Jeremy G. Miller, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Pioneer Hi-Bred and Elwood Staffing, Appellees-Defendants. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Jeremy G. Miller appeals from the decision of the Full Worker's Compensation Board (the Board) affirming the Single Hearing Member's (the Member) Order which denied Miller's Application for Adjustment of Claim against Pioneer Hi-Bred. Miller argues that the Board erred in denying his right to benefits, raising the following issues for our review, which we reorder and restate:

I. Whether any public policy considerations warrant a reversal of the Board's decision.

II. Whether Miller met his burden of proving that he suffered an occupational disease that rendered him disabled;

III. Whether the Indiana Occupational Disease Act's statute of repose bars Miller's claim; and

IV. Whether the Board correctly determined that Miller was not owed any statutory benefits.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 1

[2] Miller was employed by Elwood Staffing in 2011. Through that employment, Miller was assigned to temporarily work at Pioneer Hi-Bred from June through November 2011.

[3] Miller filed an Application for Adjustment of Claim on December 27, 2022, alleging a claim under Indiana's Occupational Disease Act (IODA) because of exposure to Roundup products during his work for Pioneer. He alleged that he was not given personal protection equipment (PPE) to protect him from exposure to Roundup products being used and created in the facility. Miller named Pioneer as the Defendant/Employer. In his Application, Miller indicated that the last date of exposure was November 14, 2011. He was diagnosed with cancer in November 2012.

[4] Miller notified Pioneer of his cancer diagnosis on February 2, 2022, nearly ten years after his diagnosis and eleven years after the last date of exposure, when he filed suit against Pioneer. Pioneer filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Miller's Application was not timely filed pursuant to Indiana Code sections 22-3-7-32(a), (c) (limitation of actions) and -9(f) (no compensation unless disablement occurs within two years after last day of exposure).

[5] Sometime in October 2024, Elwood was joined as a defendant upon Pioneer's motion pursuant to Indiana Code section 22-3-7-33 (1985) (joint employers). Elwood was notified of Miller's Application and his cancer diagnosis on September 3, 2024, when it was notified that it was being joined as a party. On April 11, 2025, Elwood filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Miller's Application was not timely filed, citing the same statutes as Pioneer.

[6] On May 6, 2025, the parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts, Exhibits, and Issues. The parties stipulated that the following issues should be determined by the Member: (1) whether Miller's claim is time-barred by the IODA's statute of repose; (2) if Miller's claim is not time-barred, whether Miller met his burden of proof; and (3) whether Miller is owed any statutory benefits and if so, by whom. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 9. The Member held a hearing and took the matter under advisement.

[7] The Member issued his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and award on May 21, 2025. The Member found and concluded that Miller had not met his burden of proving that he was entitled to benefits under the IODA, that Miller's claim was time-barred under the IODA's statute of repose, and that neither Pioneer nor Elwood were responsible for providing Miller with any benefits under the Indiana Worker's Compensation Act (WCA).

[8] On May 29, 2025, Miller filed an application for review by the Full Board. On August 25, the Full Board reviewed Miller's Application. All parties presented arguments, and the matter was taken under advisement. On October 10, the Full Board issued its award, affirming the Member's findings, conclusions, and award issued on May 21. Miller now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Standards of Review

[9] “In reviewing a worker's compensation decision, an appellate court is bound by the factual determinations of the Board and may not disturb them unless the evidence is undisputed and leads inescapably to a contrary conclusion.” Christopher R. Brown, D.D.S., Inc. v. Decatur Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 892 N.E.2d 642, 646 (Ind. 2008) (citing Eads v. Perry Twp. Fire Dep't, 817 N.E.2d 263, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied). “ ‘We examine the record only to determine whether there is substantial evidence and reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom to support the Worker's Compensation Board's findings and conclusion.’ ” Senter v. Foremost Fabricators, 137 N.E.3d 1027, 1031 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Wright Tree Serv. v. Hernandez, 907 N.E.2d 183, 186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied). So long as there is at least some evidence supporting the Board's decision, “[t]he Board will only be reversed if it incorrectly interpreted the [WCA].” Christopher R. Brown, D.D.S., Inc., 892 N.E.2d at 646. In other words: “ ‘A negative award may be sustained by an absence of evidence favorable to the claimant's contentions or by the presence of evidence adverse to the claimant's contentions.’ ” Smith v. Bob Evans Farms, Inc., 754 N.E.2d 18, 23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Starks v. Nat'l Serv All, Inc., 634 N.E.2d 88, 91 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)), trans. denied.

