IN RE: the Paternity of G.L.: (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Tara Misko (“Mother”) and Dwight D. Sizemore (“Father”) are the parents of G.L.R. (“Child”). Mother has had physical custody of Child since his birth in 2016. After being alerted to concerns about Child's safety in Mother's home, on August 11, 2025, Father filed an emergency motion for a change of custody. The juvenile court conducted a hearing, after which it determined that a change in circumstances had occurred, warranting a custody modification. The juvenile court awarded Father legal and residential custody of Child and restricted Mother's parenting time to telephonic or video “chats.” Mother appealed, arguing that the evidence does not support the juvenile court's findings and conclusions thereon regarding both its custody and visitation decisions. Because the evidence supports the juvenile court's factual findings and conclusions thereon, we conclude that the juvenile court acted within its discretion in modifying custody and in restricting Mother's parenting time with Child. Accordingly, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born to Mother and Father in Indiana on August 15, 2016. Father's paternity of Child was established on May 23, 2017. At that time, Mother resided in Indiana and retained full legal and residential custody of Child. Father, who resided in Kentucky, sought and was granted parenting time with Child.

[3] In January of 2022, Mother's then-fiancé (and now husband) (“Stepfather”) engaged in a suicidal episode in which he “had a loaded firearm in the house and said that he wanted to commit suicide or had thoughts about it.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 22–23. A few months later, the juvenile court held a hearing on April 6, 2022, at which Mother indicated that she would be moving to Columbus, Ohio, with Stepfather. Mother did not inform the juvenile court of Stepfather's mental-health issues during the hearing. The juvenile court ordered that Mother “shall continue to have legal and residential custody of [Child].” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 40.

[4] In July of 2022, Stepfather “left the house, [and] was threatening suicide by vehicle.” Tr. Vol. II p. 22. Mother advised law enforcement that Stepfather “had PTSD because of his military service,” and he was subsequently treated at the “VA Hospital for a period of time[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 35. Around the time of this second threat, Stepfather had been “driving [Child] to meet [Father] for parenting time, and [Father] had no idea[ ]” of either of Stepfather's threats to commit suicide. Tr. Vol. II p. 23.

[5] On March 9, 2023, Mother notified the juvenile court of her intent to relocate from Ohio to Fort Collins, Colorado. Mother indicated that Stepfather had accepted a residency position in Colorado and Mother was seeking a position as a Nurse Practitioner with the same employer. After they lived in Colorado for some time, Mother and Stepfather moved to Georgia with their family.

[6] Throughout her marriage to Stepfather, Mother and her half-sister Chelsea Strickland (“Maternal Aunt”) had been “really close.” Tr. Vol. II p. 10. Maternal Aunt and Mother would speak “every day, hours a day, and [she] knew [Mother's] entire relationship[ ]” with Stepfather, including allegations that Stepfather was verbally and emotionally abusive to Mother. Tr. Vol. II p. 10. At one point, Mother told Maternal Aunt that Stepfather had “spanked the sh[**] out of” another child living in the home for “backtalking[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 50. Mother and Stepfather had also made another child “clean the kitchen top to bottom. He was crying his eyes out, went to bed crying, and was crying [in the] morning.” Tr. Vol. II p. 49. Maternal Aunt “had multiple times urged [Mother] to leave the situation and the abuse from [Stepfather] that [Child] was living in.” Tr. Vol. II p. 11. In May of 2025, Mother stopped speaking to Maternal Aunt, with Maternal Aunt taking this as an indication that Mother had chosen “to protect [Stepfather] and not [Child].” Tr. Vol. II p. 11.

[7] Given her previous conversations with Mother, Maternal Aunt had concerns for Child's safety in Mother and Stepfather's home. Maternal Aunt specified that “over the course of their marriage, [Child] had been singled out. [Stepfather] is very -- not just verbally abusive, which he's very verbally abusive to [Mother], but the way he speaks to all of the children. So verbally abusive, but I do know that he was spanking the kids.” Tr. Vol. II p. 12. Mother had expressed concern to Maternal Aunt about Stepfather “hitting the kids” but claimed that “she couldn't control him ․ [or stop] him from doing it.” Tr. Vol. II p. 13. In August of 2025, Maternal Aunt reached out to Father to inform him of her fear for Child's safety in Mother and Stepfather's home.

