Richard Talbott, Appellant-Petitioner v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Richard Talbott, pro se, appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Talbott raises four issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether the post-conviction court erred when it denied his petition. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] We previously explained the factual and procedural background underlying Talbott's convictions for Level 3 felony criminal confinement, Level 3 felony aggravated battery, Level 6 felony strangulation, and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery as follows:

Talbott and P.D. met online in July 2019 and began dating shortly thereafter. In the middle of October 2019, Talbott moved into P.D.’s mobile home in Hanover, Indiana. P.D. testified her relationship with Talbott “was okay for the first day or two” after he moved into her trailer. (Tr. Vol. V at 67.) However, P.D. soon became uncomfortable with Talbott living with her. Talbott was unemployed, and P.D. explained Talbott “would stay drunk every day” and call her degrading names. (Id.) In addition, Talbott would question P.D. about content on her phone, and he would tell P.D. “what [she] could and could not wear, who [she] could and could not speak to.” (Id. at 69.)

On October 28, 2019, P.D. and Talbott got into an argument while P.D. was driving her car. Talbott demanded to see P.D.’s phone, and P.D. explained she would give her phone to Talbott once the car stopped. Talbott became angry and pushed P.D.’s foot off the accelerator as he attempted to retrieve the phone from P.D.’s purse, which was on the driver's side floorboard. P.D. eventually gave Talbott her cell phone, and Talbott told P.D. he was moving back to New Albany. Talbott attempted to call his mother and his uncle, but when they did not answer, Talbott threw P.D.’s phone out of the vehicle. P.D. was able to retrieve her broken phone, and she drove Talbott back to her mobile home so that Talbott could pack his possessions and move out.

Inside the trailer, Talbott cornered P.D. in her bedroom. He grabbed P.D. by the throat and pushed her down to the floor. Talbott slapped P.D.’s face. He also smashed her head against the floor and against a nearby wooden box. While P.D. was on the floor, Talbott continued to choke her. P.D. thought Talbott was going to kill her. She saw “stars, and then it was like all black, and I was out.” (Id. at 82.) When P.D. regained consciousness, she realized she had involuntarily urinated on herself.

Talbott guided P.D. to the bathroom and then to the laundry room where she changed her clothes. Talbott's demeanor had changed, and he asked P.D. to drive him to the liquor store. P.D. agreed, and before Talbott went into the liquor store, Talbott said, “bitch, if you call the police and get me arrested, when I get out, I will kill you, and if I don't get out, I will send somebody to kill you, you understand me.” (Id. at 86.) P.D. drove away while Talbott was inside the store and went to her sister's mobile home. P.D. contacted law enforcement the next morning and sought medical treatment at a hospital. The police arrested Talbott at P.D.’s trailer.

On October 31, 2019, the State charged Talbott with Level 3 felony criminal confinement, Level 3 felony aggravated battery, Level 6 felony domestic violence, Level 6 felony strangulation, and three counts of Level 6 felony intimidation. At his initial hearing on November 1, 2019, Talbott requested a speedy trial pursuant to Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B). During that hearing, the trial court appointed attorney Devon Sharpe to represent Talbott and scheduled Talbott's jury trial for January 7, 2020.

On December 2, 2019, the State amended the charging information to include a charge of Level 1 felony attempted murder. On December 6, 2019, the State alleged Talbott was a habitual offender. On December 9, 2019, despite being represented by counsel, Talbott filed a pro se motion to dismiss the Level 3 felony criminal confinement and the Level 3 felony aggravated battery charges against him. On the same day, Talbott wrote a letter to the trial court lodging several complaints about Attorney Sharpe and asking the trial court to appoint him a new attorney.

Attorney Sharpe filed a motion to withdraw on December 13, 2019, and on December 16, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on the motion. Talbott asked for a new attorney to be appointed to represent him, and the trial court explained to Talbott that if it granted his request, then his trial would have to be continued. The trial court granted the motion to withdraw and appointed attorney James Spencer to represent Talbott. The trial court explained:

Mr. Spencer will be joining me for a jury trial tomorrow and throughout next—this week, and I'm not going to make him be ready on the 7th if he can't start right away on your case because he's probably working right now on another case. So because of your motion, and because the Court has granted that motion, the Court is going to continue the January 7 trial date.

