IN RE: the Guardianship of Ralph W. Laux; Christopher Laux (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] The trial court appointed Nicole Sholly (“Nicole”) as permanent guardian of her father, Ralph Laux (“Ralph”), over the objection of her brother, Christopher Laux (“Christopher”). Christopher appeals and claims: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by appointing Nicole as Ralph's permanent guardian; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by denying Christopher's request for certain documents during discovery; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by appointing Nicole as Ralph's temporary guardian. We disagree and accordingly, affirm. Nicole requests appellate attorney fees, which we deny.

Issues

[2] Christopher presents three issues, which we reorder, and restate as:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by appointing Nicole as Ralph's temporary guardian.

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by appointing Nicole as Ralph's permanent guardian.

III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Christopher's request for certain documents during discovery.

Nicole presents one issue: whether we should award her appellate attorney fees.

Facts

[3] Ralph was born in 1928 and owns farmland and personal property in Bryant, Indiana. Ralph has seven adult children, including Christopher, Giles Laux (“Giles”), Teresa Laux (“Teresa”), and Nicole. Christopher is a lawyer and had long served as Ralph's attorney. Ralph suffers from dementia and significant cognitive impairments that make him unable to manage his own affairs or care for himself.

[4] In 2014, Ralph executed a general, durable power of attorney naming Christopher and Teresa as co-attorneys-in-fact, with Giles named as successor. In 2019, Ralph executed a subsequent power of attorney prepared by another attorney, which named Giles as attorney-in-fact and Teresa as the alternate attorney-in-fact. Christopher claims that the 2019 power of attorney was improperly executed, and Christopher exercised his alleged power of attorney as late as 2020 by obtaining a Medicare lien settlement for Ralph.

[5] In January 2022, Giles filed a petition for guardianship of Ralph, and Christopher filed a competing petition for emergency and temporary guardianship shortly thereafter. On February 6, 2023, the trial court appointed Giles as permanent guardian over Ralph's person and estate. Christopher appealed, and we affirmed the trial court's decision. See Laux v. Laux, No. 23AGU-403 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2024) (mem.), trans. denied.

[6] Giles passed away on May 24, 2025, and three days later, Nicole filed a petition to be appointed as Ralph's temporary and permanent guardian. The trial court appointed Nicole as temporary guardian that same day without a hearing. On June 10, 2025, all of Ralph's remaining children except Christopher filed their consent to Nicole's appointment.

[7] On June 25, 2025, Christopher filed his own petition to be appointed as temporary and permanent guardian, to which he attached his 2014 power of attorney. A hearing on the issue of the temporary guardianship was held on June 30, 2025. At this hearing, Nicole testified that her goal as guardian was to maintain things under the same management system Giles had established. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court scheduled a full evidentiary hearing for August 12, 2025, on the issue of the permanent guardianship.¹

[8] On July 29, 2025, Nicole filed a motion for a protective order regarding certain discovery requests from Christopher. The trial court held a telephonic hearing on the matter on August 1, 2025, at which the court granted the protective order in part, relieving Nicole of the obligation to respond to numerous requests for admission, interrogatories, and requests for production. The matters covered by the protective order included requests about the siblings’ feelings regarding a family farm trust, who first called Christopher a “narcissist,” and details of a 2021 meeting at which the siblings allegedly decided to file an attorney disciplinary complaint against Christopher. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 64.

[9] The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the permanent guardianship on August 12, 2025. At the conclusion of the hearing, Christopher requested that the evidentiary record be kept open to allow the admission of bank records that he had subpoenaed from Farmers & Merchants State Bank on July 3, 2025, which had not yet been produced. The trial court granted Christopher ten additional days to submit those records. The bank produced the records on August 19, 2025, and Christopher filed the records on August 22, 2025, along with a chart he contended demonstrated embezzlement Also on August 22, Christopher filed a motion to leave the evidentiary record open for an additional forty-five days to subpoena Bank of America credit card statements. The trial court denied this motion.

[10] The trial court issued its order appointing Nicole as permanent guardian on August 25, 2025. This order provides in relevant part:

The alleged incapacitated person, Ralph Laux, was born August 20, 1928. He suffers from a number of ailments, the most debilitating of which is severe dementia. He is incapable of caring for himself sufficiently and his activities of daily living are severely restricted. His health has declined significantly over the past 4-5 years. He has significant cognitive impairment.