[10] “We employ a two-tiered standard of review in evaluating the Board's decision.” Young v. Marling, 900 N.E.2d 30, 34 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Wholesalers, Inc. v. Hobson, 874 N.E.2d 622, 627 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). “We first review the record to determine if there is any competent evidence of probative value to support the Board's findings. Next, we examine the findings to see if they are sufficient to support the decision.” Id. “We will not reweigh the evidence or assess witness credibility, and we will consider only the evidence most favorable to the [decision], including any and all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom.” Wholesalers, 874 N.E.2d at 627. Moreover, “[w]e accept unchallenged factual findings as true.” Z.C. v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 213 N.E.3d 1101, 1106 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). “While we do not owe this same measure of deference to the Board's legal conclusions, we will disturb the Board's conclusions only if it incorrectly interpreted the WCA.” Gonalez v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 881 N.E.2d 19, 23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[11] The WCA mandates that “[e]very employer and every employee ․ pay and accept compensation for personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment[.]” Ind. Code § 22-3-2-2(a). The WCA states that the “burden of proof is on the employee” and the “proof by the employee of an element of a claim does not create a presumption in favor of the employee with regard to another element of the claim.” Id.

I. Public Policy Concerns Do Not Warrant Relief Based on Entry of Joint Stipulation Among the Parties

[12] Miller argues that the Board's decision is flawed and should be reversed because he, as a pro se litigant, “was misled on what the document was by Appellee.” Appellant's Br. p. 5. He contends he “did not have time to understand the [stipulation] agreement before signing.” Id. He claims “that these Findings are the result of a stipulation agreement that undermined Appellant and the Court in this matter.” Id. He additionally argues that “[t]here was no ‘meeting of the minds.’ ” Id. Furthermore, he suggests that “there was no proper allocution by the court to properly explain the terms and make sure that the stipulations were understood by the Pro Se Appellant.” Id. And he contends that he will draft a motion requesting that the stipulation agreement be deemed void. Id.

[13] Miller chose to proceed pro se on appeal as well as before the Member and the Board. “It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). “This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Id. at 983-84. “We will not become an advocate for a party, or address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.” Id. at 984. “A litigant is not given special consideration by virtue of his pro se status.” Kelley v. State, 166 N.E.3d 936, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).

[14] Here, Miller has not shown us that he asked the Member or the Board for an explanation of the implications of entering into the Joint Stipulation with Pioneer and Elwood. Even if he had asked, the Member and the Board, who act as impartial decision makers, may not offer legal advice to parties. By litigating his claim pro se, Miller must face the consequences of his decision. And Miller does not argue that he requested, but was denied, additional time in which to review the document to better understand it before signing it. We conclude that no public policy concerns warrant granting Miller relief from his decision to sign the Joint Stipulation while proceeding pro se.

II. Evidence of Disability Under the IODA

[15] For this issue, Miller contends the Board erred by concluding that he had not met his burden of establishing a direct causal connection between the conditions of his employment with Pioneer and Elwood and his cancer diagnosis proving that his diagnosis is an occupational disease. He also challenges the Board's finding that he did not produce any credible, probative or relevant evidence to prove that his cancer diagnoses gradually developed from and are directly causally connected with the conditions of his employment with Pioneer and Elwood. He also claims the Board erred by concluding that he failed to show that his contraction of an occupational disease rendered him disabled.

