IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of R.C. (Minor Child) and L.C. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] L.C., Sr. (“Father”) and K.D. (“Mother”) (collectively, “Parents”) separately appeal the trial court's order terminating their parental rights over their minor child, R.C. (“Child”). We affirm.

Issues

[2] Father raises the following three issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered that the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) was not required to use reasonable efforts to reunite him with Child.

2. Whether certain findings of fact are unsupported by the evidence.

3. Whether the court violated his due process rights when it entered its termination order after he had been ordered to comply with certain requirements in the underlying Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) proceeding.

[3] In addition, Mother raises the following issue:

4. Whether DCS presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that terminating her parental rights was in Child's best interests.

Facts and Procedural History

[4] Mother and Father have one child together, Child, who was born on April 1, 2020. Sometime after Child's birth, Mother and Father dissolved their marriage, and Mother received primary physical custody of Child. On January 24, 2024, Mother dropped Child off at Father's house, and Mother and Father “started arguing[.]” Ex. Vol. 3 at 21. The fight then turned physical, and the police ultimately arrived and arrested Father. The State charged Father with domestic battery.

[5] The same day, DCS received a report that Mother and Father had argued, which argument “led to [Father] slapping the mother and pushing her where she hit her head on a table.” Id. The next day, DCS Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Kelly Storch visited Father's home and spoke with the family. Child told FCM Storch that he “saw his daddy ․ push mommy and she hit her head on the table.” Id. at 22. FCM Storch then visited Father at the jail, and Father admitted to “pushing” Mother. Id.

[6] On February 21, 2024, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child is a CHINS. DCS alleged that Father had been charged with an act of domestic battery against Mother in the presence of Child and that Mother “has a history of using illicit or illegal substances,” which has “interfered with her ability to properly parent” Child. Id. at 18. Child remained in Mother's custody at that time.

[7] On March 18, DCS received a report that Mother had driven her vehicle while intoxicated with Child in the car. DCS removed Child from Mother's care on March 19 and filed for an emergency custody order based on “concerns of drug use by both parents,” “unsafe decisions by [Mother] while under the influence of alcohol,” and a “history of domestic violence[.]” Id. at 40. The court authorized DCS's removal of Child. Mother was charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated. When Child arrived at his relative placement, he had “severely damaged” teeth and “major outbursts at any given time[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 147. A dentist had to surgically remove four teeth and place caps on others.

[8] On April 24, both Father and Mother entered into stipulations agreeing that Child is a CHINS. In particular, Mother agreed that “she has struggled with substance abuse addiction,” that she has a pending charge for operating a vehicle while intoxicated and a prior conviction for possession of marijuana, and that she and Child “would benefit from services provided by DCS[.]” Ex. Vol. 3 at 46. Father agreed that he and Mother have a history of “domestic altercations,” that he had been charged with domestic battery, and that he and Child “would benefit from services provided by DCS[.]” Id. at 48.

[9] Following those admissions, the court adjudicated Child a CHINS on April 26. Thereafter, the court entered its dispositional order and ordered Parents to, among other things, complete a parenting assessment and successfully complete all recommendations; complete a substance abuse assessment and follow all treatments; submit to random drug screens; complete a psychological assessment; and actively participate in domestic violence assessments and programs.

[10] Father completed a substance abuse evaluation, which resulted in recommendations for addiction recovery services and therapy. Father did not attend any of the twelve addiction recovery sessions, and he completed only ten out of twenty-seven individual therapy sessions. In addition, a service was put in place for Father to visit with Child, and Father visited Child twenty-one of the eighty-one possible visits. For the drug screens he submitted to, Father had seventeen negative screens, but he tested positive for methamphetamine on March 12, 2024.

[11] Mother also completed an intake, the result of which was a recommendation for her to attend individual counseling and substance abuse services. Mother attended six out of forty-one counseling sessions and three out of five substance abuse sessions. Mother completed only twenty drug screens, and she tested positive for THC five times, methamphetamine two times, and alcohol ten times. Four of the times Mother tested positive for alcohol were during her visits with Child. Mother was ultimately convicted of operating a vehicle while intoxicated, and she was incarcerated on that conviction from January 2 through March 27, 2025. Prior to her incarceration, she visited Child sixty-seven out of a potential eighty-one visits.

[12] On March 5, DCS filed a petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights over Child and alleged that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or continued placement outside of Parents’ care will not be remedied; that there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of Child; and that Parents failed to substantially comply with a dispositional decree for at least twelve months following Child's removal.