(Tr. Vol. II at 8.)

The trial court converted Talbott's trial setting to a status conference, but this status conference was continued to January 22, 2020, by agreement of the parties. At the January 22, 2020, status conference, Attorney Spencer asked the trial court to set a trial date, but he explained he was “still playing quite a bit of catch up in this case” and asked “for enough time to get adequately prepared so that I'm not ineffective.” (Id. at 17-18.) Attorney Spencer suggested setting the matter for trial in May 2020 and stated: “We're not requesting a speedy [trial] today but Mr. Talbott is obviously anxious in getting this done as soon as we can, and I don't disagree.” (Id. at 18.) The trial court then set the trial to begin on May 11, 2020.

On March 6, 2020, Governor Eric Holcomb declared a public health emergency due to the spread of COVID-19. On March 16, 2020, our Indiana Supreme Court issued an order authorizing the suspension and rescheduling of all jury trials. On March 23, 2020, our Indiana Supreme Court amended that order and tolled “all laws, rules, and procedures setting time limits for speedy trials in criminal ․ proceedings.” In the Matter of Admin. Rule 17 Emergency Relief for Ind. Trial Courts Relating to 2019 Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), 141 N.E.3d 389 (Ind. March 23, 2020). Over a series of other orders, our Indiana Supreme Court extended the expiration date for the tolling of laws, rules, and procedures regarding speedy trials to August 14, 2020. In the Matter of Admin. Rule 17 Emergency Relief for Ind. Trial Courts Relating to 2019 Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), 145 N.E.3d 787 (Ind. May 29, 2020).

On June 15, 2020, Talbott filed a pro se motion for Attorney Spencer's removal as his appointed counsel. Shortly thereafter, Attorney Spencer filed a motion to withdraw his representation of Talbott. On July 6, 2020, the trial court granted the motions filed by Talbott and Attorney Spencer and appointed attorney Nick Karaffa to represent Talbott. The trial court also set Talbott's jury trial for September 1, 2020.

At a status hearing on July 22, 2020, Attorney Karaffa requested the trial court continue the jury trial date because he needed extra time to prepare for trial and he was counsel in a separate trial involving the death penalty. The trial court granted the motion and rescheduled Talbott's jury trial for October 20, 2020. On October 6, 2020, the trial court vacated the October 20, 2020, trial date and reset the trial for November 9, 2020, due to court congestion.

Talbott became dissatisfied with Attorney Karaffa's representation of him, and Attorney Karaffa filed a motion to withdraw. At a pre-trial conference on October 9, 2020, the trial court granted the motion to withdraw. After a colloquy between the trial court and Talbott regarding an attorney's authority over litigation strategy decisions and advising Talbott of the perils of self-representation, Talbott indicated he wished to proceed pro se. The trial court allowed Talbott to represent himself and told him he had thirty days to file all motions he felt appropriate. The trial court also stated it would schedule a hearing on the motions once they were received. The trial court vacated the November 9, 2020, jury trial date, and Talbott did not challenge the vacation of the jury trial date.

After Talbott began proceeding pro se, he filed a plethora of motions, including a motion to dismiss that challenged the adequacy of the charging information and various motions asserting he was entitled to discharge under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B). On January 7, 2021, the trial court issued a fourteen-page order that outlined the timeline of the case and denied Talbott's motions for discharge. On January 11, 2021, Talbott filed a motion asking the trial court to certify for interlocutory appeal its January 7, 2021, denial of his motions for discharge. On January 15, 2021, the trial court certified the issue for interlocutory appeal and appointed Talbott appellate counsel for the limited purpose of preparing materials for Talbott's interlocutory appeal. The certification for interlocutory appeal stayed the proceedings, and the trial court accordingly vacated the January 29, 2021, trial date. On March 12, 2021, this court issued an order in which it denied Talbott's request for interlocutory appeal.