[8] On August 11, 2025, Father filed an emergency motion for a change of custody. Prior to speaking with Maternal Aunt, Father had not been aware of “the abusive situation” in Mother and Stepfather's home or of Stepfather's “suicidal issues[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 22. Father obtained the police reports relating to Stepfather's suicidal threats and attempted to learn more about Stepfather's then-current mental status from Mother. Mother replied that “[i]t wasn't relevant to [him] at the time.” Tr. Vol. II p. 23. Mother refused to disclose any diagnosis that Stepfather might have had or whether he was receiving treatment of any kind. Father also spoke to “two previous au pairs[ ]” who had lived in Mother and Stepfather's home in Colorado about incidents of potential abuse that had occurred in the home. Tr. Vol. II p. 27.

[9] In filing his emergency motion, Father indicated that he did not believe that Child was safe in Mother and Stepfather's home. Father also indicated that while Mother claims that Child experiences behavioral issues in her home requiring punishment, Child does not experience any similar behavioral issues in his home. Father further indicated that he believes that Child had previously been harmed in Mother and Stepfather's home and that “domestic violence is a factor in the household.” Tr. Vol. II p. 32.

[10] During the evidentiary hearing on Father's motion, Mother admitted that she and Stepfather use corporal punishment on their children, including Child. Mother further admitted that Stepfather had previously used corporal punishment on Child. Mother claimed that their use of corporal punishment was “within normal state-issued, government-approved use.” Tr. Vol. II p. 42. Mother asserted that Child had never been harmed, there had never been marks left on Child's body as a result of corporal punishment, and Child had “never been spanked in any type of inappropriate manner.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 42–43. Contrary to Mother's claim, however, she acknowledged that one of the family's former au pairs had alleged in a TikTok video to have observed bruising on Child's buttocks. Mother indicated that she was “proud of the mother [Child] saw [her] be” at the time when Stepfather “spanked the sh[**] out of” the other Child and “stand[s] on how [she and Stepfather] parent our children.” Tr. Vol. II p. 55.

[11] Mother acknowledged that she had indicated to Father that she was not opposed to Child living with him but indicated that she's “certainly not sending [Child] under the guise of these threats that if I don't send him, you're calling CPS on me.” Tr. Vol. II p. 54. Mother was referring to a text message from Father that stated the following:

The only way I'm [g]oing to feel comfortable is if [Child] comes here immediately. He can talk to the same doctors and professionals here virtually. All in all I don't feel comfortable with him there until this is resolved. He can start school here and we can seek mediation and the courts [(sic)] assistance immediately. I can come get him on your own terms or I can call CPS. Either way until this is resolved I don't feel comfortable with him there.

Ex. Vol. p. 3. The juvenile court found that there was “nothing wrong” with Father's text message. Tr. Vol. II p. 71. The juvenile court further found that the text message “was appropriate and not threatening.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 20.

[12] Following the evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court determined that a change of circumstances had occurred that warranted a change of custody. In support, the juvenile court found that Father and Maternal Aunt were credible witnesses but that Mother was not and had not been forthright or candid with the juvenile court during previous hearings. The juvenile court granted Father “legal and residential custody” of Child. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 21. The juvenile court ordered that Mother's “parenting time should be restricted to telephonic or video chats because in[-]person parenting time may be injurious to the physical health or emotional well-being of [Child]” and appointed a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) to make further recommendations regarding Mother's long-term parenting time and contact with Child. Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 21–22.

Discussion and Decision

I. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Modifying Custody of Child

[13] “The court may not modify a child custody order unless: (1) modification is in the best interests of the child; and (2) there has been a substantial change in one (1) or more of the factors that the court may consider under section 2 ․ of this chapter.” Ind. Code § 31-14-13-6. The relevant factors to consider include

(1) The age and sex of the child.

(2) The wishes of the child's parents.

(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.

(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:

(A) the child's parents;

(B) the child's siblings; and

(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest.

(5) The child's adjustment to home, school, and community.

(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent.

(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto custodian[.]

Ind. Code § 31-14-13-2.

