IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of L.J. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] The Marion Superior Court involuntarily terminated T.L.’s (“Mother's”) and D.J.’s (“Father's”) parental rights over their minor children L.J., K.J., R.L., and A.L. (“the Children”). Mother and Father (collectively, “Parents”) appeal, arguing that the order terminating their parental rights is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Parents are the biological parents ¹ of L.J., born in October 2013; K.J., born in October 2014; R.L., born in July 2019; and A.L., born in December 2021. On May 4, 2023, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed petitions alleging that the Children were Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”) “because [Mother's] emotional instability impaired her ability to supervise and care for the children.” Ex. Vol. p. 102. During the initial hearing the same day, Father appeared and requested a public defender. The court appointed a public defender for Father.² At that time, Mother and Father were living separately, and the Children were living with Mother.

[4] During a hearing on the CHINS petitions approximately two months later on June 30, Mother admitted that the Children were CHINS because Mother “needs the assistance of DCS to ensure that the children are provided with a safe, stable, and appropriate living environment.” Mother's App. Vol. 2, p. 193. Father did not appear at that hearing. The trial court adjudicated the Children to be CHINS, and DCS removed the Children from Mother's care and placed them in foster care. The court also issued a dispositional order for Mother. The court ordered Mother to complete family preservation services, home-based case work, home-based therapy, and a mental health evaluation. And the court ordered Mother to follow the recommendations of all service providers.

[5] In July and October, the trial court held hearings on the CHINS petitions as to Father despite his failure to appear at either hearing. Father suffers from a debilitating condition known as ankylosing spondylitis, as well as Crohn's disease. Beginning sometime in 2023, Father began living in an assisted living facility. At some point, Father lost his ability to ambulate and was confined to his bed. Ultimately, the court ordered no services for Father until he either contacted DCS or appeared in court. See id. at 194. Each hearing held by the trial court provided Father with the option to appear virtually. There was no evidence that he was incompetent or that his condition prevented him from appearing virtually.

[6] On October 30, 2024, Mother underwent a six-hour psychological evaluation with Daniel Westmoreland, Ph.D. Dr. Westmoreland “provisionally diagnosed Mother with schizophrenia” and recommended medication. Id. at 195. In his report, Dr. Westmoreland stated that talk therapy was not an effective treatment for schizophrenia. And he stated that the “diagnosis was provisional because he wanted to observe Mother after taking medication prescribed to treat schizophrenia in order to ensure that the diagnosis was correct and the delusions could not be attributed to some other psychotic disorder caused by an unknown medical condition.” Id. Mother disagreed with Dr. Westmoreland's diagnosis and did not comply with his recommendations.

[7] Also in October 2024, Father appeared in court for a review hearing and requested another public defender, and the court granted that request. The court ordered parenting time for Father and instructed DCS to hold a family meeting with Father. The court informed Father that there would be another review hearing in January 2025. Father failed to appear at the January 2025 hearing, and his public defender told the court that he had had “no contact” with Father. Ex. Vol. p. 101. At that hearing, the court noted that

[t]he DCS had motioned for modification of the existing Dispositional Orders so as to add an order of reunification services for [Father]. Because [Father] failed to appear for this hearing, and because his attorney has not had the benefit of meeting with [Father], counsel requested that the modification issue be continued to the next hearing.

Id. At a hearing on April 11, the trial court ordered Father to participate in Father's Engagement.

[8] Also in April, Mother met with Dr. Jennifer Hoffman, a psychiatrist, for approximately one hour. Dr. Hoffman diagnosed Mother with depression and social anxiety and prescribed Lexapro, which is a medication that “does not treat schizophrenia.” Mother's App. Vol. 2, p. 198. Mother also began talk therapy with two therapists.

[9] Due to Father's months-long confinement to bed at an assisted living facility, both DCS and the trial court have offered virtual visits/meetings/hearings to accommodate Father. But Father did not take advantage of those accommodations. While Father had the option of exercising virtual parenting time with the Children weekly, his participation in those visits was rare.³ And he never connected with providers to start Father's Engagement.

[10] On April 15, 2025, DCS filed petitions to terminate Parents’ parental rights over the Children. During the final hearing in September, Mother appeared virtually and by counsel, and Father appeared virtually and by counsel.