IT IS THEREFORE ADJUDGED that Ralph Laux, born August 20, 1928, remains an incapacitated adult and that the Court should appoint a substitute guardian for his person and estate.

2. Ralph Laux now has seven (7) living adult children. Until his death on May 24, 2025, Giles Laux had served as guardian over his father's person and estate.

3. On May 27, 2025, Nicole Sholly, Ralph Laux[’s] daughter, filed her petition for appointment as temporary and permanent guardian for Ralph. She was appointed temporary guardian that date. Notably, on June 10, 2025, each of Ralph's remaining children—with the exception of Chris[topher]—filed their consent to the appointment of Nicole to serve as guardian. None have filed a consent to have Chris[topher] serve in that capacity.

4. Upon being appointed temporary guardian, Nicole set into place a consistent program of care for her father, resulting in little disruption to him. Her remaining siblings—except for Chris[topher]—have assisted in providing care for Ralph.

5. The Court notes that there remains a significant and ongoing rift among the siblings and Christopher Laux. Christopher Laux is accused of manipulating Ralph Laux for his own gain, and seeking to poison Ralph's relationship with the prior guardian. His acrimonious relationship with his siblings and behavior in court makes his claim that he would not use his appointment as guardian to punish his siblings dubious at best.

6. As between the parties, the Court finds that Ralph's best interests would be served and family integrity would be promoted by appointing Nicole Sholly as permanent guardian.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Petitioner, Nicole Sholly, shall be and is hereby appointed substitute guardian over the person and estate of Ralph Laux, an incapacitated adult, to serve without limitation.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 27-28. Christopher now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Issues regarding the appointment of Nicole as temporary guardian are moot.

[11] Christopher claims that the trial court abused its discretion by appointing Nicole as Ralph's temporary guardian. Specifically, Christopher claims that the trial court failed to conduct a hearing; the trial court failed to justify the appointment of Nicole over Christopher given that Christopher allegedly already held a power of attorney vis-à-vis Ralph; and Nicole failed to fulfill her statutory duties as temporary guardian. But after appointing Nicole as temporary guardian, the trial court proceeded to hold a hearing and appoint Nicole as permanent guardian. Once the order of permanent guardianship was issued, the order of temporary guardianship ended, and no effective relief could be granted as to that order. See Ind. Code § 29-3-3-4(a) (providing that a trial court may appoint a temporary guardian “for a specified period not to exceed ninety (90) days.”); In re Estate of Moster, 158 N.E.3d 775, 781 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (holding that temporary guardianship expired as a matter of law after the statutory timeframe concluded).

[12] “The long-standing rule in Indiana courts has been that a case is deemed moot when no effective relief can be rendered to the parties before the court.” T.W. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 121 N.E.3d 1039, 1042 (Ind. 2019) (citing In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 37 (Ind. 1991)). When the controversy at issue has been disposed of so as to render it unnecessary to decide the question involved, it is moot, and we need not address the matter. Id.

[13] Any claim of error regarding the procedure followed prior to Nicole's appointment as temporary guardian or the appointment of Nicole as temporary guardian was rendered moot by the order appointing Nicole as permanent guardian. In fact, we have already held that Christopher's challenge to the appointment of Giles as temporary guardian was moot. See Laux, slip op. at 6-7. The same applies to his challenge to Nicole's appointment as temporary guardian—we can afford no relief, so the issue is moot.

[14] We recognize that “Indiana courts may adjudicate a moot claim on the merits ‘upon the existence of three elements: the issue concerns a question of great public importance which is likely to recur in a context which will continue to evade review.’ ” Liddle v. Clark, 107 N.E.3d 478, 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting DeSalle v. Gentry, 818 N.E.2d 40, 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)). Here, however, we cannot say that the issue of Nicole's appointment as temporary guardian is a matter of great public importance. Even if it were, we cannot say that it is likely to recur; there is no indication that Nicole will be unable to exercise her duties as guardian, which would require the appointment of yet another temporary guardian. See 2 Ind. Law Encyc. Appeals § 232 (Mar. 2026 Update) (“For the [mootness] exception to be appropriate, there must be some measure of certainty that the question will recur, not just a possibility.”) (citing Krochta v. State, 372 N.E.2d 475, 478 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978)). We, therefore, decline to address this issue under this exception to the mootness doctrine.