[14] “The [juvenile] court is vested with the sound discretion to make custody determinations, and we will uphold the [juvenile] court's judgment absent an abuse of discretion.” Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 893 N.E.2d 333, 335 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Liddy v. Liddy, 881 N.E.2d 62, 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) trans. denied). “A [juvenile] court's custody determination is afforded considerable deference as it is the [juvenile] court that sees the parties, observes their conduct and demeanor and hears their testimony.” Kondamuri v. Kondamuri, 852 N.E.2d 939, 945–46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Trost-Steffen v. Steffen, 772 N.E.2d 500, 509 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied). We will not reweigh evidence or reassess witness credibility. M.S. v. C.S., 938 N.E.2d 278, 281–82 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “We will not substitute our own judgment if any evidence or legitimate inferences support the [juvenile] court's judgment. The concern for finality in custody matters reinforces this doctrine.” Baxendale v. Raich, 878 N.E.2d 1252, 1257–58 (Ind. 2008) (citing Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002)). Ellenburg v. Kropp, 175 N.E.3d 1208, 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (brackets in Ellenburg), trans. denied.

[15] Furthermore, although neither party requested findings of facts or conclusions thereon, pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A), the juvenile court made numerous factual findings. As such, we employ a two-tiered standard of review:

we must first determine whether the record supports the factual findings, and then whether the findings support the judgment. Bryant v. Bryant, 693 N.E.2d 976, 977 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied. On appeal, we will not set aside the findings or judgment unless they are clearly erroneous, and “due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses.[ ]” K.I. ex rel. J.I. v. J.H., 903 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Ind. Trial R. 52(A)). We therefore consider only the evidence favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences flowing therefrom, and we will neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Bryant, 693 N.E.2d at 977. A judgment is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence to support the findings, the findings do not support the judgment, or the trial court applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts. K.I., 903 N.E.2d at 458.

M.S., 938 N.E.2d at 281–82.

A. The Juvenile Court's Findings Regarding Corporal Punishment Are Supported by the Evidence

[16] Mother claims that the juvenile court's findings regarding corporal punishment are not supported by the evidence. The juvenile court's findings regarding corporal punishment include:

10. [Mother] and [Stepfather] both use inappropriate corporal punishment by spanking [Child], age nine, and his step brothers, ages 12 and 13. [Mother] allows [Stepfather] to use corporal punishment on [Child].

11. One of the inappropriate punishments of the 12-year-old step brother involved “spanking the sh[**] out of” him ([Mother's] words) and making him clean the kitchen top to bottom resulting in him going to bed crying and waking up crying. This event was witnessed by [Child], and [Mother] unconceivably states that she is proud of the way [Child] saw her.

12. The corporal punishment used in the home by [Mother] and [Stepfather] is neither “state sanctioned” or “judicious” despite [Mother's] view that it is.

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25. The interaction and interrelationship of [Child] with [Mother] and [Stepfather] involves inappropriate discipline of [Child] combined with allowing him to witness inappropriate discipline of his step-siblings. I.C. § 31-14-13-2(4).

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 19, 21.

[17] Although Mother downplayed the punishment and qualified it as reasonable, the juvenile court had found that Mother was not a credible witness and had demonstrated a willingness to omit and downplay evidence during earlier hearings. Furthermore, contrary to Mother's assertion that there was no evidence that Child had ever been physically harmed by her or Stepfather's use of corporal punishment, there was evidence in the record that one of the family's former au pairs had claimed to have observed bruising on Child's buttocks. While we express no opinion on the use of corporal punishment as a parenting tool, the evidence supports the juvenile court's determination that the corporal punishment used by Mother and Stepfather went beyond reasonable use. Mother's challenge to the juvenile court's findings regarding corporal punishment amounts to nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Ellenburg, 175 N.E.3d at 1210.

B. The Juvenile Court's Findings Regarding Domestic Abuse Are Supported by the Evidence

[18] Mother claims that the juvenile court's findings regarding domestic abuse are not supported by the evidence. The juvenile court's findings regarding domestic abuse include:

13. [Mother] is subjected to verbal and emotional domestic violence by [Stepfather].

14. [Maternal Aunt] reported this domestic violence and inappropriate disciple to [Father] in August 2025 to protect [Child] because she had concerns about [Child's] well-being in the home of [Mother]. Also, in August 2025, [Mother] and her family, including [Child], relocated to Georgia from Colorado for [Stepfather's] work.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 19.

