Geremy D. Miller, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In 2025, Geremy Miller was convicted of varying levels of felony child molesting and sexual misconduct for acts involving his two stepdaughters, G.B. and O.B., when the girls had been minors. The trial court imposed an aggregate 120-year sentence. Miller contends that the trial court erred in (1) denying his request for the mental-health records of G.B. and O.B.; (2) excluding from evidence a 2013 report from the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”); (3) allowing the State to amend three of the charges against him; (4) denying his request for a mistrial on the basis of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); and (5) denying his motion to dismiss as it related to interview recordings destroyed years before the filing of charges. Because we are unconvinced by Miller's arguments, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] A.B., G.B., and O.B. are siblings whose father passed away in 2000, when O.B. was still in utero and G.B. was four years old. Shortly after the girls’ father's death, Miller began a relationship with their mother. Miller had been in O.B.’s life “since [she] was born[.]” Tr. Vol. VI p. 109. G.B. considered Miller the “father figure in [her] life.” Tr. Vol. VII p. 18.

[3] When G.B. was ten years old, Miller exposed his erect penis to her and forced her to touch it. He told her it would be their “secret[.]” Tr. Vol. VII p. 22. After that incident, Miller began “touching” G.B. and eventually performing oral sex on G.B. and having G.B. perform oral sex on him. Tr. Vol. VII p. 22. When G.B. was eleven years old, Miller began inserting his fingers into her vagina. When she was twelve years old, Miller began having sexual intercourse with G.B. The sexual intercourse and oral sex continued for years, until G.B. was fifteen years old. The abuse stopped when G.B. threatened to tell someone about it.

[4] When O.B. was seven years old, Miller began touching her breasts. When O.B. was eight years old, Miller began coming into her bedroom at night, putting his mouth on her vagina, and penetrating her vagina with his fingers. This occurred continuously, “at least once a week,” until O.B. was twelve years old. Tr. Vol. VI p. 118.

[5] In July of 2013, then-sixteen-year-old G.B. reported Miller's sexual abuse, and the matter was investigated. O.B. did not report Miller's sexual abuse to DCS when they came to the home because she had seen “how [G.B.] was treated [and] didn't want to be treated that way.” Tr. Vol. VI p. 127. No criminal charges were filed, and no DCS case was pursued at the time.

[6] In 2020, O.B. disclosed to A.B. that Miller had molested her, but asked her not to tell anyone because she “saw the way that [G.B.] had been shunned.” Tr. Vol. V p. 131. In April of 2023, A.B. told her mother about O.B.’s disclosure and confronted Miller on a phone call. G.B. was also on the call, muted, and G.B.’s partner recorded the conversation. In the phone conversation, Miller admitted that he “f[***]ed up” and “did f[***]ing touch [G.B.]” but initially denied molesting O.B. State's Ex. 2, First Video at 4:40–49. Eventually, Miller admitted that he had also molested O.B. Miller also admitted to the girls’ aunt, that “pretty much everything [G.B.] accused [him] of is true.” Tr. Vol. VI p. 228.

[7] On June 5, 2023, the State charged Miller with five counts of Class A felony child molesting as to G.B., nine counts of Class A felony child molesting as to O.B., four counts of Class B felony sexual misconduct with a minor as to G.B., three counts of Class C felony child molesting as to G.B., and three counts of Class C felony child molesting as to O.B.

Mental-Health Records

[8] On March 21, 2024, Miller requested G.B.’s and O.B.’s mental health records, arguing that there was a “critical” need to discover whether G.B. or O.B. had “made any prior inconsistent statements.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 151. The parties presented arguments at multiple hearings. On June 5, 2024, the trial court denied Miller's request, noting that Miller had “available both the law enforcement and [DCS] personnel who investigated the matters and reports memorializing the investigation when originally reported.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 203. The trial court also noted that Miller had available “the Mother of the alleged victims, amongst others, to testify as to either alleged victim's reputation for truth and veracity[,]” and that Miller could depose both G.B. and O.B. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 203. After a special judge was appointed, Miller moved for reconsideration of his request for mental-health records, claiming that the records were necessary for impeachment purposes. The trial court denied the motion.

