Eleanor Marika Easton, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Eleanor Marika Easton (“Easton”) appeals her conviction of Level 6 felony possession of cocaine,¹ challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 22, 2024, Officer Nathan Stoll (“Officer Stoll”) of the South Bend Police Department (“SBPD”) conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle driven by Easton, who was the sole occupant of the vehicle. Law enforcement detained Easton and proceeded to conduct a search of the vehicle. The search disclosed a burnt pipe on the driver-side floorboard and a purse on the passenger side of the vehicle. Easton admitted that the purse belonged to her. A small metal tin was found in the purse that contained a glass pipe and a plastic baggie with a white, powdery substance inside, that was also described as “residue.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 38. Subsequent laboratory testing revealed that the substance contained cocaine.

[3] On May 22, 2024, Easton was charged with Count I: Level 6 felony possession of cocaine; Count II: Class A misdemeanor conversion; Count III: Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia; and Count IV: Class A misdemeanor operating a motor vehicle without ever receiving a license.²

[4] A jury trial was held on May 1, 2025. At trial, the laboratory analyst who tested the substance described the testing process, which involved “scrap[ing] out enough material to do the testing[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 55. The analyst noted that only “a few grains of material” were needed for testing. Id. The analyst explained that the “results [from testing] indicated that cocaine was present in the sample.” Id. at 58; State's Ex. Vol. 3A pp. 18–19. The analyst also noted that due to the fact that the baggie contained a residual amount of cocaine, a weight was not taken. The analyst opined that, based upon the amount of material inside the baggie, a person could “[p]ossibly” ingest the amount of cocaine left in the baggie through the nose. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 60.

[5] The jury found Easton guilty of all counts. On September 2, 2025, Easton was sentenced to thirty months suspended to probation for Count I with a concurrent term of sixty days suspended to probation for Count III. Easton now appeals.

Discussion and Decisions

[6] Easton challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction for Level 6 felony possession of cocaine. “Sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims trigger a deferential standard of review in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018)). “A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090 (Ind. 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review “only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is shown that ‘no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Id. at 1090–91 (quoting Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024)).

[7] Here, Easton was convicted of possession of cocaine as a Level 6 felony. Indiana Code section 35-48-4-6(a) provides that: “A person who, ․ knowingly or intentionally possesses cocaine (pure or adulterated) or a narcotic drug (pure or adulterated) classified in schedule I or II, commits possession of cocaine or a narcotic drug, a Level 6 felony[.]” Easton confines her argument to whether the “residue in the baggie” was sufficient to support a conviction for possession of cocaine. Appellant's Br. p. 11. She argues that, for there to be sufficient evidence under the statute, there must be a measurable or measured amount of cocaine.

[8] First, Easton's position is inconsistent with the plain language of Indiana Code section 35-48-4-6(a). Nowhere in Indiana Code section 35-48-4-6(a) does the statute prescribe a specified measurable amount, or weight, of cocaine an individual must possess to be convicted of Level 6 felony possession of cocaine.

[9] Next, Easton's position is unsupported by caselaw, which requires the State to prove that Easton possessed an “identifiable amount” of the illicit substance. Appellant's Br. p. 12. In Cooper v. State, the State's lab technician positively identified the “residue” found in a bottle cap as heroin but did not provide any testimony as to the amount of the substance. 357 N.E.2d 260, 266 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976). In holding that the evidence was sufficient to prove possession of heroin, our court concluded that the “statute under which [the defendant] was convicted makes no mention of an amount of drug necessary to sustain a conviction” and that “[i]t is reasonable to conclude ․ the legislature intended that any identifiable amount be sufficient.” Id. at 267 (emphasis added); See also Brown v. State, 380 N.E.2d 609, 610 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978).

[10] Easton argues that if “there was no weight that could be determined” it is “impossible” to have an identifiable amount of the substance. Appellant's Br. p. 12. Easton distinguishes her case from Beeler v. State, 807 N.E.2d 789, 790 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), where we upheld a possession conviction based upon an unmeasured, trace amount of cocaine found on a scale, but where the defendant only challenged the mens rea element of the possession statute. Easton argues that case should not be relied upon to support the conviction in this matter because the court did not consider whether the unmeasured trace amount of cocaine constituted an “identifiable amount” of the substance. Appellant's Br. p. 12.

[11] Easton also distinguishes the present matter from Brown, where the laboratory testing revealed that the substance that tested positive for an illicit substance weighed .009 grams. 380 N.E.2d at 610. Whereas in this matter, the laboratory analyst did not provide a measurable weight of substance tested. Ultimately, Easton invites this court to adopt a rule that a “usable-amount” of the illicit substance is necessary to support a possession conviction. See, e.g., Appellant's Br. p. 12 (citing Costes v. State, 287 S.W.3d 639, 642 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008)). However, the adoption of a usable-amount criteria was specifically rejected by Cooper and Brown, and we likewise decline to do so.³

[12] Here, the evidence favorable to the verdict reflects that the laboratory analyst was able to scrape “enough material to do the testing[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 55. As a result of testing, the analyst determined that the substance was in fact cocaine. Furthermore, the officers conducting the search testified that the color and consistency of the substance was consistent with cocaine, and it was found inside a plastic baggie associated with illegal drug use. This was evidence that Easton possessed an identifiable amount of cocaine. We therefore find that there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Easton possessed cocaine.

[13] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6(a).

2.   Counts II and IV were later dismissed. See Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 73–74.

3.   To the extent Appellant cites Katner v. State, 655 N.E.2d 345, 347 (Ind. 1995), we note that Katner is not applicable under the circumstances as it was a civil forfeiture case, not a criminal case considering whether there was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's conviction for possession of an illicit substance.

Foley, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.