IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of L.R. and W.R. (Minor Children) and D.R. (Father) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] D.R. (“Father”) appeals the Vanderburgh Superior Court's order terminating his parental rights to his children, L.R. and W.R. Father raises two arguments:

1. Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied Father's motion to continue the factfinding hearing, and,

2. Whether the court's order terminating Father's parental rights is supported by clear and convincing evidence.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In February 2024, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed petitions alleging that nine-year old L.R. and twenty-two-month-old W.R. (collectively “Children”) were Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”). As to Father, the petitions alleged that his whereabouts were unknown and that he “has a history of narcotic possession and domestic violence against” A.M. (“Mother”).¹ Appellee's App. Vol. 2, p. 29, Vol. 3, p. 29. DCS filed amended petitions alleging that the Children were CHINS on March 26, 2024. The petitions stated that Father had been arrested two weeks prior for possession of a narcotic drug and that he was incarcerated in the Vanderburgh County Jail. Appellee's App. Vol. 2, p. 71, Vol. 3, p. 72. The juvenile court adjudicated the Children as CHINS on April 3, 2024.

[4] Father refused to appear for the CHINS dispositional hearing. Appellee's App. Vol. 2, p. 108. In its dispositional order, the court ordered Father to participate in numerous services, including a substance abuse assessment, random drug screens, to maintain a stable home and income, and to participate in visitation with the Children.

[5] After Father was released from incarceration, the only service he participated in was some visitation with Children. However, he also missed two scheduled visitations, and the visitation supervisor had to remove Children from another visit due to Father's behavior. Father also failed to appear at a permanency hearing and failed to participate in three team meetings that were scheduled between June 17, 2025 and July 28, 2025. In addition, Father's criminal history dates back to 2005 and includes convictions related to narcotics use, domestic battery, and resisting law enforcement.

[6] DCS filed petitions to terminate Father's parental rights to Children on July 3, 2025. Father failed to appear for an initial hearing but he was present at a later pretrial hearing, and the court informed him that the fact-finding hearing was set for October 16. Father failed to appear for the fact-finding hearing. Father's counsel informed the court that Father was unable to arrange transportation to the court and requested a continuance. After noting Father's history of failing to attend hearings and his noncompliance with services, the juvenile court denied the motion.

[7] The court then held a factfinding hearing and heard limited testimony from the family case manager. The court also took judicial notice of the underlying CHINS proceedings. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 39. The court orally granted DCS's motion to default Father ² and issued written orders terminating Father's parental rights to the Children. The orders include the following pertinent findings of fact and conclusions of law:

4. On or about February 15, 2024, [Children], Mother [and] Father became involved with the DCS when the DCS investigated a report that Mother got into a physical altercation with oldest child resulting in injuries to the child that required medical attention. When DCS made contact with Mother she submitted to a drug screen that was positive for THC, methamphetamine, and amphetamine.

The whereabouts of Father were unknown at this time. Father has failed to provide for [Children's] basic needs and has a history of narcotic possession and domestic violence against [Mother].

9. On March 26, 2024, the CHINS Court issued a dispositional order following a hearing on the matter. The following are found as facts from the dispositional order issued by the CHINS court, for the purposes of this termination proceeding:

[Father] will:

Obtain a Substance Abuse and Mental Health Evaluation and follow any treatment recommendations.

Participate in Therapeutic, Supervised, or Monitored visitation services.

Participate in services or programs available while the individual is incarcerated which may improve parenting skills or relationship with the child.

Comply with the FCM and remain in contact with DCS.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 75-76, 93-94. The court also found that Father was not present for two review hearings in the underlying CHINS proceedings and that he was not compliant with DCS. Id. at 76-77, 94-95. Finally, the court concluded that DCS had established by clear and convincing evidence the elements required to terminate Father's parental rights including that termination of his parental rights was in the Children's best interests. Id. at 78-79, 96-97.

[8] Father now appeals.

The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Father's motion to continue the factfinding hearing.

