Robert Mills Jr., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Robert Mills Jr. appeals following his convictions of Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass ¹ and Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct.² The parties present three issues:

1. Whether Mills submitted an adequate record on appeal for us to decide his challenge to the validity of his jury trial waiver;

2. Whether the trial court erred when it determined Mills validly waived his right to counsel; and

3. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain his convictions.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On March 27, 2023, Mills walked into the Indiana House of Representatives’ office on the third floor of the Statehouse in Indianapolis. Shortly thereafter, Lieutenant Scott Beamon (“Lt. Beamon”) of the Indiana State Police received a text message alert that the employees in the office needed assistance. Lt. Beamon responded and encountered Mills and two employees. The employees looked “quite upset, flustered[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 92.) They told Lt. Beamon that Mills had disregarded their instructions to not enter the private office area located beyond the office's lobby. Mills then “came at” Lt. Beamon “with ungodly profanity[.]” (Id. at 93.) Mills “was very loud” and asserted “he has a constitutional right to do what he wants to do.” (Id.) When Lt. Beamon attempted to explain to Mills that he could not go back into the private office area and that he needed to leave the office, Mills became “more argumentative” and used “more profanity.” (Id. at 95.) He called Lt. Beamon a “clown” and asserted Lt. Beamon did not understand Mills's constitutional rights. (Id.) Lt. Beamon called Trooper Stephen Hankins (“Trooper Hankins”) to assist him.

[3] After speaking with both Lt. Beamon and Trooper Hankins, Mills left the Indiana House of Representatives’ office and went up the stairs to the fourth floor of the Statehouse where he entered the House Ways and Means Committee office. Kaylee Koehlinger, a legislative assistant, was working at her desk near the office's entrance. She asked Mills if he needed anything, and Mills responded that he was “[j]ust looking[.]” (Id. at 25.) Mills had a GoPro camera and was using his phone camera to record inside the office, which made Koehlinger “uncomfortable” because of the potential disclosure of sensitive constituent information kept in the office. (Id.) When Mills inquired about obtaining public records, Koehlinger attempted to explain the process to him, but Mills “did not want to follow that process[.]” (Id. at 50.)

[4] Ben Tooley, the director of fiscal policy for the Indiana House Republican Caucus, heard Mills talking with Koehlinger, could tell “it wasn't a normal interaction[,]” and came out of his office to “investigate what was going on.” (Id. at 47.) Mills's behavior “escalated through the course of the conversation” to “a level of being belligerent.” (Id. at 50.) Tooley asked Mills to leave, but he refused. Lt. Beamon and Trooper Hankins heard the commotion in the House Ways and Means Committee office and entered the office. Mills insulted Lt. Beamon “and cussed non-stop.” (Id. at 99.) Lt. Beamon and Trooper Hankins asked Mills to leave, but Mills said, “he wasn't going to do that” and that “he has a right to be there.” (Id.) Mills was “very agitated” and refused to leave. (Id.) At some point, Mills agreed to walk out of the office with Trooper Hankins. After speaking with Trooper Hankins for about twenty minutes, Mills said that his parking meter was about to expire, and he left the Statehouse.

[5] The State charged Mills with Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass and Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. On July 25, 2023, Mills filed a jury trial demand, and the trial court scheduled a jury trial for September 21, 2023. Mills's trial was continued multiple times. On January 8, 2025, Mills was personally present and represented by counsel at a pretrial conference during which the trial court rescheduled Mills's trial as a bench trial. Mills's attorney withdrew on April 2, 2025.

[6] On June 3, 2025, Mills appeared for his bench trial without counsel. Prior to the start of Mills's bench trial, the trial court asked Mills: “Are you intending to represent yourself for the trial or do you want the assistance of a lawyer?” (Id. at 11.) Mills did not answer the trial court's question. Instead, he asserted the trial court lacked jurisdiction over him. The trial court then asked Mills again whether he intended to represent himself. The trial court advised Mills: “Now, I get to tell you under Indiana law that to represent yourself is a really bad idea but you get the actual constitutional right to do so. So I need you to answer that[.]” (Id.) Mills interrupted the trial court and asserted the trial court lacked jurisdiction over him. He proclaimed: “I don't consent. I don't contract. I don't do anything with the government. I don't receive privileges.” (Id. at 12.) The trial court responded: “Mr. Mills, first – so I'm going to take the non-answer as an intention that you will continue to represent yourself ․ although I would suggest against it and I do know that there are counsel who are more than capable to assist you in that.” (Id.) The trial court recessed Mills's case to address other matters before the court, and when the court reconvened, the trial court explained:

Again, I think it's important I say every time, you have ․ the right to counsel to be appointed by ․ the community or you can represent yourself for purposes of going forward in this trial. Is it your intention to represent yourself, which I'm allowed to tell you is a bad idea because all the lawyers went to school for three years to be able to do this and some of them have been doing it for a long time, or would you like the assistance of counsel?

(Id. at 15.) Mills refused to directly answer the trial court's question. The trial court appointed standby counsel and allowed Mills to proceed pro se.