[11] DCS presented evidence that Mother's home-based therapist, Michelle Harrison, had described Mother's “clinical presentation [as] includ[ing] maladaptive thoughts, feelings, and behaviors in response to chronic physiological and psychological (mental health) symptoms.” Id. at 195. Harrison also stated that Mother “struggles with historical events that sometimes distorts her reality as evidenced by [a] lack of comprehension, compulsive behaviors, avoidance coping, passive aggressive behaviors, risky behaviors, sleeping too much, odd perceptions, resistant behavioral patterns, and parent-child relational issues.” Id. In addition, Mother's home-based caseworker, Rose Bray, described Mother as “defensive,” “challenging to work with,” and dishonest. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 21.

[12] Dr. Westmoreland testified that, based on his six-hour-long evaluation of Mother, as well as collateral information including Harrison's and Bray's insights, he gave Mother a provisional diagnosis of schizophrenia and recommended consistent treatment with a psychiatrist. Mother disagreed with Dr. Westmoreland's diagnosis and sought her own opinion from Dr. Hoffman, who diagnosed Mother with depression and social anxiety. And Mother has been engaging in talk therapy, which Dr. Westmoreland stated was not a treatment for schizophrenia.

[13] DCS presented testimony from providers who had supervised Mother's visits with the Children, and each witness described Mother's failure to demonstrate appropriate parenting skills during visits. Tabatha Crittenden testified that on several occasions, Mother was unprepared for visits. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 38. For example, “most” of the time, Mother had no food for the Children, and Crittenden would have to drive Mother to a store to buy food. Id. at 39. Crittenden also testified that Mother did not plan activities for the Children, and she would often watch television with the two younger children while L.J. was on her phone and K.J. was playing video games. And there were times that L.J. and K.J. did not want to attend visits with Mother. Mother's visits with the Children stopped altogether in June 2025 when Mother said that her therapy schedule and her work schedule would not allow time for visits. See id. at 64.

[14] DCS Family Case Manager Katrina Carr testified that she was first assigned to this case in November 2024. Carr testified that she had not talked to Father “in a long time” because he did not maintain communication with her. Id. at 215. She also testified that Father's “referrals [for services] would lapse all the time ․ because of non-engagement.” Id. at 216. Carr testified that there have been “significant” lapses in Father's visits with the Children due to his non-engagement. Id. at 218.

[15] On October 15, 2025, the trial court issued an order involuntarily terminating Father's and Mother's parental rights over the Children. In its thorough findings and conclusions, the court described Mother's history of mental illness, her refusal to comply with Dr. Westmoreland's recommendations, and her failure to demonstrate adequate parenting skills during visits with the Children. The court also described Father's failure to maintain contact either with the court or DCS and his failure to bond with the Children. The trial court concluded in relevant part that the conditions that caused the Children's removal and continued placement outside Parents’ homes would not be remedied; that continuation of the parent-child relationships poses a threat to the Children's well-being; and that termination of Father's and Mother's parental rights is in the Children's best interests. Parents now appeal.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[16] Indiana appellate courts have long adhered to a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1230-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). In analyzing the trial court's decision, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Id. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the court's judgment. Id. In deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.

[17] To determine whether a termination decision is clearly erroneous, we apply a two-tiered standard of review to the trial court's findings of facts and conclusions of law. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings; second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. If the evidence and inferences support the court's termination decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. We will accept unchallenged factual findings as true. See In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 614 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[18] It is well-settled that the parent-child relationship is one of society's most cherished relationships. See, e.g., In re A.G., 45 N.E.3d 471, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Indiana law thus sets a high bar to sever that relationship. Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS is required, in relevant part, to prove that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)-(3) (2024).

[19] In addition, DCS must prove the existence of one of the following circumstances relevant here:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(3) to (d)(4). We need only discuss one of these elements raised by Parents in this appeal, namely, whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal or the reasons for their placement outside of Father's or Mother's home will not be remedied.

[20] Clear and convincing evidence need not establish that the continued custody of a parent is wholly inadequate for a child's very survival. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 148. It is instead sufficient to show that the child's emotional and physical development are put at risk by the parent's custody. Id. If the court finds the allegations in a petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a).

Challenged Findings

[21] Mother argues that four of the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. Finding No. 22 states: “Over a period of two days, October 30 and November 1, 2024, Dr. Westmoreland met with Mother approximately six hours each day to conduct the evaluation.” Mother's App. Vol. 2, p. 194. Mother is correct that this finding is not accurate. Dr. Westmoreland met with Mother for approximately six hours on one day and spent an additional twelve hours evaluating her test scores and writing his report over the next two days. See Tr. Vol. 2, p. 33; Ex. Vol. p. 3. Thus, while Finding No. 22 is not entirely accurate, the substance of the finding is supported by the evidence. That is, the evidence shows that Dr. Westmoreland spent several hours talking to Mother and spent several more hours evaluating her mental health. We agree with DCS that the error is harmless.