[13] Also on March 5, the court found that both Mother and Father had previously had their parental rights as to other children involuntarily terminated and ordered that DCS was not required to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family. As a result, on August 5, DCS amended its petition to additionally allege that the court had found that “reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification are not required[.]” Mother's App. Vol. 2 at 77. DCS kept the referrals in place until May 19.

[14] The trial court held a fact-finding hearing on DCS's petition. During the hearing, Child's relative placement testified that Child's tantrums “were worse after seeing one or both of the parents,” but that they had stopped “[a]fter visits stopped.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 149. The placement also testified that Child is doing “[e]xcellent” in his services, that he “[v]ery rarely” asks about Parents, and that they plan to adopt him if Parents’ rights are terminated. Id. at 150. In addition, Child's Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) testified that she could not say that a home provided by Parents “would be safe and stable.” Id. at 212. And the CASA testified that Child had responded “beautifully” to living with his relative placement and that it would be “very detrimental” and “definitely not in his best interest” to be removed from that home. Id. at 217.

[15] Following the hearing, the trial court issued its findings of fact and conclusions thereon finding that Parents had failed to comply with the dispositional order by not fully participating in services. The court then concluded that it had entered a finding that reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification are not required; that the termination of Parents’ parental rights is in Child's best interests; that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child, that being adoption; and that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside of Parents’ home will not be remedied. Accordingly, the court terminated Parents’ rights over Child. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[16] Parents challenge the trial court's termination of their parental rights over Child. We begin our review of this issue by acknowledging that “[t]he traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Bailey v. Tippecanoe Cnty. Div. of Fam. & Child. (In re M.B.), 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Schultz v. Porter Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re K.S.), 750 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where a child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one's own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.

[17] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Peterson v. Marion Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re D.D.), 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court's judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Judy S. v. Noble Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re L.S.), 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.

Issue One: No Reasonable Efforts

[18] Father first contends that the CHINS court erred when it found that DCS was not required to use reasonable efforts to reunite him with Child. Indiana Code Section 31-34-21-5.6(b)(4) provides that “[r]easonable efforts to reunify a child with the child's parent ․ are not required” if the “parental rights of a parent with respect to a biological or adoptive sibling of the child have been involuntarily terminated by a court[.]”

[19] In 2008, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father's rights as to two prior children, and the court scheduled a hearing on the petition. Father “did not attend” that hearing, and the court “defau[l]ted” him. Ex. Vol. 3 at 144-45 (emphasis removed). The court then found that there is a reasonable probability that the reasons for the children's removal or placement outside the home would not be remedied, that there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the children's well-being, and that termination of Father's parental rights was in the children's best interests. Accordingly, the court terminated Father's rights as to those children.

[20] On appeal, Father argues that the court erred when it entered its order regarding reasonable efforts because there is no evidence that his rights to his prior children were involuntarily terminated. Rather, he maintains that the evidence shows that he “voluntarily relinquished his parental rights” to his prior children. Father's Br. at 12. In particular, he maintains that, because he did not appear at the hearing on DCS's petition, the proceedings were not “contested” and, as such, the termination of his rights as to his prior children was “voluntary on his part.” Id. at 12, 14. We cannot agree.

[21] In order to voluntarily consent to the termination of parental rights, a parent must give their consent either in open court or in writing before a person authorized by law to take acknowledgements. Ind. Code § 31-35-1-6(a). In addition, a parent must receive nine advisements, including that the consent is permanent and that all rights, powers, privileges, and duties are permanently terminated. I.C. § 31-35-1-12. There is no indication anywhere in the record, nor does Father argue on appeal, that he gave his consent to terminate his rights voluntarily or that he received the necessary advisements. Rather, the record demonstrates that Father simply failed to appear for a hearing.

[22] Contrary to Father's arguments, his failure to appear at the hearing and failure to challenge the default judgment do not equate to a voluntary relinquishment of his rights as to his prior children. The court involuntarily terminated the rights after DCS filed a petition. Because the court involuntarily terminated Father's rights, the CHINS court did not err when it entered its order finding that no reasonable efforts to reunify the family were necessary.

Issue Two: Findings of Fact

[23] Father next contends that the court erred when it terminated his parental rights because several of the court's findings are not supported by the evidence. Here, in terminating Father's parental rights, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon. When a trial court's judgment contains special findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208. On appeal, Father specifically challenges portions of findings number 14 and 15. We address each argument in turn.