II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by appointing Nicole as permanent guardian rather than Christopher.

[15] Christopher also challenges Nicole's appointment as Ralph's permanent guardian. The appointment of a guardian is generally within the discretion of the trial court. In re Guardianship of J.Y., 942 N.E.2d 148, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied; see also Ind. Code § 29-3-2-4(a) (“All findings, orders, or other proceedings under this article shall be in the discretion of the court unless otherwise provided in this article.”). On appeal, we review the trial court's appointment of a guardian only for an abuse of that discretion. J.Y., 942 N.E.2d at 149. A trial court abuses its discretion only if its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances presented, or if the court has misinterpreted the law. In re Guardianship of A.L.C., 902 N.E.2d 343, 352 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “We do not reweigh the evidence; rather, we consider the evidence most favorable to the judgment with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the judgment.” In re Guardianship of S.S., 249 N.E.3d 656, 660 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

[16] Indiana Code Section 29-3-5-5(a) sets forth a list of priorities for those who are entitled to be considered for appointment as a guardian. The first of these is “[a] person designated in a durable power of attorney.” Id. § 5(a)(1). But the trial court, “may pass over a person having priority and appoint a person having a lower priority or no priority” if this is “in the best interest of the incapacitated person[.]” Id. § 5(b). Indiana Code Section 30-5-3-4(a) similarly provides that “[t]he court shall make an appointment in accordance with the principal's most recent nomination in a power of attorney except for good cause or disqualification.”

[17] Christopher claims that because he held the most recent power of attorney, he was entitled to preference to be Ralph's guardian. But Ralph executed a 2019 power of attorney naming the now-deceased Giles as his attorney-in-fact with Teresa as the alternative. Christopher claims, as he did below, that because the 2019 power of attorney was not notarized and he did not receive notice thereof, it does not supersede the 2014 power of attorney naming Christopher as attorney-in-fact. Christopher unsuccessfully presented this argument to this Court in his earlier appeal. See Laux, slip op. at 10-12.²

[18] Nevertheless, even if the 2014 power of attorney were still valid, the statutes merely give preference to the attorney-in-fact to act as guardian; they do not require it. Indiana Code Section 29-3-5-5(b) specifically provides that the trial court may name a person with lower or no priority as guardian over a person with priority if doing so is in the ward's best interest. And Indiana Code Section 30-5-3-4(a) provides that the attorney-in-fact should serve as guardian “except for good cause or disqualification.” The evidence favoring the trial court's judgment supports a finding that there was good cause to appoint Nicole as guardian instead of Christopher and that such is in Ralph's best interest.

[19] First, all of Ralph's surviving children, except Christopher, consented to Nicole serving as their father's guardian. And, regardless of who is at fault, Christopher has been estranged from his siblings for several years. Moreover, Nicole testified that she had no knowledge of Christopher contacting his siblings to check on Ralph's condition and that the last contact between Ralph and Christopher occurred in June 2022.³

[20] The trial court was also justifiably concerned that Christopher would use the guardianship to “punish” his siblings. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 27. In fact, Christopher has already filed a complaint against his siblings stemming from the previous guardianship proceedings in which he brought claims of defamation, tortious interference with a business relationship, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and entitlement to punitive damages. The trial court dismissed this complaint for failure to state a claim, and we affirmed. Laux v. Baker, 238 N.E.3d 692, 695 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. Also, following the June 30 hearing, Christopher filed a motion to exclude Nicole's husband from the courthouse, claiming that Nicole's husband approached him “aggressively,” which the trial court denied. Appellant's App. Vol. III p. 45. And, as detailed below, Christopher's discovery requests in this matter included interrogatories that involved the personal conflict between Christopher and his siblings. This supports the trial court's concern that Christopher was using the guardianship proceedings to address his personal grievances against his siblings. The trial court's finding that Christopher's conduct made his claims of impartiality implausible was a credibility determination that we cannot second-guess on appeal.