On March 18, 2021, Talbott filed an additional motion to dismiss and argued the trial court violated his right to a speedy trial pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. On April 9, 2021, the trial court held a status conference, and the State asked the trial court to set a trial date. The trial court asked Talbott if he wished to request a trial date, and Talbott responded: “Your Honor, I—with all these motions coming up, I really don't request one. Not at this time, because I don't know how the motions are going to go, to be honest with you.” (Tr. Vol. III at 35.)

Talbott continued to file motions and letters to the trial court, and the trial court set a hearing on all motions for April 30, 2021. However, on April 28, 2021, Talbott filed a motion for withdrawal of the case pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 53.1. He argued “the matter should be withdrawn because the trial court has not issued a ruling on several of his motions.” (App. Vol. VIII at 5.) In that motion, he asked our Indiana Supreme Court to appoint a special judge in the matter. Talbott's motion again stayed the proceedings. On June 2, 2021, the Chief Administrator of the Indiana Supreme Court issued an order that denied Talbott's request for a special judge.

On June 11, 2021, the trial court set a jury trial for September 28, 2021. Talbott continued to file motions to dismiss, motions to reconsider, motions seeking recusal of the trial judge, motions seeking certification of orders denying his motions for interlocutory appeal, and various other motions. The trial court denied all of those motions. Talbott also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana in which he asserted he was being held by the Jefferson County Sheriff in violation of his right to a speedy trial. On August 24, 2021, the trial court rescheduled Talbott's jury trial to October 4, 2021, because the judge was scheduled to be out of town on the earlier-scheduled September 28, 2021, trial date. On September 24, 2021, the federal court issued an order denying Talbott's petition for writ of habeas corpus.

On October 4, 2021, Talbott's bifurcated trial commenced. Talbott acted pro se during his jury trial. During the first portion of the trial, the jury considered the pending charges against Talbott. The jury returned a guilty verdict as to Level 3 felony criminal confinement, Level 3 felony aggravated battery, Class A misdemeanor domestic battery, and Level 6 felony strangulation. The jury returned not guilty verdicts with respect to Level 1 felony attempted murder and the three counts of Level 6 felony intimidation. During the second portion of the trial, the jury found Talbott was a habitual offender.

On November 12, 2021, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. During the hearing, the trial court vacated Talbott's convictions of Level 3 felony aggravated battery and Level 6 felony strangulation on double jeopardy grounds. The trial court sentenced Talbott to 14 years executed at the Department of Correction (“DOC”) for Level 3 felony criminal confinement and 365 days executed at DOC for Class A misdemeanor domestic battery. Those sentences were to be served concurrent to one another. The trial court then enhanced the sentence associated with Talbott's Level 3 felony aggravated battery conviction by seventeen years based on his adjudication as a habitual offender, for an aggregate sentence of thirty-one years incarcerated.

Talbott v. State, 204 N.E.3d 288, 293-96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (footnotes omitted; other omissions and alterations in original), trans. denied (“Talbott I”).

[3] In Talbott I, we addressed the following four issues on direct appeal:

1. Whether Talbott was entitled to discharge pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(B) when his request for new counsel resulted in the vacation of his initial trial date and caused him to be held more than seventy days prior to trial;

2. Whether Talbott's constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated when delays caused by Talbott's repeated changes of counsel, the COVID-19 public health emergency, Talbott's pursuit of an interlocutory appeal, and court congestion resulted in Talbott's trial occurring twenty-three months after he was charged;

3. Whether the trial court erred when it denied Talbott's motion to dismiss the State's charge of Level 3 felony criminal confinement due to an inadequate charging information; and

4. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to prove Talbott committed Level 3 felony criminal confinement.

Id. at 292-93.

