HODGE v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Lauren Danielle Hodge and the State negotiated a plea agreement that resolved several offenses in several cases. The trial court accepted the agreement and ordered Hodge to serve a portion of her sentence in a community corrections program, on home detention.

[2] The State filed a petition to revoke Hodge's community corrections placement, alleging that she had violated several rules. The trial court found in favor of the State, revoked both Hodge's community corrections placement and her probation, and ordered her to serve a portion of her previously-suspended sentence in the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”).

[3] Hodge now appeals, arguing that she was deprived of her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process because the State did not notify her that incarceration in the DOC was a possible outcome of the revocation proceeding. Based on the Indiana Supreme Court's recent opinion in Ewing v. State, 273 N.E.3d 1107 (2026), we reverse and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[4] The State filed three cases against Hodge. In Cause Number 82C01-2501-F6-812 (“F6-812”), the State charged her with two counts of Level 6 felony intimidation. In Cause Number 82C01-2502-F5-1254 (“F5-1254”), the State charged Hodge with one count of Level 5 felony intimidation. And in Cause Number 82C01-2411-F6-7140 (“F6-7140”), the State charged her with Level 6 felony intimidation, Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, and four lesser misdemeanors.

[5] The parties negotiated a plea agreement for the three cases. Hodge agreed to plead guilty as charged in F6-812 and F5-1254. In F6-7140, Hodge agreed to plead guilty to Class A misdemeanor intimidation and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, and the State agreed to dismiss the rest of the charges. The parties also negotiated a sentence for each case. As we discuss below, they agreed that Hodge would serve a portion of her sentences on home detention through a community corrections program.

[6] During the plea agreement and guilty plea process, Hodge was repeatedly advised of the possible consequences for violations of the rules of probation and the rules of the community corrections program. The plea agreement document, an advisement of rights document, and the court's order of probation all stated, using different language, that failure to follow the rules of probation or the rules of the community corrections program could result in the trial court ordering her to serve her previously suspended sentence. The advisement of rights document specifically mentioned incarceration in the DOC.

[7] The trial court accepted the parties’ plea agreement. On April 22, 2025, the court imposed sentences in all three cases. In F6-812, the court sentenced Hodge to serve the first six months of her sentence on home detention through community corrections, with the rest of her sentence (one year) served on probation. In F5-1254, the trial court sentenced Hodge to serve one year on home detention. In F6-7140, the court sentenced Hodge to one year, all suspended to probation.

[8] On April 23, Hodge met with Katie Patterson, who is the supervisor of the community corrections home detention program. Patterson and Hodge reviewed several documents, including an agreement that set forth the rules for participation in the program. That agreement stated that the trial court could order Hodge to serve her previously suspended sentence if she violated program rules.

[9] On June 11, the State, through Patterson, filed a petition to revoke Hodge's community corrections placement in F6-812 and F5-1254, alleging that she had committed violations including allowing methamphetamine in her home and allowing an unauthorized person to live in her home. The petition did not mention Hodge's probation. Patterson requested that Hodge serve seven days in jail as a sanction. Hodge admitted to violating the rules of the program, and the court ordered her to serve seven days in jail.

[10] On July 9, the State, again through Patterson, filed a second petition to revoke in both cases. Among other claims, Patterson alleged that Hodge had consumed alcohol. On July 10, the State amended its petition to further allege that Hodge had allowed an unauthorized person to live in her home. Neither petition mentioned Hodge's probation or suspended sentence. Instead, regarding sanctions, in the July 9 petition Patterson suggested that Hodge receive “inpatient treatment” for any substance abuse issues. Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 97. And in the July 10 petition, Patterson recommended only that Hodge “[r]emain in custody pending lab results.” Id. at 99.

[11] The trial court held an initial hearing, during which Hodge admitted that she had consumed alcohol but denied any other violations. The court scheduled an evidentiary hearing. Neither the court nor any of the parties discussed what sanctions could be imposed if the State proved that Hodge had violated the community corrections rules.

[12] At the evidentiary hearing, Patterson stated that she had listened to recordings of Hodge's jail telephone calls, during which Hodge had acknowledged that a certain person was living in her home. That person had not signed a resident agreement with the community corrections program.

[13] The court concluded that Hodge had violated the terms of her placement. In F5-1254, the court ordered the case closed and discharged unsatisfactorily. In F6-812, the court ordered Hodge to serve eighteen months in the Department of Correction. This appeal followed.

