Jeffrey Starn, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Jeffrey Starn appeals his conviction for Level 1 felony child molesting, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting testimony about behavioral changes observed in the victim before and after the victim's disclosure of abuse. Because that testimony reflected personal observations—not opinions on the victim's credibility—it did not constitute impermissible vouching under Indiana Evidence Rule 704(b), contrary to Starn's claim. We affirm.

Facts

[2] Starn and his son, S.S., met N.B. at church. S.S. and N.B. developed a close relationship, and N.B. routinely spent weekends at Starn's home. Starn also volunteered in Boy Scout activities in which N.B. was active.

[3] In April 2017 or 2018, when N.B. was 11 or 12 years old, N.B. traveled with Starn, S.S., and other individuals to Indianapolis for S.S.’s birthday. They all stayed overnight in an empty apartment recently vacated by Starn's daughter. While others slept in the living room, Starn set up an air mattress in the bedroom, where N.B. was playing video games.

[4] N.B. testified that he fell asleep on the air mattress next to Starn and woke up after detecting Starn's movement. Starn moved over N.B., pulled down N.B.’s pants and underwear, and performed oral sex on him for one to two minutes. N.B., “in complete shock,” eventually said, “Jeff, Jeff, wake up” and “get off me.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 50. Starn stopped and rested his head on N.B.’s stomach, and N.B. left the bed. N.B. then went to the bathroom, cleaned Starn's saliva from his penis, and cried quietly. Afterward, N.B. slept in the bedroom but not on the air mattress with Starn.

[5] The next morning N.B. said nothing. When he arrived home, he messaged Starn on Snapchat and asked whether Starn remembered what he had done. Starn responded: “I must've been sleeping, that makes me sick to my stomach.” Id. at 52.

[6] N.B. maintained contact with the Starn family for a time. But over the following years, N.B. distanced himself. He stopped participating in Scouts and other social activities. He stopped wanting to visit the Starns. He retreated to his bedroom. N.B.’s grades fell, prompting his school to contact his parents. They attributed the changes in N.B.’s behavior to normal teenage angst.

[7] That changed in March 2022, when N.B. told a close friend, L.W., about his molestation by Starn. L.W. urged N.B. to tell his parents. N.B. did so later that day, and his parents called 911. As a result of the subsequent police investigation, the State charged Starn with Level 1 felony child molesting.

[8] Those close to N.B. noticed an immediate shift in his behavior after he disclosed the molestation. His grades recovered, and he eventually graduated from high school early. He grew closer to his siblings and his parents and reengaged in various activities that he had abandoned in the years following the molestation.

[9] Starn's bench trial began nearly two years after he was charged. Before opening arguments, Starn moved to exclude testimony from N.B.’s parents and L.W. about N.B.’s behavioral changes before and after his disclosure. The trial court denied the motion in part, drawing the following testimonial line: witnesses “can certainly testify as to what they've observed” but may not testify to “what they understand [the behavior] to actually mean or how they've interpreted it.” Id. at 9.

[10] During the State's case-in-chief, L.W. testified that, before N.B.’s disclosure, N.B. was “distancing himself and quiet, not like how we all knew him back in like 2016.” Id. at 15. L.W. testified that, after N.B.’s disclosure, N.B. was “more freely able to talk about himself.” Id. at 16.

[11] N.B.’s father testified that after the alleged molestation but before N.B.’s disclosure of it, N.B. stayed in his room more, stopped participating in Scouting and social activities, and had no interest in visiting the Starn home. N.B.’s father had attributed those changes at the time to “typical type teen stuff.” Id. at 23. N.B.’s father testified that, after N.B.’s disclosure, “[t]he old [N.B.] was back” in that N.B. was re-engaging with his family, wanting to engage in activities again, and opening up to his parents. Id. at 25.

[12] When the prosecutor later asked N.B.’s mother about N.B.’s behavioral changes, defense counsel objected, arguing the testimony constituted vouching. The trial court overruled the objection. N.B.’s mother proceeded to testify that, after the Indianapolis trip, N.B. did not want anything to do with Scouting or with friends, did not want to visit the Starns, and had dropping grades and increased calls from school. After N.B.’s disclosure, she testified, his grades improved, he graduated a semester early, and he grew closer to his siblings and parents.

[13] N.B. also testified about his own behavioral changes. He told the court that the molestation made him “super depressed” and that he spent the majority of his time in his bedroom and “kind of just led [his] life down a really lonely path.” Id. at 55. He testified that disclosing the abuse to his friend felt “almost like a weight got lifted off [his] shoulder.” Id. at 57. Starn did not object to this testimony.

