RHODES v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Diegan Matthew Rhodes appeals his conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated as a class A misdemeanor. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] At approximately 3:00 a.m. on September 22, 2024, Huntington County Sheriff's Deputy David Ryan McVoy was “working Operation Pullover” and observed a four-door sedan driving at a “[s]lower speed.”¹ Transcript Volume II at 130-131. Deputy McVoy observed the vehicle “drifting in its’ [sic] lane” and later observed “more drifting back and forth between the lines” and “[a] couple of different times the vehicle crossed the center and ․ the righthand fog line.” Id. at 132-133.

[3] Deputy McVoy activated his emergency lights and initiated a traffic stop. The vehicle pulled into the left-hand turn lane and stopped. Deputy McVoy turned on his spotlight for better visibility and “spotted the back window, kind of in the area of the review [sic] mirror.” Id. at 56. Deputy McVoy did not observe any movement of the car rocking that would suggest that “there were bodies moving around in there.” Id. at 57.

[4] Deputy McVoy approached the vehicle and observed Rhodes in the driver's seat wearing his seatbelt and a person later identified as Dustin Hutson in the passenger seat wearing a seatbelt. While speaking with Rhodes, Deputy McVoy observed that Rhodes's speech was slurred and his eyes were red and bloodshot. He could smell the odor of alcoholic beverages coming from inside the vehicle.

[5] Deputy McVoy asked Rhodes to exit the vehicle, and Rhodes did so. Deputy McVoy was able to stand close to Rhodes and detected “the odor of alcoholic beverages coming from him.” Id. at 137. Deputy McVoy asked Rhodes if he had consumed alcohol, and Rhodes repeatedly said no. Rhodes said that his passenger “had drank too much and couldn't be – he shouldn't be driving.” Id. at 59. Deputy McVoy asked Rhodes to perform field sobriety tests, and Rhodes did not consent. Deputy McVoy offered Rhodes a preliminary breath test, and Rhodes refused.

[6] At some point, Huntington Police Officer Jordan Corral arrived to assist until other units arrived. Officer Corral spoke with Huston who “was basically yelling from the inside of the car not to cooperate.” Id. at 151. Huntington County Sheriff's Deputy Alan Foster arrived at the scene and “essentially relieve[d]” Sergeant Corral. Id. at 185.

[7] At a point “[w]ell into the stop,” Rhodes told Deputy McVoy “sort of quietly” that he was not the person who was driving the vehicle. Id. at 44-45. Rhodes said that “the passenger had asked him to switch seats or made him switch seats and he did so.” Id. at 60. Deputy McVoy told him that he did not believe him. Deputy McVoy read Indiana's implied consent law to Rhodes, and Rhodes “said no to the certified chemical test.” Id. Rhodes “asked something to the effect of what if he wasn't driving.” Id. at 140.

[8] Deputy McVoy asked Hutson, the passenger and owner of the vehicle, to hand him Rhodes's wallet and phone. Hutson obtained Rhodes's wallet and phone from the top of the center console and handed the wallet to Deputy McVoy. Hutson held on to the phone, Deputy McVoy reminded him that Rhodes would probably need his phone “for numbers later on,” and Hutson handed him the phone. Id. at 61. Deputy McVoy then confirmed with Rhodes that the phone and wallet belonged to him.²

[9] After Deputy McVoy secured Rhodes in his vehicle, Deputy McVoy discussed Rhodes's claims that he was not the driver with Deputy Foster. Deputy Foster told Hutson that his “friend is in a little bit of trouble and if what we're dealing with isn't quite the truth, now would be the time to talk about that and [Hutson] didn't ․ change any of the event that was going on.” Id. at 189.

[10] Hutson called his friend, Alexis Mowery, and asked if she could pick him up and drive him home because his friend was being taken to jail. Mowery drove Hutson to his residence. During the drive, Hutson told Mowery that “his friend made a mistake and he felt bad and it's why he was the one in jail ‘cause he was the one driving.” Transcript Volume III at 50.