[7] During trial, Mills cross-examined witnesses, made objections, and advanced legal arguments. The trial court found Mills guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Mills to a term of 365 days for his Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass conviction and 180 days for his Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct conviction. The trial court ordered Mills to serve the two sentences consecutively for an aggregate term of one-and-a-half years. The trial court ordered Mills to serve sixty days of his sentence in the Marion County Jail and suspended the remainder of his sentence to probation.

Discussion and Decision

1. Jury Trial Waiver

[8] Mills argues the trial court violated his right to due process because it failed to ensure that his decision to waive his right to a jury trial was made knowingly and voluntarily. He asserts “there is no record of a waiver” and asks us to reverse his convictions. (Appellant's Br. at 17.) “The jury trial right is a bedrock of our criminal justice system, guaranteed by both Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution[³ ] and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.[⁴ ]” Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1158 (Ind. 2016) (footnotes added). “Waiver of the Sixth Amendment jury trial right must be ‘express and intelligent,’ and waiver of the Indiana constitutional jury trial right must be ‘knowing, voluntary[,] and intelligent[.]’ ” Id. (quoting Patton v. United States, 50 S. Ct. 253, 263 (1930), & Perkins v. State, 514 N.E.2d 927, 928 (Ind. 1989)) (first set of brackets in Perkins). “Whether a jury trial waiver was constitutional is a question of law we review de novo.” McQuinn v. State, 197 N.E.3d 348, 354 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). However, “ ‘[t]he party who alleges error has the duty to provide a proper record on appeal so that an intelligent review of the issues may be made,’ and where no evidence is in the record, ‘appellate review is foreclosed.’ ” Myers v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1069, 1080 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Fleenor v. State, 514 N.E.2d 80, 87 (Ind. 1987)).

[9] Mills filed a jury trial demand on July 25, 2023, and the trial court scheduled a jury trial for September 21, 2023. That trial date was continued many times. A minute entry entered following an attorney conference on February 28, 2024, indicates the defense made a motion to vacate Mills's jury trial, but other than the minute entry, Mills did not submit any other record reflecting what occurred during that conference. The chronological case summary notes that Mills was personally present at a pretrial conference on January 8, 2025, and during that pretrial conference, the trial court set Mills's case for a bench trial to occur on March 18, 2025. The March 18, 2025, trial date was also continued, and Mills was not brought to trial until June 3, 2025. Mills did not produce a transcript of the attorney conference on February 28, 2024, the pretrial conference on January 8, 2025, or any other pretrial conference, nor did he submit any verified statement of evidence pursuant to Appellate Rule 31.⁵ Because Mills failed to provide an adequate record to demonstrate the trial court failed to make an adequate inquiry of Mills regarding his waiver of his right to a jury trial, he has waived any such argument for appellate review. See, e.g., Martinez v. State, 82 N.E.3d 261, 263-64 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (holding defendant waived his claim on appeal that he did not validly waive his right to a jury trial because he failed to present an adequate record), trans. denied.

2. Right to Counsel Waiver

[10] Mills also contends that his right to due process was violated because the trial court did not adequately advise him before allowing him to represent himself at trial. “We review de novo a trial court's finding that a defendant waived his right to counsel.” Butler v. State, 951 N.E.2d 255, 260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Like the right to a jury trial, the federal and Indiana constitutions grant the accused in a criminal prosecution the right to the assistance of counsel. See U.S. Const. Amend. VI (“the accused shall enjoy the right ․ to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence”) & Ind. Const. Art. 1, § 13 (“the accused shall have the right to ․ counsel”). If the accused chooses to waive his right to counsel, “the waiver of counsel must be: (1) knowing; (2) intelligent; (3) unequivocal; and (4) voluntary.” McGraw v. State, 241 N.E.3d 1175, 1181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. “Waiver of assistance of counsel may be established based upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Jones v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1132, 1138 (Ind. 2003). Before allowing a defendant to proceed without counsel, “the court should tell the defendant of the ‘dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.’ ” Poynter v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1122, 1126 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Faretta v. California, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2541 (1975)). However, “[t]here are no prescribed ‘talking points’ the court is required to include in its advisement to the defendant; it need only come to a considered determination that the defendant is making a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver.” Id.

[11] Prior to determining that a defendant's waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent, the trial court should consider:

“(1) the extent of the court's inquiry into the defendant's decision, (2) other evidence in the record that establishes whether the defendant understood the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, (3) the background and experience of the defendant, and (4) the context of the defendant's decision to proceed pro se.”

Id. at 1127-28 (quoting United States v. Hoskins, 243 F.3d 407, 411 (7th Cir. 2001)).

The trial court is uniquely situated to assess whether a defendant has waived the right to counsel. And when that court has made the proper inquiries and conveyed the proper information and then reaches a reasoned conclusion about the defendant's understanding of his rights and voluntariness, an appellate court, after a careful review of the record, will most likely uphold the trial court's decision to honor or deny the defendant's request to represent himself.

