Deborah K. Bolinger, Appellant-Respondent v. Steven L. Hibler, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following the dissolution of marriage between Deborah K. Bolinger (Wife) and Steven L. Hibler (Husband), the trial court divided the marital estate unequally, effecting about a 74/26 split in favor of Husband. Wife contends that the trial court abused its discretion in this regard and failed to accurately apply the law to support deviation from the statutory presumption that an equal division of marital property is just and reasonable.

[2] We reverse and remand with instructions.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] Husband and Wife had been married for seventeen years when Husband filed for dissolution of marriage on September 23, 2022.¹ At that time, their daughter, A.M.H., was sixteen years old. Wife had moved out of the marital residence in June 2022 and relocated, with A.M.H., from Greencastle to West Lafayette into a rental apartment.

[4] During most of their marriage, Wife was a homemaker. In addition to caring for and homeschooling A.M.H., Wife helped raise Husband's children from his previous marriage that ended in 2004. Husband, as a law enforcement officer and a member of the United States Army National Guard/Reserves (USANG), was often away from home during the first half of their marriage.

[5] In 2012, Husband retired from the Indiana State Police (ISP) after nearly thirty years of law enforcement service. He began receiving his ISP pension of $3039 per month in August 2012, and he and Wife elected an irrevocable survivor benefit for Wife at that time, which will pay out $1482 per month if Husband, who is ten years older, predeceases Wife. The present value of the ISP pension is $613,563, and the present value of the ISP survivor benefit is $110,692. About 24% of Husband's years of service with the ISP accrued during the marriage.

[6] In 2014, Husband retired as a colonel from USANG after more than thirty years of service. He earned 53% of his USANG pension, which is based on points rather than years, during the marriage. Husband receives a gross amount of $4499 per month from this pension, from which $388 per month is subtracted to pay for the survivor benefit that he and Wife elected. This results in a net monthly payment to Husband of $4111 for his USANG pension, with a present value of $1,188,004. The present value of the survivor benefit is $375,681, with monthly payments to Wife of $2474 upon Husband's death.

[7] Further, as a disabled veteran, Husband received VA disability payments of $2035 per month. That amount would decrease by an unidentified amount following the dissolution, as Wife would no longer be a dependent. [8] Husband's former wife does not have survivor benefits under either of his pensions. Husband does, however, directly pay her about $300 per month ² as ordered in in that dissolution. This amount represents a portion of his ISP and USANG pensions.

[9] Husband had other employment after his retirement from the ISP and USANG. Eventually, he became the Cloverdale Town Marshal in January 2017. He was in this position at the time he filed for dissolution of his marriage from Wife, but he retired nine months later, on June 15, 2023. He earned approximately $47,500 per year as Town Marshall. Husband vested in the Indiana Public Employee Retirement Fund (PERF) around March 2023, after he filed for dissolution and shortly before retiring as Town Marshall. He will receive a PERF pension when he turns sixty-five years of age. He was sixty-two years old at the final dissolution hearing in January 2024.

[10] Finally, with respect to Husband's income, he applied for social security benefits upon his retirement as Town Marshall. He currently receives a monthly benefit of $1725. Thus, at the time of the final dissolution hearing, Husband had a monthly income of over $10,600 (sum of ISP pension (excluding amount deducted for survivor benefit), USANG pension, VA disability, and social security minus the $300 paid to his former wife). This amount would decrease a bit after dissolution, as his VA benefits will go down.

[11] Regarding Wife's income, at the time Husband filed for dissolution, she had recently become employed at Aramark as an event planner earning about $60,000 per year.³ She quit that job within two months. At the time of the final hearing, Wife worked about thirty hours per week as a kindergarten interventionist for the Lafayette School Corporation earning $15 per hour. For purposes of child support, the trial court imputed income to wife based on an annual salary of $60,000, resulting in a monthly income of $5000.

[12] The factfinding hearing was held on January 18, 2024, before a special judge, Joseph D. Trout of the Clay Circuit Court. That same day Judge Trout issued an order dissolving the marriage. All other matters, including the division of the marital estate, were taken under advisement pending the submission of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which each party submitted on February 20, 2024.