[11] Meanwhile, in an Affidavit for Probable Cause signed by Deputy McVoy, dated September 22, 2024, and listing a time of “0434,” Deputy McVoy asserted that he had probable cause to believe that Rhodes operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 82. Specifically, Deputy McVoy mentioned that the vehicle was traveling “51-52 MPH in a 60 MPH zone,” drifted in its lane of travel, “crossed the center line and fog line multiple times,” and “pulled into the left hand turn lane without signaling the lane change.” Id. at 81. He also mentioned that, upon interacting with Rhodes, he detected the odor of alcohol, red and bloodshot eyes, and slurred speech. He also noted that Rhodes left the vehicle running, left the driver door open upon exiting the vehicle, and refused field sobriety tests and a portable breath test. He further asserted that he read the Indiana Implied Consent Law and Rhodes “refused to perform a breath or blood test.” Id. at 82. In a search warrant signed by Judge Jennifer Newton and dated September 22, 2024, at 4:47 a.m., Judge Newton authorized the taking of a blood and/or urine sample from Rhodes.

[12] Deputy McVoy transported Rhodes to Parkview Hospital, and phlebotomist Chersen Lim drew Rhodes's blood. Elizabeth Ellis, a forensic scientist, tested the sample and determined that it contained 0.138 grams of ethanol “plus or minus 0.10 – 0.12 grams per 100 milliliters.”³ Transcript Volume III at 11.

[13] On September 23, 2024, the State charged Rhodes with: Count I, operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person as a class A misdemeanor; Count II, operating a vehicle while intoxicated as a class C misdemeanor; and Count III, unsafe lane movement as a class C infraction.

[14] On September 25, 2024, Rhodes filed a Verified Motion for Change of Judge, or in the Alternative, Verified Motion to Recuse. Rhodes's counsel argued that Judge Newton accepted jurisdiction of this case in September 2024, counsel reviewed a report showing that the lead investigator was Deputy McVoy, and Rhodes's counsel understood that Judge Newton was married to Sheriff Chris Newton, Deputy McVoy's employer. On September 26, 2024, Judge Newton entered an order granting the motion. On September 30, 2024, Special Judge Davin G. Smith accepted appointment as Special Judge.

[15] On January 30, 2025, the State filed a motion to amend the charging information by adding Count IV, operating a vehicle with an ACE of .08 or more as a class C misdemeanor. On February 3, 2025, the court granted the State's motion.

[16] On February 20, 2025, Rhodes filed a “Motion to Suppress” the blood test results and alleged that the search warrant used to obtain his blood was invalid under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 73 (capitalization omitted). Rhodes argued that “[t]he warrant Judge Newton granted ․ was not issued by a neutral and detached magistrate.” Id. at 74. On February 27, 2025, Rhodes filed a “Motion to Suppress Blood Test Results” and asserted that Deputy McVoy excluded potentially exculpatory evidence from his Affidavit for Probable Cause when he “excluded facts supporting the conclusion that Mr. Rhodes did not operate the vehicle.” Id. at 93 (capitalization omitted).

[17] On February 28, 2025, the court issued subpoenas requiring Judge Newton and Sheriff Newton to appear at the March 19, 2025 hearing. On March 17, 2025, Judge Newton, who was represented by the Attorney General of Indiana, filed a Motion to Quash Subpoena. On March 18, 2025, Sheriff Newton filed a Motion to Quash Subpoena.

[18] On March 19, 2025, the court held a hearing on the motions to quash and heard arguments and statements from Sheriff Newton. On March 20, 2025, the court entered orders granting both motions to quash.

[19] On April 2, 2025, Rhodes filed a Notice of Discovery asserting that “a Subpoena Ad Testificandum for a motion to suppress hearing was mailed via certified mail to Sheriff C. Newton, Deputy D. McVoy, Deputy A. Foster of the Huntington County Sheriff's Department, and Sgt. Jordan Corral of the Huntington Police Department” on March 20, 2025. Appellant's Appendix Volume III at 41. On May 13, 2025, Sheriff Newton filed a Motion to Quash Subpoena which was granted.

