RAYBURN v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Thomas Rayburn challenges his sentence following his conviction for stalking, as a Level 4 felony. He raises the sole issue of whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Rayburn and S.T. had been in a dating relationship. In June 2022, Rayburn was convicted of stalking S.T., and S.T. obtained a protective order against him on May 10, 2023. Despite the protective order, Rayburn had contact with S.T. on multiple occasions in 2023. Rayburn knew where S.T. worked and contacted her place of employment in an attempt to obtain a job there. Rayburn also knew where S.T.’s children went to school and, on at least one occasion, pulled into the school parking lot when S.T. was there, even though he had no legitimate reason to be there. And Rayburn knew of a park where S.T. worked out, and on several occasions, he went to the park at the same time S.T. was there. On one such occasion, Rayburn saw S.T. leave the park, noticed she seemed to be having car problems and had pulled over to the side of the road, and offered her assistance. Rayburn also once followed S.T. while she was driving on Calumet Avenue. On August 24, 2023, S.T. made a police report that a GPS device had been placed on her vehicle.

[3] On September 12, 2023, the State charged Rayburn in the instant case with Level 4 felony stalking, Level 5 felony stalking, Level 6 felony unlawful surveillance, and two counts of Level 6 felony invasion of privacy. Between September and December of 2024, Rayburn made multiple public posts on his Instagram account, saying to call Josh, which was a nickname used between him and S.T. Rayburn sent pictures of S.T. to psychics and communicated with “twin flames,” which is a psychic group that believes two souls can be “joined together forever and [that one should] do anything [one] can to be with that other soul.” Tr. at 49. On multiple occasions in January 2025, Rayburn parked his vehicle at a gas station facing Calumet Avenue and appeared to wait for S.T. to pass the location before leaving and following her. On January 30, 2025, under cause number 45G03-2501-F4-25, the State charged Rayburn with four additional counts of stalking S.T.

[4] On August 22, Rayburn entered into a plea agreement in the instant case, agreeing to plead guilty to Level 4 felony stalking in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges, the dismissal of the four stalking charges that had been filed under cause number 45G03-2501-F4-25, and an agreement that his maximum sentence would be limited to ten years. The trial court held a sentencing hearing on October 30. At the time of sentencing, Rayburn had previously been convicted of Class A misdemeanor stalking, Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy, Level 6 felony criminal recklessness, and Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. S.T. was the victim in three of those prior convictions. In addition, Rayburn had previously had his probation terminated or discharged unsatisfactorily on two occasions and was on probation when he committed the offense in this case.

[5] S.T. provided a victim impact statement at the sentencing hearing. She explained that she had met Rayburn at a time when she was going through a “horrible divorce[.]” Id. at 59. As their relationship progressed, Rayburn became controlling and manipulative. He would show up uninvited with gifts and groceries, would call her multiple times per day, and would take pictures of the calendar where she kept her and her children's schedules. When she tried to express her concerns, Rayburn would blame her and try to make her feel guilty by telling her everything he was doing for her. Rayburn had hacked into S.T.’s phone and email accounts and placed tracking devices on her car. Rayburn had yelled at one of S.T.’s friends that he “just need[ed] to have sex with her.” Id. at 61. He had told another of S.T.’s friends that he would run S.T. off the road if she went out at night because he thought she was going on dates.

[6] S.T. also stated that she had been contacted by psychics who had told her that Rayburn was trying to pay them to cast spells on her and that they were concerned her life could be in danger. In addition, Rayburn had moved S.T.’s Ring cameras in order to look into her windows at night. Rayburn had looked up S.T.’s contact information and attempted to cyber stalk her from a correctional facility. That correctional facility had subsequently reached out to S.T. out of concern that her life was in danger.

[7] S.T. stated that Rayburn's actions had caused her to feel like she “was not even human anymore” but an object, and that she felt “hunted like an animal.” Id. at 63. Sometimes S.T.’s minor children were in the car with her while Rayburn “followed or watched” them. Id. S.T. stated that her children also had been living in fear due to Rayburn's stalking actions. She asked the court to “impose a maximum prison sentence, not out of revenge, but out of necessity[,]” because Rayburn had continued to engage in stalking behavior despite being “given so many opportunities to change[.]” Id. at 64.