[21] Lastly, we cannot ignore that Christopher admitted on cross-examination that he had filed for bankruptcy more than ten years prior to the guardianship hearing. A guardian is a fiduciary who acts to manage the property and finances of the ward. See Estate of Prickett v. Womersley, 905 N.E.2d 1008, 1010 (Ind. 2009) (“As a fiduciary, the guardian ‘is appointed by a court to be a guardian or conservator responsible as the court may direct for the person or the property of an incapacitated person or a minor.’ ”) (quoting Ind. Code § 29-3-1-6). The fact that Christopher filed for bankruptcy does not disqualify him from acting in the fiduciary relationship of a guardian, but it is a relevant consideration when appointing a guardian. All of this supports the trial court's decision not to appoint Christopher as guardian.⁴

[22] We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by appointing Nicole as guardian. All of Ralph's children except Christopher consented to Nicole acting as guardian.⁵ When she was appointed as temporary guardian, Nicole took care to notify the relevant third parties of her appointment and established a care routine for Ralph consistent with his daily routine. All of Nicole's siblings, except for Christopher, have assisted Nicole in caring for their father. Christopher disputes the extent of Nicole's involvement. Christopher notes that there were periods in which Nicole did not receive caregiver payments; this, he claims, undermines Nicole's claim to be actively involved in Ralph's care. But there was also evidence that Nicole was actively involved in Ralph's care. The trial court was entitled to assess the credibility and weight of the evidence and to reach its own conclusions, which we may not second-guess on appeal.⁶

[23] Christopher also claims that the bank records he submitted prove that Nicole and/or her siblings have engaged in fraud, elder abuse, and embezzlement.⁷ But these records merely document transactions such as money moving in and out of Ralph's account, payments to siblings for caregiver expenses, legal fees to a law firm, and payments to a Bank of America credit card. These transactions by themselves do not establish criminal intent or the absence of legitimate use of the funds. Indeed, many of the transactions Christopher claims are suspicious have explanations that went unchallenged during the trial, and Christopher presented no expert testimony or other evidence at the evidentiary hearing to prove that the transactions were improper. The bank records do not speak for themselves as Christopher claims. Although this evidence could have supported an inference of wrongdoing, the trial court was not required to draw such an inference.⁸ In sum, Christopher has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion by appointing Nicole as permanent guardian.

III. The trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding discovery.

[24] Lastly, Christopher briefly claims that the trial court abused its discretion by granting Nicole a protective order limiting Christopher's discovery. Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) requires that the argument section of a brief “contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning.” Also, “[e]ach contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on ․” Id. We will not consider a claim on appeal when there is no cogent argument supported by authority and no references to the record as required by the rules. Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). If a party fails to develop a cogent argument or provide adequate citation to authority and portions of the record, the claim is waived. Dickes v. Felger, 981 N.E.2d 559, 562 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

[25] Here, Christopher's argument regarding the trial court's discovery rulings is significantly underdeveloped. With regard to the protective order, he merely concludes that the trial court “gutted” his discovery requests regarding his siblings’ basis for their hostility toward Christopher. But he does not specifically identify which discovery requests were improperly restricted, how any of his requests were relevant to the guardianship issues, or cite any legal authority for his claim that the trial court's decision constituted an abuse of discretion. We, therefore, conclude that Christopher has waived his claims regarding the trial court's discovery rulings.⁹

[26] Waiver notwithstanding, trial courts exercise broad discretion with regard to discovery matters. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp. v. ACS Human Servs., LLC, 999 N.E.2d 880, 885 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). We will, therefore, reverse a trial court's ruling on discovery issues only when the trial court abuses that discretion. Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if it misinterprets the law.” Id.

[27] Indiana Trial Rule 26(C) authorizes a trial court to enter a protective order limiting or precluding discovery upon a showing that the requested discovery is unduly burdensome, overly broad, or not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Here, the trial court issued a protective order providing that Nicole did not have to respond to numerous requests for admission, interrogatories, and requests for production. For example, in his request for admissions, Christopher asked his siblings to admit that they were “upset with the Farm Trust,” and that one of his siblings had told Christopher's children that Christopher was stealing from the farm. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 84. These requests had no direct relation to the issue of who should be appointed as Ralph's guardian.