[4] In a thorough opinion, we rejected Talbott's arguments and affirmed his convictions. As we summarized:

The trial court did not err in denying Talbott's motion for discharge under Criminal Rule 4(B) because Talbott's change in counsel on the eve of trial resulted in the vacation of his original trial date, which had been scheduled within seventy days of Talbott's motion for a speedy trial. Moreover, even though Talbott's trial occurred twenty-three months after he was charged, his constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated because most of that delay was attributable to Talbott and he did not demonstrate prejudice from the delay. The criminal information alleging Talbott committed criminal confinement adequately informed him of the charge, and the State presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate Talbott's act of strangling P.D. resulted in serious bodily injury that created a substantial risk of death. For all these reasons, we affirm the trial court.

Id. at 304-05. And, with respect to Talbott's Criminal Rule 4(B) argument in particular, we added:

Talbott also asserts both Attorney Spencer and Attorney Karaffa were ineffective for failing to move to discharge him pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(B) when his initial speedy trial deadline passed in January 2020. “A defendant may raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal; however, the defendant is foreclosed from subsequently relitigating that claim.” Heyen v. State, 936 N.E.2d 294, 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant “must show both that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance so prejudiced him that he was denied a fair trial.” Id. Talbott filed a motion for discharge after he began representing himself, and as we explained above, he was not entitled to discharge pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(B). Therefore, his trial attorneys were not ineffective for failing to move to discharge him pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(B) because any such motion would have been denied. See Wine v. State, 147 N.E.3d 409, 420-21 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (holding trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise an objection that would have been overruled), trans. denied.

Id. at 299 n.9.

[5] Thereafter, Talbott filed his petition for post-conviction relief, which he later amended. In his amended petition, Talbott alleged that his appellate counsel had rendered ineffective assistance for “fail[ing] to challenge” the trial court's denial of his Criminal Rule 4(B) motion; that his appellate counsel had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for “fail[ing] to challenge” the denial of Talbott's motion to dismiss for the alleged constitutional speedy trial violation; that appellate counsel had rendered ineffective assistance in not arguing that Talbott had been denied his right to trial counsel when he proceeded pro se in the trial court; that his appellate counsel had rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to argue that Talbott's conviction for Count 1 was an included offense to his conviction for Count 4; and that his appellate counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by raising ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal. Appellant's Supp. App. Vol. 2, pp. 112-13.¹

[6] Following an evidentiary hearing on Talbott's amended petition, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and denied the petition. In particular, the court found as follows: Talbott's challenges to his appellate counsel's effectiveness on the speedy trial issues was “completely without merit” as those issues were “presented and argued but failed”; Talbott's appellate counsel acted reasonably by not arguing on direct appeal that Talbott had been denied his right to trial counsel when Talbott had agreed to proceed pro se; Talbott's double jeopardy argument was meritless because the trial court had vacated the conviction Talbott argued in his post-conviction petition to have been erroneous; and Talbott was not prejudiced by his appellate counsel raising the issue of trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness on direct appeal. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 18-19. The post-conviction court then also denied Talbott's ensuing motion to correct error.

[7] This appeal ensued.

Standard of Review

[8] Talbott appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. As our Supreme Court has explained:

Post-conviction proceedings are civil proceedings in which the defendant must establish his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Post-conviction proceedings do not offer a super-appeal[;] rather, subsequent collateral challenges to convictions must be based on grounds enumerated in the post-conviction rules. Those grounds are limited to issues that were not known at the time of the original trial or that were not available on direct appeal. Issues available but not raised on direct appeal are waived, while issues litigated adversely to the defendant are res judicata․

Because the defendant is appealing from the denial of post-conviction relief, he is appealing from a negative judgment and bears the burden of proof. Thus, the defendant must establish that the evidence, as a whole, unmistakably and unerringly points to a conclusion contrary to the post-conviction court's decision. In other words, the defendant must convince this Court that there is no way within the law that the court below could have reached the decision it did. We review the post-conviction court's factual findings for clear error[ ] but do not defer to its conclusions of law.

Wilkes v. State, 984 N.E.2d 1236, 1240 (Ind. 2013) (citation modified).

