IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of E.B. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] E.B. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to I.B. and G.D. (“the Children”). Mother raises the following restated issues for our review:

I. Whether there was sufficient evidence supporting certain findings; and

II. Whether the trial court's judgment that Mother's parental rights should be terminated was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

[2] Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mother is the biological mother of G.D., born February 6, 2012, and I.B., born July 16, 2017.¹ In 2017, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) first became involved with Mother and the Children. Family case manager Jamie Quire (“FCM Quire”) went to do an assessment at Mother's home on 18th Street in Wayne County and ended up removing the Children due to the conditions of the home. The home was “very cluttered” and severely infested with cockroaches; space heaters were positioned too close to bedding, and Mother was not practicing “safe sleeping practice[s]” with I.B., who was an infant at the time. Tr. Vol. II p. 53. The case was resolved when the father of G.D. moved back to Indiana to help clean up Mother's home.

[4] On January 24, 2024, DCS received a report from the Children's school alleging neglect of the Children because they were observed with bedbugs on them and due to behavioral issues of the Children. In investigating this report, FCM Quire went to Mother's home, which was the same address from the 2017 investigation, and observed the conditions of the home, which was in “really, really, really poor condition.” Id. at 54. Animal feces was present, there was “barely even a pathway to walk through[,]” a “pungent smell” was noticeable as soon as you entered, and the home was filled with trash, debris, and “pure filth.” Id. at 54, 60. FCM Quire had safety concerns for the Children living in the home due to the unsanitariness and the presence of roaches and bedbugs. When FCM Quire spoke with Mother about the need to clean up the home and that the conditions were not acceptable, Mother became argumentative and did not want to “take responsibility” for the condition of the home. Id. at 55. At that time, Mother lived with her mother (“Grandmother”) and her stepfather (“Step-Grandfather”). FCM Quire told Mother that she needed to clean up the house and that she would return to check on the progress.

[5] FCM Quire returned to the home, and over the course of several days, the “home did not get better” and, in fact, “got worse.” Id. at 62. On this return trip, FCM Quire observed dead mice in a bucket inside the home. FCM Quire was accompanied by a representative of the Wayne County Health Department, who issued an abatement letter, which stated that the conditions of the home needed to be addressed as they were in violation of the health code.

[6] Therefore, on February 1, 2024, DCS removed the Children from Mother's home based on the conditions of the home, Mother's refusal to take responsibility for those conditions, concerns for Mother's mental health, and concerns for the Children's mental health and behavioral issues, which DCS believed necessitated “mental health treatment and care.” Id. The Children were placed in foster care at that time. At the time of removal, G.D. was eleven years old, and I.B. was seven years old.

[7] On the same date, DCS filed petitions alleging that the Children were children in need of services (“CHINS”). Sometime after the Children were removed in early 2024, FCM Quire conducted an additional assessment regarding allegations that Step-Grandfather had sexually abused I.B. Mother denied the allegations, but FCM Quire substantiated the allegations. On March 13, 2024, Mother entered an admission to the CHINS petitions including that her home was not suitable for the Children to live in, that she needed case management and homemaking skills, and that she needed financial assistance from DCS. On April 4, 2024, a dispositional hearing was held, and the trial court ordered Mother to, among other things, maintain a home suitable for the Children that had “adequate bedding, functioning utilities, a way to safely store and prepare food, and an adequate supply of food to feed the people living in the home,” including the Children; maintain a legal and stable source of income sufficient to support all household members including the Children; complete a parenting assessment and psychological evaluation and successfully complete all recommendations from each assessment; and attend all scheduled visitations with the Children. Ex. Vol. I pp. 184–85. The trial court also ordered Mother to “[p]articipate in case management services with the goal of obtaining and maintaining long-term housing, stable income, and transportation” and to participate in parenting education. Id. at 185.

[8] On February 20, 2025, DCS filed petitions to terminate Mother's parental rights to the Children. The trial court held the termination fact-finding hearing on May 15 and May 22, 2025. At the time of the hearing, the Children had been under the supervision of DCS for over fifteen months, and the Children had been in the same placement for all of that time except for a few days directly after removal.

[9] At the hearing, FCM Jessica Strayer (“FCM Strayer”), who took over the case in February 2024 after FCM Quire, testified. In her initial assessment, she understood that the primary concern was the condition of Mother's home, which was the same home from which the Children had been removed and where she lived with Grandmother and Step-Grandfather. FCM Strayer went to the home when she took over the case and observed dog feces on the floor and large amounts of debris and clutter throughout the home, with the home having a “very foul odor[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 176. She did a second walkthrough of the home with a representative of the Wayne County Health Department, at which time the home was still very cluttered, and mouse droppings were observed.