[8] The court found that Rayburn's criminal history and recent violations of the conditions of his probation and pretrial release were aggravating circumstances. The court found as a mitigating circumstance that Rayburn admitted his guilt by way of a plea agreement. The court sentenced Rayburn to ten years and ordered that four years be executed in the DOC, two years be executed on work release, and four years be suspended to probation, with two of those years served using an ankle monitor. The court indicated that the work release could be served in Oklahoma if allowed by that state and that Rayburn's probation could be transferred to Oklahoma as well. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Rayburn contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. Article 7, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana Constitution “authorize[ ] independent appellate review and revision of a sentence imposed by the trial court.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g on other grounds, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). This appellate authority is implemented through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Id.

[10] As our Supreme Court recently explained,

Appellate Rule 7(B) serves “to leaven the outliers, rather than to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ sentence,” McCallister v. State, 91 N.E.3d 554, 566 (Ind. 2018), allowing revision of a sentence if the court finds the trial court's decision to be inappropriate in consideration of the nature of the offense and the offender's character, Inman v. State, 4 N.E.3d 190, 203 (Ind. 2014) (quoting App. R. 7(B)). “Ultimately, our constitutional authority to review and revise sentences boils down to our collective sense of what is appropriate,” Taylor v. State, 86 N.E.3d 157, 165 (Ind. 2017) (cleaned up), an act that is reserved for “exceptional” cases, Gibson v. State, 43 N.E.3d 231, 241 (Ind. 2015). It is up to the defendant to “persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence has met th[e] inappropriateness standard of review.” Childress [v. State], 848 N.E.2d [1073,] 1080 [(Ind. 2006)]. The trial court's sentence is afforded considerable deference and will stand unless [overcome by] “compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

Cramer v. State, 240 N.E.3d 693, 698 (Ind. 2024).

[11] The maximum sentence for a Level 4 felony is twelve years, and the trial court sentenced Rayburn to only ten years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5. In addition to dismissing numerous charges, Rayburn's plea agreement capped his sentence at ten years. “A defendant's conscious choice to enter a plea agreement that limits the trial court's discretion to a sentence less than the statutory maximum should usually be understood as strong and persuasive evidence of sentence reasonableness and appropriateness.” Childress, 848 N.E.2d at 1081 (Dickson, J., concurring). Courts assessing sentence appropriateness following such plea agreements should grant relief “only in the most rare, exceptional cases.” Id.

[12] When considering the nature of an offense, we look at the defendant's actions in comparison to the elements of the offense. Cannon v. State, 99 N.E.3d 274, 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. We focus “on the nature, extent and depravity of the offense ․ and what it reveals about the defendant's character.” Sorenson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 717, 729 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (internal quotation and citation omitted), trans. denied. Moreover, so long as a plea agreement does not state otherwise, we may consider facts that would have supported charges that were dismissed under the plea. See, e.g., Threatt v. State, 105 N.E.3d 199, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134, 1145 (Ind. 2013)), trans. denied.

[13] Here, the evidence shows that Rayburn's obsessive behavior toward S.T. extended over a period of years and included stalking her both electronically and in person, even after he had been previously convicted of stalking her and even though there was a protective order in place. In fact, the attempted cyber stalking took place even when Rayburn was incarcerated. Rayburn's unrelenting stalking behavior that continued despite past legal intervention led S.T. to live in fear. Moreover, Rayburn's stalking sometimes took place in the presence of S.T.’s minor children, who also came to fear Rayburn. In short, nothing about the nature of Rayburn's offense warrants a reduction in his sentence.

[14] Nor does Rayburn's character warrant a sentence reduction. Rayburn has a criminal history of stalking S.T. and violating a protective order regarding her. See Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citation omitted) (observing that even a minor criminal history reflects poorly on a defendant's character). Moreover, Rayburn's pattern of stalking and harassment continued even after he had been convicted of stalking S.T. and had been ordered to have no contact with her. And, while Rayburn did admit to the Level 4 felony in his guilty plea, he did so in exchange for the substantial benefits of a sentence below the maximum and having all other pending charges against him dismissed; such a guilty plea is more indicative of pragmatism than actual remorse. See Reis v. State, 88 N.E.3d 1099, 1105 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Anglemyer, 875 N.E.2d at 221). In sum, there is no evidence that Rayburn has “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character” that would support a sentence reduction. Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122. Therefore, we affirm his sentence.

Conclusion

[15] Rayburn's sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character.

[16] Affirmed.

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Scheele, J., concur.