Ernest Lamont Turner, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Ernest Lamont Turner appeals the trial court's revocation of his probation and the accompanying sanction, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in (1) admitting certain evidence during the revocation hearing, (2) determining he violated probation, and (3) in issuing its sanction. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2012, Turner's fifteen-year-old daughter reported to police that Turner had been having sex with her since she was thirteen. The State charged Turner with a variety of offenses, and he later pled guilty to Class B felony child molesting, Class C felony sexual misconduct with a minor, and Class B felony incest. The trial court sentenced Turner to twenty years, with twelve years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC) and eight years suspended to probation. As conditions of probation, Turner was ordered to, among other things, not commit new criminal offenses, keep the probation department informed of his address, inform the probation department of any address changes with seventy-two hours, register as a sex offender, and refrain from contact with “any child under the age of 18 ․ includ[ing] [his] own biological children.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 80.

[3] In August 2023, the State filed a probation violation notice alleging Turner had been charged with two new criminal offenses—Class A misdemeanor operating a motor vehicle without ever receiving a license and Class B misdemeanor false informing. A hearing was held in September and the court found Turner had violated probation but imposed no sanction. Later that month, the State filed another probation violation alleging Turner had contact with one of his minor daughters. In October, Turner admitted to violating probation and the court again imposed no sanction.

[4] Approximately a year later, Charles Peters, who owned the home Turner had been residing in, reported to the sex offender registry administrator that Turner no longer lived at his registered address. On November 5, 2024, Officer William Jackson of the Madison County Sheriff's Department went to the residence to investigate and Turner was not there. On November 20, Officer Jackson met with Turner at a local hospital, and Turner admitted he had not lived at his registered address since November 2 and had not updated his address within seventy-two hours as required. See Ex. 3 at 2:05-3:25. Also that day, Turner's four-year-old son visited him in the hospital. Because Turner was no longer living at his registered address, the State charged him with Level 6 felony failure to register as a sex offender. See Cause No. 48C04-2411-F6-003488 (Cause No. 3488).¹

[5] In early 2025, Officer Jackson began investigating a tip that Turner had an unregistered Facebook account through which he was contacting minors. Officer Jackson found a Facebook account for a “Jo Taylor” that he believed belonged to Turner based on photos associated with the account. Tr. Vol. I p. 142. Officer Jackson obtained a search warrant and requested information regarding the account. The account had previous usernames of “Eric Turner” and “Ernest Turner.” Id. at 144. Officer Jackson found messages from the account to Turner's children's social media accounts, several of which identify the sender as “dad” or “pops[.]” Ex. Vol. I pp. 33, 55. In May 2025, based on Turner's “unregistered social media account” the State charged him with Level 6 felony failure to register as a sex offender. Tr. Vol. I p. 135; see Cause No. 48C04-2505-F6-001528 (Cause No. 1528).²

[6] In July 2025, the State filed a corrected notice of violation of probation alleging the following violations: (1) Turner was charged with Level 6 felony failure to register under Cause No. 3488; (2) he had contact with his four-year-old son on November 20, 2024; (3) he was charged with Level 6 felony failure to register under Cause No. 1528; and (4) ongoing contact with minor children.

[7] At the violation hearing, the State introduced evidence regarding Peters’ reports to law enforcement. Over Turner's objection, the court admitted the evidence. The State also introduced photos and messages from the “Jo Taylor” Facebook account. Over Turner's objection, the court admitted the evidence, finding “it was given ․ by a corporate entity in response to a ․ search warrant, and collected by [a] law enforcement officer in response to that, [and] that the content of it matches up both to the defendant's name and to the names of his children.” Tr. Vol. I p. 40.

[8] Following the hearing, the court found Turner violated the conditions of his probation as alleged. The court revoked Turner's probation and sanctioned him to the entirety of his eight-year suspended sentence, to be served in the DOC. Turner now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Admission of Evidence

[9] Turner first argues the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence. We review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence in a probation revocation proceeding for abuse of discretion. Votra v. State, 121 N.E.3d 1108, 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). We will reverse only where the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.

[10] “It is well settled that probationers are not entitled to the full array of constitutional rights afforded defendants at trial.” Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999). While a probation revocation hearing has certain due process requirements, it is not to be equated with an adversarial criminal proceeding. Id. at 549-50. “Rather, it is a narrow inquiry, and its procedures are to be more flexible.” Id. at 550. This flexibility is necessary to permit the court to exercise its inherent power to enforce obedience to its lawful orders. Id. And, because of this flexibility, strict rules of evidence do not apply in probation revocation hearings. Id.; see also Ind. Evidence Rule 101(d)(2) (providing that rules of evidence do not apply in proceedings relating to probation). Therefore, in probation revocation hearings, judges may consider any relevant evidence bearing some substantial indicia of reliability, and this includes reliable hearsay. Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 551.