[10] In October 2024, Mother moved to a different address with only Grandmother. When Mother moved into this home, problems continued with the condition of that home. The home was very cluttered with trash bags covering the floor and limiting accessibility. In December 2024, DCS had a pest control company assess Mother's home, and the company representative observed roaches, bedbugs, and mice droppings. The company representative told Mother that the home needed to be decluttered before they could begin the pest control services. However, the company was never contacted to begin the services. FCM Strayer took multiples pictures of the home on three different occasions, the fall of 2024, one week before the termination hearing, and one day before the hearing. Although some progress was made prior to the termination hearing, FCM Strayer testified that there were still bedbugs, dog feces, cockroaches, and mice present in the home when she went one week before the hearing.

[11] FCM Strayer also testified regarding the referrals that she put in for Mother, which included parenting education, home-based casework, individual therapy, and supervised visitation. FCM Strayer stated that the supervised visitations with the Children were therapeutic as there were concerns with Mother's parenting skills. In June 2024, FCM Strayer received a report that Step- Grandfather had sexually abused G.D. Mother denied the allegations, but after a forensic interview of G.D., DCS substantiated the allegations.

[12] Jessica Morgan (“Morgan”), Mother's home-based case worker, testified that she was referred by DCS to work with Mother in September 2024. She worked weekly with Mother on parenting skills, budgeting, housing, and employment. They held their first appointment at Mother's home, and Morgan observed things piled up in the house, dogs in cages with their feces, dishes in the sink, and a lot of clutter that made it difficult to move in the home. After the first appointment, they met at a different location. Morgan testified that their first goals were to get the home clean, learn budgeting, and get the utility bills under control. However, Mother had not completed the goals at the time of the hearing and made excuses to Morgan and blamed others for this failure. Out of the thirty-three sessions set up by Morgan, Mother only attended thirteen.

[13] Morgan organized a group of other employees from her agency to assist in cleaning Mother's home. However, when they arrived, they found bedbugs and had to leave the home. Morgan gave Mother information on how to remove the clutter so that the bedbug situation could be taken care of, but when she went to check on the house a day before the hearing, there was a little progress, but the home was still cluttered and presented a safety risk for the Children. The dogs were in their kennels with “days of feces[,]” and the smell of urine “was pretty bad.” Id. at 153. Morgan testified that, at the time of the hearing, she was still working on the same goals with Mother that they had worked on since September 2024, and Mother had not yet met those goals.

[14] Dr. Daniel Westmoreland (“Dr. Westmoreland”) was a clinical psychologist who performed a psychological evaluation on Mother in May 2024 at the request of DCS. Mother disclosed to Dr. Westmoreland that she experienced manic episodes, depression, anxiety, symptoms of borderline personality disorder, and auditory hallucinations. The cognitive examination and achievement tests revealed that Mother performed adequately in verbal comprehension and processing speed and minimally adequately in mathematic computation. Mother was in the “lower limits of low[/]average range” for perceptual reasoning and in the “lower limits of borderline range” for working memory. Id. at 46. At the hearing, Dr. Westmoreland testified that his “diagnostic impression” of Mother after the evaluation was “borderline intellectual functioning, bipolar [I] ․ disorder with psychotic features, and borderline personality disorder.” Id. at 44. His treatment recommendations were to engage in therapy using evidence-based practices, including dialectical behavioral therapy, cognitive behavioral therapy, a psychiatric evaluation for possible medication, therapeutic parenting education, and home-based case management to support her through the DCS process. Mother disclosed having suffered trauma, so Dr. Westmoreland also recommended that her therapies be “trauma-informed.” Id. at 44. He recommended Mother participate in therapeutic parenting education with her visits so she could be educated on how to parent during her visitation.

[15] In June 2024, Mother began therapy with Kaitlyn Marlow (“Marlow”). Marlow testified that, when she started her sessions with Mother, she set goals with Mother of gaining coping skills, setting healthier boundaries with Grandmother, and getting the Children back. Marlow testified that Mother attended her appointments consistently and was engaged but only showed small progress with small goals. Marlow testified that larger goals were “more unmanageable” for her to attain. Id. at 161. Marlow stated that Mother needed to be more “internally motivated[,]” which had not happened at the time of the hearing. Id.

