GOGGANS v. GOGGANS (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Michelle Goggans (“Wife”) and Quincy Goggans (“Husband”) married in 2002. In 2023, Wife petitioned for dissolution of marriage. After a hearing in August of 2025, the trial court concluded that the division of the parties’ assets and debts should be equal and ordered that Wife receive $133,006.11 in equity from the former marital residence and Husband receive $105,138.69 in equity. Wife contends that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the marital estate, finding that Husband's gambling was a hobby, finding that the evidence supported including Husband's student loans in the marital estate, and in valuing Husband's pension. Because we find no merit in Wife's claims, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Husband and Wife married on March 9, 2002. On June 19, 2023, Wife petitioned for dissolution of marriage. At the final hearing on August 26, 2025, Husband and Wife testified regarding the assets, liabilities, and real property of the marriage. Husband elicited testimony from Geffrey Lady, a real-estate appraiser, regarding the value of the parties’ marital home in Hamilton County. Wife testified that Husband had an “insatiable gambling addiction during the marriage.” Tr. Vol. II p. 18. Husband testified that Wife had “always” known about his spending on gambling, he had been gambling during the entirety of the marriage, and he had not “intentionally [tried] to spend down marital assets[.]” Tr. Vol. II pp. 110–11. The parties also testified regarding Husband's pension, and both parties presented other evidence regarding assets and liabilities to the trial court.

[3] On November 25, 2025, the trial court entered a decree of dissolution, in which it entered findings of fact and concluded, in relevant part, that

52. The consistency of Husband's spending on gambling debts leans against a finding of dissipation, especially since the parties shared joint expenses. Husband's gambling was open, and at best encouraged by Wife and in the least she acquiesced to the habit and his losses.

53. The Court now holds that both parties spent over their respective earnings to live expensive lifestyles that included gambling, travel and other discretionary expenses.

54. As a result, Wife failed to meet her burden that Husband's gambling was an intentional dissipation of marital assets, especially since the parties always kept their finances separate.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 17.

[4] The trial court, considering the relevant factors, evidence, and testimony related to the division of the marital property, and the credibility of the parties, also found the following:

58. As a result of the factors set for above, and the finding against Husband's dissipation of marital assets, Wife has failed to rebut the presumption that an equal division of all assets and debts is just and reasonable.

59. As a result, the Court now holds that the parties’ marital estate should be equally divided between the parties.

60. The largest asset acquired was the former marital residence[.]

[․]

66. The Court now accepts the appraisal testified to by Mr. Lady for the former marital residence being valued at $393,500.00, so there is equity of $238,144.79 to divide. The Court finds his estimate more credible.

67. Husband requested all assets and debts be divided evenly between the parties, with the exception of Husband's student loans.

68. Wife testified that due to dissipation of marital assets by Husband, she should receive all the equity in the former marital residence, while Wife keeps the tax debt, mortgage debt, roof loan, and modification loan, and her own credit card debt.

69. Husband testified to incurring $115,218.00 in student loans during their marriage, which he used to obtain better employment. Husband provided verification of the dates that these debts were incurred.

70. Wife used her income to pay off her student loans during the marriage, so Wife felt Husband loans should not be included on the marital estate worksheet.

71. It would be error, not to include Husband's loans in the marital pot.

72. Husband testified that he had to pay a large portion of the bills during different times in their marriage, which made it difficult to pay off his student loans.

73. The Court now holds that Husband's student loans were a debt incurred during the parties’ marriage, so it should be included in the marital estate.

74. Both parties shared equally in acquiring assets and debts during their marriage, despite having separate finances, so the division of assets and debts should be equal.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 18–20.

[5] The trial court ultimately ordered that Wife receive $133,006.11 in equity from the former marital residence and Husband receive $105,138.69 in equity.

Discussion and Decision 1

[6] Where, as here, the trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions thereon, “we apply a two-tiered standard of review; first we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, whether the findings support the judgment.” Smith v. Smith, 938 N.E.2d 857, 860 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

In deference to the trial court's proximity to the issues, we disturb the judgment only where there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support the judgment. We do not reweigh the evidence, but consider only the evidence favorable to the trial court's judgment. Those appealing the trial court's judgment must establish that the findings are clearly erroneous. Findings are clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. We do not defer to conclusions of law, however, and evaluate them de novo.