Finding 14

[24] Father first challenges finding 14, in which the court found:

Father failed to comply, or has failed to provide evidence of compliance, with the Dispositional Order issued to him, including those to:

a. Complete a parenting assessment and successfully complete all recommendations.

b. Complete a psychological evaluation.

c. Complete a substance abuse assessment and follow all treatment recommendations.

d. Participate in individual therapy; and

e. Submit to random drug screens.

Mother's App. Vol. 2 at 95. On appeal, Father specifically challenges subparts a, d, and e of that finding.

[25] As to subpart a, Father contends that he “completed the assessment” on September 17, 2024. Father's Br. at 15. However, as DCS notes, that assessment “was a substance abuse assessment and not a parenting assessment.” Appellee's Br. at 26. Indeed, the assessment summary indicates that it was for an “Addiction Services” program. Ex. Vol. 3 at 129. And Jessica Priestley, an employee at Bowen Health, testified that the assessment was Father's “substance abuse evaluation.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 48. Father has not directed us to anything in the record to show that he completed the parenting assessment. Father has not demonstrated that that finding is clearly erroneous.

[26] Regarding subpart d, Father maintains that he “participated in some individual counseling[.]” Father's Br. at 15. But the evidence shows that Father participated in only ten of the possible twenty-seven individual therapy sessions. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 50. Given that Father participated in less than half of the therapy sessions, the court's finding that he failed to comply with individual therapy is not clearly erroneous.

[27] Finally, as to subpart e, Father argues that he “believed he had done all [of] his random drug screens” and that he was not aware “of any ‘call in’ requirements for drug screening.” Father's Br. at 16. However, the only evidence to support Father's argument was his own testimony, which the court was not required to accept as true. See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004). Further, the dispositional order clearly provides that Father was required to “[s]ubmit to random drug screens.” Ex. Vol. 3 at 55. This portion of finding 14 is not clearly erroneous.

Finding 15

[28] Father next challenges the court's finding number 15, which provides:

Prior to the No Reasonable Efforts finding, Father has not participated in any services, except for visitation and random drug screens. At the Permanency Hearing on February 26, 2025:

a. Father had not attended any individual therapy sessions out of potential 44 sessions.

b. Father had not attended any of his substance abuse therapy out of a possible 44 sessions.

c. Father had not completed his Psychological Evaluation.

d. Father had only complied with and provided 17 random drug screens, despite being requested for significantly more screens. More specifically, testing positive on one (1) screen for Methamphetamine and the proceeding [sic] 15 screens were negative for all substances.

e. Father did not complete his parenting assessment.

f. Father only visit[ed] with [Child] 21 times out of a potential 81 visits.

g. Father's visits have always been supervised out of the home.

Mother's App. Vol. 2 at 95. On this finding, Father challenges subparts c, d, e, f, and g.

[29] As to subpart c, Father argues that he “schedule[d] ‘appointments’ ” at Bowen Center but that they were cancelled. Father's Br. at 16. And he argues that he was “undergoing ‘anger management’ therapy[.]” Id. However, again, Father seems to rely on the assessment that he completed to support this argument. But that was a substance abuse assessment, not a psychological assessment. Further, there is no indication that anger management therapy has any relation to a psychological assessment. We cannot say that the court's finding is clearly erroneous.

[30] Regarding the court's finding in subpart d that Father missed drug tests, Father again argues that he was unaware of the requirement to call in. But, as outlined above, the only evidence to support Father's argument was his own testimony, which the court was not required to believe. As to subpart e, the court's finding that Father did not complete a parenting assessment, Father again relies only on a substance abuse evaluation, which is not a parenting assessment. Those findings are not clearly erroneous.

[31] While Father purports to challenge the court's finding in subpart f that he missed visits with Child, he does not actually dispute that finding. See Father's Br. at 17. And that finding is clearly supported by Priestley's testimony that Father attended twenty-four of one hundred and sixteen possible visits. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 51. Rather, he simply argues that the visits he had with Child were not “inappropriate” and did not go “badly[.]” Father's Br. at 17. We acknowledge that there was no evidence that the visits went poorly. But that does not change the fact that Father attended only a small portion of the possible visits with Child. And we acknowledge that scheduling visitation while working can be challenging. But that does not excuse Father from his failure to see Child. The finding is not clearly erroneous.

[32] Father also purports to challenge the court's finding that visits were supervised and outside of his home. Again, Father does not dispute that the evidence supports that finding. Rather, he argues that the finding does not support termination because the “location of visits was always under the control of DCS.” Father's Br. at 18. But Father does not make any attempt to explain why his visits should have progressed to unsupervised visits or visits in his home when he attended only a fraction of the visits with Child. That finding is supported by the evidence, and it supports the court's termination of Father's rights.

