Jonathan Deshawn Currin Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After a jury found Jonathan Currin guilty of two counts of child molesting, attempted child molesting, and two counts of invasion of privacy, he admitted he was a habitual offender and was sentenced accordingly. He now appeals, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by permitting (1) the State to file the habitual offender charge within thirty days of trial and (2) the forensic interviewer to testify about her training, experience, and the general procedures used when forensically interviewing children. He also contends there was not sufficient evidence to support his convictions for Level 1 felony child molesting and Level 1 felony attempted child molesting. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Currin and Shanicka Thompson were in an on-again, off-again relationship that resulted in four children, including D.T. (born July 2011). Although Currin didn't live with Thompson, on the evening of April 17, 2024, he was at her apartment spending time with Thompson, D.T., and her siblings. After the others went to sleep, Currin and D.T. watched television together. At some point, Currin “told [D.T.] to go to [another] room and get something.” Transcript Vol. 2 at 162. When D.T. complied, Currin followed her with “his pants down.” Id. When the two entered the other room, Currin “covered [D.T.’s] mouth” with his hand and hit her head against the wall. Id.

[3] The next thing D.T. remembered was that she was on the ground, her pants and underwear had been removed, and Currin was rubbing his penis on her vagina. He was moving his penis “in and out towards [her] vagina” as well as “up and down on [her] vagina[.]” Id. at 167. Currin “tried to force [his penis] all the way in her vagina, but only kept it right against the hole.” Id. at 190. As this occurred, D.T.’s six-month-old sibling began to cry. Currin “grabbed [D.T.] up” and took her to Thompson's room where the baby was crying. Id. He picked up the baby and brought both children back to the room in which he had just violated D.T. He put them both on the floor and continued rubbing his penis on D.T.’s privates, though he did not “go inside [her] vagina at th[at] time[.]” Id. at 171.

[4] Approximately four minutes later, Thompson woke up and came into the room. She found Currin completely naked, his penis erect, “standing over D.T.” who was lying on her back, naked from the waist down. Id. at 205. When he saw Thompson, Currin ran into the closet claiming “he wasn't doing anything.” Id. Thompson told him she was going to call the police, but Currin took her phone away from her. Id. Thompson ushered the children into the car to take D.T. to the hospital. Currin tried to take her keys, but Thompson was able to start the car and maneuver it from the parking lot as Currin struggled with her and pleaded “that he wasn't doing anything” and “[couldn't] go to jail.” Id. at 207. Currin eventually got out of the car and hit Thompson in the face.

[5] At the hospital, medical professionals found a “little lump” on D.T.’s head. D.T. also underwent a sexual assault examination. Id. at 175. After a swab of her external genitalia was examined, the DNA analyst concluded it contained a mixture of two individuals’ DNA which showed “very strong support for the inclusion of ․ Currin.” Exhibits Vol. 1 at 20. The same was true of the samples obtained from the “inside crotch area” and “inside back area” of D.T.’s underwear and an anal swab.¹ Id. at 21.

[6] On July 2, the State charged Currin with Count 1: Attempted Child Molesting, as a Level 1 felony;² and Count 2: Child Molesting, as a Level 4 felony. Over the next year, the trial date was continued several times and the parties occasionally represented to the court that they were engaged in plea negotiations. Just five days before Currin's October 6 trial date, the State filed a motion to amend the charging information, which the court granted on October 3.³

[7] Before voir dire began at Currin's trial on October 6, the parties addressed the recently filed habitual offender enhancement. Although Currin's attorney objected to the State's late filing, he “concede[d] that the State ha[d] [put the defense] on notice [of] the habitual for a rather long time ․” Tr. Vol. 2 at 11. The State confirmed the defense had “been on notice for over a year that [it]” planned to file a habitual offender charge if plea negotiations failed. Id. at 13. Currin's attorney claimed that in early 2025 Currin told him that he “would not take any plea to a sex offense crime[,]” so his client never “sought ․ nor negotiated” a plea. Id. at 12. But the attorney didn't clarify whether Currin's position was ever relayed to the State—which had made its final plea offer in September 2025. Despite the late habitual offender filing, Currin never requested a continuance of his jury trial.

[8] One of the State's witnesses at trial was Maya James, a forensic child interviewer with the Marion County Child Advocacy Center who interviewed D.T. after she was assaulted. James testified that she was trained in the ChildFirst method of interviewing, had taken more than 200 hours of advanced training courses, participated in peer review training once a month, and had conducted 1,236 forensic interviews. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 230. Regarding the interview process, she explained:

It's very much child led. We follow the child. We don't introduce new information. We go off of whatever the child has already said. It's nonleading, nonsuggestive questioning.

