COLLETT v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Paul Collett performed oral sex on his step-granddaughter, I.C., and repeatedly fondled her beginning when she was approximately six years old and continuing into her teen years. A jury convicted him of child molesting as both Level 1 and Level 4 felonies, and the trial court imposed a 30-year sentence. Collett appeals only his Level 4 felony conviction, contending that the State failed to prove he acted with the requisite intent to arouse or satisfy sexual desires because he was physically incapable of arousal. Because the nature of the touching is itself sufficient to establish the intent to arouse or satisfy sexual desires, we affirm.

Facts

[2] Collett's step-granddaughter, I.C., was born in January 2009. When I.C. was around six or seven years old, she was at Collett's home when Collett entered the bedroom where she was playing video games. He lay on top of her and ground his pelvis against her body. During the following years, the conduct escalated. He kissed her on the lips and with his tongue. He repeatedly put his hand inside her shirt and touched her chest. He pulled her pants down, or put his hands inside them, and touched her vagina with his fingers. He also commented on her developing body.

[3] On one occasion, Collett removed I.C.’s nightgown and underwear, lifted her legs, and licked her vagina with his mouth and tongue. When she laughed because it “tickled,” he told her that he would continue the oral sex if she would stop laughing. Tr. Vol. II, p. 141. But when Collett heard I.C.’s mother arrive by car to drop off I.C.’s siblings, Collett immediately stopped.

[4] Throughout these years of abuse, Collett told I.C. that if she revealed the molestations, “people would hate [her] and nobody would love [her] and that [her] family would fall apart.” Id. at 145. He also told her that no one would buy her things as he had.

[5] By the time she was in fourth grade, I.C. understood that Collett's acts were wrong, but she remained too afraid to speak. She did not disclose the abuse until the spring of her eighth-grade year, when she confided in her friend. Although I.C. had told her friend not to share the information with anyone else, the friend reported I.C.’s molestation to a school counselor, who then contacted authorities. An Indiana Department of Child Services investigator spoke to the family, contacted police, and arranged an immediate forensic interview of I.C. During a later police interview, Collett admitted “touching” I.C. and indicated that he would tell her that he was “sorry [he] done what [he] done.” State's Exhibit 2, 10:24:15-30. Collett did not specify the “touching” or when it occurred.

[6] At trial, Collett testified in his own defense. He was 70 years old, suffered from Parkinson's disease, was legally blind and nearly deaf, and had diabetes and high blood pressure. He had undergone surgical removal of his prostate for cancer in 2007. He testified that he could not recall the last time he was aroused and that he had not had sex in approximately 12 years. I.C.’s grandmother, who immediately divorced Collett after learning of the molestations, earlier had testified that Collett and she last had sex 12 years ago. She also testified that, to the best of her knowledge, Collett had not been aroused since then.

[7] But Collett testified he had never touched I.C. inside her clothing. He claimed that he only may have accidentally touched her upper leg near her genital area when removing her from a moped.

[8] The jury found Collett guilty of Level 1 felony child molesting based on his performance of oral sex on I.C., as well as Level 4 felony child molesting based on his touching and/or fondling of I.C. The trial court sentenced him to terms of imprisonment of 30 years for the Level 1 conviction and 10 years for the Level 4 conviction, to be served concurrently, with ten years suspended to probation. Collett appeals only his Level 4 conviction based on his fondling of I.C.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Collett contends the State failed to prove he fondled I.C. with the intent to arouse or satisfy his or I.C.’s sexual desires. Collett is merely asking us to reweigh the evidence on appeal in contravention of our standard of review.

[10] We leave to the factfinder the task of weighing evidence and judging witness credibility. Washington v. State, 274 N.E.3d 196, 198 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). On appeal, “[w]e consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such evidence.” Id. We affirm a conviction if there is substantial evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[11] To convict Collett of Level 4 felony child molesting as charged, the State was required to prove he fondled or touched I.C. with the intent to arouse or satisfy his or I.C.’s sexual desires when she was less than 14 years old. See App. Vol. II, p. 8; Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(b). Proof of mere touching is not enough to prove child molesting based on alleged fondling. Rodriguez v. State, 868 N.E.2d 551, 553 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). “The State must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the act of touching was accompanied by the specific intent to arouse or satisfy sexual desires.” Id.