[20] On May 16, 2025, the court held a hearing on Rhodes's motions to suppress. Rhodes presented the testimony of Deputy Foster and Deputy McVoy. On May 23, 2025, the court entered an order denying Rhodes's motions.

[21] On June 9, 2025, Rhodes filed a Notice of Discovery asserting that “a Subpoena Ad Testificandum for a jury trial was mailed via certified mail to” Judge Newton and Sheriff Newton on June 9, 2025. Id. at 74. The court granted both motions.

[22] In June 2025, the court held a jury trial. The court had dismissed Count III on the State's motion and renumbered Count IV to Count III. The State presented the testimony of Deputy McVoy, Deputy Foster, Lim, Ellis, Sergeant Corral, Hutson, and Mowery. The State introduced and the court admitted video from Deputy McVoy's bodycam and dashcam. Hutson testified that they were drinking beer at a sports bar, he had ten beers, Rhodes had about “the same amount of beers,” Rhodes drove when they left the bar when it closed at 2:30 a.m., and Rhodes was driving when Deputy McVoy initiated the traffic stop. Transcript Volume III at 35. At one point, Rhodes's counsel asked the court to incorporate the evidence from the hearing on the motions to quash as well as the arguments into his objection that Judge Newton and Sheriff Newton “should be required to testify here today and should have been required to testify at the suppression hearing.” Transcript Volume II at 228. The court incorporated the evidence and arguments.

[23] After the State rested, Rhodes testified that he was in the passenger seat and Hutson was in the driver's seat at the time Deputy McVoy activated his emergency lights. He testified that Hutson “started to pull himself into the backseat” after he stopped the vehicle. Transcript Volume III at 84. He also testified, “I was like, okay, I'm just going to move over. I don't feel I was that intoxicated if any, um, so I was like I'll just hope for the best, I guess.” Id. at 85. He also stated that Hutson “pulls himself over the center console back in to the uh passenger seat.” Id.

[24] The jury found Rhodes guilty as charged. On June 26, 2025, the court merged Counts II and III into Count I and sentenced Rhodes to 365 days with ten days executed and the remainder suspended to probation.

Discussion

I.

[25] Rhodes argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it prevented him from presenting evidence on the issue of Judge Newton's neutrality when it quashed subpoenas for Judge Newton and Sheriff Newton. He contends that they were witnesses who were competent to testify and their testimony “would have been relevant and material on the issue of neutrality.” Appellant's Brief at 16.

[26] Our federal and state constitutions guarantee criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S. Ct. 2142, 2146 (1986); Sanchez v. State, 749 N.E.2d 509, 515 (Ind. 2001). The United States Supreme Court has observed:

The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process of law.

Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 1923 (1967).

[27] “Nevertheless, the right to present a defense is not absolute.” Schermerhorn v. State, 61 N.E.3d 375, 379 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. “The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.” Id. (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410, 108 S. Ct. 646, 653, (1988)). Both a defendant and the prosecutor “must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.” Id. (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1049 (1973)). “One of the rules of evidence is the requirement of relevance.” Sanchez, 749 N.E.2d at 521 (citing Ind. Evidence Rule 401). A defendant has no constitutional right to present irrelevant evidence. Id.

[28] When considering a defendant's claim that he was deprived of the constitutional right to present a defense, we consider: 1) whether the trial court arbitrarily denied the Sixth Amendment rights of the person calling the witness, and 2) whether the witness was competent to testify and his testimony would have been relevant and material to the defense. Washington, 388 U.S. at 19, 87 S. Ct. at 1923. Generally, we review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to quash a subpoena for an abuse of discretion. Boulangger v. Ohio Valley Eye Inst., P.C., 89 N.E.3d 1112, 1116 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Hueck v. State, 590 N.E.2d 581, 584 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), reh'g denied, trans. denied).