․

It starts with rapport in that we do interview instructions, and then it's transition to the topic of concern[.] ․ I do that through open invitation, allowing the child to tell me why he or she is there. If they don't know, that's okay, and then we go to the explore phase, asking questions about what the child has told us so far. And then closure, bring the child back to their neutral state before they leave the interview.

Id. at 232-33. James further testified that, among other things, forensic interviewers typically instruct the child to tell the truth, use body diagrams and let the child name body parts, and leave space for the child to give the level of detail she feels comfortable giving. In this case, D.T. disclosed that something inappropriate had happened, but she did not give specifics to James.⁴

[9] Ultimately, the jury found Currin guilty of Level 1 felony attempted child molesting under Count 1, Level 4 felony child molesting under Count 2, Level 1 felony child molesting under Count 4, and both Class A misdemeanor invasions of privacy under renumbered Counts 5 and 6. Currin then admitted he was a habitual offender. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate sentence of fifty-six years—which included a twenty-year term for being a habitual offender—to be executed in the Department of Correction. Currin appeals.

Discussion and Decision

1. Habitual Offender Filing

[10] Currin argues the trial court erred by permitting the State to file a belated habitual offender charge. Typically, “[a]n amendment of an indictment or information to include a habitual offender charge ․ must be made at least thirty ․ days before the commencement of trial.” Ind. Code § 35-34-1-5(e)

However, upon a showing of good cause, the court may permit the filing of a habitual offender charge at any time before the commencement of the trial if the amendment does not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant. If the court permits the filing of a habitual offender charge less than thirty ․ days before the commencement of trial, the court shall grant a continuance at the request of the:

(1) state, for good cause shown; or

(2) defendant, for any reason.

Id.

[11] Our Supreme Court has “consistently held that a defendant must request a continuance after a trial court permits a tardy habitual-offender filing to preserve the issue for appeal.” White v. State, 963 N.E.2d 511, 518 (Ind. 2012). There are “no exceptions” to this rule. Id. (noting the rule comports with “general waiver principle[s]”).

[12] Here, Currin acknowledges he never requested a continuance. See Appellant's Brief at 20 (arguing he “should not be foreclosed from appealing” this issue “simply because his attorney made the strategic choice not to move to continue the trial despite the late addition” of the habitual offender charge). But rather than request we review the issue for fundamental error, he asks that we “abandon[ ]” the procedure our Supreme Court outlined in White. Id. at 21 (describing White's holding as “backwards” and “unworkable”); see also Rhodes v. State, No. 24A-CR-1075, at *1-2 (Ind. Ct. App. April 10, 2025) (mem.) (reviewing belated habitual offender filing for fundamental error where defendant acknowledged he neither objected nor sought a continuance), trans. denied. However, “it is well-established that as Indiana's intermediate appellate court, we are bound to follow Indiana Supreme Court precedent.” Gill v. Gill, 72 N.E.3d 945, 949 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. Accordingly, we have no authority to reevaluate White, and we conclude Currin waived any challenge to the late filing of the habitual offender charge.

2. Admission of Evidence

[13] Currin also argues the trial court erred by permitting James to testify “about the procedure used during the forensic interview [and] her training [and] experience in forensic interviewing.”⁵ Appellant's Br. at 29. We review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence only for an abuse of discretion. Fisher v. State, 264 N.E.3d 696, 704 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.” Weed v. State, 192 N.E.3d 247, 249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

[14] Currin claims the background information James provided “encouraged [the jury] to infer that someone with expertise found the child's allegations to be reliable.” Appellant's Br. at 30. According to Currin, admission of this evidence violated Evidence Rules 704(b) and 403.

[15] In pertinent part, Evidence Rule 704(b) prohibits a witness from testifying to “the truth or falsity of allegations[ ] [or to] whether a witness has testified truthfully ․” Currin correctly notes that our Supreme Court has “decline[d] to carve out an exception to th[is] rule for [child] sex abuse cases.” Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1237 (Ind. 2012), reh'g denied. But the testimony considered in Hoglund bears no relation to the testimony Currin challenges in this case. See id. at 1236 (holding a witness’ opinion that “an alleged child victim ‘is not prone to exaggerate or fantasize about sexual matters,’ ․ is an indirect but nonetheless functional equivalent of saying the child is ‘telling the truth’ ” (first quoting Lawrence v. State, 464 N.E.2d 923, 925 (Ind. 1984), overruled by Hoglund, 962 N.E.2d at 1237)). Indeed, in characterizing the scope of Rule 704(b) in child sex abuse cases, “[t]his Court has repeatedly found no Rule 704(b) violation where a witness testified about how child sexual-abuse victims behave in general without making a statement about the specific victim.” Henson v. State, 237 N.E.3d 1160, 1166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (compiling cases and noting “our Supreme Court seemed to endorse this view in” Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 487 n.2 (Ind. 2023), reh'g denied, cert. denied), trans. denied.