Discussion and Decision

[14] Hodge argues that when the State petitioned to revoke her community corrections placement, the State failed to notify her that it was also requesting revocation of her probation and commitment to the DOC. She claims that she was deprived of her right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Hodge asks the Court to reverse the portion of the trial court's judgment ordering her to serve her previously-suspended sentence in the DOC.

[15] Both probation and community corrections programs serve as alternatives to commitment to the DOC. McQueen v. State, 862 N.E.2d 1237, 1242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). “A defendant is not entitled to serve a sentence in either probation or a community corrections program.” Id. “Rather, placement in either is a ‘matter of grace’ and a ‘conditional liberty that is a favor, not a right.’ ” Id. (quoting Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999)).

[16] “Before a court revokes work release or probation, though, it must provide due process.” Ewing, 273 N.E.3d at 1111. “[P]robationers do not receive the same constitutional rights that defendants receive at trial.” Reyes v. State, 868 N.E.2d 438, 440 (Ind. 2007). But revocation proceedings are still subject to “procedural and substantive limits[,]” including written notice of the violations. Ewing, 273 N.E.3d at 1111. “Whether the notice to a defendant that the State seeks to revoke probation satisfies due process is a legal question we consider de novo.” Id. at 1110.

[17] In Ewing, the trial court suspended Ewing's sentence and ordered him to serve a term of work release followed by probation. When Ewing failed to return to the work release facility, the State petitioned to revoke his work release placement. The State's petition to revoke “said nothing about revoking his probation and did not request that the court revoke the suspended portion of his sentence.” Id. at 1109.

[18] Ewing later admitted to violating the terms of his work release placement. The State asked the court to revoke his probation, in addition to his work release placement, and send him to the DOC. The trial court granted the State's request.

[19] On appeal, our Supreme Court reversed. The court stated that in a revocation action, principles of due process require that the notice of the violation must be “sufficiently detailed and timely to provide a reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense.” Id. at 1112. And “when deciding whether to admit the allegation, how extensive a defense to mount, or which alternatives to incarceration to propose, the accused should be able to rely on the sanction the revocation petition identifies absent notice that the court may impose a different sanction.” Id. at 1113.

[20] The court determined that Ewing could have reasonably inferred that probation revocation and commitment to the DOC were not at issue because the State did not request those sanctions in its petition to revoke work release. Further, probation revocation and incarceration were not discussed at any of the hearings on the petition to revoke work release until the judge decided what sanctions to impose. The court concluded that the trial court erred in revoking Ewing's probation and in committing him to the DOC, stating, “the State cannot seek sanctions beyond those identified in a revocation petition unless the defendant has actual notice that the State is seeking those sanctions.” Id. at 1114.

[21] In the current case, we are faced with home detention rather than work release, but the reasoning in Ewing compels us to reverse. The State's July 9 and July 11 petitions requesting revocation of Hodge's home detention placement did not request probation revocation. To the contrary, neither document even requests that Hodge be removed from the community corrections program as a sanction. In addition, probation revocation and the DOC were not discussed at the initial hearing on the State's petitions. Under these circumstances, Hodge, like the defendant in Ewing, did not receive constitutionally required notice that probation revocation and incarceration at the DOC were possible. It is unlikely that she prepared a litigation strategy to account for those possibilities.

[22] The State argues, correctly, that both Patterson and the prosecutor were authorized by statute to ask the trial court to revoke Hodge's placement and order her to be incarcerated in the county jail or the DOC for the remainder of her sentence. Ind. Code § 35-38-2.6-5 (2020). But the State's authority is not in dispute. Rather, the key question is whether the State gave Hodge sufficient notice in this revocation proceeding that she could be incarcerated. As the Ewing court stated, we must not “conflate[ ] notice of what the law permits with notice of what the State requests.” 273 N.E.3d at 1114.

[23] Similarly, the State points out that Hodge reviewed and signed or initialed numerous documents, including her plea agreement and the community corrections handbook, which informed her that she could be sent to the DOC for violating program rules. But these documents demonstrate only that Hodge was aware of the general possibility of probation revocation and incarceration for rules violations. They are insufficient to meet the notice requirements discussed in Ewing for this specific instance of revocation.

[24] The trial court erred in revoking Hodge's probation and ordering her committed to the DOC. We reverse and remand with instructions to impose an appropriate sanction for Hodge's violations of the community corrections program's rules.

Conclusion

[25] For the reasons stated above, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision.

[26] Reversed and remanded with instructions.

Baker, Senior Judge.

Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.