[29] The trial court held hearings on March 19 and May 16, 2025 and heard arguments from Rhodes's counsel and the deputy attorney general representing Judge Newton as well as statements from Sheriff Newton. We cannot say that Rhodes's rights were arbitrarily denied. See Hunt v. State, 546 N.E.2d 1249, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that defendant's rights were not arbitrarily denied, finding it dispositive that the trial court conducted a hearing solely for the purpose of resolving the issue, and concluding that it was evident the trial court was well advised in considering the issue and did not arbitrarily quash the subpoena), trans. denied.

[30] With respect to the second step of the analysis, there is no dispute as to Judge Newton's or Sheriff Newton's competency to testify. Accordingly, we turn to whether their testimony would have been both material and relevant to Rhodes's defense. “To be material, the witness's testimony must be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt about a verdict which, based on the entire record, is already of questionable validity.” Id. (citing Davis v. State, 529 N.E.2d 112, 114-115 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (citing United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 868, 102 S. Ct. 3440, 3447 (1982))). “In addition, because the right to compulsory process guarantees a defendant a means of obtaining witnesses in his favor, the defendant must show the witness's testimony would have been favorable to his defense.” Id. at 1251-1252 (citing Davis, 529 N.E.2d 112; Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 867, 102 S. Ct. at 3446).

[31] During the May 16 hearing, Deputy McVoy testified that he did not talk to Sheriff Newton at all on September 22, 2024. Deputy Foster indicated that he did not have any discussions with Sheriff Newton on the day of the traffic stop and that Sheriff Newton was not working at that time of the morning. When asked if he knew to whom he was making the search warrant application, Deputy McVoy answered, “Once I started working on the paperwork, yes. We have a schedule of judges.” Transcript Volume II at 49. During the March 19 hearing, Sheriff Newton stated that, “short of getting the subpoena from the prosecutor's office, this is the first time I've heard [Rhodes's] name,” he and Judge Newton “don't talk about work at home,” “[a]ny search warrants that [Judge Newton] gets aren't done in our bedroom where I'm sleeping at whatever time in the morning this probably was,” and that he and Judge Newton “don't do anything with any deputies ․ to make sure that she is neutral and detached.” Id. at 15-16. Further, Judge Newton's salary is set by statute, see Ind. Code § 33-38-5-6, and Sheriff Newton's salary was set by his contract, which was admitted during the hearing and provided for a fixed amount of compensation. We also note that the law presumes that a judge is unbiased and unprejudiced. See S.E. v. State, 929 N.E.2d 1281, 1287 (Ind. 2010); In re Edwards, 694 N.E.2d 701, 711 (Ind. 1998). In light of the record, we cannot say that the trial court arbitrarily granted the motions to quash. Rhodes has not demonstrated a constitutional violation or that reversal is warranted.

II.

[32] Rhodes challenges the admission of the blood test. Generally, we review the trial court's ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Roche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1115, 1134 (Ind. 1997), reh'g denied. We reverse only when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ind. 1997), reh'g denied. We may affirm a trial court's decision regarding the admission of evidence if it is sustainable on any basis in the record. Barker v. State, 695 N.E.2d 925, 930 (Ind. 1998), reh'g denied. We review de novo a ruling on the constitutionality of a search or seizure, but we give deference to a trial court's determination of the facts, which will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 596 (Ind. 2008); see also Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014) (holding that the ultimate determination of the constitutionality of a search or seizure is a question of law that we consider de novo).

[33] Rhodes challenges the admission of the blood test because: (A) the search warrant was granted by a judge who was not neutral and detached; and (B) the affidavit supporting the search warrant omitted facts that would cast doubt on an essential element of the offense.