2013 DCS Report

[9] On March 22, 2024, the State filed a motion in limine to prevent Miller from admitting evidence that DCS had found the allegations made in 2013 to be unsubstantiated. The DCS report, which was introduced at a pretrial hearing, indicated that G.B.’s account of the events had been inconsistent, that it had been forwarded to the prosecutor's office, and that no charges had been filed due to inconsistencies and lack of detail.

[10] At a hearing on March 27, 2024, the State argued that the unsubstantiated allegations were irrelevant. The State further argued that admitting the evidence would violate Indiana Evidence Rule 704. The State, however, agreed with Miller that the prior statements made to DCS should be admissible for impeachment purposes. On April 11, 2024, the trial court granted the State's motion in limine to prohibit any mention that the allegations of sexual abuse had been unsubstantiated, noting that “[t]his does not preclude the Defense from eliciting and arguing that the prior statements made by [Victim 1] were inconsistent.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 167. The special judge reaffirmed the ruling on February 20, 2025.

[11] At trial, Miller again sought to introduce the DCS report, and the State objected to any discussions regarding conclusions in the report and any hearsay but agreed that the witnesses could be questioned about their own statements in the report. The trial court ultimately maintained its ruling that the substantiation conclusion could not be admitted but the report could be used to impeach a witness or to refresh recollection.

[12] During trial, Miller cross-examined A.B., O.B., and G.B. about statements they had made to DCS during the 2013 investigation. Miller also presented testimony from the victims’ mother, who refreshed her recollection with the DCS report, and testified about details she remembered from the report. Miller called the DCS investigator from 2013, Marine Loveless, who refreshed her recollection with the report, and testified regarding the 2013 investigation. Loveless also testified that DCS “did not open up any other case” and that her recommendation after the investigation was that the “case be closed.” Tr. Vol. VII pp. 158, 159.

Amendments to Charges I through III

[13] On December 31, 2024, Miller moved to dismiss, inter alia, Counts I through III, which were the Class C felony child molesting charges as to G.B., based on the statute of limitations. On January 8, 2025, the State filed amended charging informations for Counts I through III, to allege that Class A felonies had been committed. At a hearing on the motion to dismiss on January 10, 2025, the trial court mentioned that the State had filed the amended counts and asked Miller's counsel if he had seen the amendments. Counsel acknowledged that there was “plenty of time before trial” and stated that he would “supplement this objection later on[.]” Tr. Vol. III pp. 88, 89.

[14] The State noted that Miller had deposed both victims and that Miller had “been well aware of the facts and this is nothing new. No new evidence here. Um, they knew when he started, um, making him-her perform oral sex on him. And so, I changed Count 1, 2 and 3, um, to fit the evidence, uh, and to take care of the statute of limitations issue.” Tr. Vol. III p. 96. On February 4, 2025, the State moved to amend Counts I through III; Miller objected, arguing that deposition questioning of the victims “focused on the charged acts of ‘touching’ rather than ‘other sexual conduct.’ ” Appellant's App. Vol. III p. 176.¹ Furthermore, Miller's objection requested that the trial court “consider other equitable remedies to even the playing field” if the trial court were to grant the State's motion. Appellant's App. Vol. III p. 177. Miller did not request a continuance.

[15] On February 18, 2025, the trial court held another hearing on the motion to amend, in which the State argued that the evidence had always supported the filing of Class A felonies and that Miller was not prejudiced by the amendments. Miller's argument related to his preparation of the defense and requested that the trial court deny the State's request. On February 20, 2025, the trial court granted the State's motion to amend Counts I through III and denied Miller's motion to dismiss as to those counts.

Motion to Dismiss (Pre-trial)

[16] On March 21, 2024, Miller filed a pre-trial motion to dismiss Counts I through XII, which concerned G.B., arguing that two recorded interviews of G.B. in 2013, which had “been lost or destroyed[,]” were “both material and exculpatory” and that the loss of those recordings violated Miller's due-process rights. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 141. At a pre-trial hearing on March 27, 2024, Kokomo Police detective Chad Rogers testified that in 2013, he had been involved in the two interviews of G.B. and one interview of Miller, all of which had been recorded on CDs and stored. Detective Rogers testified that in 2020, pursuant to police department policy concerning disposition of old evidence, he had approved the destruction of the recordings.