[19] Mother asserts that “[t]here is simply no evidence to support these findings.” Appellant's Br. p. 19. However, despite Mother's claim to the contrary, these findings are supported by Maternal Aunt's testimony, including testimony that Maternal Aunt had observed signs of abuse in Mother and Stepfather's marriage, Mother and Maternal Aunt had discussed Maternal Aunt's concerns about Stepfather's behavior and Child's safety, and Mother had told Maternal Aunt about Stepfather's verbal and emotional abuse, calling him a “monster[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 47. Mother's challenge to the juvenile court's findings regarding the presence of domestic abuse in Mother's home again amounts to an invitation for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Ellenburg, 175 N.E.3d at 1210.

C. The Juvenile Court's Findings Regarding Stepfather's Mental Health Are Supported by the Evidence

[20] The juvenile court concluded that “[t]he mental health of [Stepfather] is in question given there is no credible evidence before the Court of his treatment of suicidal ideations and PTSD.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 21. Mother claims that this conclusion is not supported by the record. Father presented evidence detailing two instances in which Stepfather had voiced suicidal ideations in 2022. Mother acknowledged these episodes but claimed that Stepfather had received mental-health treatment and had been permitted to continue working as a physician. Mother did not provide any specifics about Stepfather's treatment, and the juvenile court found that Mother was not a credible witness, noting that Mother had previously hidden information regarding Stepfather's mental state from the court. Mother's challenge to this conclusion again amounts to nothing more than a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Ellenburg, 175 N.E.3d at 1210.

D. The Juvenile Court's Findings Regarding the Threat to Child Are Supported by the Evidence

[21] In restricting Mother's parenting time with Child, the juvenile court concluded that Mother's “parenting time should be restricted to telephonic or video chats because in[-]person parenting time may be injurious to the physical health or emotional well-being of [Child.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 21–22. Mother claims that the evidence does not support the juvenile court's conclusion that Child is endangered in her care and that the juvenile court's conclusion is based on speculation and surmise. Contrary to Mother's claim, the evidence establishes that there is domestic abuse present in Mother and Stepfather's home; that Stepfather has experienced suicidal ideations, with one instance involving a loaded firearm in the home; and that both Mother and Stepfather have demonstrated a willingness to employ corporal punishment beyond reasonable levels. Mother also reports that Child has behavioral issues in her home that require punishment, which are not present when Child is with Father. We agree with Father that “Mother continues to deny and/or downplay the problems inside her house.” Appellee's Br. p. 8. Given Mother's apparent unwillingness to address the juvenile court's concerns for Child's safety, we conclude that the facts support the juvenile court's conclusion that in-person visitation with Mother in her home may constitute a threat to Child's well-being.

E. The Juvenile Court's Findings Regarding the Change of Circumstances Warranting Modification Are Supported by the Evidence

[22] Finally, Mother claims that the juvenile court's findings do not support its conclusion that a change in circumstances has occurred, arguing that the juvenile court's order was issued to punish Mother and conflates potential contemptuous acts by Mother as Child's best interests.² Mother bases this claim on her unsuccessful challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court's findings and conclusions thereon. As is relevant in this case, the juvenile court found the following changes to the parties’ circumstances: Father wishes to have custody of Child to protect Child's safety and well-being, Mother and Stepfather's willingness to use inappropriate discipline and to allow Child to witness inappropriate discipline of other children living in the family's home, concerns about Stepfather's mental health, and concerns about domestic violence in Mother and Stepfather's home. The juvenile court noted that while some of these changes in circumstances may have actually occurred prior to the earlier custody orders, the parties presented “new, relevant information ․ to the Court for the first time.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 21. Based on our review of the record, we cannot say that the juvenile court abused its discretion by determining that a change in circumstances had occurred that would warrant a change of custody.

II. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Restricting Mother's Parenting Time

[23] Mother alternatively contends that even if the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in modifying custody, the court abused its discretion in restricting her parenting time with Child.

In making and reviewing parenting time decisions, courts are required to “give foremost consideration to the best interests of the child.” Perkinson v. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Marlow v. Marlow, 702 N.E.2d 733, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied). Parenting time decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and because they typically turn on the facts, will be set aside only when they are clearly erroneous. Id.