[11] Turner challenges the admission of the photos and messages from the Facebook account. Specifically, Turner argues the State failed to provide sufficient evidence showing the account was “authentic,” and therefore the court erred in admitting messages and photos from the account. Appellant's Br. p. 23. But the information gained from Officer Jackson's search warrant showed the account was associated with Turner's name and contained photos of him. More importantly, the contents of messages on the account strongly suggest Turner was the sender—one message refers to him as “Ernest” and messages between the account and Turner's children's accounts refer to him as “dad” and “pops.” See Ex. Vol. I pp. 24, 27, 30. In the context of a probation revocation, this is sufficient indicia of reliability to show Turner utilized the Facebook account. See Jones v. State, 250 N.E.3d 1062, 1083 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (Facebook messages had indicia of reliability in part due to its contents and the recipients), trans. denied. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.³

II. Revocation

[12] A probation revocation proceeding is civil in nature, and therefore, the State must prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Smith v. State, 727 N.E.2d 763, 765 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). When the sufficiency of evidence is at issue, “we use the same standard as in any other sufficiency question[,]” id., and consider only the evidence “most favorable to the judgment without reweighing that evidence or judging the credibility of the witnesses[,]” Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 639 (Ind. 2008). We will affirm a probation revocation “[i]f there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's decision that a defendant has violated any terms of probation[.]” Id. at 639-40. When the State alleges a probation violation based on a new offense, it must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the offense. Jackson v. State, 6 N.E.3d 1040, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

[13] Turner argues the evidence is insufficient to show he violated probation by committing the new offenses. As to Cause No. 3488, the State charged Turner with Level 6 felony failure to register as a sex offender for failure to register his address. Officer Jackson testified that he visited Turner's address in November 2024 and Turner was not at the residence. In addition, the State presented body-worn camera footage of Turner's interview with Officer Jackson, in which Turner admits he moved out of the residence on November 2, 2024, and did not update his address within the required seventy-two hours. See Ex. 3 at 2:05-3:25. The State showed by a preponderance of the evidence that Turner committed the new offense by failing to register his address and thus violated probation.

[14] As to Cause No. 1528, the State charged Turner with failure to register as a sex offender for having an unregistered social media account. The State presented evidence that the Facebook account “Jo Taylor” had a previous username of “Ernest Turner” and the account contained photos of Turner. Messages on the account suggested Turner was using it to communicate, including messages that referred to “Ernest” and messages to his children's accounts referring to him as “dad” and “pops.” Given this evidence, the State showed by a preponderance of the evidence that Turner committed the new offense by having an unregistered social media account and thus violated probation.⁴

III. Sanction

[15] Turner also challenges the trial court's decision to impose the eight-year sentence as a sanction for violating the terms of his probation. Probation is a matter of grace and a conditional liberty that is a favor, not a right. Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 549. Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(h) (2015) offers the trial court the following options when it finds a defendant has violated the terms of his probation: (1) “[c]ontinue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions[,]” (2) “[e]xtend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period[,]” or (3) “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” We review a trial court's selection of a sanction for an abuse of discretion. Overstreet v. State, 136 N.E.3d 260, 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.

[16] Turner argues the trial court abused its discretion in imposing an executed sanction in light of his serious health issues. We disagree. While on probation, Turner first violated probation by committing new criminal offenses, and later by having contact with a minor child. In both of these instances, the trial court imposed no sanction. Despite this leniency, Turner went on to violate probation again by twice committing Level 6 felony failure to register as a sex offender. In proving one of these cases, the State showed evidence Turner was using an unregistered social media account to contact his children. This conduct is particularly troubling given Turner's underlying offense involved him having sex with his thirteen-year-old daughter. Given his repeated violations, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the eight-year sentence.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In January 2026, Turner pled guilty and was sentenced to serve eighteen months in the DOC

2.   In January 2026, Turner pled guilty and was sentenced to serve eighteen months in the DOC, to be served consecutively to Cause. No. 3488.

3.   Turner also challenges the admission of Peters’ statements to law enforcement that Turner no longer lived at his registered address. But even if this evidence were erroneously admitted, Turner later admitted to Officer Jackson that he moved out of his registered address on November 2, 2024, and did not notify law enforcement within the required seventy-two hours. See Ex. 3 at 2:05-3:25. We therefore cannot say that any potential error in the admission of this evidence warrants reversal. See Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A)(“No error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the trial court or by any of the parties is ground for granting relief or reversal on appeal where its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.”).

4.   Turner also argues the evidence is insufficient to show he violated probation by having contact with minors, including his four-year-old son. But the above violations regarding his new criminal offenses alone are sufficient to revoke Turner's probation. See Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(a)(1) (2015). As such, we need not address these issues.

Scheele, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.