[13] On Wife's motion, the Indiana Supreme Court removed the matter from Judge Trout under Ind. Trial Rule 53.1(E) in November 2024. The Court appointed Daniel G. Petrie of the Montgomery Superior Court to take over as special judge. Judge Petrie assumed jurisdiction over the matter on November 12, 2024. Thereafter, on December 4, 2024, Judge Petrie held a status hearing during which the parties agreed that retrial was not necessary and that the court would listen to the January 2024 hearing and review the exhibits and the proposed findings. The court would then hold a short hearing to clean up any additional matters. That hearing was held on May 16, 2025, after a delay in receiving the record from the Clay Circuit Court.

[14] On May 21, 2025, the trial court issued its order with findings of fact and conclusions of law,⁴ in which it determined that the marital estate totaled $1,258,452. The court's valuation of the estate excluded portions of the ISP and USANG pensions and survivor benefits based on a coverture fraction formula.⁵ Applying this formula, the court expressly “set aside, for the benefit of Husband, the following assets:”

Husband's Premarital ISP Pension Husband's Premarital USANG Pension Wife's Premarital ISP Survivor Benefit Wife's Premarital USANG Survivor Benefit Total $465,510.32 $558,361.99 $83,982.42 $176,570.33 $1,284,425.06

Appendix Vol. II at 25, 26. In doing so, the court noted that Husband earned over 75% of his ISP pension and 47% of his USANG pension before the marriage and that Husband's former wife received a portion of his premarital pensions.⁶ The court also set aside to Husband a personal injury settlement with CVS, which the court valued at $24,575.

[15] To effect a nearly equal distribution of those assets and debts that the court did include in the marital estate, the court ordered Wife to receive $321.52 per month from Husband's USANG pension (present value of $84,898.70) and ordered Husband to pay Wife $40,000 upon his refinancing or sale of the marital home.⁷ As will be discussed more fully below, however, the trial court's division of all the assets and debts that should have been included in the marital pot resulted in Husband receiving nearly 74% of the marital estate ($1,898,226 value) and Wife receiving 26% ($669,226 value).⁸

[16] Wife appeals the trial court's unequal division of the marital estate. Additional information will be provided below as needed.

Standard of Review

[17] It is well settled that a trial court has broad discretion in valuing and dividing marital property. Gatton v. Gatton, 249 N.E.3d 626, 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), reh'g granted in part and denied in relevant part, 251 N.E.3d 1104 (2025).

A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision stands clearly against the logic and effect of the facts or reasonable inferences, if it misinterprets the law, or if it overlooks evidence of applicable statutory factors. When, like here, the trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court may set aside the trial court's judgment only when clearly erroneous. The party challenging the trial court's division of marital property must overcome a strong presumption that the court considered and complied with the applicable statute.

Roetter v. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d 221, 225 (Ind. 2022) (internal citations and quotations omitted). On review, we look first to whether the evidence supports the findings ⁹ and then to whether the findings support the judgment. Gatton, 249 N.E.3d at 634; see also Lopp v. Lopp, 270 N.E.3d 44, 50 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (observing that a trial court's findings “should contain all of the facts necessary for a judgment for the party in whose favor conclusions of law are found”) (internal quotations omitted). “Clear error occurs when our review of the evidence most favorable to the judgment leaves us firmly convinced that a mistake has been made.” Gatton, 249 N.E.3d at 634.

Discussion & Decision

[18] Division of marital property must be just and reasonable, and a trial court must start with the presumption that “an equal division of the marital property between the parties is just and reasonable.” Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5.

However, this presumption may be rebutted by a party who presents relevant evidence, including evidence concerning the following factors, that an equal division would not be just and reasonable:

(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the property, regardless of whether the contribution was income producing.

(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each spouse:

(A) before the marriage; or

(B) through inheritance or gift.

(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the disposition of the property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family residence or the right to dwell in the family residence for such periods as the court considers just to the spouse having custody of any children.

(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to the disposition or dissipation of their property.

(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:

(A) a final division of property; and

(B) a final determination of the property rights of the parties.

Id. This list is nonexclusive, and no single factor controls the division of marital property. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 227. “Still, when ordering an unequal division of marital assets, the trial court must consider all relevant factors under [this statute].” Id. (emphasis in original and internal quotations omitted); see also Lopp, 270 N.E.3d at 52 (“When deviating from the statutory presumption of equal division, the trial court must consider all of these factors and state the reasons for its deviation.”) (emphases in original). If the trial court fails to consider all relevant statutory factors, it “runs the risk of dividing a marital estate in an unreasonable manner.” Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 227 (quoting Wallace v. Wallace, 714 N.E.2d 774, 780 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied).

