Justin Joseph Janik, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Justin Joseph Janik (“Janik”) appeals, pro se, the trial court's denial of his petition to seal and expunge records from firearm retention proceedings under Indiana Code chapter 35-47-14—the Firearm Retention Law, also known as Indiana's red flag law. Three issues are presented, which we restate as follows:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Janik's petition for expungement under Indiana Code section 35-47-14-8(g);

II. Whether Janik waived an equal protection claim because his undeveloped arguments impeded our review; and

III. Whether Janik is precluded from presenting collateral challenges to the 2018 proceedings that resulted in the retention of his firearms.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On September 6, 2018, the State filed a petition to retain Janik's firearms. Janik appeared for a December 2018 evidentiary hearing without counsel. Proceeding pro se, Janik offered his defense, but the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Janik was dangerous as defined under the Firearm Retention Law and therefore ordered the retention of his firearms.

[4] Thereafter, Janik made multiple attempts to recover his firearms. The trial court denied a July 2019 petition for the return of the firearms, determining that Janik failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was no longer dangerous. The trial court granted a January 2021 petition, finding that Janik was no longer dangerous and therefore entitled to the return of the firearms. On September 27, 2021, the trial court ordered the firearms returned to Janik.

[5] Meanwhile, the Indiana General Assembly amended provisions of the Firearm Retention Law related to the expungement of records. The amendments created two tracks. The first track applied to scenarios where the State initiated firearm retention proceedings but failed to prove the individual was dangerous—that is, where the individual was never found to be dangerous under the Firearm Retention Law. The second track applied to cases like Janik's, where an individual was found to be dangerous and his firearms were retained, but the firearms were later returned after proceedings establishing that the individual was no longer dangerous.

[6] Under the first track, Section 6(f) directed trial courts to automatically expunge records upon a determination that the State failed to prove dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence. Ind. Code § 35-47-14-6(f). Section 6(g) extended that protection to cases resolved on the same basis before July 1, 2025, providing that when a court made this type of determination before July 1, 2025, and the individual files a motion invoking the new expungement provisions, “the court shall grant the motion and issue an amended order accordingly.” I.C. § 35-47-14-6(g) (emphasis added). Under the second track, Section 8(g) addressed Janik's category of case—an individual found to be dangerous, then later found to be no longer dangerous—and provided:

If, before July 1, 2025, the court issued an order that an individual is no longer dangerous under subsection (f), and the individual subsequently files a motion to amend that order to include the expungement provisions of subsection (f)(2), the court may grant the motion and issue an amended order accordingly.

I.C. § 35-47-14-8(g) (emphases added).

[7] On July 1, 2025—the effective date of the amendments—Janik filed a pro se Petition to Seal, Reclassify, and Correct Records. Referring to the statutory amendments, Janik claimed expungement was mandatory.¹ On July 9, 2025, the State filed an objection to Janik's petition, claiming expungement was permissive rather than mandatory. It asked the court to decline to expunge the records “due to the facts presented at [prior] hearings” because Janik (1) was found dangerous in connection with the State's September 2018 petition to retain his firearms and (2) failed to establish that he was no longer dangerous when he first petitioned for their return. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 21.

[8] On July 11, 2025, the trial court denied Janik's expungement petition without a hearing. The court determined that Section 8(g) governed the petition because Janik was initially found to be dangerous, and therefore, its authority to grant or deny the petition was permissive rather than mandatory. Having “reviewed the extensive records” of the underlying proceedings and “carefully considered th[e] matter,” the court denied all requested relief. Id. at 24. Janik moved to reconsider, raising an equal protection claim. The court denied the motion. Janik now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] At the outset, we note that Janik is representing himself on appeal—a choice he is entitled to make, but one that carries no leniency: pro se litigants are held to the same standards as trained attorneys. See Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). Janik challenges the denial of his expungement petition, claims the denial violated his equal protection rights, and alleges that errors in the 2018 retention proceedings deprived him of due process. We address these issues in turn.

I. Denial of the Petition

[10] In general, we review the denial of an expungement petition for an abuse of discretion. Kelley v. State, 166 N.E.3d 936, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it, or when the court misinterprets the law. Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Liu, 250 N.E.3d 406, 410 (Ind. 2025). To the extent an appeal turns on statutory interpretation—which is a question of law—our review is de novo. See Morales v. Rust, 228 N.E.3d 1025, 1033 (Ind. 2024). “[S]tatutory language itself is the best indication of legislative intent.” Id. at 1054. In interpreting a statute, we assign words their plain meaning. Id.

[11] On appeal, Janik concedes that Section 8(g) governs the expungement petition. See Appellant's Br. pp. 4, 5. That provision states:

If, before July 1, 2025, the court issued an order that an individual is no longer dangerous under subsection (f), and the individual subsequently files a motion to amend that order to include the expungement provisions of subsection (f)(2), the court may grant the motion and issue an amended order accordingly.

I.C. § 35-47-14-8(g) (emphasis added). The word “may” signals permissive, discretionary authority. T.A. v. State, 62 N.E.3d 436, 439 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). “Shall,” by contrast, signals a mandate. Taylor v. State, 7 N.E.3d 362, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). The legislature used “shall” in Section 6(g)—the provision applicable to individuals never found to be dangerous—and “may” in Section 8(g), which applies to individuals like Janik who were found dangerous before they were later found no longer dangerous. That difference in language reflects a deliberate policy choice: individuals who were never found dangerous occupy a different category than those who were, and the legislature entrusted expungement decisions in the latter category to the trial court's discretion.