McGraw, 241 N.E.3d at 1181 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

[12] Mills was generally noncooperative during the colloquy regarding his decision to proceed pro se. Nonetheless, during that exchange, the trial court repeatedly cautioned Mills against self-representation. The trial court also pointed out that all attorneys receive legal training and many are experienced in conducting criminal trials. While the trial court did not ask Mills about his background and experience, Mills asserted that “for the last two years, I've done nothing, absolutely nothing except study the government ․ [s]tudy the courts.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 10.) Mills also advanced legal argument related to an alleged lack of jurisdiction during the colloquy. Regarding the history of the case and the context of Mills's decision to proceed pro se, Mills had been previously represented in the case by a public defender and by private counsel. Following the withdrawal of his private counsel, he chose not to hire an additional attorney or request a public defender even though his private counsel withdrew two months prior to the start of Mills's trial. Given all these facts, we cannot say the trial court erred in determining Mills validly waived his right to counsel. See, e.g., Hopper v. State, 957 N.E.2d 613, 621 (Ind. 2011) (holding the totality of the circumstances supported finding that defendant voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to counsel).

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[13] Finally, Mills asserts the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions. Our standard of review regarding sufficiency of the evidence claims is well-settled:

Sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims ․ warrant a deferential standard, in which we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Rather, we consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. We will affirm a conviction if there is substantial evidence of probative value that would lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 262-63 (Ind. 2020).

[14] A person who does not have a contractual interest in a property and knowingly or intentionally refuses to leave the property after being told to do so by the owner of the property or the owner's agent commits Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass. Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(b)(2). Likewise, an individual who knowingly, recklessly, or intentionally “makes unreasonable noise and continues to do so after being asked to stop” commits Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3(a)(2).

[15] Mills contends the State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain his criminal trespass conviction because “he did, in fact, eventually leave the premises.” (Appellant's Br. at 13.) The crime of trespass requires that the person being asked to leave be given “a reasonable period of time ․ to leave of her/his own volition.” Lemon v. State, 868 N.E.2d 1190, 1196 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). However, while Mills eventually left the Indiana House of Representatives’ office and the House Ways and Means Committee office, he did so only after ignoring several requests to leave and engaging in extensive arguments. Lt. Beamon explained that in his thirty-seven-year career, he had “never seen an individual so disrespectful” as Mills. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 93.) Mills left only after Lt. Beamon had asked him to leave “numerous times” and had spent “over an hour” interacting with him. (Id. at 100.) Mills did not leave the premises within a reasonable time of being asked to do so, and therefore, we hold the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain his criminal trespass conviction. See, e.g., Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind. 2012) (holding the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain bank patron's criminal trespass conviction when the patron refused to leave a bank branch after being asked to leave by the manager and a police officer).

[16] Mills also asserts the State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain his disorderly conduct conviction because while Lt. Beamon described him as “loud,” “[t]here was no expansive explanation of what is meant by the word ‘loud.’ ” (Appellant's Br. at 15.) The disorderly conduct statute requires the State to prove the “defendant produced decibels of sound that were too loud for the circumstances.” Whittington v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1363, 1367 (Ind. 1996) (emphasis in original). The content of the message does not matter, the statute “prohibits context-inappropriate volume.” Id. (emphasis in original). Lt. Beamon testified that while Mills was in the Indiana House of Representatives’ office, he was “very loud” and “verbally confrontational[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 93.) Lt. Beamon explained Mills used “ungodly profanity” and “was intimidating, especially to civilians who generally don't run across it.” (Id.) Tooley described Mills as acting “belligerent” while in the House Ways and Means Committee office. (Id. at 50.) Through this testimony, the State presented sufficient evidence that Mills's level of noise was at an unreasonable volume given the context of being in an office environment.

[17] Mills further contends that “[e]ven if [he] was making unreasonable noise, he was not asked to stop.” (Appellant's Br. at 16.) However, as the State notes, “[t]he directives to leave included an inherent request ‘to stop’ the disruptive noise[.]” (Appellee's Br. at 17.) Mills's belligerence disrupted the operations of the offices he entered and one way of getting Mills to stop disrupting those operations was asking him to leave. Nonetheless, Mills continued acting loudly and aggressively. Consequently, the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Mills's disorderly conduct conviction. See, e.g., Blackman v. State, 868 N.E.2d 579, (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding sufficient evidence supported defendant's disorderly conduct conviction when she refused to quiet her voice after being asked to leave and “the sheer volume of Blackman's outbursts” disrupted a police investigation and drew unwanted attention), trans. denied.

Conclusion

[18] While Mills challenges the validity of his jury trial waiver, he failed to present an adequate record for us to meaningfully review that issue. The trial court did not err in finding Mills validly waived his right to counsel, and the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain his convictions. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(b)(2) (2021).

2.   Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3(a)(2) (2014).

3.   Article 1, section 13 provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a public trial, by an impartial jury ․”

4.   The Sixth Amendment states: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed ․”

5.   Indiana Appellate Rule 31(A) provides: “If no Transcript of all or part of the evidence is available, a party or the party's attorney may prepare a verified statement of the evidence from the best available sources, which may include the party's or the attorney's recollection.”

May, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Felix, J., concur.