[16] One of the reasons that the Children were removed from Mother's care was concern for their mental health due to behaviors at school. Kayln Boyd (“Boyd”), who had been G.D.’s teacher before placement in foster care, testified. At that time, the Children attended a school that had a lot of students with behavioral disorders. Boyd taught G.D. in class but had interactions with I.B. as well. She noticed that G.D. was very unclean when he came to school, smelled of urine, and had bedbugs visible on his body. He exhibited odd behaviors, pretending he was a cat and hissing at people, which was “very distracting in class[.]” Id. at 89. He would often throw temper tantrums, which required additional staff assistance, and he had failing grades. Boyd testified that I.B. appeared cleaner than G.D., but her hair was always matted, and she had a bad temper and would curse at people. Boyd also testified that, when G.D. was having a bad day, they would “often call” Mother, but “a lot of times [she could not] come.” Id. at 93. Julie Cline (“Cline”), I.B's teaching assistant prior to removal, also testified. I.B. was not always clean when she went to school and “had a smell to her.” Id. at 97. She used profanity often, would scream if someone got close to her, and did not want to do her schoolwork. I.B. would have to often spend time in time out, and on one occasion, she took her boots off, and a dead mouse was found inside one of the boots.

[17] Marquetta Stokes (“Stokes”), Mother's parenting education provider, testified that she performed a parenting assessment with Mother in February 2024. After the assessment, Stokes recommended that Mother participate in parenting education to help identify new parenting skills to employ, bonding attachment, and to maintain safety with the Children. She also recommended assistance in case management, life skills, and home services and for Mother to continue therapy. Stokes virtually observed one of Mother's visitations with the Children and noticed that Mother struggled with disciplining the Children and setting boundaries. She interacted with I.B. more and gave G.D. an electronic device to keep him occupied.

[18] Mother consistently attended her visits with the Children, which were scheduled for two hours once a week. The first two visits took place in the community, but because of issues with discipline and Mother discussing inappropriate topics, the visits were then moved to an office setting. In the beginning, Grandmother attended all the visits and did most of the disciplining of the Children; however, it was later decided that Grandmother would only attend one visit a month. Mother continued to struggle with discipline and correcting the behavior challenges displayed by the Children. After one specific visit where Mother and G.D. engaged in a conversation and G.D. became very upset, he threatened to kill himself. At the time of the hearing, Mother's visits with the Children were therapeutic based on Dr. Westmoreland's recommendation. The therapeutic visitation supervisor had to assist Mother in setting boundaries for the Children during her visits. The supervisor attempted to assist Mother and teach her how to redirect the Children in ways that were compatible with Mother's mental health diagnoses. Mother made some progress in her visitation with the Children, but the supervisor stated that, at the time of the hearing, there was no recommendation to change the level of visitation from therapeutic supervised visitation.

[19] At the time of hearing, Children had been in the same foster placement (“Foster Parents”) since February 2024. When the Children were first placed with Foster Parents, G.D. was “very rebellious[,]” was not receptive to the rules of the house, and would hit and bully I.B. Id. at 220. He was also very defiant at school and would throw tantrums when asked to do something by his teacher. I.B. struggled with personal boundaries and struggled to keep “her hands, mouth, spit, and teeth to herself[.]” Id. at 221. She also threw tantrums at school and was very disrespectful. When the Children first arrived at the home of Foster Parents, G.D. refused to take a shower, and I.B. struggled with potty training. Both of the Children also had multiple cavities and poor oral hygiene when they came to live with Foster Parents.

[20] At the time of the hearing, G.D. was a straight A student, his behavior had greatly improved at school and home, and he had developed good habits regarding his schoolwork. I.B. still struggled with potty training, but her behavior at school had greatly improved. Prior to being placed with Foster Parents, I.B. had failed Kindergarten three times, but at the time of the hearing she had graduated to the first grade. The Children participated in many family activities with Foster Parents and their children, and Foster Parents planned to adopt the Children if termination occurred.