[9] Father claims that the juvenile court abused its discretion and violated his due process rights by denying his request to continue the factfinding hearing. “Generally speaking, a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to continue is subject to abuse of discretion review.” In re K.W., 12 N.E.3d 241, 243-44 (Ind. 2014) (citing Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 841 N.E.2d 615, 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)). When a trial court denies a party's motion for a continuance, there is a strong presumption that the trial court properly exercised its discretion. In re N.K., 249 N.E.3d 607, 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024); see also Trial Rule 7(D) (governing motions for continuances). However, “no abuse of discretion will be found when the moving party has not demonstrated that he or she was prejudiced by the denial.’ ” K.W., 12 N.E.3d at 244 (quoting Rowlett, 841 N.E.2d at 619).

[10] Father repeatedly failed to appear for hearings in these proceedings and in the underlying CHINS proceedings. However, Father was present at a pretrial hearing on September 17, 2025, and the court informed him that the factfinding hearing would be held on October 16. When it objected to Father's motion to continue, DCS noted that Father knew his presence was required at the hearing and that he had received a ten-day letter advising him to appear for the hearing. Father had sufficient time to arrange for transportation to the factfinding hearing but did not do so. Moreover, the court was not required to believe Father's stated reason for failing to appear particularly in light of his history of failing to appear for hearings and his noncompliance with DCS.

[11] Father also argues that his due process rights were violated but he has waived this claim because he failed to raise his alleged due process violation to the juvenile court. See McBride v. Monroe Cty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (explaining that a party waives a constitutional claim, including a claim that his due process rights were violated, by raising it for the first time on appeal). Waiver notwithstanding, we observe that “the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by” our courts. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). Father did not have an “absolute constitutional right ․ to be present at a termination hearing.” See K.W., 12 N.E.3d at 248 (citing C.G., 954 N.E.2d at 921). He did have “the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Id. at 249 (quoting Tillotson v. Clay Cnty. Dep't of Fam. & Child., 777 N.E.2d 741, 745 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied).

[12] In termination proceedings, a party's due process rights typically are not violated when a court proceeds with the factfinding hearing in the party's absence so long as the party was represented by counsel at that hearing and counsel was able to make argument and cross-examine witnesses. In re C.C., 170 N.E.3d 669, 677 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citation omitted). Counsel's representation of the absent parent's interests at the factfinding hearing “vastly reduce[s] the risk of error,” making the risk of error “minimal.” Id. Here, Father was represented by counsel, who was also the same attorney who represented him during the CHINS proceedings, and counsel cross-examined the family case manager who testified at the factfinding hearing.

[13] Finally, Father observes that he was not offered the opportunity to appear telephonically. However, he did not make that request to the juvenile court. Even if the court had allowed Father to appear via telephone or video, Father cannot establish that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different in light of his continued criminal activity during the CHINS proceedings and his failure to participate in services. While Father participated in visitation with the Children during these proceedings, he failed to take any steps to address his substance abuse issues or improve his parenting skills. For these reasons, Father cannot establish that he was prejudiced when the court denied his motion to continue the factfinding hearing.³

[14] For all of these reasons, we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Father's motion to continue the factfinding hearing.

The juvenile court's order terminating Father's parental rights is supported by clear and convincing evidence.

[15] Indiana appellate courts have long adhered to a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1230-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). In analyzing the juvenile court's decision, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Id. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the court's judgment. Id. In deference to the juvenile court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.

[16] To determine whether a termination decision is clearly erroneous, we apply a two-tiered standard of review to the juvenile court's findings of facts and conclusions of law. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings; second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. If the evidence and inferences support the court's termination decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.

[17] It is well-settled that the parent-child relationship is one of society's most cherished relationships. See, e.g., In re A.G., 45 N.E.3d 471, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Indiana law thus sets a high bar to sever that relationship. Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS is required to prove that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(3) (2024).

[18] In addition, DCS was required to prove the existence of one or more of the following circumstances relevant here:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(3) to (4). Clear and convincing evidence need not establish that the continued custody of a parent is wholly inadequate for a child's very survival. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 148. It is instead sufficient to show that the child's emotional and physical development are put at risk by the parent's custody. Id. If the court finds the allegations in a petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a).