[17] The trial court denied Miller's motion, concluding that “the State did not solicit the destruction of the interviews and has provided [Miller] with interview summaries[,]” and that there was “no assertion as to how [Miller] is prejudiced by the absence of three (3) interviews when the general summaries provided indicate [G.B.] was inconsistent in her claims (2 interviews) and [Miller] denied the allegations.” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 166, 167. In his December 31, 2024, motion, Miller again moved for dismissal of Counts I through XII, which motion the trial court denied.

Motion to Dismiss (During trial)

[18] A jury trial commenced on April 7, 2025. During trial, O.B. testified that Miller would sometimes discipline her by forcing her to pull her pants down, hitting her with a belt, and hitting her hands if she had moved them. O.B. testified that, after G.B. had left the home, Miller asked O.B. if she believed G.B. over him, to which O.B. had replied, “yes.” Tr. Vol. VI p. 128. O.B. also testified that when she was eighteen years old, she disclosed to G.B. that Miller had molested her after she had had flashbacks of Miller's abuse when she engaged in sexual conduct with her boyfriend at the time. O.B. testified on cross-examination that while she had not disclosed these things to the police or stated them in depositions, she had told the deputy prosecutor about them prior to trial.

[19] Miller moved for dismissal, alleging that the State had violated Brady, as to the above testimony. The trial court denied the motion. Miller also moved for a mistrial, which motion the trial court also denied, concluding that the statements were not exculpatory under Brady. The jury found Miller guilty of all counts. On June 10, 2025, the trial court sentenced Miller to an aggregate 120 years of incarceration.

Discussion and Decision

I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying Miller's Request for G.B.’s and O.B.’s Mental Health Records

[20] Miller contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for the mental health records of G.B. and O.B. Our standard of review for discovery matters is abuse of discretion. Suarez v. State, 947 N.E.2d 500, 502 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). “Thus, we will reverse only where the trial court has reached an erroneous conclusion which is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts of the case.” Id.

[21] Indiana Code section 16-39-2-3 provides that a person's mental-health record is confidential and shall be disclosed only with that person's consent, or as otherwise provided by statue. Indiana Code section 16-39-3-3 provides that a party in a legal proceeding “may file a petition [․] requesting a release of the patient's mental health record” without the patient's written consent. The trial court may order the release of the mental health record without the patient's consent “upon the showing of good cause following a hearing.” Ind. Code § 16-39-2-8(a).

[22] After the hearing the trial court

may order the release of the patient's mental health record if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that:

(1) other reasonable methods of obtaining the information are not available or would not be effective; and

(2) the need for disclosure outweighs the potential harm to the patient. In weighing the potential harm to the patient, the court shall consider the impact of disclosure on the provider-patient privilege and the patient's rehabilitative process.

Ind. Code § 16-39-3-7.

[23] Miller requested release of G.B.’s and O.B.’s records to impeach them and discover if they had “made any prior inconsistent statements.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 151. The trial court denied the request on the bases that Miller had “available both the law enforcement and [DCS] personnel who investigated the matters and reports memorializing the investigation when originally reported[,]” Miller had available “the Mother of the alleged victims, amongst others, to testify as to either alleged victim's reputation for truth and veracity[,]” and Miller could depose both G.B. and O.B. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 203.

[24] In renewing his motion to release the records, Miller argued that the depositions of G.B. and O.B. had not resulted in detailed accounts of the charges. Miller points to nothing in the record indicating that he had specifically questioned the victims about their disclosures to their mental-health counselors related to the charges in this case or whether those disclosures had been different from their current accounts of the events, arguing only that “it is the depositions of O.B. and G.B. and the prior investigation that called into question the mental health records and their contents.” Appellant's Br. p. 14.