[19] Further, I.C. § 31-15-7-4(a) makes clear that all property goes into the marital pot for division, whether owned by either spouse before the marriage, acquired by either spouse in his or her own right after the marriage and before final separation, or acquired by their joint efforts. This one-pot theory “ensures that the trial court values the entire marital pot before it endeavors to divide property.” Lopp, 270 N.E.3d at 50.

[20] Vested retirement benefits are marital property, and it is improper for a trial court to place only the coverture portion in the marital pot. See Gatton, 249 N.E.3d at 636 (holding that the trial court “erred in including only the coverture portion of Husband's pension in the marital pot”). Like the recent panel in Gatton, we conclude that the trial court improperly relied on Morey v. Morey, 49 N.E.3d 1065, 1071-72 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), “which runs afoul of [I.C. §] 31-15-7-4 in stating that the premarital portion of an asset should be excluded from the marital pot.” Gatton, 249 N.E.3d at 636; see also Lopp, 270 N.E.3d at 50 (agreeing with Gatton's reading of I.C. § 31-15-7-4). The Gatton court explained:

As mandated by statute, all assets must be included in the marital pot. If one of the assets is a retirement asset, then the coverture fraction formula is a useful means of determining which portion of the asset accrued prior to the marriage and which portion accrued after the marriage. But it is unhelpful to view the premarital portion of the asset as not being subject to division. It is instead more helpful to view the entire retirement asset as being subject to division and the coverture fraction as a tool in helping a trial court determine how to distribute the assets․.If the trial court uses the coverture fraction formula to award a greater share of the estate to a party, it should find the presumption of an equal distribution rebutted.

Gatton, 249 N.E.3d at 637 (footnote omitted).

[21] Here, the trial court improperly excluded the premarital portion of the ISP and USANG pensions and survivor benefits from the marital pot, as well as the CVS settlement. This resulted in the trial court valuing the marital estate at $1,258,452 instead of its actual value of $2,567,452. Further, nowhere in its dissolution order did the trial court recognize the significant extent to which these set offs affected an unequal division of the marital pot.

[22] In Roetter, the Indiana Supreme Court addressed a situation where the trial court expressly identified the total gross assets and liabilities of the parties but then set aside certain retirement assets to the husband and debts to the wife before calculating what the trial court termed the “remaining divisible marital pot” and dividing that pot between the parties. 182 N.E.3d at 229. The Court observed:

The better approach, we believe, would have been for the trial court to include all assets and liabilities in the divisible marital pot, rather than setting aside those assets and liabilities at issue before dividing the estate. Such an approach offers greater transparency to the parties, potentially averting further litigation. But, in the end, a trial court's judgment is “tested by its substance rather than by its form.” Shafer v. Shafer, 219 Ind. 97, 104, 37 N.E.2d 69, 72 (1941) (internal quotation marks omitted). So long as it expressly considers all assets and liabilities, and so long as it offers sufficient findings to rebut the presumptive equal division, a trial court need not follow a rigid, technical formula in dividing the marital estate and we will assume that it applied the law correctly.

Id. (emphasis supplied). In affirming, the Court determined that not only had the trial court expressly considered all marital property, but it had also considered all relevant statutory factors when deviating from the presumptive equal division. Id. at 227-28. The Court explained:

In dividing the marital estate, the trial court here expressly found that the marriage was short-term, that Wife acted as the children's primary caregiver during the marriage, that she brought very few assets to the marriage, that she failed to advise Husband of the student-loan debt she incurred prior to the marriage, that Husband received no benefit from Wife's education, and that Wife is capable of earning income of up to $30,000. The trial court also cited the disparity of the parties’ income and earning abilities to justify its division of property.

These findings either correspond with the relevant factors under our Division-of-Property Statute or find support in our case law. See I.C. § 31-15-7-5(1) (contribution of each spouse to the property's acquisition), I.C. § 31-15-7-5(3) (spouse's economic circumstances at the time of divorce), I.C. § 31-15-7-5(5) (earnings or earning ability of the parties). See [Houchens v.] Boschert, 758 N.E.2d [585, 591 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)] (short-lived marriage may rebut the presumption of equal division).

Id.