[28] Similarly, the interrogatories that were the subject of the protective order involved matters that were only tangentially related to the issue of who should act as Ralph's guardian. In these interrogatories, Christopher asked Nicole to provide specific and detailed information about a meeting held in the spring of 2021, at which Christopher's siblings decided to file an attorney disciplinary complaint against Christopher. Christopher also asked Nicole to define what a “narcissist” is, how she became aware of the term, and whether she had ever told anyone that Christopher was a narcissist. Id. at 64-65. Christopher also asked for the name of every person who had visited Ralph since February 2023. These requests have little to do with who should serve as Ralph's guardian and are merely attempts to rehash old family conflict. Indeed, even if all of these matters were true, it would not show that Christopher should have been appointed as Ralph's guardian instead of Nicole.¹⁰ We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion with regard to its discovery rulings.

IV. Appellate Attorney Fees

[29] Lastly, Nicole asks us to award her appellate attorney fees. In Bousum v. Bousum, we explained:

Appellate Rule 66(E) authorizes our court to also award appellate attorney's fees. Our court's discretion to award Rule 66(E) appellate attorney's fees is limited to circumstances where the appeal is permeated with meritlessness, bad faith, frivolity, harassment, vexatiousness, or purpose of delay. [T]he sanction is not imposed to punish mere lack of merit but something more egregious. As such, our court exercises caution in awarding appellate attorney's fees because of the potentially chilling effect the award may have upon the exercise of the right to appeal.

173 N.E.3d 289, 293 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

[30] We have also explained that:

Indiana appellate courts have formally categorized claims for appellate attorney fees into “substantive” and “procedural” bad faith claims. To prevail on a substantive bad faith claim, the party must show that the appellant's contentions and arguments are utterly devoid of all plausibility. Procedural bad faith, on the other hand, occurs when a party flagrantly disregards the form and content requirements of the rules of appellate procedure, omits and misstates relevant facts appearing in the record, and files briefs written in a manner calculated to require the maximum expenditure of time both by the opposing party and the reviewing court. Even if the appellant's conduct falls short of that which is deliberate or by design, procedural bad faith can still be found.

Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 986 (citations and internal quotations omitted).

[31] Here, Nicole claims that Christopher has demonstrated both substantive and procedural bad faith on appeal. As to substantive bad faith, she claims that Christopher's allegations of fraud and embezzlement are utterly devoid of plausibility, especially considering that he is a licensed attorney. As to procedural bad faith, Nicole notes Christopher's failure to develop cogent arguments, his omission of record citations in several sections of his brief, and his personal attacks on Nicole and the trial court.

[32] We acknowledge that Christopher's brief is, at times, unnecessarily personal in tone. Still, the bar for awarding attorney fees under Appellate Rule 66(E) is high, and we apply it with caution given its potential chilling effect on the right to appeal. Christopher's main arguments—that the trial court abused its discretion by appointing Nicole as guardian despite Christopher's claimed status as Ralph's attorney-in-fact, and that the bank records demonstrate Nicole's financial mismanagement—are unpersuasive, but they are not “utterly devoid of all plausibility.” See Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 986. And although Christopher's brief is inadequate in places, we cannot say that he has shown a flagrant disregard for the appellate rules. That is, Christopher's arguments, while ultimately unsuccessful, are not permeated with meritlessness, bad faith, or vexatiousness. Accordingly, we deny Nicole's request for appellate attorney fees.

Conclusion

[33] The issue of Nicole's appointment as Ralph's temporary guardian is moot, and we decline to address it under the exception to the mootness doctrine. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by appointing Nicole as Ralph's permanent guardian and did not abuse its discretion by restricting Christopher's discovery. We also deny Nicole's request for appellate attorney fees. Accordingly, we affirm.

[34] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Following the June 30 hearing, Christopher claims that he was confronted in an aggressive manner by Nicole's husband, Jon Sholly, and Christopher filed a motion to exclude him from the August 12 hearing, which the trial court denied.