[16] Miller, as the employee/claimant, bore the burden of proving his claim. Ind. Code § 22-3-7-2(a) (2006). He had to prove: (1) that he suffered a qualifying occupational disease—one arising out of and in the course of employment with a direct causal connection to workplace conditions—and (2) that he suffered disablement, meaning an inability to earn full wages at his last work or equal wages in other suitable employment. See Ind. Code §§ 22-3-7-10(a) (occupational disease); (b) (direct causal connection between work conditions and occupational disease) (1988); 22-3-7-9(e) (definition of disablement) (2023). Furthermore, Miller had to prove the disability by providing competent evidence, “of which there are or have been objective conditions or symptoms proven, not within the physical or mental control of the employee.” Ind. Code § 22-3-7-16(v) (2023).

[17] Here, the record reveals that Miller provided evidence of his cancer diagnoses, but he did not provide competent, objective evidence that his exposure to Roundup while employed by Pioneer through Elwood caused his cancer and subsequent alleged disablement. Consequently, we agree with the Board's conclusion that Miller has not met his burden of establishing that he suffered a qualifying occupational disease arising out of and in the course of employment with a direct causal connection to workplace conditions or that he suffered disablement, meaning an inability to earn full wages at his last work or equal wages in other suitable employment.

III. Statute of Repose, Statute of Limitations, and the Discovery Rule

[18] Miller challenges the Board's conclusion that his Application is time-barred by the statute of repose. He appears to argue that the statute of repose is unconstitutional as applied to his claim because he did not discover the alleged connection between his exposure to Roundup and his cancer diagnosis until after the statute of repose barred his claim. Based on this premise, he argues that the Board's decision should be reversed.

[19] “[I]t is important to note that this case involves analysis of a statute found within the Occupational Diseases Act, an act that is part of our state's worker's compensation scheme.” Gray v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 821 N.E.2d 431, 434-35 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). “The Occupational Diseases Act, Indiana Code chapter 22-3-7, introduced more than twenty years after the Worker's Compensation Act, was enacted by our General Assembly in order to protect employees by providing compensation, without regard to fault, for those who contracted occupational diseases which were generally not covered under the Worker's Compensation Act.” Id. at 435. “Therefore, as with provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act, provisions of the Occupational Diseases Act should be liberally construed in favor of the employee to effectuate the act's humanitarian purpose to provide injured workers with an expeditious and adequate remedy.” Id.

[20] In Stytle v. Angola Die Casting Co., 806 N.E.2d 339, 342 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied, we stated that Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f) is “a statute of repose, rather than a statute of limitation.” A statute of repose “is designed to bar actions after a specified period of time has run from the occurrence of some event other than the injury which gave rise to the claim.” Kissel v. Rosenbaum, 579 N.E.2d 1322, 1326 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). In distinguishing between a statute of limitation and a statute of repose, we have stated, “[a] statute of limitation extinguishes a remedy while a statute of repose may bar a cause of action even before it arises.” Id.

[21] Here, the challenge is to Indiana Code sections 22-3-7-32(a), (c), and -9(f). Indiana Code sections 22-3-7-32(a) and (c) (2007) provide that:

No proceedings for compensation under this chapter shall be maintained unless notice has been given to the employer of disablement arising from an occupational disease as soon as practicable after the date of disablement. No defect or inaccuracy of such notices shall be a bar to compensation unless the employer proves that he is unduly prejudiced in such proceedings by such defect or inaccuracy.

* * *

No proceedings by an employee for compensation under this chapter shall be maintained unless claim for compensation shall be filed by the employee with the worker's compensation board within two (2) years after the date of the disablement.

And Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f) (2023) provides in pertinent part that:

For the purposes of this chapter, no compensation shall be payable for or on account of any occupational diseases unless disablement, as defined in subsection (e), occurs within two (2) years after the last day of the last exposure to the hazards of the disease ․ [except for cases of occupational diseases not applicable here].

[22] To the extent that Miller's argument is a challenge based on constitutional grounds under Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f), his argument fails. In Bunker v. National Gypsum Company, our Supreme Court found that the IODA's statute of repose did not violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions, upholding the then three-year-from-exposure statutory timeframe in which to bring a claim. 441 N.E.2d 8, 13-14 (Ind. 1982). The Court flatly rejected the application of the discovery rule to circumvent the statute of repose's timeframe, except in cases carved out by the legislature, concluding that to do otherwise would subvert “the legislative intent to provide a definitive time period within which all occupational disease claims must be brought.” Id. at 13.