[21] Karen Bowen, the Children's court appointed special advocate, (“CASA Bowen”) testified that she had seen a dramatic change in the behaviors of the Children since they have been removed from Mother's care and have been with Foster Parents. G.D. was very proud of being a straight A student and liked the Foster Parents’ home because it is clean. I.B. told CASA Bowen that she feels safe in the home of Foster Parents. CASA Bowen testified that, over the course of the case, Mother was never able to progress past one visit per week with the Children and that when CASA Bowen spoke with Mother just prior to the hearing, Mother reported that she still had mice, roaches, and bedbugs at her house. She further testified that, as to the allegations of sexual abuse of the Children, the allegation had been substantiated, but Mother still denied that it had occurred, which caused CASA Bowen to believe that Mother would not keep the Children safe. CASA Bowen believed that termination was in the Children's best interests to allow them to continue to thrive and keep growing in the atmosphere they were in.

[22] FCM Strayer testified that, at the time of the hearing, DCS could not place the Children back with Mother because of the home conditions, Mother's lack of progress in parenting skills, and the substantiated allegations of sexual abuse involving Step-Grandfather, especially because Mother stated that it was her plan if the Children were returned to her care, that she would move to West Virginia with Grandmother, Step-Grandfather, and the Children. FCM Strayer testified that the Children had made drastic improvements in their behavior issues. She believed that termination was in the Children's best interests.

[23] At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement. On August 7, 2025, the trial court issued its order terminating Mother's parental rights to the Children. The trial court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of Mother will not be remedied, that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the Children's well-being, that termination was in the Children's best interest, and that DCS had a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the Children, which was adoption. The trial court concluded that Mother had not demonstrated that she could keep a safe place for the Children and that, despite assistance and sufficient time, she had not cleaned up her home to make it safe and sanitary for the Children. It further determined that the Children had thrived since being placed outside of the home, and Mother appeared unable to comprehend the safety risks of the home conditions and had been unable to correct and maintain a safe environment for the Children. Additionally, the trial court found that, despite the resources provided to Mother by DCS, over the course of fifteen months, she had not shown any recognizable progress. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[24] While the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of a parent to establish a home and raise their children, the law allows for the termination of parental rights based on a parent's inability or unwillingness to meet parental responsibilities. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005); In re D.P., 994 N.E.2d 1228, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Thus, parental rights are subordinated to the child's interests in resolving a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. In re. J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parent but to protect the child. In re D.P., 994 N.E.2d at 1231. Termination of parental rights is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The trial court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

[25] As our Supreme Court has observed, “[d]ecisions to terminate parental rights are among the most difficult our trial courts are called upon to make. They are also among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great deference to the trial courts ․” E.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). In evaluating the trial court's findings and conclusions in an order terminating parental rights, we review only for clear error, and we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d 75, 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “A judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the trial court's conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment.” Id. If the evidence and reasonable inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

I. Findings Supported by the Evidence

[26] Initially, Mother asserts that several of the trial court's findings were not supported by the evidence presented at the hearing. A finding is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or reasonable inferences drawn therefrom which support it. Stewart v. Randolph Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 804 N.E.2d 1207, 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Even erroneous findings are not reversible error if they are harmless. See, e.g., In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“We may reverse a trial court's judgment ․ only if its findings constitute prejudicial error ․ A finding of fact is not prejudicial to a party unless it directly supports a conclusion.”), trans. denied. An erroneous finding is “merely harmless surplusage” when the unchallenged findings “provide ample support for the trial court's ultimate conclusion.” Id.

[27] Mother first challenges the inclusion of Findings 1–31 in the trial court's order. These findings dealt with the removal of the Children, the underlying CHINS case, and the hearings that occurred in the underlying CHINS case. See Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 22–25. During the hearing, Mother objected to the admission of several exhibits that were documents from the underlying CHINS case, arguing that the substantive findings in the CHINS exhibits should not be relied upon because of the lower burden of proof in CHINS proceedings and inapplicability of the rules of evidence. The trial court admitted the exhibits over the objection but stated that the court would not “accept them as facts, because these facts were found by a preponderance of the evidence, and not clear and convincing.” Tr. Vol. III p. 25. Mother, therefore, argues that the trial court's inclusion of Findings 1–31 was erroneous.

[28] Most of Findings 1–31 were procedural background findings relating to the removal of the Children, the filing of the CHINS petition and Mother's admission to the allegations in the petition, the dispositional hearing and the services that Mother was ordered to comply with, and the subsequent review hearings in the CHINS case. Therefore, the vast majority of Findings 1–31 were included to provide procedural background and were not included in the order as substantive evidence to support the termination judgment. We, therefore, do not conclude that the inclusion of Findings 1–31 was erroneous. To the extent that Mother argues that specific findings (Findings 3, 4, 22, 24, and 28) within that range of findings were not supported by the evidence presented at the hearing, we do not find the inclusion of those specified findings to be prejudicial because the trial court's conclusions were amply supported by the over 300 other findings included in the order. We, therefore, decline to reverse the trial court's judgment based on those specific findings.