[12] “ ‘A defendant's intent may be proven by circumstantial evidence alone, and knowledge and intent may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of each case.’ ” Albrecht v. State, 185 N.E.3d 412, 422 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Chastain v. State, 58 N.E.3d 235, 240 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). Indeed, our courts have long held that the intentional touching of a child's genital area is circumstantial evidence establishing the intent element. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 868 N.E.2d at 553-54 (ruling that defendant's repeated touching of child victim's “privates” and offer of $3 to take off all her clothes sufficiently proved intent to arouse or satisfy sexual desires).

[13] Collett touched I.C.’s vagina and chest repeatedly over several years and made lewd comments about I.C.’s body. That conduct alone is sufficient to establish intent. See id. Collett nevertheless advances two arguments for why such evidence is insufficient here. Neither is persuasive.

[14] First, he argues that he was physically incapable of arousal and the jury therefore could not find he acted with the intent to arouse or satisfy his own sexual desires. Collett assumes he proved his physical inability to be aroused, but his evidence on the matter was far from conclusive. The evidence showed Collett's prostate had been removed, but Collett failed to offer any evidence linking the removal of his prostate to an inability to be aroused. Although Collett claims his ex-wife—I.C.’s grandmother—confirmed his impotence, her testimony did not go that far.

[15] She testified that his prostate had been surgically removed and that after the surgery about 12 years ago, he began sleeping alone on their couch based on his complaints of back pain. She testified that they stopped having sex 12 years ago and, to her knowledge, Collett had not been aroused since then. This testimony, viewed most favorably to the verdict, merely confirms Collett's prostate removal and that she never knew him to be aroused after the surgery when they had no sexual relationship.

[16] In any case, Collett conflates the ability to experience arousal with the intent to cause it. The child molesting statute requires only that Collett act with the requisite intent, not that he achieve any particular physical result. See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(b). “Intent is a mental function and so, absent an admission, it ‘can be inferred from a defendant's conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct logically and reasonably points.’ ” Heuring v. State, 140 N.E.3d 270, 275 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195-96 (Ind. 2018)). As intent is a mental function, not a physical one, the jury was free to infer that intent from Collett's conduct, regardless of his physical condition. Id.

[17] Collett repeated the sexual abuse over the span of years, with his sexual behavior escalating over time. He sought out moments of relative privacy with I.C. and warned I.C. that her family would fall apart if she told anyone of the molestations. That conduct indicates that he knew he was acting with an inappropriate purpose.

[18] In his second, but related, argument that proof of touching was insufficient to establish his requisite intent, Collett points to the lack of evidence that I.C.’s sexual desires were aroused or satisfied. But the child molesting statute does not require such proof. Instead, the statute requires that Collett intended “to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the older person.” Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(b) (emphasis added). Contrary to Collett's argument, the State need not prove the result—that is, the actual arousal of the child or the older person; it needed only to prove his intent to do so. In addition, the State's proof beyond a reasonable doubt of Collett's intent to arouse or satisfy his own sexual desires negated the need for the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt his intent to arouse or satisfy I.C.’s sexual desires and vice versa. See id.

[19] The jury heard all the evidence, including Collett's testimony about his medical conditions, his alleged physical inability to be aroused, and his denial that he ever fondled I.C. The jury credited I.C.’s account and rejected Collett's. We will not disturb that determination by reweighing the evidence. See Washington, 274 N.E.3d at 198 (noting that evidence reweighing is not part of appellate review). As the evidence was sufficient to support Collett's conviction for Level 4 felony child molesting, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Weissmann, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Foley, J., concur.