2.   We note that the 2014 power of attorney did not name Christopher as Ralph's sole attorney-in-fact. Instead, it named Christopher and his sister Teresa as co-attorneys-in-fact. Teresa declined to serve as Ralph's guardian and instead supported the appointment of her sister, Nicole.

3.   Christopher claims that his lack of contact with his father was not voluntary and that his siblings prevented him from having contact with Ralph. But the trial court was not required to credit Christopher's claims. Even if it did, it is undisputed that Christopher and his siblings have a hostile relationship, and the trial court was well within its discretion to conclude that appointing Christopher as guardian would make matters worse, not better.

4.   Christopher claims that, because the trial court's order is silent as to the power of attorney question, the trial court failed to make the required “good cause” finding under Indiana Code Section 30-5-3-4. Although it would have been preferable for the trial court to explicitly address this issue in its order, the absence of explicit findings does not require reversal where the record itself supports a finding of good cause. We presume trial courts know and follow the applicable law. Hecht v. Hecht, 142 N.E.3d 1022, 1031 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). Here, as noted, there was ample evidence that established good cause to bypass any priority Christopher may have held even if he still held power of attorney.

5.   Christopher contends that Ralph never expressed a desire for Nicole to serve as his guardian, referring to evidence from the prior proceeding where Ralph indicated that he did not want Giles to act as his guardian. Ralph's statements regarding Giles have little, if any, bearing on his attitude toward Nicole. More importantly, Ralph suffers from severe dementia and is incapable of managing his own affairs. The relevant question is not solely Ralph's preference, but rather his best interests.

6.   Christopher argues that Nicole's only qualification for guardianship is that she is “not Christopher Laux.” Appellant's Reply Br. p. 4. We disagree. Nicole's appointment was supported by the unanimous consent of her other siblings, her prior involvement in Ralph's care, her prompt assumption of the temporary guardian's responsibilities, and the trial court's assessment that her appointment would promote both Ralph's best interests and whatever degree of family integrity is possible.

7.   Christopher claims that the trial court ignored the bank records. Again, we disagree. The trial court explicitly granted Christopher's request for an additional ten days to submit the records, acknowledged their submission, and admitted them into evidence. Although the trial court's guardianship order does not mention the bank records, this does not mean that it failed to consider them. Instead, we presume that the trial court considered all relevant evidence when making its decision. Boone Cnty. Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Layton, 664 N.E.2d 735, 741 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).

8.   Citing the federal Department of Justice's elder abuse guidance, Christopher claims that many of the transactions are “red flags” of elder abuse. Although there was an increase in caregiver payments from approximately $1,400 per month in 2022 to approximately $3,800 per month in 2025, this does not necessarily demonstrate fraud or embezzlement. Even if there was evidence that could have supported an inference of wrongdoing, the trial court was not required to draw such an inference.

9.   We reach a similar conclusion with regard to Christopher's claim that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to keep the record open so that Christopher could submit records from Bank of America. Christopher cites no authority to support his one-paragraph argument that the trial court should have kept the record open. But even if we considered this issue on the merits, Christopher would not prevail. Christopher could have sought the Bank of America statements during the pre-trial discovery period. Indeed, Christopher learned of the payments to that card from Ralph's bank statements, which he subpoenaed on July 3, 2025, more than five weeks before the August 12 evidentiary hearing. The trial court had already granted Christopher an additional ten days beyond the hearing to submit the Farmers & Merchants Bank records. Under these circumstances, the trial court was well within its discretion to deny Christopher's request for an additional forty-five days to submit even more evidence.

10.   Christopher claims that the discovery requests covered by the trial court's protective order were relevant because the court ultimately relied on evidence of family conflict to question his fitness as a guardian. He argues that he should have been allowed to develop his own evidence regarding the sources and history of that conflict. We are unpersuaded. First, the trial court's findings regarding the hostile relationship between Christopher and his other siblings were not based solely on the siblings’ accusations against Christopher; they were also based on Christopher's own conduct, which includes an unsuccessful defamation claim against his siblings. Even if Christopher obtained the discovery confirming his siblings’ hostility toward him, this would not have negated the evidence that supported the trial court's decision to appoint Nicole as guardian. Moreover, the protective order only applied to specific requests, leaving Christopher free to pursue discovery on other matters.

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.