Id. (citations omitted, emphasis in original).

I. Wife has Waived her Argument Regarding the Division of Marital Property

[7] Wife contends that the trial court abused its discretion “when it failed to divide the marital estate as required by statute[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 12. Specifically, Wife contends that the trial court did not accomplish an “equal division” of the marital property as required by Indiana Code section 31-15-7-5. Appellant's Br. p. 12. Wife contends that the trial court's order awarding Husband $105,138.69 is “incorrect in that it would result in inequitable division of the real estate.” Appellant's Br. p. 13.

[8] However, instead of providing any explanation, argument, or citations to the record or to legal authority as it relates to her argument, Wife provides a chart to show her proposed “definition and division of the marital estate[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 12. Wife applies different figures from the trial court with no explanation other than that the “correct” amount to award to Husband was $92,023.81. Appellant's Br. p. 13.

[9] Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a), “[e]ach contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on.” See Martin v. Brown, 129 N.E.3d 283, 285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“Failure to present a cogent argument results in waiver of the issue on appeal.”). Because Wife failed to properly develop this argument, we consider it waived for failure to develop a cogent argument.

II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Finding that Husband's Gambling Was a Hobby

[10] Wife contends that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Husband's gambling was a hobby rather than dissipation of the marital assets.

Factors that a trial court may consider in determining whether assets have been dissipated include: (1) evidence of intent to hide, divert or deplete the asset; (2) whether the expenditure was made for a purpose entirely unrelated to the marriage; (3) the remoteness in time to the filing of the dissolution petition; and (4) whether the expenditure was excessive or de minimis. However, whether dissipation had occurred cannot be determined by applying only one of these factors. The proper inquiry requires the trial court to weigh the various considerations. Moreover, while intent is not an essential element of dissipation, intent to hide, divert, or otherwise deplete the marital estate is relevant. Additionally, the fact that one spouse or the marriage itself does not benefit directly from an expenditure does not, standing alone, require a finding that a dissipation of marital assets has occurred.

Bertholet v. Bertholet, 725 N.E.2d 487, 499 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (citations omitted). Indiana Code section 31-15-7-5 directs the trial court to consider “[t]he conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to the [․] dissipation of their property.” However,

transactions which are remote in time and effect, and where many years of marriage have intervened, may be deemed insignificant, while transactions which occur during the breakdown of the marriage, just prior to filing a petition or during the pendency of an action, may require heightened scrutiny.

When considering a spouse's claim of dissipation, the trial court should exercise caution in determining that an asset has been wasted or misused. Moreover, the non-dissipating party's participation in or consent to the expenditure is a relevant consideration.

Bertholet, 725 N.E.2d at 499–500.

[11] While Wife testified that Husband had had an “insatiable gambling addiction during the marriage,” Tr. Vol. II p. 18, Husband testified that Wife had “always” known about his spending on gambling and gaming. Tr. Vol. II p. 110. Husband testified that even before the marriage, Wife “was on board [․] nothing was hidden.” Tr. Vol. II p. 111. Husband also testified that he had not “intentionally [tried] to spend down marital assets[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 111. Regarding his winnings from gambling, Husband testified that some winnings were in the format of Bitcoin, and other times in cash “if it was an actual casino[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 94. Husband indicated that he had paid bills with cash winnings, testifying “if it was an actual casino cash [․] I paid my bills with cash oftentimes so that's how I paid my bills.” Tr. Vol. II p. 94. Wife testified that she and Husband had gone to a casino in 2023 “for a concert” and agreed that they had been “married in Vegas” and had gone to Las Vegas “probably two or three times after that and over the course of twenty-five years.” Tr. Vol. II p. 48.

[12] After considering the evidence, the trial court determined that Husband's gambling had not amounted to dissipation. Our review of the record reveals that at a minimum, Wife had known of Husband's gambling since the beginning of the marriage, Husband had not hidden his gambling from Wife, and Husband had, on occasion, used cash winnings to pay bills. Wife had accompanied Husband to casinos during the marriage. The record does not leave us with a firm conviction that the evidence positively requires the conclusion that the trial court erred in reaching its decision. Wife's argument on this point amounts to nothing more than a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Smith, 938 N.E.2d at 860.