[16] Currin claims James’ basic background testimony about her training, experience, and the standard procedures used in forensic interviewing amounted to “[i]mproper vouching for the credibility of D.T.” Appellant's Br. at 29. Yet he has cited no authority—and we have found none—indicating that such testimony is anything other than important foundational information to help the jury understand the context and reliability of the interview process itself.⁶ Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting James’ testimony.

[17] Currin's argument that admission of this testimony violated Rule 403 fails for similar reasons. In relevant part, Rule 403 provides that the trial “court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ․ unfair prejudice ․ [or] misleading the jury ․” Because we disagree with Currin's premise that the challenged testimony had any bearing on D.T.’s credibility, the court did not err in declining to exclude it under Rule 403.

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[18] Lastly, Currin argues there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for Level 1 felony attempted child molesting (Count 1) and Level 1 felony child molesting (Count 4). We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence with deference to the jury's verdict, and we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. Vanbibber v. State, 268 N.E.3d 315, 318 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “We consider only the evidence most favorable to [the conviction] and will affirm ․ unless ‘no reasonable [jury] could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000)).

[19] Currin was convicted of Level 1 felonies for committing and attempting to commit child molesting under Indiana Code section 35-42-4-3(a)(1). In relevant part, the statute provides:

A person who, with a child under fourteen ․ years of age, knowingly or intentionally performs or submits to sexual intercourse ․ commits child molesting, a Level 3 felony. However, the offense is a Level 1 felony if: ․ it is committed by a person at least twenty-one ․ years of age ․

I.C. § 35-42-4-3(a)(1). Under section 35-41-5-1, “[a] person attempts to commit a crime when, acting with the culpability required for commission of the crime, the person engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime.” I.C. § 35-41-5-1(a) (noting “[a]n attempt to commit a crime is a felony or misdemeanor of the same level or class as the crime attempted”). We address Currin's argument related to the effectuated Level 1 child molesting before considering whether sufficient evidence showed he attempted to molest D.T. on another occasion.⁷

A. Child Molesting

[20] Currin argues “there was no testimony proving or supporting an inference that [he] penetrated D.T.’s vagina.” Appellant's Br. at 24. He claims the evidence shows only that he “rubbed his penis on her vagina, and that his penis made contact with her vagina, but it did not go inside.” Id. However, “proof of the ‘slightest penetration’ of the female sex organ, including penetration of the external genitalia, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for child molestation based on sexual intercourse.” Boggs v. State, 104 N.E.3d 1287, 1288 (Ind. 2018) (quoting Spurlock v. State, 675 N.E.2d 312, 315 (Ind. 1996), on reh'g (1997); Dinger v. State, 540 N.E.2d 39, 40 (Ind. 1989)). In Boggs, there was sufficient evidence of penetration where the defendant “put his finger ‘in the folds of [the minor's] vagina’ and touched her clitoris.” Id. (finding the same level of slight penetration applies in cases of child molestation by “other sexual misconduct”) (quoting the record). In Hale v. State, penetration was sufficiently proven by the victim's testimony that the defendant had “touched her vagina with his finger or hand using an ‘up and down’ or ‘circular’ motion that felt like he was ‘trying to find something.’ ” 128 N.E.3d 456, 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting the record), trans. denied.

[21] In this case, D.T. testified at trial that Currin was rubbing his penis on her private part when she regained consciousness. She agreed he was moving his penis “in and out towards [her] vagina” and “up and down on [her] vagina[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 167. Furthermore, she reported to hospital staff that “he tried to force [his penis] all the way in her vagina, but only kept it right against the hole.” Id. at 190. In light of D.T.’s testimony and the evidence showing Currin's DNA was found on D.T.’s external genitalia and in her underwear, a reasonable jury could have found that penetration occurred. See Hale, 128 N.E.3d at 463 (noting it is “physically impossible” to touch a vagina without having first penetrated the vulva, or external genitalia). Currin's arguments to the contrary amount to an impermissible request that we reweigh the evidence.⁸ See Seal v. State, 105 N.E.3d 201, 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (declining to reweigh evidence of penetration), trans. denied. Thus, we affirm Currin's conviction for Level 1 felony child molesting.

B. Attempted Child Molesting

[22] Currin argues his conviction for attempted child molesting cannot stand because the evidence was not sufficient to show he “actually intended intercourse ․” Appellant's Br. at 27 (arguing no substantial step toward intercourse can be inferred because he “just rubb[ed] on the outside of” D.T.’s privates and such conduct did not demonstrate an “intent to engage in intercourse”).