Indiana recognizes the right of noncustodial parents “to visit with their children is a ‘sacred and precious privilege.’ ” Appolon v. Faught, 796 N.E.2d 297, 300 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting McCauley v. McCauley, 678 N.E.2d 1290, 1292 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied). A child “has the correlative right to receive parenting time from the noncustodial parent because it is presumed to be in the child's best interest.” Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d at 764; see Ind. Parenting Time Guidelines § I(E)(5).

Roper v. Roper, 223 N.E.3d 732, 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).

[24] Generally, “[a] noncustodial parent is entitled to reasonable parenting time rights unless the court finds, after a hearing, that parenting time might: (1) endanger the child's physical health and well-being; or (2) significantly impair the child's emotional development.” Ind. Code § 31-14-14-1(a). “[T]he court shall not restrict a parent's parenting time rights unless the court finds that the parenting time might endanger the child's physical health or significantly impair the child's emotional development.” Ind. Code § 31-17-4-2.

We have stated that even though Indiana Code Section 31-14-14-1 “uses the term ‘might,’ this court interprets the statute to mean that a court may not restrict visitation unless that visitation would endanger the child's physical health or well-being or significantly impair the child's emotional development.” Farrell v. Littell, 790 N.E.2d 612, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Stewart v. Stewart, 521 N.E.2d 956, 960 n. 3 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), trans. denied, which interpreted predecessor to modification statute for dissolution proceedings). “By its plain language, Indiana Code section 31-14-14-1 requires a court to make a specific finding of physical endangerment or emotional impairment prior to placing a restriction on the noncustodial parent's visitation.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). “A party who seeks to restrict a parent's visitation rights bears the burden of presenting evidence justifying such a restriction.” Id.

In re Paternity of P.B., 932 N.E.2d 712, 719 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (emphasis in original).

[25] With regard to parenting time, the juvenile court ordered the following:

31. The Court finds that [Mother's] parenting time should be restricted to telephonic or video chats because in person parenting time may be injurious to the physical health or emotional well-being of the minor child based upon the findings of fact set forth above. These chats may be initiated at the request of [Child] or by [Mother]. The chats shall be supervised at all time[s] by [Father]. 32. The Court appoints Amy Stein as Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”) in this matter to make further recommendations to the Court regarding [Mother's] long term parenting time and contact with the minor child. [Mother] shall pay all costs involved with the GAL. Once the GAL has completed her report and recommendations, she shall file it with the Court.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 21–22.

[26] Initially, we do not find the juvenile court's conclusion to be insufficient merely because it included the word “may” as opposed to “would” with regard to the threat to Child's physical health or emotional well-being. As is outlined above, the juvenile court's additional findings support its determination that it would be a threat to Child's physical and mental well-being to remain in Mother's home. At the time of the hearing, Mother resided in Georgia and Father resided in Kentucky. As such, in order for Mother to exercise non-restricted, in-person parenting time with Child, Child would be required to travel to Georgia and stay in Mother's home. Moreover, we note that the juvenile court's order regarding parenting time is temporary, as the juvenile court appointed a GAL to make further recommendations regarding long-term parenting time arrangements. Given the concerns regarding domestic abuse in Mother's home and the effect such abuse was having on Child, we cannot say that the juvenile court abused its discretion in determining that allowing Mother to exercise non-restricted parenting time in her home would threaten Child's physical health or emotional well-being.

[27] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Mother cites to In re Paternity of B.Y., 159 N.E.3d 575 (Ind. 2020), in support of this claim. In In re B.Y., the Indiana Supreme Court expressed concern that the juvenile court had conflated Mother's contempt of court with the best interest of B.Y. in making its custody determination. 159 N.E.3d at 579. In reversing the juvenile court's custody determination, the Indiana Supreme Court stated that “[t]o be sure, no party in this case is without fault. But when it comes to the most important aspect of these proceedings—the wellbeing and best interests of B.Y.—no party would have been harmed by more deliberate proceedings and additional factfinding.” Id. This case is easily distinguished from In re B.Y., because in this case, the change of custody was based upon concerns for domestic violence in the home, inappropriate punishment, and potentially untreated mental illness, not as a punishment for some failure to act in accordance with the juvenile court's prior orders.

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur