Thomas E. Neal, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A jury convicted Thomas E. Neal of Level 1 felony child molesting.¹ On appeal, Neal alleges Victim's testimony was incredibly dubious and therefore insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In September 2023, Neal and his wife began babysitting Victim and her two siblings. They lived in a two-story home with a basement containing a bedroom, an office space, a television, and a couch. The Neals babysat Victim and her siblings because their mother had to work. Although there was no set schedule, the Neals often cared for the children in the afternoons, evenings, and during weekends. At times, the school bus left Victim and her siblings at the Neals’ home.

[3] Soon after Neal took over as babysitter, he began doing “bad things” to Victim. Tr. Vol. 2 at 75. Over the next several months, Neal would take Victim to the basement and touch her private area under her clothes as she sat on the couch. Sometimes Neal would “pull [Victim's] pants down” and apply “gel ․ or something” to her private area. Id. at 76. On one occasion, Neal told Victim that “he had a movie picked out for [her]” which turned out to be an “inappropriate movie[ ], like adults doing bad things[.]” Id. at 77. On a different day, Neal “knew [Victim] was cold and started touching [her] under the blanket” as she and her brother watched television. Id. at 78. During another incident, Neal gave Victim his phone so she could play. As she sat on the couch in the basement, Neal “sat down next to [her] and started going to his private part and taking it out and showing [it to her].” Id. at 79. He then “stood up and put it in” Victim's mouth. Id. She moved away, but “he started moving closer[.]” Id. Victim tried to scream but could not. The last time Victim reported Neal reached under her clothes was on the afternoon of March 9, 2024, when he “started touching [her] in the same area in the living room.” Id. at 81. Victim told her mother later that night about the molesting, and her mother contacted law enforcement. At the time of these events, Victim was eight years old. Neal was fifty-eight.

[4] A few days after her disclosure, Victim underwent a forensic interview at a children's advocacy center. There, she recounted the abuse and described Neal's genital area. Detective Jason Lancaster of the Bartholomew County Sheriff's Department interviewed Neal about Victim's allegations. Neal denied any inappropriate contact with Victim. When Detective Lancaster inquired whether Victim had ever seen Neal's genitals, Neal answered, “I don't think so.” Id. at 105. Neal similarly denied having any marks on his genital area. Detective Lancaster later executed a warrant to photograph Neal's penis and genital area. During execution of the warrant at the county jail, Detective Lancaster observed marks on Neal's genital area consistent with Victim's description. As Detective Lancaster was taking photographs, Neal “pointed to one of the marks and wanted to let [the detective] know that that was a spider bite.” Id. at 110.

[5] The State subsequently charged Neal with Level 1 felony child molesting. Because Neal had in the past been convicted of several unrelated felonies, the State also alleged Neal was a habitual offender.² A jury trial was held on March 12, 2025. Victim, who was nine at the time, her mother, Detective Lancaster, and Neal's wife all testified.

[6] At trial, Victim's mother described Victim's demeanor when Victim disclosed the molesting. She testified Victim was visibly scared, and “looked absolutely terrified to tell [her]” about the abuse. Id. at 95. Victim recounted the molesting she experienced at Neal's home. When the prosecutor asked why she had not told anyone earlier, Victim responded: “Because I was scared that they wouldn't care about it.” Id. at 80. She was sure Neal had placed his penis in her mouth and testified his genital area had “like a giant mole on it.” Id. at 79. Detective Lancaster corroborated Victim's description of Neal's genital area, and the photographs he took at the county jail were admitted into evidence.

[7] On cross-examination, Neal asked Victim whether she recalled telling the forensic interviewer Neal's wife had seen her and Neal together. At first Victim denied having done so. After a short recess, Neal presented Victim with statements she made to the forensic interviewer. With her memory refreshed, Victim testified she had informed the interviewer Neal's wife had seen him and Victim together. Neal's wife stated she never saw anything inappropriate transpire between Neal and Victim.

[8] The jury returned a guilty verdict and found Neal was a habitual offender.

Victim's testimony was not incredibly dubious and sufficient evidence supports Neal's conviction.

[9] Neal argues the evidence the State presented was insufficient to support his conviction for child molesting. He alleges Victim offered “vague descriptions of [his] touching and/or attempting sexual contact” without pinpointing when they took place. Appellant's Br. at 11. In Neal's view, Victim's testimony “was inherently contradictory” on the “important issue” of whether his wife was a witness to the molesting. Id. at 12. He therefore urges this Court to apply the incredible dubiosity rule and reverse his conviction.

[10] A sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim warrants a “deferential standard of review in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility[.]’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied). Instead, we respect the factfinder's exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence, Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018), and consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact, Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). It is “not necessary that the evidence ‘overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ ” Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind. 1995)).

[11] A person commits child molesting when they knowingly or intentionally perform or submit to sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct with a child under fourteen years of age. I.C. § 35-42-4-3(a). If committed by a person who is at least twenty-one years of age, the offense is a Level 1 felony. I.C. § 35-42-4-3(a)(1). And under Indiana Code Section 35-31.5-2-221.5, “other sexual conduct” is defined, in relevant part, as involving “a sex organ of one ․ person and the mouth ․ of another person[.]”

[12] In general, the uncorroborated testimony of the victim is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012). We may make an exception, however, when that testimony is incredibly dubious. The incredible dubiosity rule allows the reviewing court to impinge upon the factfinder's responsibility to judge the credibility of witnesses when confronted with evidence that is “so unbelievable, incredible, or improbable that no reasonable person could ever reach a guilty verdict based upon that evidence alone.” Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 751 (Ind. 2015). We apply the rule where there is: “1) a sole testifying witness; 2) testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; and 3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 756. Application of the incredible dubiosity rule is “rare[,] and the standard to be applied is whether the testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it.” Love v. State, 761 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 2002). Although incredible dubiosity “provides a standard that is ‘not impossible’ to meet, it is a ‘difficult standard to meet, [and] one that requires great ambiguity and inconsistency in the evidence.’ ” Moore, 27 N.E.3d at 756 (quoting Edwards v. State, 753 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. 2001)).

[13] In this case, Victim was the sole testifying witness about the molesting she endured. Yet the State presented evidence to corroborate Victim's testimony. Detective Lancaster confirmed Victim's description of Neal's genital area, and the trial court admitted the photographs he took into evidence. Victim's mother testified how distraught Victim was when Victim disclosed what had been occurring at Neal's home. The circumstantial evidence renders the incredible dubiosity rule inapplicable. See Dean v. State, 222 N.E.3d 976, 988 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied; see also Toles v. State, 151 N.E.3d 805, 808–09 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (rejecting applicability of incredible dubiosity where only one element of the rule was satisfied), trans. denied.

[14] Even if we disregard any corroborating evidence, Victim testified Neal took her to the basement on numerous occasions and touched her under her clothes. She recounted Neal lured her to the basement to watch what turned out to be a pornographic film. Victim consistently detailed Neal touching her private area with his hands, the part she uses to go “[n]umber one.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 76; see also id. at 75, 78, 81. Victim was sure Neal placed his penis in her mouth. She stated Neal's genital area had visible marks, “like a giant mole[.]” Id. at 79. Victim never wavered in alleging Neal touched her repeatedly and placed his male organ into her mouth. Her testimony was not contradictory or equivocal, and Neal does not argue the testimony was the result of coercion.

[15] Neal would have us disregard Victim's testimony in part because it was insufficiently “anchored in time or place.” Appellant's Br. at 11. But Victim testified Neal began “doing bad things” sometime in October 2023 until she finally told her mother what was happening in March 2024. Tr. Vol. 2 at 75. She further stated the molesting occurred in the basement and at least once in the living room. We are not persuaded Victim's testimony is contradictory or equivocal simply because Victim did not more precisely identify the times Neal molested her. See Williams v. State, 170 N.E.3d 237, 244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (holding testimony not incredibly dubious even though witness could not recall exactly when, within the charged time period, the crimes occurred), trans. denied.

[16] Lastly, Neal argues Victim's testimony was “inherently contradictory” because—after he presented her with past statements—she acknowledged telling the forensic interviewer Neal's wife had seen her and Neal together. Appellant's Br. at 12. Neal's wife denied noticing anything inappropriate. First, we note the incredible dubiosity rule applies only when a witness contradicts herself “in a single statement or while testifying, not to conflicts between multiple statements.” Glenn v. State, 884 N.E.2d 347, 356 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. Second, whatever discrepancy may exist in Victim's account, “ambiguities, inconsistencies, and even wholesale revisions of testimony do not require reversal if there was any basis on which a reasonable fact-finder could choose between conflicting accounts or reconcile inconsistencies.” C.S. v. State, 71 N.E.3d 848, 853 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Edwards v. State, 753 N.E.2d 618, 623 (Ind. 2001)); see also Chambles v. State, 119 N.E.3d 182, 193 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“When a witness's trial testimony contradicts a statement she made before trial, it is the jury's province to decide which statement to believe.”), trans. denied.

[17] Having already concluded Victim's testimony as a whole was not contradictory or equivocal, we will not impinge on the jury's credibility determination here.

Conclusion

[18] Victim's testimony was not incredibly dubious, and sufficient evidence supports Neal's conviction.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1) (2022).

2.   Neal was previously convicted of two counts of Class C felony forgery and one count of Class D felony escape. The habitual offender charge is not at issue here.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.