III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Found Husband Had Incurred Student Debt During the Marriage

[13] Wife contends that the evidence does not support the trial court's finding that Husband had incurred student debt during the marriage. Specifically, pointing to Husband's testimony that his student loan debt had grown to $115,000.00 during the marriage, Wife contends that “the only conclusion can be that [Husband] did not properly service this debt and allowed it to grow to this substantial amount.” Appellant's Br. p. 18.

[14] In relevant part, the trial court found the following in its decree of dissolution:

70. Wife used her income to pay off her student loans during the marriage, so Wife felt Husband's loans should not be included on the marital estate worksheet.

71. It would be error, not to include Husband's loans in the marital pot.

72. Husband testified that he had to pay a large portion of the bills during different times in their marriage, which made it difficult to pay off his student loans.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 20.

[15] Wife does not challenge these findings, which we therefore accept as true. See Haggarty v. Haggarty, 176 N.E.3d 234, 246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Furthermore, Wife testified that Husband “paid lights, gas and sewage.” Tr. Vol. II p. 74. Husband testified that he had also often indirectly made payment on the home loan by giving Wife cash and had made “numerous upgrades to the house.” Tr. Vol. II p. 95. Viewing only the evidence favorable to the judgment and all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom, we find no merit in Wife's argument that Husband had “not properly service[d his] debt” or that the trial court erred in concluding that Husband's student loan debt was incurred during the marriage. Appellant's Br. p. 18. The trial court's findings support the conclusion that Husband's student loan debt had been incurred during the marriage and so should have been included in the marital estate.

IV. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion When It Valued Husband's Pension at $162,673.09

[16] Finally, Wife contends that the trial court abused its discretion in selecting the dates of Huband's pension valuation.² Wife contends that “[b]ecause Husband has the power to vary the amount of pension depending on what age he chooses to retire, the court has no basis upon which to find that the value of the pension is the lesser amount.” Appellant's Br. p. 19.

[17] The party challenging the trial court's property division bears the burden of proof. That party must overcome a strong presumption that the court complied with the statute and considered the evidence on each of the statutory factors. The presumption that a dissolution court correctly followed the law and made all the proper considerations when dividing the property is one of the strongest presumptions applicable to our consideration on appeal. Thus, we will reverse a property distribution only if there is no rational basis for the award.

Smith v. Smith, 194 N.E.3d 63, 72 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

[18] Husband testified that he would receive $162,673.00 from his pension if he were to retire at age fifty-five, and he would receive $190,960.00 if he were to retire at age sixty-five. Husband testified that he would be “working fifteen more years” to receive the higher amount and requested “that the [trial court] use the lower of the two which gives [Wife] a windfall of five additional years of work[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 104. The trial court valued Husband's pension at the lower amount.

[19] Wife contends that “[b]ecause Husband has the power to vary the amount of the pension depending on what age he chooses to retire, the court has no basis upon which to find that the value of the pension is the lesser amount.” Appellant's Br. p. 19. However, Wife cites no authority on this point. Furthermore, other than Indiana Code section 31-15-7-5 stating that the trial court shall presume an equal division of marital property is just and reasonable, Wife cites to no legal authority and makes no argument to support her claim that “[t]he reasonable solution for this conundrum is for the Court to order that Wife is to receive 50% of the pension payment upon its distribution and not Husband's projected date of retirement.” Appellant's Br. p. 19.

[20] We conclude that Wife has not met her burden of overcoming the strong presumption that the trial court complied with the law and considered the evidence in determining the value of Husband's pension. See Smith, 194 N.E.3d at 72. That is, Wife has again failed to properly develop a cogent argument on this issue. See Martin, 129 N.E.3d at 285.

[21] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FOOTNOTES

2.   We note that Wife's Statement of the Issues includes a fifth issue, that the trial court abused its discretion “when it did not find [H]usband in contempt for not complying with discovery[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 4.However, Wife does not address this issue in the Argument section of her brief. We therefore find this issue waived for failure to develop a cogent argument. See Martin, 129 N.E.3d at 285.

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.