[9] Much of Talbott's argument on appeal turns on alleged ineffective assistance of his trial and appellate counsel. To prevail on such claims:

[The post-conviction petitioner] must show (1) that his counsel's performance fell short of prevailing professional norms, and (2) that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). A showing of deficient performance under the first of these two prongs requires proof that legal representation lacked an objective standard of reasonableness, effectively depriving the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the proceedings below would have resulted in a different outcome. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

When assessing the counsel's performance, we rely on some basic guidelines. First, we start by strongly presuming that, throughout the proceedings, counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment and rendered adequate legal assistance. Second, defense counsel enjoys considerable discretion when developing legal strategies for a client, demanding deference during judicial review. Third, counsel's isolated mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render representation ineffective.

Wilson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1163, 1177 (Ind. 2020) (citation modified). Further:

[A criminal defendant] is entitled to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment not only at trial but also on direct appeal. These claims are also judged under the two-part Strickland test. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims generally fall into three basic categories: (1) denial of access to an appeal, (2) waiver of issues, and (3) failure to present issues well.

Id. at 1178 (citation modified).

The post-conviction court properly denied Talbott's petition.

[10] We thus turn to the merits of Talbott's arguments. He first argues that the post-conviction court failed to enter appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(6). Appellant's Br. at 33-46. Talbott is incorrect; the post-conviction entered appropriate findings and conclusions. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 16-20. This argument therefore fails.

[11] Talbott next argues that the post-conviction court's denial of his petition is erroneous because he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to file a timely motion for discharge under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B). Appellant's Br. at 47-62. Talbott made this argument on direct appeal in Talbott I, and we rejected it. 204 N.E.3d at 299 n.9. He is therefore precluded from relitigating the issue by way of a petition for post-conviction relief. Wilkes, 984 N.E.2d at 1240.

[12] Next, Talbott contends that the post-conviction court's denial of his petition is erroneous because he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his appellate counsel failed to challenge the trial court's January 2021 denial of Talbott's motion for discharge. Appellant's Br. at 63-83. Talbott is again incorrect; his appellate counsel raised this issue on direct appeal, and we rejected it in a thorough analysis. Talbott I, 204 N.E.3d at 296-99. This argument fails.

[13] Talbott also argues that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in not arguing on direct appeal that the trial court had violated Talbott's right to counsel during those portions of the trial proceedings in which Talbott proceeded pro se. Appellant's Br. at 84-94. Most notably, Talbott alleges that he never affirmatively and unequivocally consented to proceeding without counsel during those portions of the trial proceedings in which he proceeded pro se. Id. at 90.

[14] At the evidentiary hearing on Talbott's post-conviction petition, Talbott's appellate counsel testified that he had reviewed the trial transcripts and concluded that Talbott had validly waived his right to counsel during the relevant times, and, thus, Talbott's appellate counsel did not consider this argument to be an issue worthy of raising on appeal. The post-conviction court agreed with appellate counsel's assessment, and so do we. The trial court thoroughly explained Talbott's right to counsel to him as well as the benefits of having an attorney and the perils of proceeding pro se. See Direct Appeal Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 82-89; Direct Appeal Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 6-8, 90-91, 160. Talbott affirmatively and unequivocally stated that he wished to proceed pro se save for limited exceptions that the trial court recognized and accommodated. Direct Appeal Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 82, 88-89; Direct Appeal Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 7-8, 91. Accordingly, the post-conviction court's denial of Talbott's argument on this issue is not contrary to law.

[15] Talbott next argues that he was entitled to summary disposition on his petition for post-conviction relief. Appellant's Br. at 95-96. He also argues that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his motion to correct error. Id. at 97-104. As these two claims of error are based on the substance of Talbott's rejected arguments above, they likewise fail. We therefore affirm the post-conviction court's denial of his request for summary disposition and his motion to correct error.

Conclusion

[16] For all of the above-stated reasons, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of Talbott's petition for post-conviction relief.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Our page references are to the .pdf page numbers.

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Felix, J., concur.