[14] Starn testified in his defense and denied molesting N.B. But the trial court ultimately found N.B. “very credible” and could not “find a reason for [N.B.] to say what he said unless it's true.” Id. at 183-84. The court found Starn guilty of Level 1 felony child molesting as charged and sentenced him to 29 years imprisonment, with all but 4 years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction. Starn appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[15] Starn argues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the testimony of N.B.’s parents and L.W. regarding N.B.’s behavioral changes before and after he disclosed he was molested by Starn (hereinafter, the “behavioral testimony”). He claims the behavioral testimony was impermissible vouching and therefore inadmissible. We typically review a trial court's evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. Barbee v. State, 269 N.E.3d 888, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). An abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling “ ‘is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances’ before the court.’ ” Id. (quoting McCoy v. State, 193 N.E.3d 387, 390 (Ind. 2022)). We will sustain the ruling on any reasonable basis apparent in the record. Washburn v. State, 121 N.E.3d 657, 661 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Errors in the admission of evidence are harmless unless they affect a party's “ ‘substantial rights.’ ” Barbee, 269 N.E.3d at 894 (quoting Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1238 (Ind. 2012)).¹

I. The Behavioral Testimony Was Not Impermissible Vouching

[16] Indiana Evidence Rule 704 specifies that “[t]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue.” Evid. R. 704(a). However, the rule prohibits witnesses from testifying to “opinions concerning intent, guilt, or innocence in a criminal case; the truth or falsity of allegations; whether a witness has testified truthfully; or legal conclusions.” Evid. R. 704(b). The vouching testimony prohibited by Rule 704(b) invades the province of the factfinder in determining the weight to give a witness's testimony. Henson v. State, 237 N.E.3d 1160, 1165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). “[I]t is essential that the trier of fact determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence.” Gutierrez v. State, 961 N.E.2d 1030, 1034 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

[17] Testimony that is the functional equivalent of an opinion on a witness's truthfulness—“indirect vouching”—is equally prohibited. Sampson v. State, 38 N.E.3d 985, 991-92 (Ind. 2015) (prohibiting testimony that child victim showed signs of coaching when the defense had not opened the door to such testimony); see also Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1236-37 (Ind. 2012) (prohibiting testimony that child victim is not prone to exaggerate or fantasize about sexual matters after finding that such “indirect vouching testimony is little different than testimony that the child witness is telling the truth”). The testimony of N.B.’s parents and L.W. was neither direct nor indirect vouching.

[18] The distinction that matters here is between a credibility opinion, prohibited by Sampson and Hoglund, and a factual observation. Sampson, 38 N.E.3d at 991-92; Hoglund, 962 N.E.2d at 1236-37. A mother testifying that her son stopped participating in Scouting activities is not the same as the doctor in Hoglund testifying that her patient “was not prone to exaggerate or fantasize about sexual matters.” Hoglund, 962 N.E.2d at 1232. The former is a raw observation. The latter is an expert's professional assessment of a child's propensity for truthfulness on the exact topic at issue. See id. at 1237 (“This indirect vouching testimony is little different than testimony that the child witness is telling the truth.”). Rule 704(b) prohibits the latter, but it does not bar a parent or friend from describing what they saw, which is exactly what the trial court ruled. See State v. Velasquez, 944 N.E.2d 34, 46-47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

[19] Starn argues that the only reason to admit the behavioral testimony was to invite the factfinder to infer that N.B. was truthful. But corroboration is not vouching. Evidence may be probative of whether abuse occurred without expressing any opinion that the victim is telling the truth.

[20] For instance, a witness may testify about a victim's demeanor. See, e.g., Robey v. State, 7 N.E.3d 371, 380 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (finding no improper vouching when a witness described a child victim's demeanor as “matter of fact” and further testified that such responses did not surprise her “because it's a very normalized behavior for that child”); Velasquez, 944 N.E.2d at 44, 46-47 (ruling that a licensed clinical social worker's testimony regarding a child victim's demeanor when discussing the defendant, as well as the child's grandmother's testimony that the child was screaming, having nightmares, and bedwetting after the molestation, did not constitute improper vouching, given that this testimony was about the child's behavior and did not constitute opinions on the child's credibility).

[21] The evidence of N.B.’s changed behavior falls squarely within the net of Indiana Evidence Rule 401. This rule, which defines relevant evidence, sets a deliberately low bar: evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency” to make a fact of consequence more or less probable. Evid. R. 401. The behavior evidence clears that bar with ease on two independent grounds.

[22] First, and most directly, Starn himself placed the timing of N.B.’s disclosure at the center of his defense. During opening arguments, Starn characterized N.B.’s allegations as coming “out of the blue” years after the alleged molestation—explicitly inviting the jury to draw an adverse inference from the delay. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 12-13. Once Starn injected that theory into the proceedings, behavioral evidence that directly undermined it became not just relevant but essential. Evidence that N.B. exhibited changed behavior following the incident made Starn's “out of the blue” characterization demonstrably less probable—precisely the function Rule 401 contemplates.

[23] Second, the behavioral evidence gave the jury the context necessary to evaluate the delayed disclosure on accurate terms, transforming what Starn framed as a suspicious gap into an understandable human response. Both purposes—rebutting a defense theory and providing context to the factfinder—go to facts of consequence in determining guilt or innocence. See Evid. R. 401(b). That the evidence also happened to corroborate N.B.’s account does not strip it of its relevance or convert it into an improper credibility opinion. See Velasquez, 944 N.E.2d at 44, 46-47. Corroboration has never been the test for vouching—every piece of corroborating evidence a prosecutor introduces tends to make the victim's account more believable, and that incidental effect cannot be what disqualifies evidence under Rule 401. To hold otherwise would perversely exclude the most probative evidence at trial.

[24] The trial court carefully drew the line between admissible and inadmissible behavioral testimony before the presentation of evidence. The court told the parties explicitly that witnesses could testify to what they observed, but not to “what they understand [the behavior] to actually mean or how they've interpreted it.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 9. That ruling tracks the precise distinction Robey and Velasquez draw between impermissible opinion and permissible observation. Robey, 7 N.E.3d at 379-382; Velasquez, 944 N.E.2d at 46-47. The trial court thus identified the correct legal standard and applied it on the record before any witness took the stand. We find no abuse of discretion.

II. Any Error in Admitting the Behavioral Testimony Was Harmless

[25] Even if some portion of the witnesses’ behavioral testimony improperly crossed from observation into credibility inference, any error in the admission of that testimony would be harmless. An evidentiary error is harmless when “the conviction is supported by substantial independent evidence of guilt satisfying the reviewing court there is no substantial likelihood the challenged evidence contributed to the conviction.” Hoglund, 962 N.E.2d at 1238. Error is also harmless “if the same or similar evidence has been admitted without objection or contradiction.” Id.

[26] Both conditions are met here. First, N.B. testified unequivocally that Starn “put his mouth on [N.B.’s] penis and started sucking on it.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 49. The trial court found N.B. “very credible” and could not “find a reason for [N.B.] to say what he said unless it's true.” Id. at 183-84. “The testimony of a sole child victim is sufficient to sustain a conviction for molestation.” Hoglund, 962 N.E.2d at 1238.

[27] Second, N.B. testified without objection that the incident made him “super depressed,” he “spent the majority of [his] time inside [his] own room,” and his disclosure of the molestation felt “like a weight got lifted off [his] shoulder.” Tr. Vol. II, pp. 55, 57. He also testified that he gradually stopped seeing the Starns after the molestation, his grades fell, and he stopped participating in Scouting. This is the same behavioral trajectory L.W. and N.B.’s parents described. Because N.B.’s own unchallenged testimony described identical behavioral changes, any error in admitting the observations of those around him was cumulative and harmless. See Hoglund, 962 N.E.2d at 1240 (determining that vouching evidence cumulative of other evidence was harmless).

Conclusion

[28] The behavioral testimony of N.B.’s parents and L.W. reflected personal observations, not direct or indirect opinions on N.B.’s credibility. This testimony therefore did not constitute impermissible vouching under Indiana Evidence Rule 704(b). The trial court identified the correct legal standard, applied it on the record, and admitted only what the law permits. Even if an error occurred, N.B.’s own unchallenged testimony describing the same behavioral changes rendered any error harmless.

[29] We affirm the trial court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State claims that Starn waived the vouching issue by largely failing to contemporaneously object to the testimony of L.W. and N.B.’s father. This failure to object would ordinarily waive claims on appeal of vouching. See, e.g., Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 651 (Ind. 2018) (quoting Bunch v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1285, 1287 (Ind. 2002) (“A party's failure to object to an alleged error at trial results in waiver, also known as ‘procedural default’ or ‘forfeiture.’ ”). The Indiana Supreme Court, however, has amended Indiana Evidence Rule 103(b) to provide that, “[o]nce the court rules definitively on the record—either before trial or at trial—a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.” Indiana Supreme Court, Order Amending Rules of Evidence, Case No. 26S-MS-8, Exh. A (March 6, 2026). Although that amendment does not take effect until July 1, 2026, and therefore does not govern this appeal, we address on the merits all the evidentiary challenges raised by Starn—both waived and not waived—for purposes of judicial economy.

Weissmann, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Foley, J., concur.