[33] The trial court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous.

Issue Three: Dispositional Order

[34] Father finally contends that the court violated his due process rights when it terminated the parent-child relationship after the CHINS court ordered him to comply with conditions that were not applicable to him. In particular, Father asserts that it was error for the CHINS court to order him to assist in the formulation and implementation of a protection plan, to complete a parenting assessment, and to meet all personal medical and mental health needs. Father asserts that he “was not the custodial parent,” so those requirements “did not apply to him.” Father's Br. at 19.

[35] However, this Court has held that a party can waive a claim related to a CHINS proceeding by failing to “object to any of the alleged deficiencies in the CHINS process during the CHINS proceeding” or arguing “during the termination proceedings that those alleged deficiencies constituted” a violation. See McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Here, Father has not provided us with a copy of the dispositional hearing to show that he objected during the CHINS proceedings. And the record he provided demonstrates that he did not argue about any of the alleged errors in the dispositional order during the termination proceedings. Rather, he raises this claim for the first time on appeal. As such, he has waived his challenge to the dispositional order. See id. at 195.¹

Issue Four: Best Interests

[36] In her appeal, Mother contends that the court clearly erred when it terminated her parental rights as to Child. Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS must file a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. As the Indiana General Assembly has provided:

(c) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

(d) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:

* * *

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child․

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 (2024). If the court finds that the allegations in the petition are true, “the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a). DCS's “burden of proof in termination of parental rights cases is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’ ” R.Y. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re G.Y.), 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting I.C. § 31-37-14-2).

[37] On appeal, Mother challenges only the court's conclusion that the termination of her parental rights is in Child's best interests. In determining what is in a child's best interests, a court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the evidence. A.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re A.K.), 924 N.E.2d 212, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). A parent's historical inability to provide “adequate housing, stability, and supervision,” in addition to the parent's current inability to do so, supports finding termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. Id. at 222.

[38] When making its decision, the court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child. See Stewart v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re J.S.), 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “The court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship.” Id.

[39] Mother contends that the court erred when it determined that the termination of her rights was in Child's best interests because she had made a “substantial transformation since her release from incarceration” by completing a substance abuse treatment program, maintaining full-time employment, and “stay[ing] sober.” Mother's Br. at 10. And she maintains that, despite a lack of contact with Child, she has a “strong bond” with him. Id. at 11.

[40] But Mother does not challenge the court's findings related to her, and we accept those unchallenged findings as true. L.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re S.S.), 120 N.E.3d 605, 608 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). And as those unchallenged findings demonstrate, Mother did not significantly participate in any service. Indeed, the only program Mother completed was the Matrix program, and she completed that less than one month prior to the final date of the fact-finding hearing on DCS's petition to terminate her rights. In addition, because of Mother's criminal actions of driving while intoxicated with Child in the car, Mother was unable to visit with Child for almost three months.

[41] Further, when Child first went to his relative placement, he was prone to “major” outbursts and tantrums “at any given time [of] day.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 147. Those tantrums were “worse after seeing one or both” Parents, but they stopped “[a]fter visits [with Parents] stopped.” Id. at 149. Child is doing “[e]xcellent” in his placement, and his placement plans to adopt him. Id. at 151. Child's CASA testified that Child has “responded beautifully” to his placement, that he “has made significant progress,” and that “it would be very detrimental” to Child and “definitely not in his best interest” to be removed from his placement. Id. at 217. The unchallenged findings support the court's conclusion that the termination of Mother's parental rights is in Child's best interests.

Conclusion

[42] The trial court did not err when it ordered that DCS did not need to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family. In addition, the trial court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous. And Father has waived any claim regarding error related to the dispositional order. Finally, the court did not err when it concluded that the termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. We therefore affirm the court's order terminating Parents’ parental rights over Child.

[43] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   To the extent that Father argues within this issue that the court erred when it found that there is a reasonable probability that the reasons for Child's removal will not be remedied, we note that, because Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(c) is written in the disjunctive, DCS needs to prove either that a finding had been made under Indiana Code Section 31-34-21-5.6 that reasonable efforts for reunification were not required or that there was not a reasonable probability that Father would remedy the reasons for removal. Because the court properly found that a finding was made under Indiana Code Section 31-34-21-5.6, we need not address his argument regarding the reasons for Child's removal.

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Scheele, J., concur.