bault on his Level 5 felony child exploitation conviction because the eight-year sentence imposed was outside the statutory range for a Level 5 felony, which is between one and six years. See I.C. § 35-50-2-6(b). The State requests, and we agree, that we should also remand for the trial court to resentence Bault on his Level 5 felony child exploitation conviction under the statutory range set forth in Indiana Code § 35-50-2-6(b).

4. Consecutive Sentences

[46] Lastly, Bault argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering his sentences to be served consecutively to each other. We disagree.

[47] Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). A trial court has discretion to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences, and we review that decision only for an abuse of discretion. Gellenbeck v. State, 918 N.E.2d 706, 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). See also I.C. § 35-50-2-1(c) (providing that the trial court shall determine whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Weaver v. State, 189 N.E.3d 1128, 1132 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (cleaned up), trans. denied. “A trial court is not obligated to identify the aggravators that support consecutive sentences separately from the factors that support the sentence enhancement[,]” and the trial court may rely on the same factors to both enhance a sentence and impose consecutive sentences. Smith v. State, 770 N.E.2d 818, 821 (Ind. 2002). Moreover, “[a] single aggravating circumstance may support the imposition of consecutive sentences.” Gellenbeck, 918 N.E.2d at 712.

[48] Here, the trial court found the following aggravating circumstances: (1) the nature and duration of the offenses; (2) Bault's care of A.C. and violation of that position of trust; and (3) the harm caused to A.C. was greater than needed for proof of the elements. Bault does not challenge the validity of these aggravating circumstances. The trial court determined that these aggravators outweighed the sole mitigator and then imposed consecutive sentences on Bault's two child molesting convictions and his child exploitation conviction.¹⁰ Because these unchallenged aggravating circumstances can support the imposition of consecutive sentences, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences.¹¹

[49] We affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3.

2.   I.C. § 35-42-4-3.

3.   I.C. § 35-42-4-4. The jury convicted Bault of Level 4 felony child exploitation, but the trial court entered judgment of conviction as Level 5 felony child exploitation.

4.   During this time at issue, Bault lived with his parents at his parents’ house.

5.   The State also charged Bault with Level 4 felony child molesting related to an offense against A.C.’s sister, and the jury acquitted Bault of this charge.

6.   At the time of Bault's sentencing hearing, he had two pending criminal cases. The trial court referenced these cases when it stated that Bault's violation of pretrial release conditions in those cases was a “lesser aggravator[.]” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 98).

7.   Additionally, we reject Bault's suggestion that we should disregard our supreme court's Baker decision and determine that it is no longer good law in light of Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83 (2020). See Culbertson v. State, 929 N.E.2d 900, 906 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (explaining that it is not our Court's role to reconsider or declare invalid decisions of our supreme court and that our supreme court's precedent is binding until it is changed by the supreme court or legislative enactment), trans. denied. Moreover, Ramos did not address whether the lack of a unanimity instruction would constitute fundamental error.

8.   At the time of Bault's Level 1 felony offense, Indiana Code § 35-50-2-4(c) had a sentencing range of twenty to fifty years if the person committing the Level 1 felony child molesting offense was a credit restricted felon under Indiana Code § 35-31.5-2-72(1), which applies when the offense is committed by a person at least twenty-one years old and the victim is less than twelve years old. Indiana Code § 35-50-2-4(c) was then amended effective July 1, 2023. This amended statute still provides a sentencing range of twenty to fifty years, but it now applies to a person who commits Level 1 felony child molesting under Indiana Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1), which applies when the offense is committed by a person at least twenty-one years old.

9.   The Holmgren Court also expressed its concern that Indiana Code § 35-50-2-4(c) was “an anomaly ․ because it provides different sentencing ranges for the same level of offense based upon certain facts” and “encourage[d] the General Assembly to reconsider” the statute because it was “unnecessarily confusing.” Holmgren, 196 N.E.3d at 288 and 288 n.7. As noted above, the General Assembly amended Indiana Code § 35-50-2-4(c), effective July 1, 2023.

10.   Moreover, Bault's three convictions are all classified as a crime of violence under Indiana Code § 35-50-2-1(a). Thus, the trial court was statutorily authorized to impose consecutive sentences. See I.C. § 35-50-2-1(c) (imposing restrictions on the imposition of the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment except for crimes of violence).

11.   Bault cites to Appellate Rule 7(B) and references an appellate court's authority to revise a sentence found to be an inappropriate, but he does not develop a separate argument under Appellate Rule 7(B). “[O]ur [Indiana] Supreme Court has made clear ․ [that] inappropriate sentence and abuse of discretion claims are to be analyzed separately.” King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491). Because Bault does raise a separate or cogent argument on Appellate Rule 7(B), we will not address it. See Foutch v. State, 53 N.E.3d 577, 580 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (holding that defendant waived appellate review of abuse of discretion sentencing argument by failing to raise a cogent and separate argument from an Appellate Rule 7(B) argument).

Pyle, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Mathias, J., concur.