[25] Miller's arguments on this issue were based on whether the records contained prior inconsistent statements by the victims. Our review of the record indicates that Miller presented little to no evidence that other reasonable methods were not available or effective. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Miller had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that other reasonable methods of obtaining the information sought were not available or would not be effective.² See Norton v. State, 137 N.E.3d 974, 985 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (concluding that, “[b]ecause Norton could have obtained the same information from A.G. that he could have obtained from a review of her mental health records, the trial court properly declined to release the records to him”), trans. denied.

II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Excluding the 2013 DCS Report

[26] Miller contends that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding DCS's 2013 report from evidence. Specifically, he contends that the trial court erred in its determination that the DCS report contained inadmissible hearsay. Miller concedes, however, that he “used the DCS Report to question Detective [Rogers] and Loveless and to refresh their recollections,” but contends that the report “contained other information including the determination that the allegations were unsubstantiated which the trial court did not allow reference to.” Appellant's Br. p. 18.

[27] Even assuming, arguendo, that the trial court erred in excluding the physical report from 2013, we conclude that any such error would be harmless. “A trial court's error in excluding evidence does not require reversal if the error was harmless.” Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 492 (Ind. 2023).

No error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the trial court or by any of the parties is ground for granting relief or reversal on appeal where its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.

Ind. App. Rule 66(A). “[W]e consider the likely impact of the improperly admitted or excluded evidence on a reasonable, average jury in light of all the evidence in the case.” Hayko, 211 N.E.3d at 492. “Ultimately, the error's probable impact is sufficiently minor when—considering the entire record—our confidence in the outcome is not undermined.” Id.

[28] During trial, Miller cross-examined A.B., O.B., and G.B. about statements they had made to DCS in 2013. Miller also presented testimony from the victims’ mother by refreshing her recollection with the DCS report, and she testified about details she remembered from the report. Miller presented DCS investigator Loveless, refreshed her recollection of the 2013 investigation with the report, and elicited testimony regarding the 2013 investigation. As to the conclusion that the abuse was unsubstantiated, Miller elicited testimony from Loveless that DCS “did not open up any other case” and that her recommendation after the investigation was that the “case be closed.” Tr. Vol. VII pp. 158, 159. Miller also elicited testimony from Detective Rogers that he had told G.B. that he was “having a hard time believing her,” and that the prosecutor at the time had “declined to file charges[.]” Tr. Vol. VII pp. 137, 138.

[29] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that any error in the trial court's exclusion of the physical report or the substantiation determination was harmless in light of the fact that, quite simply, Miller brought before the jury the substance of the report, including that the DCS investigator had recommended the case be closed and that prosecutor at that time had not filed any charges.³

III. Miller Waived His Challenge to State's Amended Charges

[30] Miller contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted the State's motion to amend charges I through III. However, Miller did not request a continuance after the trial court granted the State's motion to amend the charges. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-34-1-5(d),

[b]efore amendment of any indictment or information other than amendment as provided in subsection (b), the court shall give all parties adequate notice of the intended amendment and an opportunity to be heard. Upon permitting such amendment, the court shall, upon motion by the defendant, order any continuance of the proceedings which may be necessary to accord the defendant adequate opportunity to prepare the defendant's defense.

We have previously interpreted this section to mean that “a defendant's failure to request a continuance after a trial court allows a pre-trial substantive amendment to the charging information over defendant's objection results in waiver.” Wilson v. State, 931 N.E.2d 914, 918 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied; see also Jones v. State, 250 N.E.3d 1062, 1079 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (“A long line of cases originating with Riley v. State, 506 N.E.2d 476 (Ind. 1987), has held the failure to request a continuance after the trial court allows a pre-trial substantive amendment to the charging information over defendant's objection results in waiver of the issue on appeal.”), trans. denied. Miller chose not to pursue a continuance and had therefore waived this issue for appellate review.⁴

IV. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying Miller's Mistrial Motion

[31] Miller contends that the trial court erred in denying his mistrial motion. Specifically, Miller contends that he is entitled to a mistrial because the State knew of, but had not disclosed before trial, O.B.’s testimony that Miller had disciplined her by forcing her to pull her pants down, hitting her with a belt, and hitting her hands if she had moved them; that Miller had asked O.B., after an argument with her mother, whether O.B. believed G.B. over him, to which O.B. had answered affirmatively; and that when O.B. was eighteen years old, she had disclosed to G.B. that Miller had molested her after she had had flashbacks of Miller's abuse when she had engaged in sexual conduct with her boyfriend at the time.

