Lonnie D. Strong, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Lonnie D. Strong pled guilty to Level 6 felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated and was sentenced to 540 days, with thirty days executed in the Marshall County Jail and 510 days suspended to probation. After Strong violated his probation, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered him to serve 365 days of his suspended sentence in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC). He now appeals, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the sanction. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On November 22, 2024, Strong pled guilty to Level 6 felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Strong to 540 days, with thirty days executed in the county jail and 510 days suspended to probation. Strong was ordered to complete a substance abuse treatment program and to comply with all terms of probation, including submitting to random drug and alcohol screens, not consuming alcohol, and not committing any new offenses.

[3] In May 2025, Strong tested positive for ethyl glucuronide, an alcohol metabolite. On June 12, the State charged Strong with Level 6 felony operating a vehicle as a habitual traffic violator. See Cause No. 02C01-2506-F6-000879 (Cause No. 879). On June 23, the State filed a motion to revoke due to Strong's positive alcohol test and new criminal charge. The State amended its motion in July, alleging Strong failed to complete a substance abuse treatment program. On July 12, Strong pled guilty in Cause No. 879 and was sentenced to one year executed in the DOC. Strong admitted to all three violations on October 29.

[4] The trial court held a dispositional hearing on November 17. Strong asked the trial court to impose no sanction and instead allow him to return to probation upon his release in Cause No. 879. The trial court found the following aggravating factors: (1) Strong's prior criminal history, consisting of seven felony convictions and seven misdemeanor convictions; (2) the nature of Strong's probation violations; and (3) Strong's history of failing community supervision, including five probation revocations in other matters. The court identified his acceptance of responsibility and the impact lengthy incarceration would have on his family as mitigating factors. Finding the aggravators outweighed the mitigators, the court ordered Strong to serve 365 days of his 510-day suspended sentence executed in the DOC. Strong now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Strong challenges the trial court's decision to impose 365 days executed in the DOC as a sanction for violating the terms of his probation. Probation is a matter of grace and a conditional liberty that is a favor, not a right. Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999), reh'g denied. Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(h) (2015) offers the trial court the following options when it finds a defendant has violated the terms of his probation: (1) “[c]ontinue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions[,]” (2) “[e]xtend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period[,]” or (3) “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” We review a trial court's selection of a sanction for an abuse of discretion. Overstreet v. State, 136 N.E.3d 260, 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.

[6] Strong does not dispute that he violated the terms of his probation. Instead, he argues the trial court's sanction of 365 days executed in the DOC “was not proportional to the violations that [he] admitted to.”¹ Appellant's Br. p. 7. The selection of an appropriate sanction depends on the severity of the defendant's probation violation. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 618 (Ind. 2013).

[7] Here, Strong was convicted of Level 6 felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated. As a result, he was ordered to, among other things, not consume alcohol, complete a substance abuse treatment program, and not commit any new offenses. Strong disregarded the court's order and tested positive for alcohol, failed to complete a substance abuse treatment program, and committed Level 6 felony operating a vehicle as a habitual traffic violator. These violations go to the heart of Strong's underlying case and his substance abuse. Strong's violations, along with the fact that Strong's probation was revoked in five other matters, demonstrated he was not a suitable candidate for returning to probation. We further note the trial court could have imposed Strong's entire 510-day suspended sentence, yet only ordered he serve 365. Strong has not persuaded us that the court abused its discretion in imposing this sanction. We affirm.

[8] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Strong claims this sanction violates Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution which guarantees that “[a]ll penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense.” However, he cites no authority, and we are unaware of any, applying Article 1, Section 16 to probation revocations. Article 1, Section 16’s protections are “narrow” and “[i]t is violated only when the criminal penalty is not graduated and proportioned to the nature of the offense[.]” Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1289-90 (Ind. 2014) (quotation omitted), cert. denied. Strong's initial sentence is a criminal penalty whereas the revocation of his probation occurred in the nature of a civil proceeding. See Mateyko v. State, 901 N.E.2d 554, 558 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. Without any authority to support his argument, we decline Strong's invitation to conduct a proportionality evaluation under Article 1, Section 16.

Scheele, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.