A. Neutral and Detached

[34] Rhodes argues that Judge Newton was not neutral and detached because she was “married to Sheriff Newton whose deputy obtained the warrant.” Appellant's Brief at 12. He contends that “[t]he association between magistrate and law enforcement in the present case offends the concepts of separation of powers.” Id. He argues that “there is a pecuniary interest involved in the form of Judge Newton's pecuniary gain from the Sheriff's department through her husband's employment.” Id. He argues that “[t]he fact that Judge Newton agreed not to preside over the case due to her marriage to the Sheriff should give some indication that she should not have presided over the warrant process either.” Id. at 13.

[35] “The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution provide ‘the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures ․” Jones v. State, 655 N.E.2d 49, 54 (Ind. 1995) (quoting U.S. Const, Amend. IV; Ind. Const., ART. 1, § 11). “The warrant requirement commands that an agent of the government obtain a search warrant from a neutral, detached magistrate prior to undertaking a search of either a person or private property, except under special circumstances fitting within ‘certain carefully drawn and well-delineated exceptions.’ ” Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514-515 (1967)), reh'g denied.

[36] In light of the record, including the testimony of Deputy McVoy that he did not talk to Sheriff Newton on the day of the traffic stop, the testimony of Deputy Foster that he did not have any discussions with Sheriff Newton on the day of the traffic stop and that Sheriff Newton was not working at that time of the morning, Deputy McVoy's statement that he submitted his affidavit for the warrant based upon a “schedule of judges,” Transcript Volume II at 49, and the fact that Judge Newton's salary was set by statute and that Sheriff Newton's salary was set to a fixed amount set forth in his salary contract, we cannot say that Judge Newton was not neutral and detached. See generally U.S. v. McKeever, 906 F.2d 129, 131-132 (5th Cir. 1990) (observing that the fact that the magistrate's husband was a reserve deputy did not, alone, make her an interested party, and concluding that the magistrate's former position as a reserve peace officer, her husband's position as a reserve deputy, and her visit to the site of the search did not affect her objectivity such that she was no longer neutral and detached), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1070, 111 S. Ct. 790 (1991), reh'g denied, 501 U.S. 1277, 112 S. Ct. 28 (1991); State ex rel. Brown v. Dietrick, 444 S.E.2d 47, 54 (W. Va. 1994) (“The fact that a magistrate's spouse is the chief of police of a small police force does not automatically disqualify the magistrate, who is otherwise neutral and detached, from issuing a warrant sought by another member of such police force.”).

B. Omitted Facts in the Probable Cause Affidavit

[37] Rhodes argues that Deputy McVoy excluded from his Affidavit for Probable Cause “all facts supporting the possibility that Hutson operated the vehicle rather than Rhodes.” Appellant's Brief at 18.

[38] In Franks v. Delaware, the United States Supreme Court held that when the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that the supporting affidavit for a search warrant knowingly or intentionally contains a false statement, or reflects a “reckless disregard for the truth,” the trial court must hold a hearing. 438 U.S. 154, 155-156, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2676 (1978). If, at the hearing, the court determines that “the rest of the affidavit is insufficient to establish probable cause, ‘the search warrant must be voided’ and any evidence obtained from its fruits excluded.” Keeylen v. State, 14 N.E.3d 865, 872 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 156, 98 S. Ct. 2674), clarified on reh'g, 21 N.E.3d 840 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. “A defendant makes a ‘reverse’ Franks claim when alleging that the State omitted information material to the probable cause analysis.” Wainscott v. State, 210 N.E.3d 853, 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Keeylen, 14 N.E.3d at 872), trans. denied.

[39] The omission of information may invalidate a search warrant if the defendant shows: (1) “the police omitted facts with the intent to make, or in reckless disregard of whether they thereby made, the affidavit misleading,” and (2) “the affidavit if supplemented by the omitted information would not have been sufficient to support a finding of probable cause.” Ware v. State, 859 N.E.2d 708, 718 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting United States v. Lakoskey, 462 F.3d 965, 978 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1259, 127 S. Ct. 1388 (2007)), reh'g denied, trans. denied. In seeking a search warrant, the affiant is obligated to include material facts, “which are those facts that ‘cast doubt on the existence of probable cause.’ ” Id. (quoting Query v. State, 745 N.E.2d 769, 772 (Ind. 2001), reh'g denied). A defendant bears the burden of proving an affiant's intent to mislead and does not meet the burden of proof “simply by showing the omission itself.” State v. Allen, 187 N.E.3d 221, 230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans denied.