[32] We review the denial of a mistrial motion for an abuse of discretion. Ramirez v. State, 7 N.E.3d 933, 935 (Ind. 2014). “A mistrial is an extreme remedy that is warranted only when less severe remedies will not satisfactorily correct the error.” Banks v. State, 761 N.E.2d 403, 405 (Ind. 2002) (citation and quotations omitted). “When a motion for mistrial has been denied, the defendant has the burden to demonstrate both that he was placed in a position of grave peril to which he should not have been subjected and that no other remedy can cure the perilous situation in which he was placed.” Brooks v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1234, 1243 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citation omitted), trans. denied. “Moreover, a reviewing court accords great deference to the trial court's ruling on a mistrial motion.” Id.

[33] Miller's claim relies on his assertion that the State had violated Brady. In Brady, the Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87.

To prevail on a Brady claim, a defendant must establish: (1) that the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) that the suppressed evidence was favorable to the defense; and (3) that the evidence was material to an issue at trial. Bunch v. State, 964 N.E.2d 274, 297 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. Evidence is “material” under Brady only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. And a “reasonable probability” is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. However, the State will not be found to have suppressed material evidence if it was available to a defendant through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Id.

Shelby v. State, 986 N.E.2d 345, 358 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. “[F]or most exculpatory evidence, the prosecution is able to satisfy its constitutional obligation by disclosing the evidence at trial.” Davis-Martin v. State, 116 N.E.3d 1178, 1189 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. “In such cases, the burden rests with the defendant to establish that ‘the lateness of the disclosure so prejudiced defendant's preparation or presentation of his defense that he was prevented from receiving his constitutionally guaranteed fair trial.’ ” Id.

[34] We agree with the State that these facts and circumstances do not establish a Brady violation. The three statements about which Miller complains were disclosed at trial, and Miller did not request any continuance after the disclosures. See id. at 1190 (noting that “if the defendant does not request a continuance when the disclosure is first made at trial, that failure may be viewed as negating any claim of actual prejudice.”). Furthermore, we have no hesitation in concluding that the evidence was not material to any issue at trial. Again, evidence is material under Brady “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. And a ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Shelby, 986 N.E.2d at 358.

[35] Here, Miller cross-examined O.B. on the statements and suggested, at length, in closing argument that O.B. was not credible due to those disclosures. We agree with the State that “Miller received a fair trial in which he was able to vigorously pursue his defense.” Appellee's Br. p. 37. Furthermore, the State provided overwhelming evidence of Miller's guilt that was not related to or affected by the challenged testimony here, including Miller's admissions which corroborated O.B. and G.B.’s accusations against him and testimony regarding his admission to the girls’ aunt that “pretty much everything [G.B.] accused [me] of is true.” Tr. Vol. VI p. 228.

[36] Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Miller did not suffer a Brady violation which would necessitate a new trial.

V. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying Miller's Motion to Dismiss because of the Destruction of G.B.’s 2013 Interviews

[37] Miller contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss Counts I through XII because of the destruction of G.B.’s interview videos from 2013. Specifically, he argues that “[t]he failure to maintain these recordings which are materially exculpatory evidence has resulted in serious violations of Miller's substantial rights,” including his right to due process. Appellant's Br. p. 27.

[38] When determining whether a defendant's due-process rights have been violated by the State's failure to preserve evidence, we must first determine whether the evidence is materially exculpatory evidence or merely potentially-useful evidence. State v. Durrett, 923 N.E.2d 449, 453 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Land v. State, 802 N.E.2d 45, 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied). Evidence is potentially useful if “no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant.” Id. (quotation omitted). Failure to preserve potentially-useful evidence does not constitute a violation of a defendant's due-process rights unless the defendant shows bad faith on the part of the police. Id.