[12] Janik argues that the trial court failed to exercise its Section 8(g) discretion and instead improperly deferred to the State's “flawed” objection. Appellant's Br. p. 5. His principal theory is that the no-longer-dangerous finding superseded earlier findings to the contrary, making prior assessments of dangerousness legally irrelevant to the expungement decision. According to Janik, the trial court abused its discretion by relying on “outdated” findings without identifying an independent, current public safety rationale for denying his petition. Id. at 4.

[13] There is no language in Section 8(g) requiring an independent, current public safety threat to deny an expungement petition. And this makes sense. If an individual currently posed a threat to public safety, it seems likely the State would again petition to retain the individual's firearms. Moreover, there is no indication here that the court simply deferred to the State's objection and failed to independently consider whether to grant the petition. To the contrary, the written denial indicates that the court expressly identified Section 8(g) as the governing provision, recognized that its authority was permissive rather than mandatory, reviewed the “extensive records” of the underlying proceedings, and exercised its discretion to deny the expungement petition. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 24. In other words, the court did what it was authorized to do, and Janik presents no other grounds for disturbing the trial court's decision.

[14] Furthermore, our expungement caselaw confirms that a court exercising discretionary expungement authority may consider what the records show. In R.M. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, we affirmed the denial of a petition to expunge substantiated child abuse reports—even though the parent no longer posed a current threat to children—because the records would be relevant to future professional licensing decisions. 203 N.E.3d 559, 564–66 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (noting that the parent might decide to work with children). The same reasoning applies here. Janik's record—with a finding of dangerousness and a denial of a petition to return the firearms—may remain relevant to future proceedings or licensing decisions, and a court with permissive authority does not abuse its discretion by deciding this type of record should remain public.

[15] Section 8(g) also does not require the trial court to make special findings explaining the denial. The statute imposes no such obligation, and Trial Rule 52(A) otherwise requires special findings only when timely requested by a party—a request no one made here. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Janik's expungement petition.

II. Equal Protection Claim

[16] Janik argues that Section 8(g) “seeks uniform expungement for those no longer dangerous” and that the denial—allegedly “based on outdated findings without explanation”—arbitrarily distinguishes him from others eligible for relief. Appellant's Br. p. 4. To the extent this claim reasserts that the 2021 no-longer-dangerous finding rendered the court's prior findings irrelevant, it fails for the reasons discussed above. Janik's broader constitutional argument seems to be that the discretionary nature of Section 8(g) violates equal protection principles because similarly situated individuals might receive different outcomes. But that argument is undeveloped. Janik invokes what he calls “Indiana's equal protection clause” without identifying any specific constitutional provision. Id. He cites Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. 1994), which explains the difference between the federal Equal Protection Clause and Indiana's Privileges and Immunities Clause, but he does not bridge that distinction to the claim he makes. He also asserts that “others with similar pre-2025 findings get expunged absent current risks” without identifying a specific instance of such treatment. Appellant's Br. p. 4.

[17] Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) requires that an appellant's contentions be “supported by cogent reasoning” and by “citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on ․” A party risks waiver by failing to comply with this rule. Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). We prefer to resolve cases on the merits instead of on procedural grounds, but we do not reach the merits where briefing deficiencies are “sufficiently substantial to impede our consideration of the issue raised ․” Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Guardiola v. State, 375 N.E.2d 1105, 1107 (Ind. 1978)). As our Supreme Court has put it: “We will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on his behalf, ‘nor will we address arguments’ that are ‘too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.’ ” Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)).

[18] Janik's briefing deficiencies are sufficiently substantial to impede our review. We therefore do not further address the merits of his equal protection claim.

III. Collateral Challenges

[19] Portions of Janik's briefing seem to target the integrity of the 2018 hearing that resulted in the firearm retention order, with Janik alleging error related to a lack of appointed counsel, the admission of a deposition, the reliability of evidence, and the overall legitimacy of the dangerousness finding. See Appellant's Br. pp. 4–5. He also invokes New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), appearing to suggest that the retention order is constitutionally suspect under post-Bruen Second Amendment doctrine. The State argues that Janik is trying to collaterally attack the validity of the underlying order to retain his firearms, which is not permitted in an expungement proceeding. “A collateral attack is ‘a judicial proceeding pursued to avoid, defeat, evade[,] or deny the validity and effect of a valid judgment or decree.” Earl v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 91 N.E.3d 1066, 1071–72 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting In re Chapman, 466 N.E.2d 777, 780 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984), trans. denied), trans. denied. Janik disputes that he is trying to collaterally attack a final judgment, characterizing Section 8(g) as providing “an independent, remedial pathway for addressing lingering public records based on changed circumstances and current facts.” Reply Br. p. 2. Janik nevertheless maintains that “[p]rocedural due process was violated by the lack of counsel” in the underlying firearm retention proceedings. Id.

[20] To the extent Janik's appellate arguments challenge the validity and effect of the trial court's firearm retention order issued in 2018—rather than its instant expungement decision—those arguments constitute impermissible collateral attacks on a final judgment that we will not consider. Cf. In re Chapman, 466 N.E.2d at 780 (explaining that, in general, a trial court's judgment “is presumed valid until set aside and is not subject to collateral attack unless procured as a result of fraud”). We thus confined our review to the expungement decision.

Conclusion

[21] The trial court acted within its discretion in denying the expungement petition. Janik waived his equal protection claim due to inadequate briefing, and any challenge to the 2018 order is precluded as an impermissible collateral attack.

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Janik also sought reclassification of the case from an “MC” (Miscellaneous Criminal) cause number to a different case type and requested destruction of ballistics data and test-firing results. The trial court rejected each of these requests, and Janik does not challenge the disposition of these issues on appeal.

Foley, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.