[22] Mother also argues that Finding No. 28 is clearly erroneous. That finding states: “[Dr. Westmoreland's schizophrenia] diagnosis was provisional because he wanted to observe Mother after taking medication prescribed to treat schizophrenia in order to ensure that the diagnosis was correct and the delusions could not be attributed to some other psychotic disorder caused by an unknown medical condition.” Mother's App. Vol. 2, p. 195. Mother mischaracterizes this finding by reading it out of context. Rather than stating that her symptoms “could not be attributed” to another disorder or medical condition, as Mother contends, the court found explicitly that Dr. Westmoreland explained that his diagnosis was provisional for the very reason that her symptoms might be due to something other than schizophrenia. Mother's argument on this issue is without merit.

[23] Mother argues that Finding No. 82 is clearly erroneous. That finding states:

During ․ her time as a supervised visit facilitator, [Rosemary] Olubayo stated there was one parenting time session that was unsupervised but parenting time was immediately reverted back to supervised status after the Children reported that they didn't have food during the parenting time session and were left hungry

Id. at 201. Mother quibbles with the court's use of the words “left hungry.” She maintains that Olubayo only testified that the Children “were hungry,” which Mother describes as common. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 84. But Olubayo explained that, when she checked on the Children during the sole unsupervised visit with Mother, the Children had reported that they “[hadn't] eaten[.]” Id. And FCM Crittenden testified that it was “halfway through the day” during the one unsupervised visit when the Children reported to Olubayo that they were hungry. Id. at 52. The evidence supports this finding.

[24] Finally, Mother contends that Finding No. 99 is clearly erroneous. That finding refers to a minor and accidental head injury R.L. had sustained in the care of his foster mother. When Mother saw a “knot” on R.L.’s head and his pink, crusty eye, she was understandably “upset,” but then she began “spiraling[.]” Id. at 101-02. Mother left the Children and went to a room by herself. Mother eventually told the visit facilitators to end the visit, saying “I can't do this.” Id. at 104. The trial court found: “Although the injury was accidental and not a cause for alarm, Mother had a reaction that concerned [Chloe] Sanford[, a visit facilitator].” Mother's App. Vol. 2, p. 203. Again, Mother mischaracterizes this finding as showing that her reaction was “completely unjustified․” Mother's Br. at 14. The court made no such finding. Sanford's testimony clearly showed that she was concerned about Mother's reaction. Mother's contention on this issue is without merit.

Reasonable Efforts at Reunification

[25] Father argues that his parental rights must be reinstated because DCS “plainly failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify Father and his Children, as required by statute[.]” Father's Br. at 18. Indeed, to protect a parent's due process rights in the context of termination proceedings, “DCS must have made reasonable efforts to preserve and/or reunify the family unit in the CHINS case[.]” In re T.W., 135 N.E.3d 607, 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. But “[w]hat constitutes ‘reasonable efforts’ will vary by case, and ․ it does not necessarily always mean that services must be provided to the parents.” Id.

[26] Father blames DCS for his failure to participate in services after the Children were removed from Mother's home. He points out that, other than visitation, he was not offered services for two years. Four days before DCS filed the termination petitions, and five months before the final hearing, DCS offered him a Father's Engagement program. And Father claims that DCS never offered in-person visits with the Children.

[27] Father attended the initial hearing on May 4, 2023, but he did not attend the fact-finding hearings on the CHINS petitions. Then his public defender withdrew due to Father's failure to communicate. And the trial court stated that it would not enter a dispositional order for Father until he either showed up in court or contacted DCS. On October 4, 2024, Father appeared for a hearing and requested a new public defender, which the court granted. And the court set a new hearing date for January 10, 2025, but Father did not appear, and his public defender said that he had had no contact with Father.

[28] FCM Carr testified that she had provided Father with “links to court hearings” so that he could attend virtually. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 49. Carr testified further that she had made “multiple referrals” for Father's Engagement, but the providers were not able to make contact with Father. Id. at 50. Carr also testified that she had invited Father to attend a family case meeting by phone in November 2024, but she could not get a hold of Father the day of the meeting. With respect to visits with the Children, Carr said that she did not think that in-person visits were possible given Father's health condition, and she testified that Father had never requested in-person visits. She also testified that Father had been “inconsistent” with his virtual visits with the Children. Id. at 51.