[39] Materially exculpatory evidence is “evidence that might be expected to play a role in the suspect's defense[,]” meaning that the evidence “must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488, 489 (1984). Neither of these conditions is met in this case. First, the videos were destroyed pursuant to department policy in 2020, seven years after the case had been submitted to the prosecutor's office for charges which it had declined to pursue at the time. Miller was charged in this case in June of 2023, approximately two months after the recorded phone conversation in which he had admitted to molesting G.B. and O.B. Therefore, at the time that the recordings were destroyed, any potential “exculpatory value” was not apparent. Furthermore, Miller was able to obtain comparable evidence by other, reasonably-available means, that is, both the detective and the DCS investigator involved in the case at the time of the recordings had been made summarized the recordings and verified that those summaries were accurate. We therefore conclude that the recordings were not materially exculpatory.

[40] Given our conclusion that the recordings were not materially exculpatory, Miller must demonstrate that the State's failure to preserve the evidence was in bad faith. We find no indication of bad faith here. “The mere assertion that the circumstances suggest bad faith is not sufficient to establish that the State acted in bad faith.” Terry v. State, 857 N.E.2d 396, 408 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. Instead, to show bad faith, “a defendant must show that the State failed to preserve the evidence pursuant to a conscious doing of wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.”⁵ Id. (citation and quotations omitted).

[41] The circumstances here do not point to bad faith. Again, Detective Rogers testified that, seven years after the initial investigation, in 2020, pursuant to police department policy concerning disposition of old evidence, he had approved the destruction of the recordings. The destruction of the recordings was documented, and the summaries of the recordings retained.⁶ See Terry, 857 N.E.2d at 408 (finding no bad faith where evidence was destroyed “pursuant to IPD procedures, and its movements and destruction were fully documented[,]” after the evidence was photographed and serial number was recorded).

[42] Because Miller has not demonstrated that the State destroyed the recordings in bad faith, he has not demonstrated a violation of his due-process rights. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Miller's motion to dismiss.

[43] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We note that there appears to be an issue with the pdf pagination of Volume III of the Appellant's Appendix. While this quotation can be found on page 176 of the electronic pdf version of Volume III, the page number listed on the bottom of the quoted page is 171. When citing to this appendix, we cite to the pdf page numbers as opposed to those listed on the document.

2.   To the extent that Miller briefly contends that his rights under the Sixth Amendment and Article 1, Section 13, of the Indiana Constitution were violated by the trial court's denial of his request, we find these claims waived for failure to provide a cogent argument. Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a), “[e]ach contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on.” See Smith v. State, 822 N.E.2d 193, 202–03 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“Generally, a party waives any issue raised on appeal where the party fails to develop a cogent argument or provide adequate citation to authority and portions of the record.”), trans. denied.

3.   We are also confident that there was substantial independent evidence of guilt such that any error in the exclusion of the records did not contribute to Miller's conviction. Both O.B. and G.B. testified regarding Miller's sexual abuse, and their testimony was strongly corroborated by the phone call admitted in which Miller confessed to molesting both of them and testimony regarding Miller's confession to the girls’ aunt regarding G.B.’s allegations. “The improper admission of evidence is harmless error when the reviewing court is satisfied that the conviction is supported by substantial independent evidence of guilt so that there is no substantial likelihood that the challenged evidence contributed to the conviction.” Meadows v. State, 785 N.E.2d 1112, 1122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied.

4.   To the extent that Miller contends that he did not seek a continuance because the trial court determined the amendments to be of form, and therefore, he “wouldn't have been entitled to [a continuance] even if he had asked[,]” Appellant's Br. p. 23, we note that he cites to no authority to support such an assertion. We therefore consider this specific argument waived. See Smith, 822 N.E.2d at 202–03.

5.   The term “obliquity” is defined as “deviation from moral rectitude or sound thinking.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1557 (Phillip Babcock Gove et al. eds., G. & C. Merriam Company 1964).

6.   Under the circumstances of this case, we disagree with Miller's assertion that destroying the evidence before the expiration of the statute-of-limitations period equated to bad faith.

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.