[23] To show Currin committed Level 1 felony attempted child molesting, the State had to prove he knowingly or intentionally took a substantial step toward performing sexual intercourse with D.T. A person acts intentionally if it is his conscious objective to engage in the conduct he's engaged in. I.C. § 35-41-2-2(a). Likewise, “[a] person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). A defendant's mental state “can be established by circumstantial evidence and inferred from [his] conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct reasonably points.” Boling v. State, 982 N.E.2d 1055, 1057 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[24] Here, Currin briefly stopped molesting D.T. when her brother started crying. After he retrieved the baby, Currin laid D.T. back on the ground and resumed rubbing his penis against her privates, though he was not “able to go inside [her] vagina at th[at] time[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 171. After about four minutes, Thompson entered the room and found Currin standing over D.T. with an erect penis. D.T. also had no pants or underwear on. Currin displayed consciousness of guilt when he ran into the closet after he got caught, took Thompson's phone from her as she tried to call the police, and attempted to prevent Thompson from taking D.T. to the hospital. Under these circumstances, the jury had ample evidence to find Currin knowingly or intentionally took a substantial step toward performing sexual intercourse with D.T. the second time he violated her. See Boling, 982 N.E.2d at 1057-58 (holding a jury could reasonably find the defendant took a substantial step toward penetrating the victim's female sex organ when he “touched her ‘front private’ first over her underwear and then under her underwear, directly on her skin”). Currin's argument that if he'd “actually intended intercourse, he would have done something different, something more[,]” is a pure request to reweigh the evidence that we will not oblige. Appellant's Br. at 27.

Conclusion

[25] For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Currin waived any challenge to the belated habitual offender filing, the court did not abuse its discretion in the admission of evidence, and there was sufficient evidence to support Currin's convictions for Level 1 felony child molesting and Level 1 felony attempted child molesting.

[26] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At trial, the DNA analyst testified that while she confirmed male DNA was found on the internal genital and vaginal/cervical swabs she received, the samples she tested from those swabs contained “an insufficient amount of male DNA” to be tested against Currin's DNA. Ex. Vol. 1 at 21; see also Tr. Vol. 3 at 147-49. She explained that such testing requires “a minimum amount of male DNA present ․ to get a result from the sexual assault kit because ․ the female DNA might overwhelm the male DNA ․” Tr. Vol. 2 at 139.

2.   Ind. Code §§ 35-42-4-3(a)(1) (child molesting), 35-41-5-1(a) (attempt).

3.   The additional charges were: Count 3: Child Molesting, as a Level 1 felony; Count 4: Child Molesting, as a Level 1 felony under Indiana Code section 35-42-4-3(a)(1); Count 5: Incest, as a Level 4 felony (which was ultimately dismissed before trial); Count 6: Invasion of Privacy, as a Class A misdemeanor; Count 7: Invasion of Privacy, as a Class A misdemeanor, and a habitual offender enhancement. Currin only specifically appeals the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions of Counts 1 and 4, and the habitual offender enhancement.

4.   The State did not introduce the video of the forensic interview.

5.   The trial court denied Currin's pre-trial motion in limine attempting to exclude such testimony and granted him a continuing objection to such testimony at trial.

6.   For this reason, the information was also relevant under Evidence Rule 401. See Appellant's Br. at 29 (suggesting the forensic interviewer's background testimony was irrelevant and mischaracterizing the test for whether evidence is relevant).

7.   To the extent Currin argues we must review his crimes strictly in accordance with how the State characterized them in its closing arguments, we disagree. Rather than focus on the State's closing arguments to the exclusion of the evidence, “we will consider all of the evidence submitted to the jury in determining whether sufficient evidence support[s] [a defendant's] convictions.” Galateanu v. State, No. 22A-CR-1413, at *4 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. June 8, 2023) (mem.).

8.   Currin makes much of the fact that Thompson admitted to law enforcement and at trial that some information she gave the hospital staff was false. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 214 (Thompson admitting she didn't see Currin masturbating or touching D.T.’s genitalia in contravention of what she told hospital staff). She thought she needed to allege she saw a sexual assault occur to have a sexual assault kit done. Currin also seizes on the fact that D.T. agreed at trial that Currin “was not actively penetrating ․ [or] inside of [her]” when she regained consciousness. Id. at 179-80. But these discrepancies are of no consequence on appeal given the definition of penetration, the other testimony at trial, and our standard of review. See Young v. State, 198 N.E.3d 1172, 1176 (Ind. 2022) (noting it is the jury's role, not the appellate court's, to resolve conflicts in the evidence).

DeBoer, Judge.

Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.