[29] Mother also challenges several additional findings by the trial court. As to Finding 125, which stated, “Mother never followed up with Black[,]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 28, who was the pest control representative sent by DCS to assess Mother's home for pest eradication, she contends that the evidence did not support that Mother was the party who was responsible for contacting the pest control company; instead, she asserts that the evidence established that DCS was the party who failed to follow up with the company.

[30] Regarding the pest control company's interaction with Mother, the evidence demonstrated that DCS had the company assess Mother's home in December 2024, and after the company representative observed roaches, bedbugs, and mice droppings, he told Mother that the home needed to be decluttered before they could begin the pest control services. However, the company was never contacted by either Mother or DCS to begin the services, and the representative testified that he had no further dealings with Mother after the initial assessment. Although the evidence was not clear who was responsible for following up with the pest control company, the evidence did support that neither Mother nor DCS reached back out to the company. Furthermore, there was no indication that Mother decluttered the home at any point in anticipation of pest control services. Sufficient evidence supported this finding.

[31] Mother next challenges Finding 140, which stated that the Children's school “would call Mother to get [the Children] due to their behavior often but Mother couldn't come to pick them up.” Id. at 29. Mother argues that insufficient evidence supported this finding because the testimony only supported that the school would reach out to Mother regarding G.D's behavior and not I.B.’s and that the evidence did not support that Mother was asked to pick G.D. up from school or that she was unwilling to do so. While Mother is correct that the testimony regarding the school's calls to Mother only pertained to G.D. and not I.B., the evidence did support that the school would “often call” Mother, but “[a] lot of times [she] couldn't come.” Tr. Vol. II p. 93. Thus, the evidence supported the majority of Finding 140, and to the extent that it did not, we do not find it to be prejudicial error.

[32] Mother further argues that the evidence did not support Findings 238 and 248, which stated that Morgan, Mother's home-based case worker, had not seen or observed any progress from Mother during the time that Morgan worked with Mother, which was from September 2024 to the time of the hearing. Mother contends that, although Morgan did testify that there had “been no progress” regarding the goals she set with Morgan, she also testified that there had “been a little progress made in the home” as of the day before the hearing. Id. at 153, 154. As Mother concedes, when Morgan was asked how she would characterize Mother's progress on the goals set, Morgan stated there had been no progress. The evidence supported Findings 238 and 248.

II. Sufficient Evidence for Judgment

[33] Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's decision terminating her parental rights to the Children. Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, the State must allege and prove:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c). As stated above, a petition must allege the existence of one or more of the circumstances contained in subsection (d). Here, the pertinent alleged circumstances were:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(3), (4). The State's burden of proof for establishing these allegations is one of clear and convincing evidence. In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Moreover, “if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a) (emphasis added).

[34] Mother argues that there was insufficient evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the removal of the Children and the reasons for placement outside of the home would not be remedied. In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to a child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, a court engages in a two-step analysis. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). First, the court must determine what conditions led to the child's placement and retention in foster care, and second, the court must determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id. In the second step, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions and balancing a parent's recent improvements against “ ‘habitual pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.’ ” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). Under this rule, “[trial] courts have properly considered evidence of a parent's prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment.” In re D.B., 942 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

[35] In addition, DCS need not provide evidence ruling out all possibilities of change; rather, it must establish only that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change. In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of Kay L., 867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). “We entrust th[e] delicate balance to the trial court, which has [the] discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. When determining whether the conditions resulting in removal would be remedied, the trial court may consider the parent's response to the offers of help from DCS or the service providers. D.B., 942 N.E.2d at 873.

[36] Mother asserts that, although her progress was slow, she was making progress to address the conditions. She contends that, over the course of the case, she moved to different housing since the Children were removed and that she was making progress on her home conditions and had passed a health department inspection in July 2024. Mother also claims that she was regularly attending visitations, with her parenting skills progressing and that she was working with her therapist and taking her medications.