[23] In Kinder v. Kinder, 265 N.E.3d 550 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), a panel of this court applied Roetter in a situation where a trial court applied the statutory factors separately to eight assets, dividing the value of each to different degrees. While this method was not optimal, we held that the trial court did not err in this regard because “[i]t provided detailed findings based on the factors in [I.C. §] 31-15-7-5 for why and how it was dividing some assets outside the remaining divisible marital pot as part of its attempt to fashion a just and equitable division.” Id. at 556 (observing that the better practice would be to “include all assets in the divisible pot and conduct one analysis of the statutory factors”); see also Gatton, 249 N.E.3d at 637 (although premarital portion of pension was improperly excluded from marital pot, the error was not reversible where the trial court considered more than just the coverture fraction formula but also the other relevant statutory factors).

[24] In the case at hand, it is evident that the trial court did not consider all relevant statutory factors when unevenly dividing the marital estate as a whole or when considering specific assets individually. In setting aside more than half of the marital estate to Husband based on the coverture formula, which removed $1,284,425 from the pot for division, the trial court expressly considered, at least in part, only two statutory factors – I.C. § 31-15-7-5(2)(A) (extent to which property was acquired by Husband before the marriage) and (5) (the earning ability of Wife). That is, respectively, the court observed that Husband earned 75% of the ISP pension and survivor benefits and 47% of the USANG pension and survivor benefits before marriage ¹⁰ and that Wife is ten years younger than Husband and can earn $60,000 per year while Husband is retired. The trial court also noted that “Husband's former spouse received a portion of his premarital ISP pension and his premarital USANG pension.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 26. Notably, however, the trial court did not address, under I.C. § 31-15-7-5(3), the economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the disposition of property or, under § I.C. § 31-15-7-5(5), Husband's substantial monthly income despite being retired (more than twice the monthly income imputed to Wife).

[25] While we are prohibited from reweighing the evidence, which may indeed support an unequal division in favor of Husband, the trial court's inexact application of the law and limited justifications for awarding Husband 76% of the marital estate do not allow us to infer that it considered all relevant statutory factors as required when considering whether such an unequal division is just and reasonable. See Lopp, 270 N.E.3d at 53.

[26] Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to: (1) include all assets and liabilities in the divisible marital pot, including the CVS settlement and the full value of the ISP and USANG pensions and survivor benefits; (2) divide the entire marital estate in a just and reasonable manner; and (3) if deviating from the presumption of an equal division, consider the evidence related to all relevant statutory factors and clearly articulate those considerations.

[27] Judgment reversed and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Husband and Wife married on September 6, 2005.

2.   We note that the trial court did not identify the amount of these payments in its findings, but Wife testified that it was $285 or $300.

3.   Wife has a bachelor's degree in communications from Purdue University, which she earned prior to the marriage, and a master's degree in human resource development from Indiana State University, which she earned during the marriage. She plans to obtain a teaching license.

4.   Wife asserts that the trial court committed reversible error by adopting Husband's proposed findings and conclusions without any substantive changes. But the trial court did make some limited substantive changes. Further, the practice of adopting a party's proposed findings and conclusions is not prohibited and thus not a ground for reversal. See Campbell v. Campbell, 250 N.E.3d 459, 468 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

5.   Under this formula, the value of the retirement plan is multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which is the period of time during which pension rights accrued during the marriage and the denominator is the total period of time during which pension rights accrued.

6.   The trial court also determined that the PERF pension was not a marital asset because Husband had not vested in this plan at the time he filed for dissolution. Though she argued below that the PERF pension, with a present value of about $75,000, should be included as a marital asset, Wife does not make that argument on appeal. Accordingly, we do not review the trial court's exclusion of this pension from the marital estate.

7.   The trial court's spreadsheet setting out its distribution of assets and liabilities is somewhat confusing, due to its unique treatment of the survivor benefits and its incorrect calculations of the final totals for the parties – Wife's total should be $40,000 higher and Husband's should be $40,000 lower. Using the correct totals, Wife received about 53% of the marital estate as defined by the trial court (that is, excluding the CVS settlement and the premarital portion of the pensions and survivor benefits).

8.   The present values of the ISP and USANG pensions and survivor benefits totaled nearly $2,288,000 and comprised 89% of the marital estate. The remaining assets and liabilities of the marital estate totaled about $279,500.

9.   A trial court's findings are controlling unless the record includes no facts to support them either directly or by inference. Gatton, 249 N.E.3d at 634. We note that Wife does not specifically challenge any of the trial court's predicate findings (including valuations of property), only the conclusions based thereon.

10.   Wife seems to suggest that it is improper to consider the coverture formula with respect to survivor benefits, but she provides no authority and otherwise fails to persuade us on this point.

Altice, Judge.

May, J. and Foley, J., concur.