[19] Here, the juvenile court found that DCS proved both subsections 31-35-2-4(d)(3) and (d)(4), and Father argues that neither finding is supported by clear and convincing evidence.⁴ Because DCS was required to prove one but not both of those circumstances, we only consider Father's argument regarding subsection 31-35-2-4(d)(3). Consideration of this argument involves a two-step analysis: first, identifying the conditions that led to removal, and second, determining whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will be remedied. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014). In the second step, the juvenile court determines a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions; in other words, the court must balance a parent's recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. In conducting its analysis, the juvenile court may also consider the reasons for the child's continued placement outside the home. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[20] Father claims the court “failed to consider any progress Father had made since the Children's removal.” Appellant's Br. at 15. When the Children were removed from Mother's care in February 2024, Father's whereabouts were unknown. A few weeks later, Father was arrested for possession of a narcotic drug. Father's criminal history includes convictions for narcotics-related offenses, resisting law enforcement, domestic battery, and neglect of a dependent. Children's older sibling reported to DCS that Father had used cocaine and fentanyl and that Father had committed domestic violence against herself and Mother.

[21] Father failed to participate in services, including drug screens and treatment related to his narcotics use. He also failed to complete the mental health evaluation and he was unemployed. Father failed to appear for hearings in these proceedings and the underlying CHINS proceedings and failed to participate in child and family team meetings. The only service Father participated in was visitation with Children. There was no evidence that Father has made any progress in addressing his use of narcotics and his history of domestic violence, or in improving his parenting skills. This evidence supports the juvenile court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to Children's removal and their continued placement outside Father's home will not be remedied.

[22] Father also argues that DCS failed to prove that termination of his parental rights was in Children's best interests. To determine if termination is in the best interests of a child, the trial court “must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019) (citing In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied). A central interest is a child's need for permanency. Id. (citing In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009)). “Indeed, ‘children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.’ ” Id. (quoting E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648). “A parent's historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability and supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.” Castro v. State Off. of Fam. & Child., 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied.

[23] There is no evidence in the record from which we could conclude that Father was ever significantly involved in Children's lives or in caring for Children. Father argues that termination of his parental rights is not in Children's best interests because he has been participating in visitation and should be given more time to engage in services. But Father's failure to participate in any other services and failure to attend child and family team meetings and court hearings established that he was not able to provide Children with the stability that they need and deserve. In addition, the family case manager testified that termination of Father's parental rights was in Children's best interests. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 40. For all of these reasons, we conclude that DCS presented clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father's parental rights was in Children's best interests.

Conclusion

[24] The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Father's motion to continue the factfinding hearing. In addition, Father has not persuaded us that the juvenile court erred when it terminated his parental rights to the Children.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother also had substance abuse issues, and DCS alleged that she had been physically violent with her oldest child, S.M. Mother eventually voluntarily terminated her parental rights to L.R. and W.R. and consented to their adoption. She does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Although the court stated that Father was in default, see Tr. Vol. 2, p. 41, the court heard the family case manager's testimony, Father cross-examined the case manager, and the court took judicial notice of the underlying CHINS proceedings. The court also issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. Therefore, the trial court incorrectly labeled its judgment as a “default” against Father.

3.   In his brief, Father does not present any argument that he was prejudiced by the court's denial of his motion to continue the factfinding hearing. As we noted above, a party must establish how he was prejudiced by the denial of a motion to continue to prevail on appeal. K.W., 12 N.E.3d at 244. In addition, Father directs our attention to the standard for reviewing due process claims but does not apply that test to the facts of his case to argue that he was denied due process. Although we could agree with the State that Father waived his challenge to the denial of his motion to continue because he failed to make cogent arguments in his Appellant's Brief, we address his arguments on the merits given the significant interests at stake.

4.   Father also challenges two findings of facts in his brief and argues that they are not supported by the evidence. One finding contains an inaccurate date for Father's dispositional hearing and that is simply a scrivener's error. The other challenged finding states that Father was not compliant with DCS. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 77, 95. Father argues that this finding is not supported by the evidence because he participated in visitation with his children. Contrary to Father's claim, the finding is supported by Father's failure to participate in any other services ordered in the CHINS and termination proceedings.

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Felix, J., concur.