[29] It is well settled that

“[a] parent may not sit idly by without asserting a need or desire for services and then successfully argue that he was denied services to assist him with his parenting.” In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Furthermore,

we have stated on several occasions that, although the DCS is generally required to make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families during the CHINS proceedings, that requirement under our CHINS statutes is not a requisite element of our parental rights termination statute, and a failure to provide services does not serve as a basis on which to directly attack a termination order as contrary to law.

In re J.W., Jr., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (․ internal brackets and quotation marks omitted), trans. denied; see also In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009); In re E.E., 736 N.E.2d 791, 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

T.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re J.W.), 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

[30] Father's argument on this issue amounts to a request that we reweigh the evidence. In light of Father's consistent refusal to maintain contact either with DCS or the court, Father's argument that DCS did not make reasonable efforts to reunify the family is without merit.

Reasons for Removal

[31] Father and Mother argue that DCS failed to prove that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal and continued placement outside of their homes will not be remedied. Consideration of this argument involves a two-step analysis: first, identifying the conditions that led to removal, and second, determining whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will be remedied. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014). In the second step, the trial court determines a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions; in other words, the court must balance a parent's recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. In conducting its analysis, the trial court may also consider the reasons for the child's continued placement outside the home. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[32] Initially, Mother contends that the trial court “made no finding regarding the reason for the children's removal.” Mother's Br. at 16. And she maintains that that omission is “fatal” to the termination orders. Id. Mother argues that we can only “speculate” as to the reason, but that is obviously not true. Id. As the trial court found, at the CHINS hearing in June 2023, Mother conceded that the Children were CHINS because she needed “the assistance of DCS to ensure that the children are provided with a safe, stable, and appropriate living environment.” Mother's App. Vol. 2, p. 193. Given her concession, and given the trial court's many findings regarding her mental health issues and struggles to care for the Children during supervised visits, the record is clear that the reasons for the Children's removal and continued placement outside Mother's home were Mother's mental illness and inability to provide the Children with a safe and stable home.

[33] DCS presented evidence that Mother refused to follow Dr. Westmoreland's recommendations regarding his provisional diagnosis of schizophrenia. And Mother does not challenge the following findings:

59. [L.J. and K.J.] often behaved in a parental role towards [R.L. and A.L.] to make up for the gaps in Mother's parenting.

60. Multiple visit facilitators were required to be present at parenting time sessions to ensure the safety of the Children.

61. The supervised visit facilitators would often have to intervene in parenting time and eventually [L.J. and K.J.] started refusing parenting time.

62. There was an incident at a parenting time session in December of 2024 in which Mother started saying that DCS was going to kill the Children and she stated she didn't know who [visitation supervisor] Ms. Crittenden was.

63. The parenting time session was chaotic and scary and had to end early due to Mother's behavior.

64. Based on her time supervising Mother's parenting time, Ms. Crittenden concluded that Mother was not capable of caring for the Children.

Id. at 199-200. Further, the visit facilitators presented compelling testimony that Mother was not prepared for supervised visits with the Children; she rarely had food for the Children; she did not have activities prepared to do with the Children; and she mostly watched television during visits. Indeed, in December 2024, L.J., then eleven years old, and K.J., then ten years old, wrote letters to the trial court complaining about Mother. L.J. ended his letter this way: “I DO NOT WANT TO GO BACK.” Ex. Vol. p. 99 (capitalization original). And K.J. started his letter this way: “I don't want to go home!!!” Id. at 100.

[34] The clear and convincing evidence shows that it is reasonably probable, given Mother's habitual conduct, that she will be unable to provide stability for the Children. Mother's argument on appeal focuses solely on the evidence in her favor, which amounts to an impermissible request that we reweigh the evidence.

[35] Father argues that the reasons for the Children's removal from Mother's house have nothing to do with him. But Father ignores the fact that our analysis also looks at the reasons for the Children's continued placement outside of Father's home. See N.Q., 996 N.E.2d at 392. As detailed above, prior to the final fact-finding hearing, Father only attended two court hearings. His first public defender withdrew because Father was not maintaining contact. And his second public defender likewise had difficulty communicating with Father. FCM Carr testified that Father would take days or a week to respond to text messages, and he did not attend a family team meeting after she had given him the link to attend virtually. Father's virtual visits with the Children were inconsistent. The trial court found that Father had “failed to take any steps to build or demonstrate a bond with the Children.” Mother's App. Vol. 2, p. 217.