[40] During the hearing, Deputy McVoy denied intentionally omitting the idea that Rhodes was not the driver. Rather, Deputy McVoy testified that he “believed that Mr. Rhodes was the correct driver.” Transcript Volume II at 48. Defense counsel asked, “You chose not to put in information that could cast doubt on probable cause, correct?” Id. at 51. Deputy McVoy answered, “No, I chose not to put information in that I didn't believe.” Id. He also stated, “With the information and – and what I'm seeing and observing, I believe by the time I got him to the jail and was preparing this document that to the best of my knowledge he was the driver.” Id. at 51-52. During cross-examination of Deputy McVoy, the following exchange occurred:

Q Did you leave out the information about Rhodes claiming he wasn't the driver in order to mislead the judge?

A Absolutely not.

Q Why didn't you put that information?

A I didn't believe him. I – I felt comfortable enough at that point that we – we had the right person as the driver.

Id. at 63. On cross-examination at trial, Rhodes's counsel asked Deputy Foster, “You had a suspicion that Hutson was actually the driver?” Id. at 192. Deputy Foster answered, “I did? I did not.” Id. Based on the record, the trial court did not err in rejecting Rhodes's claim that Deputy McVoy intentionally omitted material information from the affidavit.

[41] We need not address the second element of the reverse-Franks standard because Rhodes failed to show entitlement to relief under the first element. See Allen, 187 N.E.3d at 230 n.3 (noting the defendant's failure to show “intent to deceive was fatal to her claim”). Even assuming that we reach the second step, we cannot say that reversal is warranted.

[42] If Deputy McVoy's affidavit had included Rhodes's assertion that he had switched seats with Hutson, it is reasonable to assume that the affidavit would also have mentioned that: Deputy McVoy turned his spotlight on and “spotted the back window,” Transcript Volume II at 56; he could see into the sedan and did not see any movement or movement of the car rocking that would suggest that there were bodies moving around in the vehicle; the front seats were bucket seats with a center console between them and he approached the vehicle “relatively quick,” id. at 57; Rhodes was in the driver's seat and was wearing a seatbelt; and Hutson, who was in the passenger seat, was wearing a seatbelt. Under the totality of the circumstances, presenting Rhodes's statements regarding switching seats would not have shown a lack of probable cause. See Ware, 859 N.E.2d at 719 (addressing a probable cause affidavit which failed to mention that an eyewitness looked at a photographic array and identified someone other than the defendant as the person she had met; observing that an officer explained at the suppression hearing he and his colleagues had investigated the person misidentified by the eyewitness and excluded him as a suspect; holding that, if the officer had included in the affidavit the eyewitness's mistaken identification from the photographic array, the officer would have also described the investigation the officers performed to exclude the misidentified person as a suspect as well as other evidence; and concluding that the excluded information would not have shown a lack of probable cause).

[43] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Rhodes's conviction.

Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Deputy McVoy testified that Operation Pullover is “a federally funded uh through NHTSA – the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration program. They concentrate on bad driving behaviors.” Transcript Volume II at 130. He also indicated that his work in that shift was funded by those grants.

2.   Law enforcement found keys to the vehicle in Hutson's pocket and found Hutson's phone in the back seat of the vehicle. During the May 16, 2025 hearing and at trial, Deputy Foster indicated that the key did not need to be inserted into the ignition and the vehicle had a push to start feature.

3.   Ellis testified that “ethanol is the type of alcohol that you would find in alcoholic beverages like beer, wine, and liquor.” Transcript Volume III at 11.

Brown, Judge.

Altice, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.