[23] In Woodworth v. Lilly Industrial Coatings, Inc., our Supreme Court upheld the IODA's two-year statute of repose for claims where the claim was filed more than three years after the claimant's last day of exposure, citing Bunker for the statute of repose's constitutionality. 446 N.E.2d 646, 648 (Ind. 1983). Furthermore, in Gray, we noted that the result was harsh but held that the IODA's statute of repose did not violate article 1, section 23, Indiana's privileges and immunities clause. 821 N.E.2d at 441. And in Stytle, we rejected a constitutional challenge to the statute of repose brought under article 1, section 12 of the Indiana Constitution, the Open Courts Clause, concluding that the two-year time-frame was not so manifestly insufficient that it represented a denial of justice. 806 N.E.2d at 345.

[24] In sum, “the Occupational Diseases Act only protects those workers who come within its provisions.” Gray, 821 N.E.2d at 440. And short of legislatively-crafted statutory exceptions to the IODA's statute of repose, while “recogniz[ing] that this result is harsh,” we must conclude that a constitutional challenge to Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f) must fail.

[25] Miller also claims that Indiana Code subsections 22-3-7-32(a) and (c)’s timeframe of two years to notify the employer of an injury is “unfair, unjust, and unconstitutional” because the causal link between Roundup exposures and cancer in some people was not known until after the statutory timeframe had expired. Appellant's Br. p. 13. Unlike, Indiana Code section 22-3-7-9(f), these subsections are statutes of limitation because subsection (a) requires notice “to the employer of disablement as soon as practicable after the date of disablement” and subsection (c) provides that no proceedings shall be maintained “unless [the] claim shall be filed by the employee with the worker's compensation board within two (2) years after the date of disablement.” Ind. Code § 22-3-7-32(a) and (c).

[26] Here, as discussed above, Miller did not meet his burden of providing competent, objective evidence that he contracted a qualifying occupational disease resulting in disablement while he was employed by Pioneer through Elwood. Assuming for the sake of argument that his 2012 diagnosis would qualify as a disablement, Miller waited until 2022 to provide notice to Pioneer and until 2024 to provide notice to Elwood. Thus, Miller's remedy was extinguished by the statute of limitation for bringing his claim.

[27] As for the constitutionality of those provisions, Miller's argument is that the statutory timeframe should not apply to his claim because of his delayed discovery of the alleged connection between his cancer diagnoses and his alleged exposure to Roundup while working for Pioneer. However, Miller has not identified which Indiana constitutional provision these subsections allegedly violate. Nevertheless, when a statute's constitutionality is challenged, the statute stands “ ‘clothed with the presumption of constitutionality until clearly overcome by a contrary showing.’ ” Dvorak v. City of Bloomington, 796 N.E.2d 236, 238 (Ind. 2003) (quoting Boehm v. Town of St. John, 675 N.E.2d 318, 321 (Ind. 1996)). Miller has not overcome the presumption of constitutionality. Therefore, we conclude the Board did not err.

IV. Propriety of Denial of Benefits

[28] Miller's final challenge is to the propriety of the Board's denial of his claim for benefits. However, based upon our review of the Member's order, which was upheld by the Board, and our discussion above, we conclude that the Board properly determined that Miller was not entitled to statutory benefits. He did not meet his burden of establishing that he suffered a qualifying occupational disease arising out of and with a direct causal relationship to workplace conditions that resulted in disablement. The Board could not award statutory benefits absent this evidence.

Conclusion

[29] Miller is not entitled to relief on public policy grounds from his decision as a pro se litigant to enter into a Joint Stipulation with Elwood and Pioneer. The Board did not err in concluding that Miller's claim was barred by the statute of repose. Miller's constitutional challenges to the statutes of repose and limitation are unavailing. Miller did not meet his burden of establishing, by competent, objective evidence, that he suffered a qualifying occupational disease resulting in disablement. And the Board did not err by denying him statutory benefits.

[30] Affirmed.

Robb, Senior Judge.

Felix, J., and DeBoer, J., concur