[36] Father makes much of his debilitating illness as the reason for his lack of participation, and he points to his testimony that he anticipates a full recovery within one year. But Father ignores the evidence that every court hearing included the option to attend virtually, and DCS tried to connect Father with providers, to no avail. Had Father maintained consistent contact with DCS and engaged in services available to him while he was confined in bed, Father may have been able to demonstrate grounds for giving him more time for reunification.

[37] The clear and convincing evidence shows that it is reasonably probable, given Father's habitual conduct, that he will be unable to provide stability for the Children.⁴ Father's argument on appeal focuses solely on the evidence in his favor, which amounts to an impermissible request that we reweigh the evidence.

[38] For all of these reasons, we conclude that DCS proved that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal and continued placement outside of Parents’ homes will not be remedied.

Best Interests

[39] Father also argues that DCS failed to prove that termination of his parental relationships with the Children is in their best interests. In determining what is in a child's best interests, a court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the evidence. A.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re A.K.), 924 N.E.2d 212, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). A parent's historical inability to provide “adequate housing, stability, and supervision,” in addition to the parent's current inability to do so, supports finding termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. Id.

[40] When making its decision, the court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child. See Stewart v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re J.S.), 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “The court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship.” Id. Moreover, this Court has previously held that recommendations of the family case manager and court-appointed special advocate to terminate parental rights, coupled with evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. Id.

[41] The Children have not been in Father's or Mother's care since June 2023. The Children are living together, and thriving, in a pre-adoptive foster home. Father argues, again, that his illness should not be the reason for terminating his parental rights. Father notes that

[o]ur Supreme Court and this Court have postponed termination where a parent faces grave challenges, including not only battles against substance abuse, but up to and including criminal charges and incarceration – and even where that parent may ultimately fail to overcome his challenges. See R.Y.[ v. Marion County Dep't of Child Servs.], 904 N.E.2d 1257 [(Ind. 2009)]; In re J.M., 908 N.E.2d 191 (Ind. 2009); H.G. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 959 N.E.2d 272, 293 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

Father's Br. at 28.

[42] Father's attempt to analogize this case to the cases upon which he relies is not well taken. In re J.M. involves an appeal taken from the trial court's denial of DCS's petitions to terminate the parents’ parental rights to their child. 908 N.E.2d at 193. Given the fundamentally different standard of review here, the analysis in In re J.M. is inapplicable. And the parents in R.Y. and H.G. were extremely engaged with DCS and completed several services in their efforts to maintain their relationships with their respective children. In contrast, here, Father made almost no effort to preserve his relationships with the Children.

[43] Moreover, the DCS family case manager, Carr, testified that Parents’ parental rights should be terminated and that adoption is in the Children's best interests. And the Guardian ad Litem testified that termination of Parents’ parental rights is in the Children's best interests. For these reasons, Father has not shown that the trial court clearly erred when it found that termination of Parents’ parental rights is in the Children's best interests.

Conclusion

[44] Parents have not persuaded us that the trial court's order is clearly erroneous, and we affirm the court's order terminating Father's and Mother's parental rights over the Children.

[45] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Our reading of the transcript suggests that Father has not established paternity over any of the Children. See Tr. Vol. 3, p. 44. And at least one court order indicates that A.L.’s father has not been identified. Indeed, at the final hearing, Father testified that he had only three children, and he omitted A.L. from the list. See Tr. Vol. 3, p. 28. In any event, Father alleges in his brief on appeal that he is the biological father of all four Children. See Father's Br. at 4. And the trial court did not make any contrary finding.

2.   Father's public defender later withdrew his representation of Father due to a lack of communication.

3.   The evidence is not clear as to when Father last exercised any virtual parenting time with the Children. He has not exercised in-person visits with the Children during the pendency of the CHINS proceeding.

4.   Unlike the parents in M.W. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, 942 N.E.2d 154 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied, and In re D.Q., 745 N.E.2d 904 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), cited by Father, Father has not presented evidence, other than his self-serving testimony, that he will be physically able to care for the Children anytime in the foreseeable future. The mother in M.W. had suffered a stroke, but she was living in a facility that could also accommodate her child. 942 N.E.2d at 158. And the mother in D.Q. had fully recovered from her illness and had complied with almost every service included in the court's dispositional order. 745 N.E.2d at 907. Here, Father could only speculate that he might be recovered within one year. Indeed, Father describes his illness as “hopefully temporary.” Father's Br. at 20 (emphasis added).

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Felix, J., concur.