[37] The Children were removed from Mother's care based on the conditions of the home, Mother's refusal to take responsibility for those conditions, concerns for Mother's mental health, and concerns for the Children's mental health and behavioral issues. The Children were placed in foster care at that time and remained in the same foster placement for almost the entire length of the case. At the time of removal, G.D. was eleven years old, and I.B. was seven years old, and approximately seventeen months elapsed from the date of removal until the last day of the termination hearing.

[38] The Children remained out of Mother's care because the initial reasons for removal were never remedied and because Mother demonstrated either an unwillingness or an inability to respond appropriately to the Children's reports of sexual abuse. Over the course of the seventeen-month life of the case, Mother continuously showed an inability to clean her home and rid it of dangerous conditions that could prove harmful to the Children.

[39] At the time of removal, the conditions of Mother's home were poor with animal feces present, barely a pathway through the home, a “pungent smell” that was readily noticeable as soon as you entered, and trash and debris filling the home. Tr. Vol. II p. 60. DCS had safety concerns for the Children living in the home due to the unsanitary conditions and the presence of roaches, bedbugs, and mice. Initially, when FCM Quire spoke with Mother about the need to clean up the home, Mother was argumentative and denied responsibility for the condition of the home. The conditions of the home were so bad that the health department issued an abatement letter stating that the conditions of the home were in violation of the health code. Over the course of the case, Mother failed to show an ability or a willingness to remedy the conditions of her home. Even after moving to a new home in October 2024, the conditions of that home quickly deteriorated and that home also became infested with mice, cockroaches, and bedbugs. Mother was never able to clean up enough of the clutter for an exterminator to remediate these infestations. DCS visited Mother's home a week before and a day before the hearing, and the conditions of her home had not significantly improved. The home remained cluttered and unsanitary and was a safety risk for the Children.

[40] Mother also had not shown that she was able to parent the Children effectively and implement the parenting skills necessary to do so. Before their removal, G.D. had behavior issues and would end up in time out every day at school. He had failing grades, would pretend that he was a cat, and would curse at his teacher. I.B. was very angry and would scream and hit other students and curse at others. After being removed and being placed in a structured and clean home environment, the Children's behaviors improved. G.D.’s grades greatly improved, he no longer defied his teachers, and at home, he was happy and loving. I.B. had finally graduated to first grade, her behavior changed drastically, and she no longer had behavioral issues at school. However, the evidence demonstrated that Mother remained unable to effectively parent the Children during visitation. Based on Dr. Westmoreland's recommendation, Mother's visits with the Children were therapeutic, and the visitations supervisor testified that she had to assist in setting boundaries for the Children during visits. Although the supervisor attempted to teach Mother how to redirect the Children, at the time of the hearing, Mother still struggled to enforce boundaries with the Children and there was no recommendation to change the level of visitation from therapeutic supervised visitation.

[41] Further, during the pendency of the case, allegations of sexual abuse against Step-Grandfather concerning both of the Children came to light, and DCS substantiated both allegations. However, Mother denied the veracity of the allegations, which was concerning, especially in light of the fact that Mother stated that it was her intention, if the Children were returned to her care, to move to West Virginia with Grandmother, Step-Grandfather, and the Children. DCS therefore could not place the Children back with Mother based on the home conditions, Mother's lack of progress in parenting skills, and the substantiated allegations of sexual abuse involving Step-Grandfather.

[42] At the time of the termination hearing, Mother had not remedied any of DCS's concerns that resulted in removal. The evidence presented established that, over the course of the case, Mother was unable to demonstrate that she was able to safely parent the Children, meet the Children's needs, and provide the Children with a safe and sanitary home. Over the course of the case, she had not met any of the goals set for her, and even the day before the hearing, her home was still not in a condition where it would be safe for the Children to live there. Sufficient evidence was presented to support the trial court's conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions which resulted in Child's removal and continued placement outside the home would not be remedied.

[43] Mother also argues that there was insufficient evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being of the Children. However, we need not address this argument because of the disjunctive nature of the subsection (d) as we have concluded that clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's determination that the conditions for the Children's removal and continued placement outside of the home would not be remedied.

Conclusion

[44] We, therefore, conclude that the evidence supported the challenged findings, and to the extent that the findings were erroneous, the error was harmless. We further conclude that the trial court did not err in its judgment terminating Mother's parental rights to the Children.

[45] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   J.B., the biological father of I.B., signed a voluntary relinquishment of his parental rights, and M.D., the father of G.D., had his parental rights terminated in the same proceedings as Mother. However, neither participates in this appeal.

Foley, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.