WHITE v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Demond J. White (“White”) was convicted after a jury trial of dealing in methamphetamine ¹ as a Level 2 felony and was adjudicated as a habitual offender.² The trial court imposed a twenty-four-year sentence for his conviction for dealing in methamphetamine, which was enhanced by sixteen years for being a habitual offender, resulting in an aggregate forty-year sentence. White appeals, challenging his sentence and arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to find a proffered mitigating factor. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In January 2021, a detective with the Madison County Sheriff's Department Drug Task Force worked with a confidential informant (“the CI”) and identified White as a suspect from whom she could purchase methamphetamine. The detective and the CI set up a controlled buy in which the CI would purchase a half of an ounce of methamphetamine for $300 from White. Wearing a recording device, the CI went to White's apartment and completed the purchase of the methamphetamine. After the transaction, the CI confirmed that White was the person who sold her the drugs. The drugs were sent to the Indiana State Police Laboratory for testing and weighing. Tests confirmed that the drugs sold by White were methamphetamine and that the weight was 13.93 grams.

[3] On May 26, 2022, the State charged White with Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine and filed a notice of intent to file a habitual offender enhancement. On April 25, 2024, the State filed its motion to amend the charging information by adding the habitual offender enhancement, and the trial court granted the motion the next day. The case proceeded to a jury trial held on May 19 and 20, 2025, at the conclusion of which the jury found White guilty of Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine and found him to be a habitual offender.

[4] A sentencing hearing was held on June 23, 2025. White argued that the trial court should consider that incarceration would create a hardship for White's son as a mitigating factor. The trial court found White's criminal history to be an aggravating factor and declined to find any mitigating factors. The trial court reasoned that “any [Department of Correction] commitment always creates a hardship” but that the test is whether there “is an undue hardship.” Tr. Vol. III p. 53 (emphasis added). The trial court further stated that the evidence revealed that White's son did not physically live with him and that an aunt was taking care of the son, which did not constitute an “undue hardship.” Id. (emphasis added). The trial court proceeded to sentence White to twenty-four years for his Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine conviction, enhanced by sixteen years for the habitual offender finding, which resulted in an aggregate sentence of forty years executed. White now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[5] White argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him. The trial court has discretion in determining aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See generally Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). We review sentencing decisions for an abuse of that discretion. Id. The trial court abuses its discretion by failing to enter a sentencing statement that includes a “reasonably detailed recitation of the ․ reasons for imposing a particular sentence.” Id. If the sentencing statement “includes a finding of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, then the statement must identify all significant mitigating and aggravating circumstances and explain why each circumstance has been determined to be mitigating or aggravating.” Id. “[T]he reasons given, and the omission of reasons arguably supported by the record, are reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion.” Id. at 491.

[6] White asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to consider his proffered mitigating factor of the impact of incarceration on his child. Under Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.1(b), the trial court may consider as a mitigating factor that “[i]mprisonment of the person will result in undue hardship to the person or the dependents of the person.” Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(10). When the defendant claims “the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor,” the defendant must “establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493. However, “[i]f the trial court does not find the existence of a mitigating factor after it has been argued by counsel, the trial court is not obligated to explain why it has found that the factor does not exist.” Id. (quoting Fugate v. State, 608 N.E.2d 1370, 1374 (Ind. 1993)).

[7] Here, after finding White's criminal history to be an aggravating factor, the trial court stated that it found no mitigating factors. During sentencing, White proffered the hardship to his child that incarceration would cause as a mitigating factor. The presentence report (“PSI”) contained evidence that White had a four-year-old child, and the child's mother had been murdered in 2024. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 143. The PSI also stated that White “reported he ha[d] not had contact with his child in approximately one ․ month since leaving him with his Aunt.” Id. Although White proffered the hardship to his child that incarceration would cause, the trial court was not obligated to find such as a mitigating factor. In its pronouncement of sentence, the trial court specifically found that incarceration always creates a hardship but that the test is whether it causes undue hardship, and here, White did not prove an undue hardship because testimony established that the son was not living with White on a daily basis and the PSI established that the child was being taken care of by an aunt. The trial court was within its discretion to determine that the evidence presented did not establish that White's incarceration would result in an undue hardship to White's child such that it constituted a mitigating factor. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing White.

[8] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(1), (e)(1).

2.   I.C. § 35-50-2-8.

Foley, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.